

New Philosophies in Policing¹

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I. The Function and the Role of the Police

A. The Everyday Business

The function of police officers has become more complex and expansive in course of time. Policing is a highly professional and difficult business (Home Office 1988). This is recognized by practitioners, scholars, and the general public. Equally, it is obvious that police has more tasks than crime fighting. Functions like peacekeeping, order maintenance, or service provision represent a large part of the police work (Flanagan 1985).

The Police is - and this is true for all countries - an unspecified agency, used by citizens for various purposes which exceed by far the very specified duties named e.g. in the given Laws. Some Police Forces like the German Police formally do not have any discretionary power in criminal cases. Every offense noticed by or brought to the notice of a police officer must be registered and prosecuted. The state attorney or the judge only may dismiss cases and use discretionary power. Nevertheless, reality is different. One result of our evaluation of patrol police diaries was, that the German police officers make use of some kind of "informal discretionary power". In neighborhood disputes, family conflicts and minor offenses (for example damage of property), police officers on shift use their possibilities of discretionary decisions in everyday conflicts. They use techniques like immediate conflict solution, and take immediate actions to help people in everyday conflicts.

In many cases the police has to function as a coordinator for the administration of damages, usually required by the insurance company. Police also is supposed to deal with situations of threatening, nuisance and to settle neighborhood conflicts and domestic disputes. Further on, police plays an important role in the settlement of conflicts with road traffic and in the redress of various molestations (disturbances, brawls). In these fields their work is relatively effective and efficient. But these services have only partly to do with their legal task. In the field of prosecution, however, police work is rather ineffective.

B. Availability

The number of police officers is often calculated in a ratio of one officer per 250 or 350 inhabitants (Barclay 1991; Szikinger 1993), or 30 to 40 officers per 10.000 citizens. This seems to be a very important point in the political discussion in nearly every european

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country. In reality and if we ask, how many patrol police officers are "on the street" at a given moment, for Germany, for 10.000 citizens, just one policeman is available, or for every 20.000 citizens a patrol car with two officers in it. This is due to training, illness, the shift systems and other factors. Therefore, to ask for just one police officer more on the street, you need all in all some 15 officers, which will cost in Germany some 600.000 US\$.

C. Crime Fighting vs. Peace Keeping: The old conventional bias

Our studies in Germany showed, that the average patrol police officer arrests an offender every one and a half month (shoplifting and fare dodging not included). The chance for a police officer to come across a real crime is very low. The American President's Commission on Crime found, that a patrolling officer on a busy street in the U.S. might hope to come across a street robbery in progress once every fourteen years, and the British Home Office calculated, that a police officer in London could expect to pass within 100 yards of a burglary in progress roughly once in every eight years.

In Canada a police officer on average records one indictable crime occurrence a week, makes one indictable crime arrest every three weeks and secures one indictable crime conviction every nine month (McMahon 1992).

Less than 20% of all interventions are initiated by the police themselves, and even less time is spent on such proactive initiatives in comparison with reactive interventions, where the public or local authorities request actions by the police (Eliaerts/Enhus/Broeck 1993 for Belgium).

The major part of the everyday routine of the German police is represented by different types of accidents, events and offenses in connection with road traffic. The rate ranges between 25% and almost 60% in different cities. "Real crimes", i.e. patrol dispatches on the grounds of a supposed or actual offence are rather exceptional (between 16% and 28%). Brawls and quarrels are to a similar extent the cause for action (up to 25%) as help and assistance in different ways (e.g. drunken and helpless persons) (Feltes 1989). Here again we have about the same results as the study by the Home Office (Home Office 1988), by Hanak for Vienna (Hanak 1991) and by Steffen for Bavaria (Steffen/Polz 1991).

Skogan (1990) reports that the activity occupying most police time with citizens is the exchange of information: either citizens giving police non-crime related information (16%) or asking police for information (23%). Reporting crime accounted for only 18% of reasons for contacting the police.

Of the two functions of police, namely to keep up law and order, in reality the "order"-function plays the dominant role. But in public, media and political discussions, the "law"-function is always pushed in the foreground, esp. in connection with violent demonstrations, terrorism or most recently in Germany violent acts against foreigners.

D. Frustration is increasing among police officers

The actual situation in Germany with increasing hostility against foreigners shows, that the police is absolutely powerless in situations, where the politics and the politicians fail. To ask for more repressive police power and for more repressive laws and to blame the police for situations, happend recently in Germany, where rightist or nazi-oriented juveniles tried to burn down houses of foreign people (mainly asyants, but also turkish citizens, who lived for years in Germany) or chased foreigners (mainly black africans) through the cities, is just concealing the real responsibilities.

One reason for the fact, that frustration among the police force is increasing (Feltes/Hermann 1987) may be, that in the daily routine of a police officer the aspect of "helping others" can be realized less and lesser nowadays, although for nearly all police officers this aspect was once crucial for their choice of vocation (Feltes 1990). As service functions predominate in the everyday routine of police, citizens are increasingly confronted with discontented police officers who, moreover, often come from different neighborhoods and social classes than the citizen himself.

Structural changes in the police apparatus (centralization e.g.) and problems with the appointment of qualified personnel have effected that a police officer nowadays only rarely works in the area in which he or she lives.

E. Administration and Bureaucratism

The administrative aspect of police work is still dominating in nearly every country. Paper-work is given priority over verbal communication and deliberation, quality of work is measured by the amount of paper consumed, law enforcement 'by the book' and written in the book is more rewarding than order maintenance and broad social interest. In the end superiors must manage their corps relying on paper instead of presence at and knowledge of daily practice. Work is committed primarily to the development and control of rules and procedures; no time is left for real management, crime analysis or policy plans (Eliaerts/Enhuis/Broeck 1993).

Using calls-for-service data as a measure of crime, as it was done recently in several studies (Warner/Pierce 1993; Bursik et al. 1990; Sherman et al. 1989), may not only be a way to define "criminogenic characteristics of the physical environment" (Byrne/Sampson 1986), but may also increase the responsibility of the police in using such data for planning community crime prevention activities. Reducing calls-for service by providing neighborhood police stations and increasing the personal contacts between citizens and police officers, as it is reported from Edmonton, Canada by Braiden (1992), may be a way out of the dilemma, to have not time for prevention due to the increasing amount of calls-

for-service.

F. Towards a Rational Policy in Policing

All in all, two different tendencies can be observed: On the one hand the demand for help or intervention by the police has risen permanently up to the beginning of the 80's and is now rising again due to structural changes in nearly all european countries. The rise of the criminal offenses, registered by the police, is only partly responsible for this, but the readiness and/or capability of the citizens to settle conflicts by means of communication has decreased. Victims are less ready and capable of helping themselves. Official authorities are increasingly called in to clear and settle conflicts. Even the rise of registered offenses can be explained by this phenomenon - at least partly. On the other hand, the police is less and lesser capable of accomplishing this task of keeping up order and settling conflicts adequately and for the benefit of the victims concerned. To view the social reaction against crime as a police monopoly is obviously untrue, as Jock Young pointed out. Public opinion and informal social control have the central role, not only in defining what is crime, but also in maintaining social order (Young 1987). Recently, private policing becomes a hot topic in Europe, more than ten years after private security and private justice was discussed as the "challenge of the 80s" (Shering/Stenning 1982).

As a result of that, the aim of a rational policy in policing must be to increase the activities in those fields, where police work is rather effective, which seems to be true for the everyday police work in terms of service and order maintenance. Just to put a few more police officers on the street has - as empirical studies could show - no impact on both the crime rate and what is called 'everyday policing': the demand of the public for help, conflict solution, order maintenance and so on.

The situation in Germany as in other countries shows, that we do need the police in a lot of everyday situations, in which the citizens rely on the police. But the police is less and lesser able to cope with the very different and difficult task of policing a modern, complex society.

The solution we try to find in Germany is two-folded: First, to get rid of those tasks or duties, undertaken habitual by the police like the regulation of small car accidents, to guard or to take care of VIP's, special buildings or facilities and sports events. Furthermore, it seems worth to discuss the function of the police as an documentation center for insurance companies in everyday thefts from shops and small enterprises. Second, we try to optimize the capacities and qualifications of police officers by different kinds of "training on the job" and in an academic training at a polytechnic or police college for 3 years for those, who have already practiced police work for some years after finishing their basic training of 2 or 3 years at a police school (Feltes et. al. 1993).

II. Changes in Policing Philosophy

A. Core Values for Police Work

Over the last years there has been a reappraisal of policing philosophy and the role of the police, which was more or less intensive or radical within different european countries. The background is difficult to describe, but at least the following factors played an important role:

- drives for greater efficiency within the police service had led to an erosion of service-styled policing (The Joint Consultative Committee 1990);
- public dissatisfaction with the police reported in nearly all european countries stemmed largely from inappropriate and outdated policing styles and poor service delivery (ACPO 1990);
- since a long time ago we know, that the police do not have immediate access to offenses and offenders; nevertheless we still believe in the proactive, crime-reducing capacity of the police;
- the police furthermore do not and can not effectively control crime-prone individuals and/or criminogenic structures and situations; prevention through repression and prevention through police patrol is rather ineffective (Kerner 1993)

As a result of that, policing policy is discussed more and more seriously. Most forces have begun to devise plans to evaluate police performance through local crime surveys and through police activity surveys with the view of improving the quality of policing at the local level (Bennett 1993). Some countries like the Netherlands have even changed the total structure of their police forces, resulting in a more decentralized system with local and very personal responsibilities. This seems to be a kind of "state of the art" within the international discussion on how to reform police forces: The report "Police 2000" for the Canadian government stresses it (Solicitor General Canada 1990), as e.g. the chief of the Edmonton police, Chris Braiden does (Braiden 1992). In Sweden the local police force is now responsible even for the decision whether a given amount of money is used for more staff, for better training of the staff, for more technical equipment like personal computers, or for more patrol cars and the like.

Bearing this in mind, the following remarks should be understood as a kind of concept paper. Most ideas are neither evaluated, nor empirically tested. Both is difficult to undertake in european countries, where the police is still a kind of secret institution (this is true at least for most of the european countries). Nevertheless, the demand for external evaluation or external professional help in policing a society is increasing, resulting in

contracting out organization analysis' to consultant firms.

Some of the core values for future police work were put together by the already mentioned "Police 2000" report. One important value is, that police officers shall be an integral part of the community and work in partnership with the local community. In doing so, police shall provide the public with high quality services with sensitivity to the particular needs of victims, minorities, and vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the elderly. Police shall work to reduce fear of being victimized and concerns about local crime and disorder problems, and shall not increase fear by special preventive activities or frightening mass media reports. In partnership with other agencies, police is responsible for peace, order and security within the community. Rather than viewing crime as a police problem, the primary burden of crime prevention and crime control shifts to the community because crime and disorder are caused by processes that are largely beyond the ability of the police to control (Manning 1977; Kelling 1988).

B. Is Community Policing the Solution?

As even the police themselves starts to see the force no longer solely as a law-enforcement agency, one is approaching the public service idea, having similar to other public services the same (financial) restrictions. Police are in need for public support to legitimate their actions. As community policing is not just a new technic, it has to be a guiding philosophy to really improve police work and to change both attitudes of police officers and of citizens (Gramckow/Jacoby 1993). Community policing might be more rhetoric than reality in the actual discussion (Greene/Mastrofski 1988; Bayley 1988). Whether community policing is another example of "police strategies aimed at shaping and manipulating public opinion" (Manning 1988), and an "important new source of institutional legitimation", the near future will show. Until now, studies suggest that e.g. coordinated police interactions with youth from economically disadvantaged sectors offer an important starting point for developing better ties between the police and the community they serve (Thurmann/Giacomazzi/Bogen 1993), and that such strategies may have many other advantages.

Many critical analysts believe that the community policing model mystifies or covers up police use of coercive force, which they regard as the essence of policing. Community policing seems to be "a romantic delusion, not for the `world we have lost', but for one we never had. It harks back to a harmonious idyll, where the police were everyone's friend. It was never thus, and it is unlikely that it ever will be" (Waddington 1984; see also Ericson/Haggerty/Carriere 1993).

But the police has and need the authority and the power to intervene by force in situations where emergencies and conflicts occur, and especially lower class people, having no

resources for other solutions, trust in that competence.

Models such as community policing help to give the police officers their authority back and to rebuilt a trustful cooperation between police and citizens - but only as far as community policing is not misused as just one tool among others to "fight crime".

Regarding community policing as an ideology of "concealment and circumlocution" (Klockars 1988), sees the essence of policing in state monopoly on legitimate use of force within a political territory. Thus Klockars explains the fall of previous models - militarism, legalism and professionalism - in terms of their inability to make more palatable the fact that the police are essentially there to be violent when necessary. For him, community policing is best understood as "the latest in a fairly long tradition of circumlocutions whose purpose is to conceal, mystify, and legitimate police distribution of nonnegotiable coercive force" (Klockars 1988).

C. Crime Prevention by means of "War on Crime" - a very doubtful experience

Police work and crime prevention as only one part of it is related to all dimensions of State and society. A concept of "war on crime" (or "war on drugs") is a most dangerous one since a war needs a distinct and discernable enemy. But many fundamental crime (causation) problems are nothing but the other side of the coin, the (partly inevitable) by-product of the basic structures of the given State and society, in particular of the condition and the developmental stage of the whole socio-economic field. Prevention, analyzed from this perspective, may help to monitor and carefully moderate unwanted consequences of planned results or accepted side-benefits.

The police could, apart from their rather restricted genuine field of activity, to a wide extent serve as "detectors" of problems due to their daily contact with many parts of the population. Those problems could and should actively and publicly (if not sometimes drastically) be delegated or transferred to other actors in State and society that are nearer to the sources of primary socialization, mutual exchange, and informal social control (Kerner 1993).

Bearing in mind what the police is really doing and really engaged in (and not what politicians and trade unions suggest the police is doing, e.g. crime fighting), the everyday business of policing is "communications policing" as Ericson and others pointed out.

III. The Current State of Policing in the World

A. Police Work in the late modern society

Late modern society consists of institutions organized in relation to fear, risk assessment and the provision of security. This is true right now for most of the western european

societies and it will be true within the next few years for the eastern european societies as far as the "free economic market" (i.e. capitalism) is pushing away and displacing the planned economy (i.e. socialism) - with the result, that tight social bindings and communications between the people will disappear. This is one of the most important results of recent research on the effect of the unification in Germany. Theft, fraud and all the other crimes will become widespread, and the people will call for a more powerful police and state again. This could be of great danger for those new democracies: If police are not able to cope with these problems, and if politicians blame the police for failing these objectives, the old fashioned system (and those who were in) may strike back by a counter-revolution. Every eastern european state has examples for that. Even in Germany, we were complaining about such a situation some years ago: During the demonstrations against nuclear power plants and the dumping of nuclear waste during the 70s in Germany, police officials and politicians were afraid of a situation, that even the total German police force would not be able to defend those places against the public and to protect the state from being unable to act.

Community in late modern society is different. It is constituted by bureaucratic institutions and their communications media (Ericson et al. 1993), as the results of the recent election in Italy and the nomination of the head of a rightwing multi-media-concern as president showed. These institutions and media fundamentally transform community as communications that involve sharing, tradition, quality human relationships, and local spatial arrangements.

Security is multifaceted and includes for example security of territory (e.g. safe streets, secure premises), of the environment (e.g. healthy natural environment, safe products), of life course (e.g. social security, private insurance), and of identities (e.g. protection of national and ethnic identities in multi-cultural societies). Late modern institutions are so driven by the production and distribution of knowledge for risk assessment and security provision that it has become reasonable to suggest that they constitute a "risk society" (Beck 1992).

"Community policing is also associated with more explicit socioeconomic inequality. Community boosterism based on threats, fear and the urge for security is used as a vehicle for defending property values. Two solitudes are created, one for the better off symbolic workers, wired to the global, who can pay for better security provision, the other for the poor service workers and unemployed" (Ericson/Haggerty/Carriere 1993).

Security becomes a positional good defined by income and access to private protective services and membership in some hardened residential enclave or restricted suburb, as recent German examples in Munich and Cologne show. On the other side, the cooperation

between police and private security firms is quite good in protecting soccer games, metro stations, subways, trains, and shopping malls. In some German federal states, the police even does not respond to emergency (burglar) alarms until a private security car has been on the spot and checked the situation.

Community policing is part of a wider trend in the risk society away from prevention per se to the just distribution of risks. The just distribution of risk (shared risk) becomes more important than prevention (less risk), elimination (no risk) or punishing the morally culpable person. Here we have the same situation as discussed for the purpose of the penal sanction or the aim of the penal system.

As part of this shift in the risk society, every institution adopts the template of insurance, including the police.

B. Policing Policies in Europe

Just now we find all different policing policies (Ericson/Haggerty/Carriere 1993) in the european states:

- militarism (order maintenance), still in most of the eastern european states;
- legalism (police officers as law officers), and
- professionalism (public servants), in some of the western european states and
- "communitarianism" (community agents), perhaps in more modern societies e.g. the U.S. and Canada.

The problem with everyday policing and with the cooperation of different police forces is, that those policing policies do not fit together.

Until a police force has its very special philosophy, elaborated by the police officers themselves, each of the police officers has its own, sometimes very personal philosophy on how and why policing is done. Large discrepancies in everyday policing are the result.

Police are professional security experts. They possess abstract and specific knowledge about security that is valuable to others but is used until now mainly internal and not within community communications. Police has to start such communications and to occupy this field of public interest. This results in a proactive role of the police, acting as a service institution for the citizen and not as an institution which is responsible for the inner security of the State. Police detectives are first and foremost knowledge brokers, since they spend most of their time working within the established formats and forms of bureaucratic "paper" (Ericson 1981; Manning 1988; Miyazawa 1992). This knowledge brokerage function on behalf of other institutions is de-skilled work. That is, the police officer is placed in the position of having to think, act and report within criteria framed by the expert systems of other institutions.

C. Police Officers as Knowledge Brokers

Police **has** a special mandate which is expansive, covering participation in urban planning, environmental design, compliance of social service agencies, and lobbying for changes to legislation. Police have to be active civilians, taking over responsibility for their neighborhood, but for the political system also. The idea, that the police are always politically conservative, by the nature of their responsibility is the result of former ideologies. The "real radicals" in policing are no longer academics, as Radelet pointed out, "voicing their opinions from protected cloisters. They surely serve a useful purpose with their sometimes bizarre ideas, but they pay no great price for being dreamers or for being wrong" (Radelet 1986). Most of the newer ideas in policing were presented and evaluated by practitioners and leading police officials.

Part of the mandate of the police is to serve as clinician-like counsellors about security. Following the "broken windows" thesis of Wilson and Kelling, the particular focus is on creating a sensibility of security by reducing fear of threats or dangers regardless of the epidemiology of threatening incidents.

IV. The Special Societal Problems facing Eastern Europe

A. The Economic Situation and Increasing Social Problems

The situation in the eastern european states concerning police and public security seems to be dramatic. The economic situation is very difficult in all of those countries with rates of inflation between 10% in the Slovak and Czech Republic, 23% in Hungary, 200% in Rumania and Slovenia and more than 1000% in Estonia and Russia per year (UNO EGB-report). The monthly average wage is between 31US\$ in Russia, 100 to 200 US\$ in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republic and about 400 US\$ in Hungary and Slovenia. Nevertheless, prices for living and housing are increasing and (at least in the main cities) approaching western standards.

Furthermore, the percentage of those living under subsistence level is increasing, especially in urban areas. E.g. in Hungary, the percentage of urban population living under subsistence level in households with active earners increased from 24.4% in 1977 to 59.7% in 1987, and the equivalent percentage of rural population decreased from 33.9% to 26.5% in the same period (Gönczöl 1993). Whether this and the increasing rate of unemployment is a causal explanation for the increasing crime rate has to be discussed. At least the social process going on in most of the eastern european countries shows signs of anomie and structural changes within the society go together with structural changes in crime.

B. The Situation of the Police in a Changing Society

A changing system of values touches not only the society and the people living in it but also the police and the criminal justice system as a whole. Police have to cope with those changes, and a recent empirical field study on the effect of the unification on everyday policing and the attitudes of police officers could show, that there is a great unsteadiness under those who remained at the police, resulting in frustration, aversion against organisational changes and drawing-back from the public (Behr 1993).

In Poland (Gaberle 1993), the official name of the police was changed from "Civic Militia" to "Police", but constitutes only few and symbolic changes, and is therefore a good example for the development in those eastern european countries which until now have at least a little experience with democracy.

The intention to replace at least the higher district police leaders failed very often in eastern Europe. It is self evident, that the replacement of the total force was impossible and is still impossible.

The experience in Germany show, that it takes a long time to replace the old staff, and especially those, who were active and competent during the socialistic times usually show great staying power - and this is true not only for the police force but for nearly all public services.

One must realize that a) the socialist and communist systems had well trained experts at the police (e.g. criminalistic was well established at universities, which is and was not the case in West-Germany), and b) those who knew how to cope with the socialist system also know very well how to cope with nearly every other political system: they just survive and show up again after a more or less short period of going underground.

Human resources seem to be one of the main problems in reforming the police of the former eastern-block-states. The hungarian solution, to appoint only high-school-graduates and to train them very intensively for two years is for sure the right, but a very difficult way. But here again the 'cloven hoof' is, that the trainers and teachers need a special training for teaching the new philosophies of policing.

C. Weaker Police - Increase of self-defense groups

Another problem seems to be important: Realizing the failure of the official law enforcement apparatus, voluntary-based self-defence groups have been formed throughout many countries in eastern and western Europe. Basically these organizations fulfil their duties in the capacity of citizens collectively exercising the rights for crime prevention. This might be a democratic idea with elements of community policing, working together with the police and private security firms. But it might also result in a new "Blockwart" system, which was well known in Nazi-Germany and in some former socialist countries also. Recent experiences in Germany show, that the number of cases, where citizens reveal

others to public agencies is increasing and that members of the ultra-conservative Republican party try to join local crime prevention activities or even built up such activities by their own.

V. Discussion: Issues Facing the European Police in the Future

A. Increasing Crime vs. "More of the Same"

More and more people all over Europe are hit by crime. At least, more and more people report crimes to the police, and more and more people are frightened by crime. A number of studies have indicated that victims have very clear ideas about police performance and in many cases see the police as failing to address their own priorities vis a vis the crime situation (Mawby/Walklate 1993). The number of crimes reported to the police is increasing nearly everywhere and the ideas, how to cope with this problem and how to sanction offenders in an effective and appropriate way always seem to stay the same: to call for more and harsher laws, for more police officers and for harsher sentences, as this is currently the case in Germany again. In 1993, the american president Bill Clinton announced a law-and-order program, spending \$3.4 billion for 50.000 new police officers as a "major down payment" as he said on his campaign promise for 100.000 new cops (TIME 1993). But as Watzlawick pointed out, just "more of the same" will not be a solution for **any** problem, and the aim to get better justice through a more consistent approach to sentencing, so that convicted criminals get their "just deserts", as the Home Office White Paper "Crime, Justice and Protecting the Public" pointed out (Home Office 1990) is a far modern, but nevertheless not very creative proposal for the solution. To arrange criminal justice beginning with the police and ending with the prison system in a more rational, cost effective and consequent way, as the Netherlands start to do, might be a solution.

Since years, private firms and corporations have been organising their actions around entrepreneurial strategies, setting long term goals and plans to achieve market objectives. However, the public sector, particularly policing, has focused primarily on immediate problems and short term solutions to solve those problems. In Germany e.g., when during the eighties the crime rate stayed relatively stable and terrorism was moving back, nobody cared about policing. Now, with increasing crime rates and political challenges with immigrants and increasing hostility against foreigners, policing reform is again reduced in terms of more (and better paid) police officers and harsher sentences. In the near future, Policing must face an increase in special interest group protests, with a corresponding increase in civil disobedience and violence. Hate groups will proliferate as social unrest groups in coming decades, as FBI futurist William Tafoya pointed out. The unsolved problems of unemployment, poverty, homelessness will contribute to social turmoil, with a

rising frequency of minority-related crimes, both in western and eastern european states. People's attitudes to crime and punishment seem to vary with the passage of time. Today, people are much less tolerant of violence then they were, and the same seems to be true according to the tolerance of immigrants - at least in those countries, where the now open boarder to former socialist countries allows the immigration of mostly lower class, poor people, very often with a distinct racial background (e.g. Sinti and Roma).

B. Managing Future Police Forces

Rational policing means to assess the organizational capabilities of the force, the identify critical issues, threats, and opportunities by assessing the present and expected future environment in which police function. Success should be measured by the public value, produced by the police and not by clearance rates, number of convicted criminals and so on. Policing must be an political active business. Police should not wait for the politicians to decide what has to be done, after special (and very often momentary) problems occur; they should go ahead in approaching the public and serving their demands; and those demands seem to be quite the same in most of the european countries. The public cares less about drugs and organized crime but very much about the everyday disturbances and troubles. Even if sometimes those everyday troubles might be connected with drugs or other "official" crimes with the result, that the public is concerned about the trouble or the inconvenience (or just "unmorality"), but not really about the fact, that a crime is going on. More women and more immigrants will join the police forces, and the key words for management in the police will be flexibility, shared power, autonomous teams and regional responsibility. Police officers of the future will be active problem-solving participants, particularly when given the necessary discretion, encouragement, and opportunities by their supervisors, as e.g. Chris Braiden, the Chief of the Edmonton Police Department could show on his own experience. Small work units, free-flow information, cooperation with private security institutions are some other key words, challenging the former militaristic, bureaucratic structure of the police forces all over Europe.

C. Calculating Justice and Police Work

As criminal justice is a very expensive tool, one must be very careful in using it. Looking onto the penal law as a tool to prevent crime, we have to be very skeptical on that. As empirical research shows, the real effect of law in preventing crimes is quite low - and this is true for all the different levels of the criminal justice system.

The criminal justice system with the necessary constitutional rights for the offender and the defence is by its structure a very difficult, slow and expensive tool.

In England, to prosecute a less serious offence costs about 120 US\$, to prosecute a more

serious case at the Crown Court 900 US\$. A Crown Court proceeding may range from 2.500 US\$ to 60.000 US\$ per case (Home Office 1992).

For Germany, an average sum of 6.000 US\$ per offender, formally convicted by a judge, may be calculated, including the costs for prosecution. At a time, where the economic situation in all European states is quite difficult, we have to ask more and more for the financial consequences of our decisions. In Germany, the imprisonment of an offender costs more than 22.000 US\$ per year, only for the actual costs for staff and food.

Taking into account, that the offender is not able to work during that time, and therefore the state welfare has to pay for his family, a prison sentence is a very expensive tool - and, as we know, a less effective one too. Let me give you an example for the amount of money, we have to pay for the criminal justice system. A decrease of prison sentences either in length or totally by 25% in Germany would reduce the costs for imprisonment by even more than 600 million US\$ per year - and we know, that the actual length of a prison sentence does not significantly affect recidivism. After reducing the length of the prison sentences by 25% or even more, the average length of such a sentence would be still higher in Germany than in other european states.

Nearly the same is true for the Police Forces: From German and foreign studies and research we learned that the (detective) police clears up less than 10% of all crimes with unknown offenders by their own efforts (the following figures are for Germany within the old borders - without the former GDR). In all other cases, the victim provides the police with the name and sometimes even the person (e.g. shoplifting) of the suspect. By taking this fact into account, and breaking down the number of cleared offenses (2.957.135 in 1993) by this ratio of 10%, results in some 300.000 cases cleared by the police themselves in this year. As a result of that, on an average, every German detective clears up some four to ten cases each year, which results in costs of more than 12.000 US\$ for salary only for one case cleared by detectives themselves. Thus the idea to raise the clearance rate by only one percent by employing more detectives, my result in costs of 150 million US\$ for detectives only - keeping in mind, that only a few more police officers have no impact on the clearance rate, which is determined by a lot of different factors. Furthermore, the patrol police and the justice system (prosecutors, judges) will increase their costs. To bring those cases to court and to convict the offenders, costs of some 240 million US\$ per year may arise. All in all, a one percent higher clearance rate could cost about 600 million US\$ per year. The size of a police force may even increase the potential of discovered crimes simply because of higher levels of policing (Warner and Pierce 1993).

D. The Challenge of the next Century: A Look to the Future

What is called the preventive overload of the criminal justice system reduces and even

replace what was historically the purpose of this system: to give the offender a special shelter against the arbitrariness of the state - and not to provide a (useless) tool to educate the citizens.

The western democratic societies are more and more unable to cope with the quantitative increase and the increasing complexity of conflicts and the dimensions of risk. Recourse to criminal law, wherever it is done, may impede the implementation of a more effective system of administrative or private law control mechanisms and other more social forms of regulation.

Highly educated officers and better trained personal do not per se guarantee better cooperation and communication, but training and education is a sine qua non factor on the way to improve the quality of police work. As highly educated police officers could become frustrated in their jobs, grow cynical and look for formal or informal ways out, changes must occur not only in the recruitment, selection and training programs, but in the organizational environment as well, as Goldstein already 15 years ago pointed out (Goldstein 1977). Otherwise, new personnel will have little chance of surviving in the organization. The pressures for conformity are so strong that a new officer will either be forced into the police subculture, with the values and orientation of the larger group replacing his own, or his life will be made so unpleasant he will decide to resign (Sewell 1985).

The actual challenge might be a good chance for the police forces to reflect their basic duties: To serve first the people and not the state, politicians or other authorities.

VI. References

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