

Policing the Streets in Europe

**a comparatative observational study in The Netherlands,
Denmark, Belgium, Germany and Norway**

[working title]

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CHAPTER 1

1. A first look at police patrol work¹

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1.1 The importance of what police officers do

Every society to function properly needs a certain level of social order. It is by their everyday activities that ordinary people unintentionally construct and reconstruct the existing social order of the community they live in (Berger and Luckman, 1966; Giddens, 1984). Most important in this respect is the upbringing of a next generation, or, in other words, the primary socialisation of children by means of parenting and education (Elias, 1939; Mills, 1959; De Swaan, 1996; Christie, 2004). When someone, child or adult, acts against the prevailing social standards, as a rule other people exert social control over the wrongdoer, especially those with a small social distance to him/her such as parents, teachers, peers, neighbours and colleagues. Social control means that people sanction deviant behaviour, or threaten to, and so attempt to have other people behave in conformance with the general standards of their community.

More often than not, this (informal) social control by relevant others is sufficient to maintain the predominant social order. Thus people manage to take care of most trouble and problems on their own. Even when they have become the victim of a crime, they usually do not take the trouble to call in the police.² They have so to say a great capacity to resolve things themselves. Not in all cases, however. As people feel that they no longer master their social environment, they frequently ask the police if they will help bring the matter to an acceptable end. If the police come, it is not without obligation. They do not come just to observe but take action and give direction to the events. As Kop et. al. observe, ‘Officers will generally not leave before they have brought the situation to a – according to them – satisfactory end.’ (1997:122). In case of the police we use the term *formal* social control, because under the law it is provided that they take action on behalf of society as a whole (cf Cachet, 1990).

Seen in this perspective it is the police officers’ daily work to solve the problems of society that people are not able to manage themselves. Now and then this provides a spectacle, for example when officers arrest robbers. But officers also help maintain order merely by their presence, by being visible and approachable, such as when they are supervising shopping malls, week markets, school yards, parks, red-light districts, festivals, building sites, car parks and pedestrian areas. In these cases the police are reproducing order on a routine basis (cf Ericson, 1982).

Police officers do not always wait until they are asked to come into action; when carrying out routine patrol police officers in West European countries, as we shall further on see, predominantly come into action on their own initiative. They then also principally decide their procedure, possibly even more than when a citizen has called them. When officers move into action of their own accord, it is mainly concerned with a traffic offence, a routine traffic stop or an internal job such as questioning a suspect or giving out a writ of summons. In similar cases the officers have the last word.

That officers by their actions do have so much influence on the course of events, has a number causes. First of all the monopoly on violence is of importance. If talking does no longer help, the police still can always use physical force, alone or together with colleagues

¹ Parts of this chapter are taken from a study that preceded the present international comparison (Stol et. al., 2006).

² For example: the willingness in the Netherlands to report criminal offences is about 37 percent (VMR, 2006:48); in the United States ‘the police process less than one-quarter of the crime reported in victim surveys’ (Manning, 1997:110).

and with or without the use of weapons. People know that all to well and weigh this when they decide about their attitude towards the officers. Seen more fundamentally, the influence of police officers relies on the legitimacy of the police.³ Police action, including the eventual use of violence, has a lawful basis and by that is ‘officially juridically’ legitimized. In our West European societies, in the terms of Weber (1922:124-130), the rational legal authority is the basis for legitimate police supervision. The influence of the police also comes about because they have a professional experience with unusual incidents. Whoever decides they cannot manage a law or order problem themselves, can fall back on the extra experience that the police have had with this type of incident, such as with the settlement of a collision, judging of a suspicious situation or dealing with troublesome youth. Police action also is legitimized, based on the direct social environment of the officers, especially when they take action on behalf of civilians who have called upon their assistance. The influence of officers is also partly based on a kind of traditional respect that many people have for ‘the police’, although particularly the police in the big cities presumably do not want to be too dependent on this.

When people have to deal with the police, it usually is with the officers who carry out patrol work, for example, emergency patrol officers in a marked police car or community beat officers on foot. Also with matters that are later taken over by specialized departments, such as serious offences, the officers on the street usually attend to the first police involvement and take the first measures. Citizens have to deal with the police fairly often: in The Netherlands for example in one year 29 percent of the citizens over the age of fourteen have some contact or other with the police (VMR, 2006:66).

Most of the problems concerning law and social order are indeed settled without the police. Still the police play an important role in producing and reproducing social order in our society, in the first place because they quite often are called to take action in crisis situations that citizens are not able to manage themselves and that the citizens involved will not forget for the rest of their lives. Further more when assigned to patrol police officers for the most part come into action of their own accord, which means that formal social control as accomplished by the police for a significant part is shaped by the officers’ initiatives. All together year in year out a significant part of the population gets in contact with a police officer, with the officers giving direction to the course of events.

1.2 Relevance of information about police patrol work

Police work has always been labour intensive. From early on most operational police capacity has been invested in surveillance and community bound supervision (Bayley, 1985, 1994; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003; Johnston and Shearing 2003). Police work still is predominately done by people. The technological evolution, through which a great deal of manual labour has disappeared, has not really affected the labour intensiveness of police work. The use of cars and computers has not made police supervision less dependent on human labour, therefore the police cannot manage with less people; on the contrary, through the years the work has become more intense and complex. Moreover for a considerable time now, West European countries have been calling for a more frequent and more close interaction between police and the local society and a more proactive style of policing, using terms such as ‘problem oriented policing’, ‘community beat patrol’ or, more recently, ‘reassurance policing’ (e.g. Finstad, 2000; Balvig and Holmberg, 2004; Fielding 1995; Fielding and Innes 2006; Stol et.al., 2006).

³ See for example Reiner (2000: 47-80) for a discussion of transformation of English police legitimacy from 1856-1991. However, Loader and Mulcahy (2003) make an important corrective to Reiner's thesis about the influence of the detraditionalizing process on the legitimacy of the English police.

The police have at their disposal certain powers of control, a substantial part of which is invested in police officers who do patrol work. That power is not police property unconditionally. Society indeed has given the police the authority to take regulatory and sanctioning action on its behalf, but not a free hand. The police must take responsibility for what they do. In this construction the police control citizens and again are themselves controlled by representatives of the citizenry. The latter is also referred to as the democratic control over the police. That control knows, just as police work, a reactive and a proactive dimension. On one hand the government and the representatives of the people control if police work goes as agreed (reactive), on the other hand they try, by taking specific measures, to guide what the police do (proactive). That control and guidance are essential conditions for a legitimate police force.

Control and guidance are only useful possibilities when those involved have good insight into what the police do. Among other things, officers must account for their actions via registration systems. They note what they have done, but not everything, or better said: the most not. In a Dutch observational study in the beginning of the nineties, it became clear that officers did not register more than 27.2 percent of all cases in which they took action (Stol, 1996). Now that command and control rooms directly put the citizen calls they receive into a computer, so that registration no longer depends on the individual officer, this percentage shall be significant higher. Police involvement with citizen calls and serious incidents is fairly well documented today. Whoever for example wants to know how often and how police officers take action against violent offences, can get a great deal of information out of what the officers have recorded. But those who want to know what officers undertake if they are not working on serious matters, and that is usually the case, is all too soon groping in the dark. That means that it is particularly unclear how officers are engaged in their routine social control, and thus how they carry out local police supervision, including community policing. Are officers enterprising or do they wait until they are called upon? How often do they speak to a citizen about a violation or just stop for a chat? How do they settle the incidents they deal with?

Considering the importance that our society attaches to local police concern and considering the power to control that is invested there in volume and capacity, the lack of knowledge of how officers fill out their routine patrol work, is a notable gap in the supervision of policing. It is not only of importance for politicians and the government to know more about this, but also for the police themselves. Without insight into their own work it is after all difficult to oversee changes in their own profession and to improve the quality of policing.

1.3 The point of focussing on police actions

This study is about police actions, about what police officers do when out on patrol, not about police effectiveness. Of course in the end one should be concerned with the social effectiveness of policing. After all the core issue in policing and therefore in police management is to secure a satisfying level of safety; police actions are the means to this end, not an end in itself. At the same time it can be stated that police actions are an important element in the materialization of police performance. Consequently, one of the core issues in police management is to give direction to what police officers do (and don't) when out on patrol. If police management are not able to establish a serious effect on police actions, we can hardly expect them to have a significant effect on police effectiveness.

1.4 Goal of this study and research question

The motivation for this study is that people in society and certainly those who are responsible for the management of police work, should know what officers do in order to be able to give a

meaningful interpretation of police management and of the democratic control of the police. Or, as Whitaker and his fellow researchers express it: ‘Whether it is police actions themselves that are of interest to police constituents or whether it is the consequences of police activities, anyone assessing police performance needs to know about the police activities which constitute the relevant “performance”.’ (Whitaker et.al., 1980:61).

The goal of this study is to provide police management and others, such as politicians and officials, with a better insight into what determines what actions police officers perform and what possibilities, if any, police management have to affect this. The main question in this study therefore is what determines what is involved in police patrol work. In this line of approach police management is just one of the factors affecting police actions; there are several other factors such as the level of urbanisation and information facilities. This study should help determine which factors carry the most weight.

Below we will present a conceptual model of police patrol work, a model based on earlier observational studies in different countries. However, we will now first present a brief overview of earlier research on police patrol work.

1.5 Earlier research on police patrol work

Police patrol work can be described in qualitative and quantitative terms, or of course a combination thereof. In the pure qualitative tradition we find for example anthropological, ethnographically tinted studies of police culture, such as by Holdaway (1980) in Great Britain, Behr (1993, 2002, Blankenburg and Feest 1972) in Germany, Girtler in Austria (1980), Herbert (1997) in the United States, Holmberg (1999) in Denmark, Punch (1978, 1979) and Van der Torre (1999) in the Netherlands, and Granér (2004) in Sweden. These qualitative studies are about intentions, feelings, norms, values, professional attitude, motives and tactics. To put it briefly: they are about *how* officers handle certain situations and which priorities they establish. This way they provide important knowledge about understanding police work. Whoever also wants to know which of society’s problems the police as a whole often or on the contrary seldom pay attention to and on whose initiative officers then come into action, should look for these in studies that present quantitative data.

The primary question that such studies have about patrol work is which activities police officers undertake if they are on patrol and how they settle these. In some quantitative studies attention is also paid to the question how much time the police spend on the various activities – with the question behind this question: if officers do not waste their time too much, with drinking coffee for example (e.g. Junger-Tas and Van der Zee-Nefkens, 1976; Whitaker et.al., 1980). Seen socially, the most important question however remains what the police do and how they do it, because that determines how the social control of the police precisely is formulated and therefore what influence the police have on the daily social order in society. Also the legitimacy of the police, its most precious possession, is more dependent on what the police do than how much time it costs. Significant in this connection is what the media reports daily about police work. It is always about what the police officers do or fail to do, only once in awhile is it about the question if they spend too much or too little time on specific work.

Not every quantitative study about police patrol work focuses on its full breadth. In the Netherlands for example Kop et. al. (1997) conducted a study about the interaction between the police and the public. They observed officers during their work and presented their findings qualitatively as well as quantitatively. The study is about the social skills of officers when resolving (potential) conflict situations that last longer than three minutes and that have a limited number of people involved. From all the observed incidents therefore, eventually only a part are analysed. The study gives a good picture of the use of social skills on patrol, but provides no picture of what patrol work involves in its complete context.

Studies in which police work is *exclusively* expressed in numbers are seldom. A purely quantitative study of what officers have to deal with during their patrol work was carried out in the Netherlands in 1988 within the Project Quantifying Police Work (PQP, 1988a, 1988b). The aim of which was to spread police officers over the police forces better on the basis of the work load measured. What the police did on patrol duty was mapped by the officers themselves by having them note their activities in a personal notebook. In purely quantitative studies about what police patrol work involves we also find researchers who base themselves on emergency room data or police journals, such as in the studies by Hauge and Stabell (1975) in Norway, Dreher and Feltes (1996) in Germany and the international comparison study by Bayley (1985), with data from India, Japan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States. But then at the same time most studies with statistics about patrol work also do not lack qualitative descriptions about police action. We call these the methodologically mixed studies. Most of these mixed studies lay emphasis on qualitative aspects; as a rule in these studies figures are used to objectify the findings and to compare results from different field work locations.

The very first study in this tradition was carried out by Reiss et.al. (1971) in the United States, with the field work being carried out in 1966. More recent mixed studies from the US are from Kelling et.al. (1974 – the classic Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment) and Whitaker et.al. (1980). Soon after the pioneering work of Reiss et.al. police researchers from other countries carried out similar studies. In 1969 the first methodological mixed study in Germany was conducted by Feest and Blankenburg (1972). In 1975 Veendrick and Jongman (1976) carried out their fieldwork in The Netherlands, promptly followed by Junger-Tas and Van der Zee-Nefkens (1977) and Geerlings (1978). In the beginning of the nineties and in 2001 Stol et.al. conducted further research in The Netherlands (Stol, 1996; Stol et.al., 2006). The first and as far as we know only study in Canada was carried out in 1976 by Ericson (1982). In 1985 Knutsson and Partanen (1986) did their fieldwork in Sweden, in 1987 Enhus and Hendrieckx (1988) carried out their study of policing in Belgium and in 1993-1994 Finstad (2000) did the same in Norway. In an overview of mixed studies Stol et.al. (2006) also presented figures from Holmberg (1999), introduced above as a qualitative study, which was made possible by Holmberg who provided them with observational data not published in his book.

In our study we look at what police patrol work (emergency patrol as well as community beat policing) involves without limiting ourselves to certain types of incidents. We describe police patrol work in qualitative as well as quantitative terms since quantifying helps in making comparisons between different places.

1.6 A conceptual model about what is involved in police patrol work

We do not have a coherent theory about what determines what is involved in police patrol work. Earlier Sherman (1980) and Bayley (1985) extensively went into the question what exactly determines police actions. In his study on causes of police behaviour Sherman concludes that ‘The present state of the field is best characterized as a series of bivariate assertions about the impact of certain variables on police behaviour about which a moderate amount of empirical evidence has accumulated.’ (1980:70).⁴ But there is still more lacking. Police investigation is basically directed at the interaction level or micro level. The search for explanations consequently deals with the connections between the characteristics of the people involved (officers and citizens) and police conduct. The significance of organizational and social characteristics for police conduct is hardly being mentioned. In 1985 Bayley has devoted a study to this, using official police statistics as his empirical basis.

⁴ Shermans and also Bayleys work is presented in greater detail by Stol et.al. (2006:164-8).

Bayley first develops a theoretical model. In his approach the extent of social cohesion or integration in a society is the focal point and determines what is involved in police work. Next to that his model includes seven other possible explanatory factors, community characteristics such as wealth, modernization, police strength and communication facilities. Surveying all his (pre)suppositions Bayley concludes that his explanatory model has become too complex and provides no basis for predictions. ‘Altogether, unless most of the factors suggested prove in fact to be minor in importance, variations in the nature of police work as situations will prove to be unpredictable.’ (1985:143). All the same he subsequently analyses the material for parts of the model. For the analysis Bayley brings his ten types of incidents back to two: police work that is or is not crime related. He compares police work in an urban area (low integration) with that in a rural area (high integration), but finds no difference in profile. So he puts question marks by the practical knowledge of police officers and managers that police work in big cities is different from police work in the country.

Furthermore Bayley concludes that differences in police work do not particularly occur very much within a country but do between different countries. The question then what causes these differences still remains unexplained. According to Bayley it appears to be that culture and tradition are more important factors than structural variables. ‘Although structural elements may be important to some extent in explaining police work, as the model indicates, factors belonging to the domain of culture and tradition may be much more important, possibly involving an interactional dynamic between police and public.’ (1985:154). In particular he assumes police culture is thus of importance, but in his study that aspect has not been under discussion.⁵

Later Bayley (1994) once again goes into the question of what determines what police officers do when out on patrol. He now reports that the extent of urbanization makes the difference. In the cities more than ninety per cent of the work is a reaction to a call from the public.⁶ In rural area officers go into action more often on their own initiative. Then they especially take action against traffic violations.

Sherman as well as Bayley did not succeed in formulating a coherent theory about police patrol work. In 2004 on the basis of the work of Sherman and Bayley, and on the basis of the above mentioned methodologically mixed observational studies,⁷ Stol et.al. made an attempt to come to a conceptual model for police patrol work, meant to give impetus to the further development of a theory (2006:170-5). We present this model below and at the same time suggest some changes to adjust it somewhat in the light of our study.

The studies available (Sherman, Bayley, thirteen methodologically mixed studies⁸) offer insight into dozens of factors which influence all the officers’ actions in some way. Such a varied list does not offer much for constructing a conceptual model. First of all organization is useful. The factors that follow from earlier research can be arranged in three main groups:

1. The first main group includes the characteristics of the immediate context of the action taken, such as the seriousness of the incident, the attitude of the citizens involved, the attitude of the audience to the incident and the beliefs of the officer involved.
2. In the second main group are the characteristics of the organization of the local police work. In this case one can think of the duty assignment of the police officers, the way of patrolling, customs in police work or police culture, the amount of paperwork, the police strength, as well as the management by police chiefs.

⁵ The possible importance of organisational culture for police conduct is also not under discussion by Sherman.

⁶ The fact that Bayley bases himself on police registrations also plays a role here: what officers undertake on their own initiative does not show up quickly in police statistics (Stol, 1996).

⁷ With the exception of the study of Finstad.


⁸ Reiss et.al., 1971; Feest and Blankenburg, 1972; Kelling et.al., 1974; Veendrick and Jongman, 1976; Junger-Tas and Van der Zee-Nefkens, 1977; Geerlings, 1978; Whitaker et.al., 1980; Ericson, 1982; Knutsson and Partanen, 1986; Enhus and Hendrieckx, 1987, 1988; Stol, 1996; Holmberg, 1999; Stol et.al., 2006.

- The third main group concerns the broader social environment (the characteristics of the society of country). It does not only concern the extent of urbanization of the work area but also national factors such as national character, prosperity, legislation, extent of technologizing, overall expectations of the population with regard to the police, the readiness to take citizen calls, national police policy and such.

This division into three main categories means that a conceptual model should have three distinct frames or layers, or at least three different points of view. The next step is a matter of weighing the factors that are mentioned in the different studies and thus separate the main issues from the side issues.

The first frame of the model includes the micro level or the immediate context of the incident. Within the micro-context of individual incidents, there are three factors that predominantly determine the actions of police officers (figure 1.1): the seriousness of the actual situation (the more serious the situation, the stricter the action), the reaction of the citizens involved (those who react in a recalcitrant manner can count on stricter police action) and the opinions of the police officers involved (some officers are simply more strict than others).

Figure 1.1: micro level factors that predominantly determine what is involved in police patrol work



These factors on a micro level do influence how an incident develops, but they do not explain the difference in patrol work in different places. As these factors are rather universal (a serious incident is always dealt with more severely, et cetera), the effect of these factors is more or less the same in any given place. Local differences should therefore mainly be comprehended on the basis of the meso and macro factors mentioned in the conceptual model presented in figure 1.2. These factors are to be found in the organizational and the (broader) social context of police patrol work.

Before we turn to the factors that determine what police patrol work consists of, a remark about patrol work as the dependent variable in the model. In our study what is involved in patrol work first of all deals with the *profile* of patrol work, which refers to the sort of incidents that police officers deal with, such as traffic incidents, criminal offences, or networking with the public. Secondly patrol work can be characterized by the manner in

which incidents are *settled* (outcome of the incidents). Finally what is involved in patrol work also lets itself be characterized by means of the *nature* of the work: the work in the inner-city of a capital for example has a more metropolitan character than the work in a rural environment. In this connection Stol et.al. (2006:65-6) concluded: ‘In short, according to our study there are no numerically significant differences between the four cities concerning the part that criminal offences play in patrol work. Nevertheless the work of police in the big city district De Pijp is different from that of their colleagues in the smaller cities. They then do not take action more often with criminal offences, but on average it concerns the somewhat more serious and more complex incidents.’

The model as presented by Stol et.al. (2006) originally embodies four factors that determine what police patrol work consists of (the independent variables in the model):

1. *Basic assignment.* Different sort of police officers (emergency patrol officer, community beat officer, traffic officer, et cetera) do a different type of police work. All police officers in a police force have the same mission (something like ‘promote safety and security’) but not all officers have the same basic assignment. The term ‘basis assignment’ in this study refers to the principal task or role the police officer in question has to fulfil. Emergency patrol officers for example may have as a basic assignment to supervise their area and react to citizen calls; a community beat officers’ basic assignment may be to build up and maintain relationships with the public and to prevent or tackle problems in close cooperation with other welfare agencies.
2. *Management control.* Although it is often claimed that police work is policy resistant to a great extent, previous studies show that police chiefs do have an appreciable effect on what police patrol work involves. Management control refers to everything police chiefs do to stimulate or urge officers to undertake specific actions when out on patrol.
3. *Urbanisation.* Police work in a highly urbanized area has another profile than police work in a rural area. In the first place the amount of work via citizen calls and structural problems decreases as an area is less urbanized. In the second place the anonymity is greater in a more urbanized area. That has as a result that just having a chat with the public takes up a less large amount of the work. In the third place in a highly urbanized area traffic violations (such as parking illegally, driving in the wrong direction) are taken less seriously than in the country. That holds for citizens as well as for police officers. Officers do comment on these violations but give a summons less quickly.
4. *Exceptional local circumstances.* Besides the extent of urbanization exceptional circumstances can arise in the neighbourhood which determine what is involved in police work. It then deals with a phenomenon that dominates the whole of police work in a certain area. That does not occur often, but it does occur once in awhile. In Maastricht in 1993 for example on many specific points the profile of police work was determined by the great deal of drugs tourists who visited the city and who on top of that had a place in a small park that was situated in the area that was studied (Stol, 1996). When such an exceptional situation is present that strongly determines what is involved in patrol work.

We suggest that this model should be redesigned and extended somewhat. First of all there is a gap between everyday management control on the one hand and basic assignment on the other. ‘Basic assignment’ in fact refers to the main structure of a police force; the dividing of the organization into units such as ‘traffic police’, ‘juvenile police’, ‘community officers’, ‘detective department’, ‘dog handlers’, et cetera. What is involved in the work of police officers from such different units indeed differs. After all each department, and sometimes within a department each subunit, has its own specialization. But there are also differences between places, showing that a certain police specialization or police role, such as

‘community beat officer’, does not inevitably include just one standardized universal set of police actions.

In this context Stol et.al. observed: ‘In the four cities community beat officers, in contrast to their colleagues in the emergency patrol, work according to different basic strategies. In Wageningen the working day of the community beat officers is purposefully built up around talking about problems, at people’s homes or at their work. When the officers are out on the street, they are not doing surveillance but they are going from one place to another. This we can therefore call the *problem-oriented strategy*. Community beat officers in Zevenaar have the same basic principle. However the community beat officers in the centre of Zevenaar in particular also give priority to (repressive) traffic surveillance, especially that of maintaining the no parking zones. We can see that as the *problem plus enforcement-oriented strategy*. In Woerden officers more often just go into the neighbourhood in order to go on patrol and then they will see what they come across. This way they regularly get to talk with citizens; at the same time they pay attention to traffic matters. Also they always have an uncomplicated detective case to cover. This is the *strategy of the broad setting of tasks*. Community beat officers in De Pijp do not actually add any variations of their own to this. Just as their colleagues in Zevenaar, they work according to the problem-oriented and enforcement-oriented strategy, which in De Pijp leads to another type of involvement from the patrol work because of the big city environment.’ (2006:91). With regard to ‘basic strategy’ Stol et.al. conclude that ‘The basic strategy employed works its way through in the profile of patrol work. So we saw that the problem-orientated schedule of the community beat officers in Wageningen means that traffic takes a minor position in their work.’

In short, Stol et.al. did observe that within one and the same police specialisation there are differences between places but they neglected to incorporate this finding in their conceptual model. We have come to the conclusion that ‘basic strategy’, which is the answer to the question ‘how do we do things around here’, in the model should have a place between ‘basic assignment’ and ‘management control’.

In this approach basic assignment is the answer to the question ‘how do we structure our organization’ or ‘what kind of police roles do we wish to distinguish’. Basic strategy is the answer to questions such as ‘what are the principle elements of this police role’ or ‘what are the basic ideas of this kind of police work’ – what are the basic ideas of community beat patrol for example. Management control or day to day police leadership has to do with the question what exactly these specific police officers should be doing today.

Since our study implies a comparison between police patrol work in different countries, our model should embody an international perspective. To begin with, in a certain respect the countries involved have similar characteristics. On the level of a Western European context we have a number of more or less constant factors, such as form of government (democracy), basis for governmental authority (rational-legal), organisational form of the police (bureaucracy), religion (predominantly Christian), ethnicity (predominantly white), level of prosperity (industrialized society), legal system (formal law) and the extent of the use of technology (car, telephone, radio, television, mobile phones, computers). Because these factors are constant in our study we can therefore not ask ourselves in how far such factors determine what is involved in police patrol work. Still we should have an open eye for national characteristics that are of importance for what police patrol work entails. Consequently we include in our model the factor ‘national features’. Particularly we demand attention for facets of national legislation, with special attention to police powers, and national culture.


Our last addition to the model has to do with technology or, perhaps better said, information facilities. The police are heavily information dependent. It is often pointed out that the gathering of information about people and, to a lesser extend, objects is what police

work is all about (e.g. Foucault, 1975; Manning, 1992, 1997; Poot et.al., 2004). As a consequence in our technological society information technologies are of vital importance for the police, although technological innovations do not always bring along the wished-for improvements in police work (Colton, 1978; Ackroyd et.al. 1992; Rademaker, 1996; Stol, 1996; Chan et.al. 2001; Pativana, 2005; Gundhus, 2006). Since the present study covers different countries, we assume that it also covers different technological settings, at least to some degree. In a word we ask ourselves if differences in information facilities have an effect on what is involved in police patrol work.

With the above thoughts in mind, we revised the conceptual model of Stol et.al. (2006) into the one presented in figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2: conceptual model of police patrol work

Organizational and national context



1.7 The structure of this study

In chapter 2 we give a methodological account of how the fieldwork was conducted in the five participating countries. We go into the main method of research – systematic social observation – and the problems we encountered when collecting our research data. Also here we briefly present the fieldwork locations, the twelve cities where we have been observing the police officers' comings and goings. In closing, we present some statistics about our research data. Chapter 3 till chapter 7 form the main component of this book and include pictures of police patrol work in The Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Belgium and Norway respectively. These five chapters are structured identical, which should help to gain insight into similarities and differences between the countries involved. In the last chapter we come back to the question what determines what is involved in police patrol work and we present suggestions for the improvement of the conceptional model of police patrol work.

CHAPTER 2

2. Observing police patrol work

Wouter Stol, Peter Kruize, Els Enhus, Thomas Feltes & Helene Oppen Gundhus

2.1 Research method*Systematic observation*

Bayley mentions four ways by which we can gather information about police on patrol. 'Information about the nature of situations that police confront comes from four sources: observation of police officers at work, activity reports by individual officers, activity files maintained collectively by police units, and reports of calls for assistance from the public. The best of these is observation of police officers at work, because it is the most direct and the least self-interested.' (1985:113).

Essential in the study presented here is the study method: the observation of police work by researchers. Whoever studies police patrol work on the basis of what police officers themselves record about it, misses a considerable part. Whoever compares patrol work in two cities on the basis of police data and files must therefore seriously bear in mind that the differences found may be due to the various methods in registration and not to the difference in police work. That is also the problem with Bayley's study (1985). He studied police work in different countries on the basis of what officers themselves record about their work. The question about the differences he observes is still whether it is about the differences in police work or about the registration behaviour of the police officers.

For our research we have chosen to use precisely the same research technique as one of us had used several times before: *systematic* observation of patrol work (Stol, 1996; 2006). 'Systematic social observation is a technique where observers are trained to observe and record according to explicit procedures that permit replication.' (Reiss, 1979:285). The researchers study police patrol work by going along with the officers and immersing themselves in the police officers and their work. In their field work notes the researchers in their own words describe what police patrol work consists of (appendix 1a-c); at the same time they also record that work, using a standardised code form as a guideline (appendix 2). With this approach patrol work can be described in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. The quantitative parts are primarily used to come to well-defined comparisons between different places; the qualitative study material, the field work notes, should help to understand police work and explain the observed differences. It might be clear from all this that our study can be placed in the tradition of what we have earlier called the methodologically mixed studies (section 1.5).

During the time that the researchers spent *at the police station* they did not make any *systematic* observations but they recorded observations that were important for the understanding of patrol work, such as comments from the officers about patrol work, about the concept of community policing or about police policy.

Observations: possible problems

During an observational study the researcher devotes him/herself to collecting data. Therefore relationships and emotions play a particular role in this type of study. If frictions arise between the researcher and the group where he/she is a guest, it will be detrimental to the study and it would be better to discontinue.⁹ In each case the researcher has to find a solution for two general problems. He/she must be introduced and become accepted by the group

⁹ See for example Wöstman (1989) who became bogged down during her study about discrimination by the police.

he/she is observing. At the same time the researcher must keep the distance that is needed in order to observe the activities of the others. In general that demands that he/she seeks 'to obtain a discrete place in the group' (Maso 1994:72).¹⁰ In each case he/she must try not to influence that which he/she is studying: in our case all the actions and movements of the police.

Furthermore in a study about the police special attention must be given to emotional and ethical problems. Researchers within the police also have to deal with the less pleasant sides of our society. They can be confronted with victims of accidents and criminal acts, with disturbed people and pitiful cases, people who neglect themselves and eat out of rubbish bins; they could be faced with individuals being arrested and with the use of force by officers. It is not an exception that police have problems with post traumatic stress disorder (Carlier et.al., 1995). By all means therefore we must keep in consideration that experiencing police work can cause emotional problems for an outsider as well.

The researcher also can be confronted with police actions that he/she does not agree with. That can be the source of an ethical dilemma: not to say anything and continue with the study or do say something and by doing so making further research practically impossible.

Definitions and reporting

In the present study during the observations the researcher took notes in a scribbling-pad which he/she then later worked up into a field work report about the happenings during the observations (see appendix 1a-c). We followed the same procedure as Stol et.al. did in 1991-1993 and in 2001. The researcher described each 'incident' that occurred during the patrol work. That is each *encounter* between a police officer and a citizen; also every *citizen call* that is passed on to the officers through the police station but no encounter follows on patrol, for example such as the case when officers do not encounter anything on the scene after a citizen call. The researcher also filled in a code form about every incident (see appendix 2).

An encounter is reported if a police officer and a citizen have verbal or non-verbal contact and the police officer is performing in the role of the police. This approach corresponds with what has been done in other observational studies (Reiss, 1971; Feest and Blankenburg, 1972; Kelling et. al., 1974; Veendrick and Jongman, 1976; Geerlings, 1978; Junger-Tas and Van der Zee-Nefkens, 1979; Whitaker et. al., 1980; Ericson 1982; Knutsson and Partanen, 1986; Enhus and Hendrieckx, 1988; Hofstra 1994). In none of the other observational researches studied by us is the term 'encounter' well defined. However it can be concluded from the various reports that it is noticeable that there is a *common sense* consensus about what is and what is not an encounter. A few examples could help to clarify the boundary between whether it is an encounter or not. While patrolling in a car and looking at someone greeting them with a wave of the hand is not an encounter, but giving a non-verbal sign as a reprimand for an offence is an encounter. Giving a personal message is not an encounter, but again just having a chat with a shopkeeper is one.

In talking about emergency patrol with 'patrol work' we must picture two or (in Norway) three uniformed police officers who are on patrol in a marked police car. Their basic assignment is to supervise their patrol beat and react to citizen calls. While doing community beat policing the officers normally work alone; they usually do their patrol work in uniform but also regularly in plainclothes, for example when they are visiting citizens at home. They walk or cycle, but then community beat officers also patrol with a car. As a rule a community beat officers' basic assignment is to build up and maintain relationships with the public and/or

¹⁰ This vision is not undisputed. Mastrofski and Parks (1990) plead for researchers having an active position through which they are allowed to debrief the officers after an incident, with as a goal to get an idea of the motivations behind the behaviour of the police.

to prevent or tackle law and order problems, preferably in close cooperation with other welfare agencies.

We write about patrol work or ‘policing the street’ but that does not necessarily have to happen on the street. Policing in buildings is also patrol work. We use the following definition: patrol work is police work during which officers are not in their own police station. The boundaries of patrol work since 1991-1993 have been shifted somewhat since the introduction of the mobile telephone. It now happens that community beat officers on patrol call, or are being called by a citizen. This mobility means that patrol work now also includes contacts that before only could have occurred at the police station.

While observing police who work in a team, we made no distinction between the input and the behaviour of either of the officers. If during an action one of the two (or three) officers knows the citizen involved, the researcher noted that the police had been dealing with an acquaintance, separate from the question if the other police officer(s) also knows the citizen.

During the studies which are the core of this book, the researchers each wrote a ‘field work report’ (field notes) as well as an ‘additional field work report’. The latter report contains observations about issues other than patrol work. Topics are the neighbourhood where the police work took place, the police organisation, the presence of information facilities and a reflection on the researcher’s own performance. The field work reports and additional field work reports served as the guideline for writing the empirical chapters.

2.2 The places, officers and fieldworkers involved

We have observed police patrol work in five different countries. In Belgium and The Netherlands we made observations in three places and in Denmark, Germany and Norway in two. The twelve places will be presented in greater detail in the empirical chapters. Some of the places are relatively large cities, or even capitals (Oslo and Brussel), while other places involved in this study are considerable smaller.

Table 2.1: cities involved and number of inhabitants

| <i>City</i> | <i>Number of inhabitants (city)</i> |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------|
| Oslo (N) | 550,000 |
| Bochum (D) | 376,000 |
| Münster (D) | 281,000 |
| Groningen (NL) | 181,000 |
| Brussel (B) * | 141,000 |
| Leeuwarden (NL) | 91,000 |
| Assen (NL) | 63,000 |
| Roskilde (DK) | 46,000 |
| Dendermonde (B) | 43,000 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 30,000 |
| Aarschot (B) | 28,000 |
| Lillestrøm (N) | 14,000 |
| AVERAGE | 154,000 |

* The city of Brussel is part of the Brussel district with a total of 1,031,000 inhabitants.

Table 2.1 list the twelve places in descending order of city size, showing that of these twelve places Oslo is the city with the most inhabitants while Lillestrøm (also Norway) is the smallest place included in this study, having no more than 14,000 inhabitants. This list gives us an indication of the level of urbanization of the places involved. However, in the light of

police patrol work it might be of greater importance to take into account the population density instead of population size. Furthermore our observations did not always cover the entire places. Whenever a place knew more than one police station, the field worker in question was attached to one of these and, consequently, to a particular geographical part of the place involved in the research. On the other hand, in some of the smaller cities the police officers' patrol beat covered a larger area than just the surface of the city in question. It then also covered some smaller towns or rural surroundings. This is particularly the case in the two Danish field work locations Roskilde and Hillerød and in Lillestrøm in Norway.

In table 2.2 the field work locations are listed in descending order of the population density of the area where the observation has been carried out. Of course these differences in population density should be taken into account when explaining differences between police patrol work in different places or different countries.

Table 2.2: population density of patrol areas under observation

| <i>Police station</i> | <i>Number of inhabitants</i> | <i>Area (km²)</i> | <i>Population density of patrol area under observation</i> |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| Brussel-Center (4th section)(B) | 20,000 | 0.9 | 22,200 |
| Groningen-North (NL) | 37,400 | 4.9 | 7,600 |
| Leeuwarden-Center/West (NL) | 47,700 | 10.7 | 4,500 |
| Bochum-Center (D) | 123,000 | 32.0 | 3,800 |
| Oslo-Center (N) | 49,500 | 16.7 | 3,000 |
| Dendermonde (B) | 43,400 | 55.7 | 780 |
| Münster-North (D) | 100,000 | 155.5 | 640 |
| Lillestrøm (N) | 44,600 | 77.0 | 580 |
| Assen-Center/South (NL) | 24,900 | 49.9 | 500 |
| Aarschot (B) | 27,900 | 62.5 | 450 |
| Roskilde (DK) | 175,500 | 552.1 | 320 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 143,500 | 629.0 | 230 |
| AVERAGE | 837,400 | 1,646.9 | 510 |

On the basis of this list, one could broadly divide the twelve places into two categories: the high urban areas (Brussel-Center, Groningen-North, Leeuwarden-Center/West, Bochum-Center and Oslo-Center) on the one hand and the low-urban or rural areas on the other. It should be stressed that both observational studies in Denmark were carried out in places with a low population density.

The officers whose work we have observed for the most part were white males. Now and then we observed the work of a female emergency patrol officer; almost never we joined a female community beat officer. In our study police officers from ethnic minority groups are roughly as uncommon as female community beat officers: in fact in everyday police patrol work pictured in this book they both play a negligible role. The impression in this paragraph does apply to all places involved in our study.

The emergency patrol officers acting in our research were predominantly between 25 and 45 years old. Police officers assigned to community beat patrol were between 40 and 55, with two exceptions. First, in Oslo as well as Lillestrøm (both Norway) community beat patrol had the form of problem oriented policing (POP) and was carried out by the officers who also carried out emergency patrol (25-45 years old). Secondly, in Leeuwarden, The Netherlands, community beat patrol was carried out by a so-called 'priority 3/4 team' (see chapter 3) which as a rule, but not always, is made up of two relatively young and less experienced police officers (approximately 20-30 years old).

The field work of our study was carried out by a mix of undergraduate students in their last year and postgraduates, all of them with a relevant subject such as safety and security, criminology, pedagogics and law. In some cases the fieldworker was attending a part time study combined with employment within a police department (PD). That was the case in all three Dutch studies as well as the study in Aarschot (Belgium). Three of them were law enforcement officers (LEO's) at the time of the study, the fourth was employed as a information analyst (table 2.2). In each place police patrol work, that means emergency patrol as well as community beat patrol, was observed by one and the same field worker – with the exception of Dendermonde (Belgium), where both types of patrol work had their own field worker. As a result of this there are 13 field workers involved in this study. Of these 6 are male and 7 are female; none of them are from ethnic minority groups. Table 2.2 shows who carried out the field work in the various places.

2.2 The field workers

| <i>Place</i> | | <i>Field worker</i> | <i>M/F</i> | <i>Status</i> |
|--------------|-----------------|-----------------------|------------|-------------------|
| NL | Groningen | George Wildeboer | Male | Employee PD (LEO) |
| NL | Leeuwarden | Astrid Wassenaar | Female | Employee PD (LEO) |
| NL | Assen | Frits Tuijt | Male | Employee PD |
| DK | Roskilde | Jesper Krogh | Male | Graduate |
| DK | Hillerød | Rikke Simonsen | Female | Graduate |
| B | Aarschot | Yves Sannen | Male | Employee PD (LEO) |
| B | Brussel | Bob Van Beeck | Male | Undergraduate |
| B | Dendermonde EP | Katie Van Vaerenbergh | Female | Undergraduate |
| B | Dendermonde CBP | Birgit Van Impe | Female | Undergraduate |
| D | Bochum | Frank Fischelmanns | Male | Graduate |
| D | Münster | Sandra Jeremias | Female | Graduate |
| N | Oslo | Siv Runhovde | Female | Graduate |
| N | Lillestrøm | Karianne Rønning | Female | Graduate |

2.3 Course of the observations

In the period between September 2005 and March 2007 we observed emergency patrol as well as community policing in the above twelve places, a total of 24 observations. Each observation consisted of us following the standard police duty schedule during twenty shifts. This way we were not bound to a particular police officer but during an eight-hour shift went along as often as possible with officers on patrol. Since we followed the standard duty roster, we made observations during all days of the week, not only on weekdays. Consequently we did also not restrict ourselves to observations during the daytime; in keeping with the officers' working routines we made observations during morning, evening and night shifts.

We gained access to police work by way of the hierarchic route. As a rule we spoke with police chiefs before we reached a contact person on the shop floor. The introduction to the officers did not give any problems. Further, there were no officers who openly resisted to cooperate with the field workers, although some of them had to get used to the idea of someone observing their work. In all cases they accepted our presence – immediately or within a few days. During the first days of an observation, it sometimes happened that an officer asked about (the goal of) the research in such a way that the field worker got the impression that the officer did not yet fully trust this 'supervision'. In these cases we always stressed that, although the field worker takes notes, he/she does not register which officer

does what, since the goal of the research is to understand police patrol work in a more general sense and the researchers are after an international picture of police patrol work. After this, more often than not the officers were interested in the research project. In most cases they even gave us the impression that they appreciated our presence, since they were friendly and always willing to explain things about police patrol work.

In all places we were able to observe the police officers wherever they went, excepting Norway. The field workers in Norway were not allowed to follow the police officers into private houses. In cases where (a part of) the incident took place in a private house, the field workers interviewed the officers about what happened in the house, a procedure suggested earlier by Mastrofski and Parks (1990). To do this, the field workers used the SPSS variable list (appendix 2) as a guideline. We do not have the impression that we, by following this procedure, have missed a significant amount of relevant information about how the officers dealt with the incidents they were involved in.

We can be short about emotional problems since we have not experienced any. This does not mean that we do not have faced any serious situations. We observed the finding of a corpse in nine cases, three of which took place during emergency patrol in Hillerød (the most rural area in this study). These incidents did not traumatize the field workers or otherwise put them off their stroke. Probably this is so because they could keep their distance to the body, in fact keep as much distance to it as they wished. In these cases it was the main task of the officers to establish the identity of the dead person, to call in other agencies and, if still necessary, to inform the family, and to provide the people most concerned with moral support. In these cases it is not the emergency patrol officers task to closely investigate the body. The field workers did not have to look at the body from too close either, if at all, since this would not add much to their picture of what the officers did or did not do in these cases. Furthermore we observed 134 incidents that included violence, or the threat thereof, 131 incidents in which the officers made an arrest (these two categories do overlap in 39 cases) and 212 incidents in which a marginal person was involved, including pitiful cases that might evoke feelings of, for example, guilt or unfairness.

Neither did we experience ethical problems. None of the field workers reported cases in which they could not bear the police officers behaviour towards the public or towards other peoples belongings. Neither did they report cases in which they thought the police officers behaviour was 'strange' or otherwise against the prevailing social convention. Of course by saying this we do not claim that our field work proved that police officers on patrol never act against rules. The point here is that our observations were never disrupted because of a difference of opinion on ethical matters between the field workers and police officers.

As we have already said we tried to influence as little as possible what officers did or did not undertake. Yet, as one could expect, we were not able to observe the officers and not to have any effect at all.

(1) Occasionally we did lend a helping hand when officers had already begun a certain action. Below we give some examples of this. We helped the officers to put in place crush barriers in connection with a weekly market. Once or twice the officers asked us to read a text for them so that they could make notes, or they asked us to write down certain information for them, which we then did. We once took care of a victims bicycle and once we looked after some school children who, with the community beat officers' permission, played in and around the police car, to ensure that their fingers would not get jammed by the car doors. A researcher who would not now and then give any assistance to the officers, would put his relationship with the officers under pressure, risking that the officers also would minimize their cooperation and bog down the study. With this in mind, we felt that we did not have the choice to decide not to assist the officers at all. All the same we tried not to influence what kind of initiatives the officers took or how they settled incidents they were involved with.

The field workers who were employed as law enforcement officers were in a special position since they could lend the officers a helping hand as a fellow-officer, which they actively did on three occasions. In the first case the officers whom we observed were deployed to a fatal case: a one and a half year old child drowned in a pond somewhere in the middle of a residential area. Several emergency services arrived, including a helicopter for medical aid. Right away local residents turned up, forming a crowd at the scene. Many residents were emotionally involved. The fieldworker, being employed as a police officer with the rank of inspector, in this case did not only lend his colleagues a helping hand but also took control over a part of the police work on the spot. In another occasion the same fieldworker did lend the officers a helping hand by confiscating the clothes of a victim of a shoot-out. Because some people involved were caught up in blazing emotions, it was a great advantage for police work that the fieldworker, wearing civilian clothes of course, was not recognizable as an officer. In a third case the field worker assisted the officers by interrogating a man who was arrested for shoplifting. This happened at the police station, so this helping hand did not directly affect police patrol work, but it did so in an indirectly manner since because of this help the officers and the field worker sooner went out on patrol again.

(2) Even when we did not take any specific action such as lending a helping hand, we sometimes suspected or noticed that our presence had an effect on what the officers did. It was clear to the officers that we were interested in patrol work, especially in the officers' activities. The officers knew that we took notes about all their interactions with the public. Occasionally we noticed that the officers wanted to please the fieldworkers by giving them something extra to observe.

Sometimes a community beat officer indicated that when the researcher went along with him he would go on patrol sooner than usual and would let the paperwork wait for awhile. That of course could have had some effect on the view that we got of that work. Indeed, if a community beat officer goes on patrol in order to please the researcher and apart from that has no definite goal in mind, perhaps he might have filled in that time differently than when he would have gone on patrol with a specific goal in mind.

Now and then community beat officers as well as emergency patrol officers asked the field worker if there were specific places that he/she wanted to go to. In such cases the field worker always answered that the officers should not let their comings and goings be affected by the fieldworkers presence. Nevertheless, the officers on occasion showed specific places or persons to the fieldworker, such was the case, to give an example, when a community beat officer went to see a man who lived in a house with no electricity and no gas and who seriously neglected himself as well as his house. Many of the officers we observed found it interesting that their work became part of an international comparative study of police patrol work. Some officers showed to be curious about what the field workers did record about their work and how many incidents the field work notes included. We once heard one officer say to his colleague, pointing at a car, 'that one we should have stopped, so we had another one included'.

(3) Sometimes the mere fact that the police officers are accompanied by an extra person affects what police work entails. In one occasion the officers had to transport two detainees. Because of the presence of the field worker, in the police car there was just only room enough for one extra person, as a result of which the officers asked for an extra car on the spot. On the other hand it also happened that a community beat officer did transport a detainee without asking the assistance of a colleague, since there already was an extra person he could count on in case of unexpected problems.

Further more we sometimes noticed that the officers were concerned about the field workers safety when out on patrol. In some cases the officers saw to it that the field worker

got him/herself a bullet proof vest. Once, when reacting to a burglar alarm, the officers took the field worker in between them when they went into the shop involved. We do not know if the fact that the officers showed concern about the field workers safety affected the figures that we use to characterize police patrol work. In short, we sometimes noticed that the officers felt that they had to protect the field worker against possible danger, we saw that this influenced their behaviour (arrange a vest, walk next to the field worker), and we can't completely rule out the possibility that this affected the figures presented in the empirical chapters.

(4) Now and then we noticed that citizens reacted to the field workers presence. Citizens sometimes took the field worker for a plain cloth police officer. Once the sister of a man who at that moment had trouble with his ex-wife, addressed the field worker because she did not want to speak to the uniformed police officer, since he had no more than one stripe on his uniform. The other, more experienced officer was inside a house, talking with the ex-wife. Following the guidelines, the field worker did not enter into a conversation with the ex-husbands sister. As soon as the other police officer arrived on the street again, the sister started talking with him. In this case the field worker became involved in the interaction between the police and the public. It is unclear whether or to what extent this has affected the course of events. In another case a citizen only wanted to speak with the community beat officer without the presence of the field worker, as a result of which the field worker was not able to observe the whole interaction. Another time the officers were assigned to a compulsory admission to hospital. After they arrived at the hospital the patient became aggressive because of the field workers presence. The field worker then went to another room so as to not to disturb the course of events unnecessarily.

In brief, citizens may take the field worker for a plain cloth police officer. Every now and then we noticed that this had an effect on the citizens behaviour during an incident. As a consequence in these cases the field workers presence influenced the course of the interaction to at least some degree. However, we did not get the impression that this was a factor determining how officers eventually acted.

(5) In some occasions the field worker, intended or unintended, became part of the interaction, having a clear effect on the course of the incident. In one case a citizen asked the officers where a certain street was, which they did not know. The field worker however knew the street and told the citizen how to get there. In another case the officers had to transport a youngster to a refugee centre for minors; they were not sure about how to drive. The field worker thought he knew and he told the officers. However, since the field worker confused this centre with another refugee centre in the same neighbourhood, he showed them the wrong way. When the officers got near the centre, the minor recognized the neighbourhood and told them how they should drive. In one case the field worker recognized a wanted person who walked on the street and she told the officers. 'It would have almost felt like cheating the officers if I would not have told them.' – the field worker notes in her additional field work report. The officers checked the man and indeed found that he was wanted because of a raid the week before. The field worker did not include this incident in the research since it was she who initiated this arrest. But although this incident is not included, the fact that the field worker pointed out the wanted person, as a result of which the officers made an arrest and went back to the police station, meant that the officers did not do whatever they would have done if the field worker would have kept silent about the wanted person. Perhaps they would have checked one or two cars instead.

The above considerations and examples illustrate that we have given thought to the question to what extent our presence had an effect on comings and goings of the officers. Taking into account that we have observed more than four thousand incidents, the above list is limited.

The influence we observed was relatively small and our impression is therefore that our presence has not led to significant different police work than usual. But we cannot prove that, because, after all, we are not capable of telling which transformations escaped our attention.

2.4 Organisation and inter-observer reliability

The international research team consists of one or sometimes two principal researchers per country. One of them, Wouter Stol, initiated the research and played a leading role throughout the research. The field work in the twelve different places was conducted by thirteen different persons (see table 2.2), each of them being a local student, junior researcher or a staff member of the police.

At various times attention is given to the inter-observer reliability. Wouter Stol supervised the field work in all participating countries since he used the same research method before at different occasions (1996, 2006). Besides, he is able to read the languages of the countries involved (Dutch, German, Danish and Norwegian) so the field workers could make their field work notes in their native language.

Preceding each fieldwork the field work supervisor and the local research team in question (the principal researcher and the field workers) discussed the working procedures to be followed on the basis of an observation protocol. The protocol included definitions of key concepts, such as patrol work, emergency patrol, community beat patrol, incident and encounter; and instructions as to how to record their observations (section 2.1). Furthermore the research protocol provided the field workers with guidelines about how many and what kind of duties should be included into the field work (section 2.3).

The field workers produced two key documents: their completely worked-out field work notes and SPSS code forms – one for each incident. Although the field workers were asked to describe every incident in their own words, they were also asked to take into account the SPSS variables when describing an incident. The golden rule here is that whenever a variable has another value than zero, the why has to be clear from the field work notes. If, for example, SPSS variable ‘BEKPERS (Are the officers dealing with a person they are acquainted with?)’ has value 01 (yes), it must be clear from the field work notes why this variable has this value; the field work notes must then include a sentence such as ‘the officers know this man since he owns a shop in their district’.

Every description of an incident together with the corresponding SPSS code form went through a working procedure that was designed to achieve the highest possible level of inter-observer reliability. The field worker completed the field work notes and the corresponding code forms as soon as possible after the observations took place. He/she then sent this draft data set to the field work supervisor who checked for each incident (a) whether the field work notes and the SPSS codes did tally with one another, and (b) whether the incidents were coded in accordance with the current definitions – that is to say the definitions used in earlier studies within the framework of this line of research (Stol, 1996, 2006). When the field work notes and the SPSS codes did not match, because there was information about police patrol work in the field notes that could not be found in the SPSS-form or the other way around, or when the field worker had used an SPSS code different from how it was used in earlier research, the field work supervisor asked the field worker for a clarification. Usually matters were clarified by the field workers answer, sometimes another exchange of e-mail was needed to get things clear and make the necessary corrections.

2.5 Research data

During the emergency patrol we have observed a total of 1,166 hours police work on patrol spread over 251½ shifts, each shift taking eight hours. We recorded 2,089 incidents, including 911 calls from the public. Consequently, the average number of incidents per observation

hour is 1.8. (table 2.2). In total we were on patrol with community beat officers during 809 hours, spread over 223½ eight-hour shifts. During these 809 hours on patrol we noted 2,094 incidents, 323 of which are calls. The average number of incidents per community beat patrol hour is 2.6. The observational studies in both Belgian cities show an exceptional high number of incidents per observation hour (table 2.3). That is the data on which the descriptions of police patrol work are based in the following chapters.

Table 2.2: Emergency Patrol – data

| | <i>Shifts</i> | <i>Hours of observation on the street</i> | <i>Observed incidents</i> | <i>... of which are calls *</i> | <i>Number of incidents per observation hour</i> |
|------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Groningen (NL) | 20 | 91 | 281 | 117 | 3.1 |
| Leeuwarden (NL) | 20 | 105 | 171 | 84 | 1.6 |
| Assen (NL) | 20 | 77 | 175 | 80 | 2.3 |
| Roskilde (DK) | 20 | 76 | 136 | 42 | 1.8 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 20 | 101 | 246 | 59 | 2.4 |
| Bochum (D) | 20 | 91 | 167 | 79 | 1.8 |
| Münster (D) | 20 | 96 | 129 | 72 | 1.4 |
| Brussel (B) | 20 | 121 | 191 | 89 | 1.6 |
| Dendermonde (B) | 20 | 80 | 109 | 66 | 1.4 |
| Aarschot (B) | 20 | 79 | 152 | 76 | 1.9 |
| Oslo (N) | 25 | 138 | 199 | 81 | 1.4 |
| Lillestrøm | 26½ | 111 | 133 | 66 | 1.2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>251½</i> | <i>1,166</i> | <i>2,089</i> | <i>911</i> | <i>1.8</i> |

*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding ‘answering a question from the public’ (var06=65) and ‘chatting with the public’ (var06=84).

Not in all places we managed to observe the desired 20 shifts of community beat patrol. In Groningen (18), Assen (18) and Bochum (19) this actually had no special reason. In these places we were simply not able to make 20 shifts within the time frame that we had set for the field work (we planned to do 20 shifts of community beat patrol within 5 weeks, including the writing of the field work reports – see also appendix 3). In the above three cities sometimes there were no community beat patrol officers available at our police station. If that was the case, we interrupted our field work and did not count that day as a shift. We did not run into this problem when observing emergency patrol officers, since the police give a high priority to this type of patrol work and, consequently, there always are some emergency patrol officers on duty and out on patrol.

In Oslo and Lillestrøm we managed to observe no more than 15 and 13½ shifts of community beat patrol respectively. This has to do with the fact that the Norwegian police have chosen not to establish separate police units with community beat officers. Community beat policing, or better said the Norwegian variant of this called ‘problem oriented policing’ (see chapter 7), is carried out by the same officers as those assigned to emergency patrol. Since, as we have already said, emergency patrol has the highest priority in police patrol work, during the five weeks that we had planned to observe community beat patrol it happened several times that there were no officers assigned to this type of patrol work. To make a good use of our time we decided to make some extra observations of emergency patrol instead (see table 2.2).

Table 2.3: Community Beat Patrol – data

| | <i>Shifts</i> | <i>Hours of observation on the street</i> | <i>Observed incidents</i> | <i>... of which are calls *</i> | <i>Number of incidents per observation hour</i> |
|------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Groningen (NL) | 18 | 59 | 179 | 28 | 3.0 |
| Leeuwarden (NL) | 20 | 101 | 185 | 43 | 1.8 |
| Assen (NL) | 18 | 53 | 163 | 25 | 3.1 |
| Roskilde (DK) | 20 | 48 | 114 | 16 | 2.4 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 20 | 57 | 116 | 14 | 2.0 |
| Bochum (D) | 19 | 72 | 196 | 20 | 2.7 |
| Münster (D) | 20 | 79 | 162 | 18 | 2.1 |
| Brussel (B) | 20 | 42 | 175 | 19 | 4.2 |
| Dendermonde (B) | 20 | 100 | 489 | 71 | 4.9 |
| Aarschot (B) | 20 | 59 | 78 | 8 | 1.3 |
| Oslo (N) | 15 | 85 | 155 | 34 | 1.8 |
| Lillestrøm (N) | 13½ | 54 | 82 | 30 | 1.5 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>223½</i> | <i>809</i> | <i>2,094</i> | <i>323</i> | <i>2.6</i> |

*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding ‘answering a question from the public’ (var06=65) and ‘chatting with the public’ (var06=84).

CHAPTER 3

Policing the Streets in The Netherlands

Wouter Stol, George Wildeboer, Astrid Wassenaar and Frits Tuijt

3.1 The Dutch Police*The police organization*

The role of the Dutch police is put into words in section 2 of the Dutch Police Act 1993: ‘The police have the task, subordinate to the competent authority and in accordance with the applicable rules of law, of upholding the rule of law and rendering assistance to those who need it.’ ‘Upholding the rule of law’ includes law enforcement (fighting crime) as well as the maintenance of public order. Another facet of police work is the performance of policing tasks for the justice authorities (BZK, 2004).

Since 1993 the Dutch police organization has consisted of 25 regional police forces and a National Police Services Agency (KLPD). The latter comprises eleven divisions including Traffic Police (policing on motorways), Railway Police, Water Police, Aviation Police, Mounted Police and Police Dogs Service, and a National Criminal Investigation Department (especially against organized crime). The KLPD-divisions have a responsibility for policing special situations and/or policing some key parts of the Dutch infrastructure (motorways, railways, waterways, aviation). However, the prime responsibility for policing in The Netherlands rests with the regional police forces.

Every regional force is responsible for policing in its territory. As a rule each force is geographically broken down into districts which on their turn are geographically subdivided into police teams or units for basic police services such as patrol work, detective work, traffic enforcement and community beat policing. (A few of the smaller forces have removed the middle organizational layer.) The great majority of Dutch police officers are assigned to a police team.

Of course the officers in a police team frequently need support from more specialized departments. For this reason regional police forces have various supporting divisions such as a criminal investigation department, information desk, crime prevention department, traffic police, juvenile police, vice squad, aliens police, technical investigation department, and the like. As a rule such supporting divisions are situated on a regional level; in some occasions however, we may find supporting units, mostly in the field of crime investigation, on district level, but never on the level of a police team.

National police policy

It is national police policy that the police operate as closely as possible to the public (BZK 2004, PVP 2005). As a result of this high priority is given to the concept of community beat policing. This means that every police team employs at least a few community beat patrol officers, each of whom is assigned to a specific neighbourhood within the area of the team in question. A community beat officers’ territory theoretically has a population of ‘only a few thousand inhabitants’ (Beumer, 1997). It is the community beat officers’ primary task to establish and maintain good relationships between the police and the public and to settle social problems in their neighbourhood. Their style is problem oriented and when they tackle a problem they use an integrated approach, which means that they cooperate with relevant partners and/or other relief agencies and that they also (try to) mobilize the problem solving capacity of the local community. The community beat officers’ leading motto is ‘to know and to be known’.

Another facet of national policy that applied to policing during the years of our field work in The Netherlands (2005-2006) is that the police should give more attention to maintaining the law and less to rendering assistance. According to the first Balkenende cabinet (2002)¹¹ the police was carrying out its legal obligation to give assistance too freely. The police ministers write in their so-called *security memorandum*: ‘The police must direct itself more to enforcement and tracking down criminals. Even though assistance is a legal duty of the police, in practice this duty has been carried out too liberally. ...Assistance activities which are not critical, that now demand too much capacity, are therefore stopped or transferred as much as possible.’ (Memorandum 2002:79). The second Balkenende cabinet (2003-2006), with the same police ministers in it, has taken over this memorandum entirely (Memorandum 2003:6).

In addition, according to the safety memorandum, it must be possible to express the results of police work in measurable terms: ‘In a national covenant performance agreements with concrete target values will be set down. An example of this is the stated objective ... that 20,000 cases extra will be handled, with the accent on multiple offenders. Furthermore for example agreements will also be made about the visibility of the police ..., the number of fines ..., the satisfaction of citizens concerning contact with the police, percentages of absenteeism et cetera’ (Memorandum 2002:85). Consequently during the period of our field work, the police were bound to performance contracts, including targets with respect to how many offenders had to be fined.

National police data bases

With respect to patrol work the Dutch police have access to several national police databases. First there is the Vehicle Register, maintained by the National Transport Agency (NTA) and containing information about who the owner of the car is, the periodic motor vehicle test (MOT), car insurance, road tax and of course the cars’ technical characteristics. The NTA also manages the national drivers’ license register. Furthermore, the police have at their disposal a Wanted Person Register and a register with information on stolen goods, including cars, mopeds and bicycles. Finally, the national Criminal Record System allow police officers to check someone’s criminal records.

Although this is not a police database, the police also have access to the register of births, deaths and marriages.

Police officers in the three Dutch cities can obtain information from the above-mentioned databases via the incident room. They do not have mobile data terminals to retrieve data without someone else’s intervention.

3.2 Police in Groningen, Leeuwarden and Assen

The three cities

Groningen, Leeuwarden and Assen are provincial capitals in the relatively sparsely populated northern part of The Netherlands.¹² Especially Groningen and Leeuwarden can be pictured as cities against the background of a rural area with villages, farmland and a few smaller towns. Assen, the smallest of the three, is less dominant in its county because that county includes at least one other city of about the same size. Furthermore, Assen lies no more than approximately 30 kilometres south of Groningen, which also adds to its less dominant position.

As to size (182.000 inhabitants), Groningen is the seventh city of The Netherlands and ‘the capital’ of the Northern part of the country. Groningen university was founded in 1614

¹¹ This cabinet was in power from 22 July 2002 only until 16 October 2002.

¹² Groningen is not only the name of the city but also of the province it is the capital of.

and the city has all the characteristics one would expect of a university town. In addition to this, Groningen also has an academic hospital and a university of applied sciences. The old inner city, surrounded by canals, is characterized by a shopping area, places of entertainment, a market square with town hall and the Martini Tower, which is widely known. In total, Groningen houses some 46 thousand students, over a quarter of all inhabitants. The inner city is known for its bustling nightlife, and contrary to most other large cities in The Netherlands Groningen does not have strict closing times for pubs. The city also has some older working class neighbourhoods, for example in the north of Groningen, which is where our study was conducted.

The district Groningen-North consists of 5 quarters: Oosterparkwijk, De Hoogte, Oranjestraat, Korrewegwijk and Centrum-Noord. The income position of many inhabitants of Groningen-Noord is weak, the level of education is low, unemployment is high, houses are small. There are drug issues. Various day shelters have been set up for problematical cases (homeless persons, drug addicts). The methadone post of the Care and Treatment of Drug Addicts Northern Netherlands (Dutch: Verslavingszorg Noord Nederland) is located in this district. The percentage of non-western migrants of 9.9 % is just above the average of Groningen (9.0 %) and just under the national average of 10.4 %.¹³

The Oosterparkwijk is widely known because of the Oosterpark riots of December 1997, when the (mainly white) inhabitants turned against the police after disorders. The quarter was depicted rather unflatteringly in a television programme about problem neighbourhoods in The Netherlands. At the start of our field work the (also widely known) Oosterpark Stadium was still in use, which was the place where FC Groningen used to play its home matches. In December 2005, during our field work period, the last matches were played in the stadium. After that, FC Groningen moved to the new Euroborg Stadium on the outskirts of the city.

Two other quarters of Groningen-Noord are on the list of forty problem neighbourhoods the national government focuses on especially: De Hoogte and Korrewegwijk. Oranjestraat and Centrum-Noord are the two better quarters of Groningen-Noord. More people with a higher income as well as students live there.

Leeuwarden only has half the inhabitants of Groningen (91.000 inhabitants). Leeuwarden does not have a university, but it does have institutions for higher education. The old inner city, also surrounded by canals, harbours the same elements as the inner city of Groningen, albeit on a smaller scale. The city has some 17 thousand students. Which is, relatively, less than Groningen, but still quite enough to set a stamp on city life. Like Groningen, the population of Leeuwarden consists for 9.0 % of non-western migrants. The district where we conducted our study comprises the city centre as well as the western part of the town, including quarters on the outskirts of the city, with primarily offices and businesses. The research area also comprised the socially weak quarter Bilgaard, where problems occur with Antillean youth. From there, they also operate in the inner city.

Assen is the smallest city of the three (63.000 inhabitants). The city does not have any large educational institutions as Groningen and Leeuwarden do, but it has a regional function with regard to employment, shopping and recreation. Due to many green spaces and a large surface area, Assen has a more rural character, as compared to the other two cities. The population density is relatively low (see table 3.1). Assen is expanding, the annual growth of the population is approx. 1000. There are no real problem areas. Due to the fact that the city is the regional centre for the shelter of the homeless, it harbours relatively many homeless people. A part of this group also has an addiction. In addition, the city also has various institutions for mental health, as a result of which relatively many (former) psychiatric patients live in Assen. The population of Assen consists for no more than 5.7 % of non-

¹³ Source: www.cbs.nl, reference date 1 January 2005. The observations took place in 2005.

western migrants. It should not be left unmentioned that the city also has a large Moluccan community which has its own, originally non-western identity, but this has not been taken into account in the percentage.¹⁴ The research area in Assen is of mixed character. Apart from the city centre, it comprises a working class area of rustic rather than urban character, an older quarter and a fast-growing new housing estate.

Police in Groningen-North

The regional police force Groningen has 1,600 employees¹⁵ and it is organized into three districts, which have in turn been subdivided into units for basic police services. Our observations were performed in the unit Groningen-Noord.¹⁶ The units are primarily responsible for the police services in their area. The force has a few specialist departments on a regional and district level to support the units, such as traffic, environment, capital crime, immigration affairs, public order and special laws.

Unit-Noord is 58 employees strong. Its surveillance area is no more than 5 km² and a population density of 7.600 inhabitants per km² (see table 3.1). This makes it the smallest area except for the research area in Brussels, and, again except for Brussels, the area with the largest population density.

The majority of the unit's police officers are assigned to basic police services (see figure 3.1, box with double outline), which means that they perform various front line activities such as emergency patrol, detective work, and tasks in the sphere of community beat policing. In other words, the officers assigned to basic police services form a pool of officers that fulfill different job roles in the frontline of the organization. The management of the unit Groningen-Noord consists of a chief inspector (the unit leader) and four inspectors who each supervise a certain aspect of the work as 'project leader', such as community beat policing, traffic or investigation. In turn they act as Chief of Operations, which means that they are in charge of current affairs (see figure 3.1). Police sergeants (the rank just below inspector) do not have a formal supervisory role, but they are specialist in one specific area, such as youth or community beat policing. These 'Professional Experts' perform executive police work in their field. They fall directly under the unit chief and are expected to jointly direct the police officers assigned to basic police services, for example by providing information at the briefing or by initiating projects. In the course of the research we have observed on several occasions that a community beat officers or detective told other policemen during a briefing what he knew about a certain problem in the quarter, such as a trouble location or rape case.


¹⁴ The Moluccas are a group of islands in the Malay Archipelago. In the years 1945-1949, Moluccan soldiers fought for The Netherlands, that tried to restore her authority in the former Dutch East Indies after WWII. When The Netherlands gave up its attempts, forced by international pressure, and as a temporary measure some thousands Moluccan soldiers were brought to The Netherlands. Later, they would be able to return, the Dutch idea was, after the Moluccas would have obtained some kind of independence in a federation with Indonesia. Indonesia did however not recognize the strive for independence, the Dutch part had been played out, and Indonesia established a unified state of which the Moluccas were a part. The former soldiers who then lived in The Netherlands did not return to the Moluccas for fear of a hostile reception because they had fought for The Netherlands, against Indonesia. The Moluccans moved from their temporary accommodation (often barracks or camps) to 'Moluccan quarters', that still exist today, as in Assen. The second generation Moluccans in The Netherlands fought for a free Moluccan Republic in the 1970s using radical actions, and demanded that the government would finally dedicate itself to it. Among other things, they took hostage dozens of people in the provincial government building in Assen on March 13, 1978, at which action they shot dead one of the hostages. Although Moluccan quarters still exist and maintain their own identity, there has been no tension for a long time.

¹⁵ This number consists of executive as well as administrative and technical personnel. Source: *Kerngegevens Nederlandse politie over het jaar 2005*. Den Haag: BZK.

¹⁶ Regional Force Groningen covers the *province* Groningen, the unit Groningen-North covers the northern part of the *city* Groningen.

The Groningen Police Force has an annual work plan, partly based on national performance contracts with the ministers involved. At the time of the field work these contracts also comprised targets with regard to the quantity of charges to be made.¹⁷ Every police officer is supposed to contribute to this. The management of a unit draws up a unit work plan based on the regional work plan, taking into account the specific situation in the work areas of the unit. Local policemen regularly make an analysis of the problems in their area. Their findings co-determine the content of the unit work plan. At the time of our field work, priorities were for example dealing with violence, assault, sexual offences, burglary and vandalism. As far as traffic is concerned the unit has no distinct priorities, because the initiation of actions in the field of traffic lies primarily with the specialists in traffic who work outside the unit.

Figure 3.1: Organizational chart of unit Groningen-North



The emergency patrol is not directed from the own station, but from headquarters. Investigation is partly organised from within the unit (a crime team of five police officers) but for example also on district level. Police officers who are working on investigation and detective work on a district level are managed by the district and not by their own unit.

The daily activities of the Professional Experts and the other unit members is, insofar as they are working on tasks that fall within the unit, coordinated by one of the project leaders in his role as Chief of Operations. Among other things, he presents the briefing at the start of the shift. The briefing is mainly an exchange of information, for example about current events in the quarter and focus points of the youth and local police officers.

The idea is that, during emergency patrol, if they are not working on an assignment for head office, police officers work on the unit work plan or other points of special interest,

¹⁷ These national quantitative targets were much criticized, especially because it was expected that the quantity of charges would become a target in itself ('production of measly cases' just in order to meet the target). Partly because of this the later performance agreements no longer stress the quantity of charges.

among which matters that have been brought up by community beat officers or youth officers. They have to be able to break off their work the moment an emergent call comes in from headquarters.


Police in Leeuwarden Centrum/West

The regional police force Friesland has 1,480 employees and consists of six districts, that have been subdivided into units. The area of a unit has been geographically subdivided into neighbourhoods. Our research was conducted in the district Leeuwarden in unit Centrum/West. In Friesland, as in the rest of The Netherlands, the police units are primarily responsible for basic police services in their area. They can be supported by specialist teams at district and force-level, for example in the fields of detective work or traffic.

Team Centrum/West has 59 employees. The surveillance area comprises approx. 11 km², and has a population density of 4.500 inhabitants per km². This makes Leeuwarden in our research the third smallest (after Brussels and Groningen) surveillance area and the largest population density (see table 3.1) – although Leeuwarden is only the sixth city in our study as far as population of the entire city is concerned (see table 2.1).

Also in Leeuwarden the majority of the unit's police officers form a pool assigned to basic police services (figure 3.2, box with double outline). The management of the unit consists of a unit leader, who is seconded by a few permanent Neighbourhood Coordinators, a Crime Coordinator and a Chief of Operations, who are all police sergeants. The Crime Coordinator is part of the pool for local police services. With the fight of crime he also involves the 3/4-teams and emergency patrol, whom he gives assignments when to go out on the streets. Officially however, his coordinating activities go via the Chief of Operations. For the Chief of Operations supervises the daily activities of the neighbourhood teams and this function is fulfilled in turn by one of the police sergeants of the team, or by one of the Neighbourhood Coordinators. A Neighbourhood Coordinator also performs emergency services. The sergeant who is fulfilling the role of Chief of Operations is also in charge of the briefing. At that occasion he gives the attendees information about recent events in the quarter, and sometimes issues a work order.

Figure 3.2: Organizational chart of unit Leeuwarden-Centrum/West



As in Groningen, the Friesland Police work with a work plan that is derived from the national annual work plan. And here too the plan is translated into an annual work plan for the team, in our case team Centrum/West, partly based on local events. At the time of the field work local policy paid special attention to monitoring alcohol and drug addicts, with the objective to reduce disturbances in the street. There was a special fast procedure for dealing with addicts that were caught in the act of drinking alcohol in public, or who still had unpaid fines: the Fast Disposing of Addicts (FDA, Dutch: Versnelde Afhandeling Verslaafden (VAV)). In the station an FDA-cell was especially reserved for arrested addicts, so that they could actually be dealt with quickly. Naturally, agreements had been made with the Public Prosecutor about this approach. Main objective was to reduce the number of loitering addicts in the streets of Leeuwarden. Part of the FDA-protocol was that addicts were also offered help. Other priorities of the team were to prevent violence, housebreaking and youth disturbances. In the field of traffic the so-called marram grass facts¹⁸ took priority: helmet, seatbelt, red light, alcohol and speed, with special attention for complaint locations.

Police sergeants assigned to basic police services usually have a task focus, such as domestic violence, addicts or centre-youth. Within the unit, they have a coordinating and informative task with regard to that focus, but they also perform executive police work. The pool of officers assigned to basic police services is subdivided into neighbourhood networks: groups of policemen that are coupled to their own neighbourhood in the quarter. Each neighbourhood network has a Neighbourhood Coordinator. The Neighbourhood Coordinator is a community beat officer whose role is coordinating rather than executive. This often prevents him from doing surveillance work in the neighbourhood. When he does enter the neighbourhood, it is often a purposeful visit to someone to discuss a particular problem. For police interventions concerning smaller problems that are basically part of the range of duties of the community beat officer, the Neighbourhood Coordinator can appeal to surveillance

¹⁸ In the field of traffic the 'marram grass' facts are well-known general police priorities in The Netherlands, and therefore not specific for Leeuwarden. Marram grass or beach grass (*ammophila arenaria*) is a firm type of grass that grows in the Dutch dunes, and fulfills an important function there in maintaining this natural protection against floods.

duo: the so-called 3/4-team, which is especially formed for this, and which is to act in case of incidents with a low priority (priority 3 and 4).¹⁹ Due to the fact that the Neighbourhood Coordinators are not often on the street, our observations mainly refer to the 3/4-teams.

The police officers assigned to basic police services perform various types of activities, also dependent on their rank and experience. More experienced police officers or higher educated police officers are mainly deployed for emergency assistance and detective work, while the 3/4-surveillance is also performed by less experienced policemen. Police sergeants can also fulfil the role of Chief of Operations.

The emergency patrol (priorities 1 and 2)²⁰ are performed between 07:00 and 23:00 h under responsibility of the unit; in the nocturnal hours emergency assistance is carried out on a regional level, under responsibility of police headquarters.

Due to the fact that emergency patrol is only awarded priority 1 and 2, the emergency patrol officers are not constantly occupied, and so they can also work on cases that have priority in their own neighbourhood, which is also what is expected of them.

Table 3.1: Strength of the Dutch police teams under observation, police-inhabitant ratio and population density

| | Strength (number of employees)* | Area covered by EP (km ²) | Inhabitants in this area # | Inhabitants per employee | Population density (inh./km ²) |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Groningen (NL) | 58 | 4.9 | 37,380 | 640 | 7,600 |
| Leeuwarden (NL) | 59 | 10.7 | 47,710 | 810 | 4,500 |
| Assen (NL) | 48 | 49.9 | 24,930 | 520 | 500 |
| <i>TOTAL PSE</i> | <i>1,741</i> | <i>1,646.9</i> | <i>837,420</i> | <i>480</i> | <i>510</i> |

* : including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.

Police in Assen-Centrum/Zuid

The police force Drenthe employs 1,010 employees and is geographically divided over three districts, which have been divided into police units. There are support units on a district and force level. So far, the situation is comparable to Groningen and Friesland. Our field work took place in the basic unit Assen-Centrum/Zuid.

This unit is 48 employees strong, and that makes it a smaller unit than the ones in Groningen and Friesland that we have just discussed (see: Table 3.1). The surveillance area of 50 km² is significantly larger than that of Groningen (5 km²) and Leeuwarden (11 km²), but the population density is significantly lower, with 500 inhabitants per km². This makes Assen one of the low-urban or rural areas of our study (cf. Table 2.2).

The management of the Assen-unit consists of a unit leader seconded by three team leaders for the daily supervision of the police officers who are assigned to basic police services. The team leaders are in charge of the daily briefing and they distribute the work. They are supported in that by two Planning Officers. The unit also has community beat officers and youth officers. As in Groningen, they directly fall under the unit chief – only the Groningen community beat and youth officers are called Professional Experts (see Figure 3.1).


¹⁹ Priority 3 and 4 are incidents where police action is not urgent or can be delayed.

²⁰ Priority 1 are incidents which are immediately life-threatening (such as: car in water, hostage) or politiemensen in distress; priority 2 are reports where police action cannot be delayed (such as housebreaking in the act, fight, et cetera).

The unit Assen-Centrum-Zuid also has an annual work plan that has been derived from the regional annual work plan (which in its turn has been partly derived from the national performance contracts between the Minister and chiefs of police). Although the priorities within the unit are a derivative of regional police policy, care is taken to give this a local interpretation. Information from community beat officers are an important source for this local interpretation. One of these local projects is policing the nightlife. Substantial priorities in the annual work plan of the unit were the handling of juvenile crime, of recidivists and of domestic violence (in both cases, in accordance with a regional protocol), violence in the public domain (especially connected to the nightlife), sexual offences, traffic (un)safety (number of checks, derived from national performance contracts) and environment (especially noise pollution from pubs).

Police officers who are assigned to basic police services (see: Figure 3.3, box with double outline) have various main tasks. They are available to the incident room to respond to emergency reports that do not tolerate delay (priority 1 and 2). In accordance with a rotation system they sometimes are deployed for investigation work on unit level. A detective of the district detective unit supports the detective work at unit level, while the responsibility and so the official steering remains with the unit. Otherwise, the policemen work as much as possible on tasks and projects in the sphere of community beat policing. There is no official authoritative relationship between Community Beat officers and the officers assigned to basis police services, but there is a mutual tuning in by way of informal contacts. As in Groningen, (see: Figure 3.1) the Community Beat Officers in Assen do not directly steer the officers who are assigned to basic police services. They do in Leeuwarden, in the neighbourhood networks (see: Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.3: Organizational chart of unit Assen-Centrum/Zuid



Each morning the Chief of Operations holds a briefing. The theme is exchange of information about recent events in the work area. Sometimes the Chief gives a work order during a briefing, but usually that happens at other moments. At the end of the day there is a debriefing. The events of the day are discussed (exchange of information).

Police in Groningen, Leeuwarden, Assen: the outlines

In outline there are resemblances between the units. The fact that police officers jointly shape a group or pool for basic police services is a central point for all three units. No separate organisation entities with a permanent staff have been set up for emergency patrol and detective work: emergency patrol and detective work are no departments with their own chiefs and its own policy, but they are considered as work processes that are executed by alternating police officers from the group of police officers for basic police services. The units do have permanent community beat and youth officers. With their expertise they are considered to jointly shape the work of the other unit members, to firmly base the concept of community policing. Furthermore, all units have members that change roles or tasks, such as officers assigned to basic police services or youth officers who temporarily function as emergency officer or help with detective work, coordinators who temporarily work as Chief of Operations, or planners who temporarily cooperate in a project. Although each of the three units still know the classic line-staff structure (mainly the upper part of the figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.), the units have been organised mainly around work processes (especially visible in the lower part of the figures). Instead of consisting of (sub)departments with a permanent staff and fixed tasks, the unit consists of work capacity which is more or less flexibly deployed in order to make the various work processes work as well as possible.

There are of course also differences between the three units. The most striking differences are:

- The Leeuwarden police unit does not have a clear organisational layer of deputy unit chiefs (see figure 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). The units in Groningen and Assen do have this layer (in Groningen the Project Managers and in Assen the Team Chiefs). The community beat and youth officers in Groningen and Assen directly fall under the unit leader, and therefore under a higher chief than the other unit members.
- The unit Leeuwarden-Centrum/West does not have a real *all-round* community beat officer; there are neighbourhood coordinators who have external meetings and who coordinate the neighbourhood policing internally, and there are 3/4-teams that (steered by the neighbourhood coordinators) perform the neighbourhood street work. Simpliciterly, one could say that the neighbourhood policing has been divided into a supervisory part at the station, and an executive part on the street. Contradictory to Groningen and Assen, in Leeuwarden there are no police officers who as community beat officers are standing somewhat outside the large group of officers for basic police services (boxes with double outline in figs. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). The community beat officers in Groningen and Assen do not have any official say over the deployment of other team members, as is the case with the Neighbourhood Coordinator in Leeuwarden.
- For the basic police services, in Leeuwarden the police officers have been divided into groups which are linked to a neighbourhood (neighbourhood network). Police officers with special tasks, such as youth, do not fall outside the group for basic police services in the organisation chart, as is the case in Groningen and Assen, but they are a part of it, with the exception of the Neighbourhood Coordinator who has been placed outside the group in the organisation chart, and who has a supervisory task with regard to the other unit members. However, the Neighbourhood Coordinator does not stand alone but is closely related to the other team members: he depends on the deployment of others for his

community work (especially the 3/4-team), he does day shifts as Chief of Operations, and he performs emergency assistance services.

Table 3.2: Work load

| | Observed incidents | ... of which are calls # | Inc./hour | Calls/hour | Police initiatives/hour |
|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|------------|------------|-------------------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 281 | 117 | ** 3.1 | ** 1.3 | ** 1.8 |
| Leeuwarden | 171 | 84 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Assen | 175 | 80 | 2.3 | 1.0 | 1.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>911</i> | <i>1.8</i> | <i>0.8</i> | <i>1.0</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 179 | 28 | 3.0 | 0.5 | 2.5 |
| Leeuwarden | 185 | 43 | ** 1.8 | 0.4 | 1.4 |
| Assen | 163 | 25 | 3.1 | 0.5 | 2.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>323</i> | <i>2.6</i> | <i>0.4</i> | <i>2.2</i> |

#: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding 'answering a question from the public' (var06=65) and 'chatting with the public' (var06=84).

* p<0.05 and ** p<0.01, independent t-test, comparing city with Total PSE.

An overview of the number of incidents (Table 3.2) shows that the emergency patrol in Groningen has relatively many incidents (3.1 per hour against 1.8 per hour on average over other places in our study). Police officers in Groningen act more frequently than average and also act more often on their own initiative. Leeuwarden has relatively less actions than average in community policing, which seems to be caused by the fact that the officers take relatively few actions on their own initiative.²¹ In the course of this chapter we will discuss these differences in more detail.

3.3 Kind of Incidents Involved in Patrol Work

Traffic

Incidents regularly concern traffic. In earlier research from various countries, the percentage of traffic in emergency patrol lies between 22 and 69 per cent (Stol, 1994). Research in The Netherlands shows that the percentage of traffic of community beat policing is usually lower than in emergency patrol (Stol, 2006). The outcomes of our study basically confirm these earlier findings. But there also are some special results.

Table 3.3: proportion of traffic

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 157 | 62.4 | 124 | 19.4 | 281 | 43.4 |
| Leeuwarden | 77 | ** 33.8 | 94 | 10.6 | 171 | ** 21.1 |
| Assen | 92 | ** 44.6 | 83 | 20.5 | 175 | 33.1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.074</i> | <i>62.9</i> | <i>1.015</i> | <i>18.9</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>41.6</i> |
| <i>Community Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 113 | 37.2 | 66 | 6.1 | 179 | 25.7 |

²¹ Although the difference between the 1.4 politie-initiatives per hour in Leeuwarden and the 2.2 average over all cities in this study, is just not significant.

| | | | | | | |
|------------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|--------------|-------------|
| Leeuwarden | 127 | * 26.0 | 58 | 3.4 | 185 | 18.9 |
| Assen | 121 | 44.6 | 42 | 9.5 | 163 | 35.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>567</i> | <i>39.5</i> | <i>658</i> | <i>6.7</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>29.2</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

To start with, the percentage of traffic in Leeuwarden emergency patrol is remarkably low with 21.1 per cent. The officers do not respond much to traffic offences while on emergency patrol (Appendix 3, Table A.12). Yet, in accordance with the performance contracts, the Leeuwarden unit should issue an average of 100 summons per officer, at which the citizen is stopped. Usually traffic checks in this unit are, however, executed outside the emergency patrols, for example by officers of the unit with the task focus on motor patrol. In addition, a district traffic team regularly performs traffic controls. Finally, there is a regional traffic team that is deployed on site of complaints, also within the working area of the unit Leeuwarden-Centrum/West. In this way, the major part of the activities intended by policy is organised in the field of traffic.

The officers of the Leeuwarden emergency patrol regularly pay attention to the focus points given in the briefing, such as places of disturbance the neighbourhood coordinators ask attention for. This mainly concerns hangouts of addicted vagrants. The officers regularly talk to one of these persons. On the same locations they look for persons that are still to be arrested, as mentioned in the briefing. Sometimes a specific task focus brings the officers to specific locations, mainly in relation with youngsters. Officers on emergency patrol also often perform activities in the field of crime. The chief of operations gives them assignments, for instance. Various incidents consist of the stopping of a suspect, securing a videotape of a surveillance camera, or handing over a court order. Twice the emergency patrol officers went door-to-door interviewing residents in connection with a housebreaking and a car theft. They called on various houses to ask whether the inhabitant has seen or heard anything. Each individual talk with the inhabitants during this residents interviewing was noted as a separate incident.²² During the observations we noticed that the emergency patrol officers' interest does not really lie with traffic. Traffic is not 'their thing'. They are interested in the addicts' and vagrants' issue in the neighbourhood, and crime fighting. Their attention specifically goes to the latter when they are not busy with a report. On these fields especially the Chief of Operations, or sometimes the crime coordinator, gives them focus points and internal assignments to do, such as processing a report, stopping a suspect, collecting evidence or delivering a court document.

In short, in Leeuwarden traffic takes up a smaller part of the street work because the attention for traffic has been arranged outside the emergency patrol, and the emergency patrol officers explicitly receive other focus points and tasks when they go out on the street (the work of emergency patrol officers in Leeuwarden consists of a relatively high percentage of internal jobs - Appendix 3, Table A.12). The deviating situation in Leeuwarden, the scant interest of the officers for matters concerning traffic, seems to be an intended effect of local police policy.

In Assen too the emergency patrol officers act relatively little in the field of traffic. According to the performance contracts the team should make 50 charges per officer per year, at which the citizen is stopped. (In Leeuwarden that was 100.) In Assen organised traffic controls fall outside emergency patrol, just as in Leeuwarden. Management does not stress booking during the briefing. Yet officers in Assen regularly charge someone for cycling without lights. This was related to the season: the observations took place in the months of

²² Emergency patrol officers interviewing residents as a result of a crime were only seen in the three Dutch cities (Appendix 3, Table A.12)

September up to and including November. A few officers even held a ‘competition’ where the number of summoned people was the stake. So, the attention of the Assen emergency patrol officers does go to traffic. And yet, insofar as the officer’s own initiatives are concerned, the traffic share is below average (44.6%). Two cases in which the emergency patrol officers were involved in interviewing residents because of a crime, are one of the causes (Appendix 3, Table A.12). During that they made contact 17 times with various local residents. If we ignore these two cases, the share of traffic in Assen no longer deviates from the average of all places.²³

A third deviating find is that community beat patrol in Leeuwarden consists of very little traffic cases, insofar as the officers act on their own initiative (26.0% against 39.5% average over all observations). The cause lies in a combination of factors. The neighbourhood policing in Leeuwarden is as it were split up into a policy part (the neighbourhood coordinator) and an executive part (the 3/4-team on the beat). We primarily observed the 3/4-team because the neighbourhood coordinator only went out on the street every now and then. The 3/4-team goes, like the emergency patrol officer, on the beat with specific orders. The team receives orders from the neighbourhood coordinator on the basis of neighbourhood policing, for example in the field of youth; the team also receives internal orders from the chief of operations or the crime coordinator, for example for the execution of a residents interviewing; and the team gets citizen calls with priority 3 and 4.

Four times the 3/4-team was involved in interviewing residents in connection with a (possible) crime: three times at the request of the chief of operations as a result of fire set to a car (in total 10 incidents), and once at the request of the crime coordinator as a result of a person who died in the street under suspicious circumstances (also 10 incidents). If we ignore these 20 incidents, the share of traffic in the Leeuwarden neighbourhood policing no longer deviates from the average of all places in our study.²⁴

Furthermore, the officers of the 3/4 team regularly pay attention to permanent hangouts where youth cause disturbances (Appendix 3, Table A.13). This usually happens on their own initiative. The incident in illustration 3.1 is an example of this.

Illustration 3.1: Boy with joint

On their own initiative, officers check various places of disturbance in the city centre. They focus on the youths. On one of these places the officers meet four youths. One of them tries to run away. The officers ask for the ID-cards of the youths. One of them does not have his ID-card on him. The officers make a note of his particulars. They see a nearly rolled joint on the ground behind the boys. The officers tell the boys that if they do not say whose joint it is, they will have to come to the station. One boy answers that the joint is his. The weed comes from a plant of his 19-year-old sister.

The officers warn the boy that next time he will be given a fine for smoking weed in public. (Officers cannot charge him yet, because the general bye-law still has to be adapted). According to the boy, the mother knows about the weed use of her daughter, but not about his. The officers take down the mother’s particulars and tell the boy that they will inform his mother. Later at the station the officers log the boys’ particulars in the computer system and they inform the mother.

²³ Then there will not be 92 incidents on the initiative of the officers, but 75, of which 41 concern traffic, which corresponds with 54.7%.

²⁴ Then there will not be 127 incidents on the initiative of the officers, but 107, of which 33 concern traffic, which corresponds with 30.8%.

Source: observations CBP Leeuwarden (200510241340).

The street work of the 3/4-teams shows similarities between that of the emergency patrol officers. Due to the fact that the officers of a 3/4-team receive specific orders, and can also be used for interviewing citizens, and because the officers pay more than average attention to disturbance situations, traffic plays a less dominant role in their work than what is usual in community beat patrol.

Law enforcement and other main themes in policing

Law enforcement always covers the largest proportion of incidents (Stol, 1994, 2006). This also applies to our study. Our material also contains a few special observations. Let's first focus on emergency patrol again, and then on community beat patrol.

In Groningen a relatively large part of the work of the emergency patrol officers consists of maintaining public order; especially incidents regarding drinking alcohol in public spring to mind (Appendix 3, Table A.12). We have seen emergency patrol officers act 13 times in connection with this, 8 times of which on their own initiative. The officers' focus on public order comes from the presence of socially problematic cases (homeless, alcohol and/or drug addicts) in socially weak neighbourhoods. They hang round in the vicinity of the various day shelters and especially the methadone post they hang round or they walk to and fro the locations concerned. Officers in emergency patrol regularly give attention to these cases, in the briefing these issues are also regularly addressed. Below an example is given of officers maintaining public order.

Illustration 3.2: Check disturbance situation

The officers drive past a location mentioned in a briefing. They find nothing there. A few minutes later they see a junkie using drugs in an other well-known disturbance location. One of the officers makes a report of the offence while the other checks if this person is on record. This is not the case. The officers continue on their way. Immediately they see a known alcoholic carrying several cans of beer. They address the man and tell him that he cannot use alcohol in public. The officers threaten to fine him. At that moment, the officers get a report of a shoplifting incident, where the staff is still chasing the suspect. The officers do not pursue the warning, and leave. Later, in the car, they say to each other that they will definitely run into the alcoholic again later.

Source: observations emergency patrol, Groningen (200509231727)

In Leeuwarden, the work of the emergency patrol officers includes relatively little law enforcement. This is a reflection of the finding mentioned before, that these officers are not very focused on traffic, and that they spend more time on the addicts in their neighbourhood, although the latter is not – as in Groningen – expressed in an over-average proportion of maintenance of public order. The police officers in Leeuwarden do not act against loitering addicts enough for that. We do see in Leeuwarden that the emergency patrol officers are more occupied with internal jobs than elsewhere (Table 3.4). This concerns tasks the chief of operations or the crime coordinator (see before) give them.

Table 3.4: Patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages)

| | <i>N</i> | <i>Maintaining the law</i> | <i>Maintaining public order</i> | <i>Giving assistance</i> | <i>Networking</i> | <i>Internal job</i> | <i>Else</i> |
|------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 281 | 59.8 | * 12.8 | 20.6 | 3.6 | 1.1 | 2.1 |
| Leeuwarden | 171 | ** 43.3 | 8.2 | 29.2 | 7.0 | * 7.6 | 4.7 |
| Assen | 175 | 57.7 | 4.6 | 22.9 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 3.4 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>56.8</i> | <i>8.1</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>4.9</i> | <i>3.3</i> | <i>4.0</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 179 | 33.0 | 5.0 | 25.1 | ** 34.6 | ** 1.7 | * 0.6 |
| Leeuwarden | 185 | ** 49.7 | 7.0 | 15.7 | ** 10.8 | 13.8 | 3.2 |
| Assen | 163 | 45.4 | 3.1 | 15.3 | ** 33.1 | ** 0.6 | 2.5 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>37.1</i> | <i>5.8</i> | <i>18.4</i> | <i>21.4</i> | <i>11.6</i> | <i>5.8</i> |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to 'Total PSE').

As far as community beat patrol is concerned, in Groningen and Assen there is a focus on networking (informal talks with the public) while in Leeuwarden there is a focus on maintaining order, and (so) not on networking. In Groningen and Assen the officers have few internal jobs.

In Groningen the community beat officers intermittently patrol by car, on foot or by bicycle. Especially when they patrol on foot or by bike, the officers have frequent contact with the public, but also when they go by car, they regularly have a chat with somebody or other. In over half of the 62 cases (56.5%) the officers take the initiative. In three-quarters of the cases (77.4%) the officers talk to someone they know. Over one-third of the network contact (35.5%) is connected with surveillance during two football matches in the

Oosterparkstadion. Then the officers not only talk to the fans, but also to fan escorts, attendants, ticket salesmen, security personnel and sometimes an alderman. If we ignore football matches, the percentage of networking no longer deviates significantly from the average over all places in our study.²⁵ Furthermore, the officers have contact with persons who have a more or less official function in the neighbourhood, such as bridge master, the neighbourhood cleaner, the chairman of the neighbourhood council, a neighbourhood caretaker and the youth worker. They meet the latter in the community centre, where they also meet various other people. They also regularly speak with people they know from previous assistance activities. (Stol, 2006).

The work of the community beat officers in Assen too, largely consists of networking. (Table 3.4). Police officers in Assen have similar network contacts as their colleagues in Groningen. The talk with shopkeepers, community workers, neighbourhood caretakers, personnel from the neighbourhood post, pub owners, teachers, school kids, vagrants, market vendors, security personnel and people they know from earlier occasions. Community beat officers in Assen network more than average with officials in their neighbourhood (Appendix 3, Table A13), such as the caretaker of a primary school, a gardening employee, a representative of the (subsidized) rental housing organization, a community worker and an assistant of the Advisory and Registration Body Child Abuse (Dutch: Advies- en Meldpunt Kindermishandeling (AMK)) (see illustration 3.3). The reason why networking constitutes such a large part of the work of Assen police officers, and why the focus is on networking with officials, is not clear from the research material.

Illustration 3.3: Networking with officials, by the community beat officer

The community beat officer goes to the local station. There he finds the community worker, and he wishes him a happy new year. The community worker asks how the turn of the year had been in the neighbourhood. It had been reasonably quiet, according to the community beat officer. The usual youths had announced that they had wanted to play all sorts of pranks, but nothing much had come of it, also because they did not know how to shoot with calcium carbide. The fire brigade had put out a fire, the police confiscated the carbide can and the local authorities removed some wood that had been intended for a fire. Subsequently, the community beat officer and the community worker had a chat about all sorts of private issues.

An other day. The community beat officer takes the initiative to call the Advisory and Registration Body Child Abuse (Dutch: AMK). He tells them that he is concerned about a family in the neighbourhood. The mother had died recently, and the household was now being run by the 13-year-old daughter. The community beat officer tells them that the father has told him that he sleeps with her in her bed. The assistant takes down the particulars, and says he will attend to it. After that he will contact the community beat officer again.

Source: observations community beat patrol Assen (200601041324 and 200601201430)

Internal jobs play a relatively small role in the work of the community beat officers in Groningen and Assen. Their immediate supervisor does not give them any orders. This may be caused by the fact that the community beat officers in Groningen and Assen fall directly under the unit leader (figure 3.1 and 3.3) and he is not involved in the daily management of the work.

²⁵ Then there won't be 179 incidenten but 157, of which 40 times networking, which corresponds with 25.5%.

In Leeuwarden the neighbourhood coordinator has also been placed directly under the unit leader, but we mainly observed the police officers in the 3/4-team – and they have been positioned under a lower supervisor than the unit leader (figure 3.2). We already observed that the 3/4-team frequently receives specific orders when they go out on the beat, given by the chief of operations, the neighbourhood coordinator or the crime coordinator. The latter gave them four times the order to interviewing residents, which resulted in 20 incidents with regard to maintaining the law. That explains the high percentage in that column.²⁶ The high percentage of law maintenance automatically means that networking takes up a smaller share of the total work (no more than 10.8%). In addition, the way in which the 3/4-teams do their work is very similar to the work in emergency patrol, and networking does not take up a large part of that work.

Crime

In Groningen and Assen the work the police initiates relatively often concerns crime (Table 3.6). This is a result of the habit of emergency patrol officers to immediately start interviewing residents themselves in case of a burglary. This is also the custom in Leeuwarden. There we observed three times the interviewing of residents by emergency patrol officers after a burglary, but these were slightly less extensive than the interviewings we observed in Groningen and Assen. If we look at all 55 incidents at which Dutch police officers undertook action concerning crime on their own initiative, we see that 74.5 per cent of that concerns a case in which the officers were interviewing residents. An other 7.3 per cent relates to the fight against drugs, and for the remainder various incidents are involved such as the request of colleagues to take in clothes and bullets, catching a driver for drinking and driving at a traffic surveillance, confiscating a new bike suddenly in the possession of three vagrants (the vagrants say they do not know where the bike came from and the officers do not arrest them) or, on behalf of a few colleagues, looking for and confiscating a knife. Only now and then, the officers' attentiveness leads to catching a perpetrator in the act and arresting him. Once 'our' officers assisted some of their colleagues in an action against street dealers, which led to the arrest of three suspects, and once the officers in Groningen managed to catch a thief red-handed. (Illustration 3.4). Although the arrest was the direct consequence of the officers' attentiveness, a clear description given by a perceptive citizen had put them on the right track.

Illustration 3.4: The exception in street work: caught in the act because of attentiveness

The officers receive a call about housebreaking, with the description of the perpetrator. They go to the address concerned, and first they look around the vicinity. They find nothing. After that they talk to the informant, take down the details of the incident, and continue their surveillance. Shortly after that they drive through a shopping street and see a man fitting the description. The man is just entering a shop. The officers park their car. They get out and look through the shop window. There is no shop personnel in sight, but they do see the man getting a bag from behind a desk, putting it under his coat and preparing to leave the shop. At that moment the officers enter the shop and arrest the man. The man confesses immediately. The officers take down the particulars of the victim who has just arrived in the shop again, and take the suspect to the station.

Source: observations emergency assistance, Groningen (200510071105)

²⁶ If we ignore these, there won't be 185 incidents but 165, 72 of which concern maintenance of law and order, which corresponds with 43.6%, which is not significantly more than the 37.1% over all cities.

Community beat policing in Leeuwarden consists of a relatively large part of incidents in the field of crime, both officers reacting to citizen calls and officers acting on their own initiative (Table 3.6). Concerning the incidents where the police officers acted on their own initiative we observed earlier that interviewing residents constitute a striking aspect of the work in Leeuwarden. This makes the traffic share of the work relatively small (Table 3.3). Because of the fact that interviewing residents concern criminality, the share of criminality in the work is relatively large.

When community beat officers in Leeuwarden act in response to a call, criminality also takes up a large part (25.9% - Table 3.6). That is because community beat patrol in Leeuwarden is performed by a 3/4-team that regularly receives orders from the incident room. When police officers have to deal with crime it is usually the consequence of a citizen call. The officers of the 3/4-team are for instance sent four times to an incident with a stolen bike or moped, twice to an incident in connection with drugs and twice to an incident with possession of firearms. The work of a 3/4-team really shows its own profile here because the team also has the explicit responsibility to handle orders and citizen calls, not only from the neighbourhood coordinator but also from the chief of operations or headquarters.

Table 3.6: Proportion crime

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|------------|-------------------------------------------|---------|------------------------------------------|---------|---------------|---------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 157 | ** 17.2 | 124 | 21.8 | 281 | 19.2 |
| Leeuwarden | 77 | 13.0 | 94 | 28.7 | 171 | 21.6 |
| Assen | 92 | ** 19.6 | 83 | 25.3 | 175 | 22.3 |
| Total PSE | 1.074 | 8.0 | 1.015 | 24.6 | 2.089 | 16.1 |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 113 | 6.2 | 66 | 4.5 | 179 | 5.6 |
| Leeuwarden | 127 | ** 22.8 | 58 | ** 25.9 | 185 | ** 23.8 |
| Assen | 121 | 4.1 | 42 | 7.1 | 163 | 4.9 |
| Total PSE | 1.436 | 7.4 | 658 | 7.8 | 2.094 | 7.5 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

3.4 Police Mobilization

The majority of the incidents are actions on the own initiative of the police officers. This applies to the community beat officers more than to the emergency patrol officers. The Dutch findings do not deviate from that main feature (Table 3.7). The last paragraph showed that community beat officers in Leeuwarden (the 3/4-team), unlike the community beat officers in Groningen and Assen, explicitly also have the responsibility to deal with orders (internal jobs) and citizen calls – and are also deployed to that end. Still, community beat policing in Leeuwarden does not consist of a greater part of incidents taken at the initiative of a citizen than community beat policing in Groningen and Assen (Table 3.7). In other words: although it is not the responsibility of the community beat officers in Groningen and Assen to deal with calls, a comparable part of their work nevertheless consists of incidents for which a citizen has taken the initiative.

In Groningen and Assen citizens are not so much the cause for community beat officers' actions because they 'call the police' but because they address the officers directly in the street and sometimes call them by mobile phone.

A community beat officer in Groningen and Assen is often an older policeman

exclusively linked to a certain neighbourhood. People in the neighbourhood know him as ‘their’ community beat officer and address him if they want to inform the police of a certain issue, or just want to make a chat.²⁷ In addition to that, in Groningen and Assen community beat officers patrol alone while the officers of the 3/4-surveillance in Leeuwarden always act as a team. An officer on his own is usually addressed sooner by a citizen than a team on patrol.

Table 3.7: Proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police

| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
| Groningen | 122 | 80.3 | 159 | 37.1 | 281 | 55.9 |
| Leeuwarden | 36 | 72.7 | 135 | 37.8 | 171 | 45.0 |
| Assen | 58 | 70.7 | 117 | 43.6 | 175 | 52.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>77.9</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>32.6</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>51.4</i> |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 46 | 91.3 | 133 | 53.4 | 179 | 63.1 |
| Leeuwarden | 35 | 94.3 | 150 | 62.7 | 185 | 68.6 |
| Assen | 58 | 93.1 | 105 | 63.8 | 163 | 74.2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>92.8</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>58.6</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>68.6</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

3.5 Knowledge of the People in the Neighbourhood

The extent to which police officers deal with people they know could be connected with the sort of work they do or the extent to which they are at home in their patrol area, or a combination of these. The extent to which police officers know the citizens they have to deal with is particularly relevant in relation with community policing. The adage ‘know and be known’ applies there specifically.

Leeuwarden takes up a special position with regard to emergency patrol. The percentage of incidents where police officers have dealt with a known person is there not only significantly higher than average (Table 3.8), but it is by far the highest percentage of our study (Appendix 3, Table A8). After the 33.3 per cent of Leeuwarden, Dendermonde follows with 22.9 per cent.

The higher percentage in Leeuwarden is mainly caused by the attention the emergency patrol officers have for vagrants (Illustration 3.5; see also paragraph 3.3). Often the officers take the initiative to address the vagrant or the addict, the officers also regularly act to known vagrants in response to a citizen call. This not seldomly concerns a shopkeeper who is fed up with the vagrants hanging round his business – a shopkeeper, no doubt, who knows that the police are watchful for this kind of disturbance.

Illustration 3.5: Three contacts of emergency patrol officers with vagrants

At half past two at night officers talk with a vagrant they know in the city centre. He is accompanied by an unknown vagrant who has a new bike with him. The officers ask the unknown vagrant for his ID-card and inquire about the origin of the bike. The unknown

²⁷ In exactly half of the number of times a citizen in Groningen or Assen addresses the community beat officer in the street a person known to the officer is concerned (50.0% van 86). The officers of the 3/4-team in Assen are addressed 28 times in the street by a citizen. In only four cases (14.3%) a person known to the police is involved. The difference is significant (p<0.01).

vagrant tells them that he had recently started living with a person called Jan and that he has lent him the bike. The officers take down the particulars of the vagrant and of the bike. The vagrant shows them a note that shows that an other police officer has already checked him and the bike earlier that night.

Ten minutes later the officers see a vagrant they know talking to a passer-by. The officers ask the passer-by what the conversation had been about. They suspect that the vagrant might have been begging, which is an offence. The passer-by tells them that she asked the vagrant if he would care for a cigarette. Begging does not seem to have been the case, so the officers move on.

Two hours later in the same night the officers talk with three known vagrants. They have two bikes with them. A little while earlier they only had one bike, and so the officers suspect that the second bike has been stolen. The vagrants say they don't know whose bike it is, or where it came from. One of the officers impounds the bike and cycles it to the station.

Source: observations emergency assistance, Leeuwarden (200509150230, 0240 en 0430)

Table 3.8: Proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance

| | Traffic | | Social problems | | Other | | All incidents | |
|------------------------------|---------|--------|-----------------|---------|-------|--------|---------------|---------|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 122 | 0.0 | 52 | 40.4 | 107 | 12.1 | 281 | 12.1 |
| Leeuwarden | 36 | * 11.1 | 40 | ** 70.0 | 95 | 26.3 | 171 | ** 33.3 |
| Assen | 58 | 6.9 | 23 | 39.1 | 94 | 16.0 | 175 | 16.0 |
| Total PSE | 868 | 2.8 | 294 | 35.7 | 927 | 14.5 | 2.089 | 12.6 |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 46 | 6.5 | 19 | 63.2 | 114 | * 50.9 | 179 | * 40.8 |
| Leeuwarden | 35 | 14.3 | 23 | 60.9 | 127 | 29.9 | 185 | 30.8 |
| Assen | 58 | 3.4 | 20 | 80.0 | 85 | * 54.1 | 163 | 39.3 |
| Total PSE | 611 | 7.5 | 168 | 57.7 | 1.315 | 38.3 | 2.094 | 30.9 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

The fact that the emergency patrol officers are regularly requested by the chief of operations or the neighbourhood coordinator to act in relation with a known problem in the neighbourhood, or to arrest a known person, also plays a role. Finally, the fact that a neighbourhood coordinator is also regularly part of a emergency patrol team also contributes to the high percentage. These officers know relatively many people in the neighbourhood, and look them up during the surveillance or accidentally meet them in the course of an incident.

The community beat control in Groningen shows a high percentage of incidents where police officers have to deal with an acquaintance (40.8%). Only Brussels shows a higher percentage here (63.4%). Groningen does not deviate from average (Table 3.8) in the fields of traffic or social problems. The high percentage in Groningen is mainly caused by the group 'other incidents'. The presence at two football matches in the Oosterpark stadium mentioned earlier also falls in this category. The community beat officers frequently contacted an acquaintance while patrolling on foot in and around the stadium, such as established fans and fan supervisors. The community beat officers also frequently patrol on foot or by bike, which makes them easy to contact by acquaintances and which also makes it relatively easy for them to contact someone they know.

Illustration 3.6: Four contacts of cycling community beat officers with an acquaintance

De community beat officer (CBO) cycles through his neighbourhood. He sees a woman he knows practising in an electric wheelchair. He accosts her. After a short talk he cycles on.

Half an hour later. The CBO visits the community centre. A few children talk to him in front of the entrance. They ask about his gun. He makes a short chat, and then goes in. There he shakes hands with several people, of whom he knows a few, because of the new year. Someone makes a chat with the CBO about his problems at home. The CBO wishes the man good luck and he goes on.

An hour later. The CBO enters a pub and chats with the manager, whom he knows. Their talk is about the recent turn of the year.

Shortly after the CBO enters a coffee shop and shakes hands with several customers. He then chats with the manager, whom he knows from previous occasions. After that he continues his surveillance.

Source: observations community beat patrol Groningen (200601041405, 1436, 1530, 1541)

As in Groningen, in community beat patrol in Assen we also see a high percentage of incidents in the category 'other' where police officers deal with a person they know (Table 3.8). In Assen there are no apparent special circumstances such as the presence during football matches with established, and so known fans and fan supervisors. When they are on surveillance, the officers in Assen, just like their colleagues in Groningen do, regularly take the initiative to talk to an acquaintance, such as a shopkeeper, coffeeshopkeeper, caretaker, street musician, recidivist, security employee, a market vendor or just any inhabitant of the neighbourhood they have dealt with before. But these people in their turn also regularly address the community beat officer on their own initiative. The realization of these kinds of contacts is stimulated by the fact that the community beat officers often do their surveillance on foot or by bike – again just like the colleagues in Groningen. The community beat officer of Assen-Centrum almost always patrols on foot. An other community beat officer almost always goes by bike, in all weathers, because in his view that is the best way to make contact with the people in the neighbourhood. Two other community beat officers alternate the car with the bike, depending on the weather and the appointments they have. All community beat officers in Assen have a community beat bicycle at their disposal, a classic reliable bike with gears.

There is a parallel with our findings regarding networking (paragraph 3.3). We saw that the work of the community beat patrol officers in Groningen as well as Assen consisted mainly of networking. In Groningen that was caused by the presence of officers at football matches in the Oosterpark Stadium; in Assen it was striking that the officers networked with officials a lot (see also illustration 3.3). The parallel between networking and having contact with acquaintances is of course not strange: networking is often done with people one has met before. The percentage of 'networking' and 'contacts with acquaintances' was higher than average in Groningen because the community beat officers went to football matches and frequently talked with people they knew. In Assen the percentage 'networking' en 'contacts with acquaintances' is also high, but not because of any specific reason. It is there more a general characteristic of community beat patrol: the community beat officers in Assen are also networking frequently in ordinary circumstances.

In the category 'other incidents' Leeuwarden scores lower than Groningen and Assen (Table 3.8).²⁸ We already know that the community beat patrol in Leeuwarden is executed by

²⁸ The 29.9% of Leeuwarden is significantly less than the 50.9% of Groningen and the 54.1% of Assen ($p < 0.01$).

3/4-teams that are generally composed of officers that are younger and less experienced than the community beat officer. The 3/4 team also deals with orders from the incident room. The community policing in Leeuwarden is similar to, up to a point, emergency patrol (young policemen, respond to citizen calls).²⁹ Because of these two characteristics, it was to be expected that community beat patrol in Leeuwarden would have a smaller number of incidents at which the officer had to deal with an acquaintance (cf. Stol 2006, section 4.3). This raises the question whether the high percentages in Groningen and Assen might be indicative for community beat patrol in The Netherlands.

We have at our disposal the data from an identical Dutch study from 2001, conducted in Amsterdam and the three smaller towns of Wageningen, Zevenaar and Woerden (Stol et al. 2006).³⁰ We add these data to the data of Groningen, Leeuwarden and Assen (Table 3.8a). It now follows that the high percentages in Groningen and Assen are *not* representative for the extent to which the Dutch community beat officers have to deal with acquaintances during their actions. There are various significant differences between the Dutch studies, especially in the column 'Other'. Three of the seven Dutch towns (among which Leeuwarden) score below the Dutch average, and two above. If we take these seven Dutch studies together and compare the total with the total of nine studies from Belgium, Germany, Denmark and Norway, we see that the Dutch average percentage is significantly higher than the average percentage measured of the other countries together. So, on the one hand there are differences within The Netherlands, on the other hand the analysis also points at a possible difference between The Netherlands and the other countries in our study. The preliminary conclusion is that the community beat officers do not deal with acquaintances as much in all Dutch towns, but that on average the community beat officers in The Netherlands deal with an acquaintance more often than their colleagues in the other countries. We will come back to this finding in chapter 8, when we perform an analysis on a higher level of abstraction.

Table 3.8a: proportion of incidents in which the community beat officers meet an acquaintance, current data compared with earlier research in The Netherlands (NL)

| | Traffic | | Social problems | | Other | | All incidents | |
|------------------------------|---------|---------|-----------------|---------|-------|---------|---------------|---------|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 46 | 6.5 | 19 | 63.2 | 114 | 50.9 | 179 | 40.8 |
| Leeuwarden | 35 | 14.3 | 23 | 60.9 | 127 | ** 29.9 | 185 | 30.8 |
| Assen | 58 | 3.4 | 20 | 80.0 | 85 | 54.1 | 163 | 39.3 |
| Amsterdam | 86 | 3.5 | 35 | 60.0 | 173 | ** 27.2 | 294 | ** 24.1 |
| Wageningen | 20 | ** 60.0 | 22 | 77.3 | 127 | ** 64.6 | 169 | ** 65.7 |
| Zevenaar | 121 | 9.1 | 17 | * 100.0 | 222 | ** 32.0 | 360 | ** 27.5 |
| Woerden | 58 | 20.7 | 13 | 61.5 | 158 | ** 68.4 | 229 | ** 55.9 |
| Total NL | 424 | 11.3 | 149 | # 70.5 | 1,006 | ## 44.7 | 1,579 | ## 38.2 |
| Total B/D/DK/N | 472 | 7.6 | 106 | 51.9 | 989 | 36.5 | 1,567 | 28.8 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total NL); # p<0.01; ## p<0.001 (with respect to Total B/D/DK/N).

3.6 Marginal persons

Police officers frequently have to deal with alcoholics, drug addicts, homeless persons, mentally disturbed people and other 'marginal persons'. We consider drug dealers marginal

²⁹ In Leeuwarden the percentages of incidents where an officer deals with an acquaintance is equal for emergency patrol and community beat patrol (table 3.8).

³⁰ Amsterdam has approx. 730.000 inwoners, the three smaller town each have between 26.000 and 33.000 inhabitants.

persons because on the street these people are closely linked to the world of addicts, homeless and vagrants as far as the work of the police officers is concerned, and they are often also addicted themselves. We are not referring to the ‘big boys’ here, but to small street dealers. For the rest we do not consider people who commit an offence for that reason alone a marginal person. With ‘mentally ill persons’ we have, apart from the known disturbed people in the neighbourhood, also grouped people who tried to commit suicide.

Whether or not a marginal person was involved we determined afterwards on the basis of the fieldwork notes. At the first coding, by the fieldworkers, a ‘disturbed person’ was a value of the variable ‘kind of incident’. During a recoding that value was dropped, and we created a separate variable called ‘marginal person’, which means: ‘a marginal person is involved in the incident’. All incidents of which the nature had been coded as ‘disturbed person’ have been recoded in accordance with the fieldwork notes into an other nature (for example noise nuisance, quarrel, public order). These incidents were awarded a ‘yes’ for the variable ‘marginal person’. Subsequently, of all incidents related to alcohol, needy people, quarrel, noise nuisance, public order and chatting with the public we determined whether a marginal person was involved on the basis of the fieldwork notes.³¹ If that was the case, that incident was also given the value ‘yes’ for the variable ‘marginal person’. The result of this exercise can be seen in Table 3.9.

When considering all incidents, we note that especially the police in Leeuwarden has many dealings with marginal persons. That picture is partly caused by the fact that police work there involves few incidents with regard to traffic (Table 3.3). If we only focus on incidents outside traffic, only the emergency patrol in Groningen shows a deviating percentage where a marginal person is involved. Outside the sphere of traffic emergency patrol officers in Groningen have strikingly frequent dealings with marginal persons: in 18.9 per cent of all incidents. Only the emergence patrol in Oslo scores higher with 21.8 per cent. The 16.3 per cent of the emergency patrol in Leeuwarden is indeed a high percentage (apart from Oslo and Groningen it is the highest percentage in our study) but that 16.3 per cent does not deviate significantly from the total over all cities (9.9%).

Table 3.9: Proportions of incidents with marginal persons

| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
|------------------|------------------------------|------------|--------------|------------|---------------|------------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 122 | 0.0 | 159 | ** 18.9 | 281 | * 10.7 |
| Leeuwarden | 36 | 0.0 | 135 | 16.3 | 171 | ** 12.9 |
| Assen | 58 | 0.0 | 117 | 6.8 | 175 | 4.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>0.0</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>9.9</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>5.8</i> |
| | <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 46 | 0.0 | 133 | 3.0 | 179 | 2.2 |
| Leeuwarden | 35 | 0.0 | 150 | 10.7 | 185 | * 8.6 |
| Assen | 58 | 0.0 | 105 | 10.5 | 163 | 6.7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>0.0</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>6.1</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>4.3</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

The high percentage in Groningen is caused by the presence of day shelters, methadone post and the related homeless, alcohol and drug addicts in the neighbourhood, that we discussed earlier (see illustration 3.2). These marginal persons stick together, hang around at the shelters and the methadone post, or they are underway from the one to the other address. Emergency

³¹ In the Appendix, appendix A.12 and A.13 the incidentcodes 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 60, 61, 62, 69 and 84 are involved.

patrol officers regularly pay attention to these persons; the issue of the homeless and addicts is also frequently addressed in the briefings. Officers very often act against drinking of alcohol in public (Appendix 3, Table A.12).

When *community beat officers* have dealings with a marginal person, in all towns, the chance that they know this person is bigger than when an *emergency patrol officer* has to deal with a marginal person (Table 3.9a, $p < 0.01$). This is not because the community beat officers more often take the initiative to act and seek contact with the marginal persons they know already.³² The fact that community beat officers know the marginal persons they have to deal with more often than the emergency patrol officers is caused by the number of service years (community beat officers usually have more service years than emergency patrol officers) and with the nature of the work of an community beat officer. More than the emergency patrol officer they are focused on the people in their neighbourhood. A considerably larger share of their work for instance consists of making a chat with a local resident.³³

When we compare table 3.9a with table 3.8, we see that police officers deal with an acquaintance more often with incidents that involve marginal persons than observed over all incidents. This is not strange, of course. Vagrants, addicts and other marginal persons often hang around in the public domain. That is where the officers usually patrol. Marginal persons can invariably count on the police's attention because they not move around at the fringes of society in a social sense, but also legally and criminologically. That is why marginal persons get more attention from the police than 'ordinary' citizens – that means citizens who do not attract the police's attention in the street because they are different from other people.

Table 3.9a: Proportions of marginal persons that police officers are acquainted with

| | All incidents | |
|------------------|------------------------------|-------------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | |
| Groningen | 30 | 46.7 |
| Leeuwarden | 22 | ** 95.5 |
| Assen | 8 | 50.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>121</i> | <i>48.8</i> |
| | <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | |
| Groningen | 4 | 100.0 |
| Leeuwarden | 16 | 81.2 |
| Assen | 11 | 90.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>91</i> | <i>70.3</i> |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

The emergency patrol officers in Leeuwarden are relatively well-acquainted with the marginal persons in their community. In 21 of these 22 incidents which involved a marginal person they were in one way or other acquainted with this person (95,5%). That is related to the high priority the police management and the emergency officers in Leeuwarden give to supervising addicts and vagrants. As concluded before, traffic is not the subject of their attention when they are not dealing with a citizen call, but supervision of marginal persons is. The incident with marginal persons at which the Leeuwarden emergency officers did not come across an acquaintance was the following. At midday the officers receive report that people were

³² Of all incidents with a marginal person, the officers take the initiative in 60.4% of the cases in case of emergency assistance, and in case of community beat patrol in in no more than 40.5% of the cases. EP officers more often than community beat officers take the initiative ($p < 0.01$).

³³ 17.1% of the incidents of community beat patrol consists of chatting with the public, emergency patrol only 4.8% ($p < 0.001$) (Appendix 3, Table A.12 and A.13).

bothered by begging vagrants at the train station. Underway the officers debate how they should book the beggars. They look in their books and discover that begging is a FDA-fact (Fast Disposing of Addicts, FDA, Dutch: Versnelde Afhandeling Verslaafden (VAV) – a police project in Leeuwarden to quickly punish addicts for the offences they commit). When they arrive on the scene the officers notice that the vagrants are no longer there. They do not ask any further questions from the public present. In view of the findings it is not unlikely that the officers would have known the vagrants, but because they were not found on the scene, this could no longer be established.

3.7 The Outcome of Incidents

With regard to the outcome of incidents we characterize the police work on the basis of the repressive actions. Police officers can handle incidents that consist of an offence differently. We discern: giving a warning, giving a fine or charging them, or arresting a person. We will deal with these three as categories that increase in seriousness, but also exclude each other. If ‘warning’ is registered as a method of settlement, then that incident will not be recorded under ‘summons’ or ‘arrest’. If an incident is settled with a fine or charge, then a warning nor an arrest is the case. If there is an arrest, the incident will not fall in the category ‘warning’ or ‘summons’.

We use the word ‘warning’ when officers explicitly warn a citizen with regard to a committed offence. This is often accompanied with the remark that an offence has been committed and that a charge could have been the consequence, but this time the citizen will get away with a warning. We also speak of a warning when the officers urge a citizen to do or not do something immediately in relation to an offence, with the distinct meaning that the citizen cannot ignore this (for instance: ‘start walking’ to a cyclist without lights). If the citizen were to ignore the warning, it is to be expected that the officer will not let that pass and will act. This last criterion also proved useful for the field workers. It is usually clear that it is best for a citizen to obey, in order to prevent anything worse than a warning. Previous research (Stol e.a., 2006) describes how police officers sometimes tell the citizen to remove his or her lorry / car within 5 minutes in case of a traffic offence, or urge the citizen to be extra careful when unloading goods from an illegally parked car, after which the officers then drive on. We did not code these kinds of situations as a warning, because the citizen was able to (temporarily) continue with his/her activities.

We speak of a fine or charge when a citizen receives this unconditionally on the street. The citizen is then not given the opportunity to settle defects, for instance in case of defects to a car, or to come and show the improvements at the police station.

We speak of an arrest when a citizen is taken by and on the initiative of the officers to the police station. We do not consider whether the possible formal requirements for an arrest have been met. If the officers for instance tell a citizen that ‘it is better to come along to the station to sort things out’ after a fight, we have counted that as an arrest (also see illustration 3.7).

Illustration 3.7: Repressive actions in emergency patrol: three arrests

The officers observe a moped driving fast into a street. They follow it and see a man parking the moped in front of a house. One of the officers speaks to the man; he reacts aggressively and does not want to cooperate. The man wants to enter his home but the officers do not allow it. Because the man does not cooperate, not even after repeated questions, and does not want to give his name, the officers arrest the man. One officer handcuffs him and takes him to the station in the back of the police car; the other rides the moped to the station. At the station the

officers investigate the moped. It shows several defects. They fine the man for three defects. They question him, give him the fines and then let him go.

The officers drive past a dealer location. They see a group of people. When the officers come near, the group disperses. One of them shows, in the eyes of the police officers, conspicuous behaviour. They check the man based on the opium act. The officers see that he drops a cocaine ball on the ground. They arrest him and take him to the station. At the station they investigate his identity. He is locked up because his name and nationality remain unknown. The next day he will be handed over to the aliens registration office.

The officers receive a call of a shoplifting at which the perpetrator has been arrested by the security service. The officers go to the site and speak with the shopkeeper, a safety guard and then with the underaged suspect. After having completed several forms, the officers take the suspect with them to the police station. There they deal with the matter further.

Source: observations emergency patrol, Groningen (200509051341)

In emergency patrol the officers in Groningen book someone in relatively many incidents (18,9%; Table 3.10a). Only officers in both German towns Bochum and Münster are more generous with booking people.

Various circumstances cause the high Groningen percentage. To start with, the Groningen fine level should be considered against the background of the national performance agreements and the fact that our observations took place at the end of the year. A number of police officers possibly still had to get the required number of fines; it is a fact that dusk fell increasingly sooner during the observation period (September to November) and the officers were frequently focused on cyclists without lights. Police chiefs in Groningen stress the importance of repressive actions and officers experience a certain pressure to issue fines. The focus on cycling without light is not covered outside emergency patrol. The Groningen police officers regularly carry out roadside checks (Appendix 3, Table A.12). These are aimed at cyclists and the officers issue fines to most cyclists they stop.

Still, the Groningen officers do not issue fines for everything. They sometimes give a warning, but they also sometimes only give one fine when several offences have been committed. An example of the latter we observed during a roadside check where a cyclist cycles on the pavement without head or tail light. An officer stops the cyclist and fines him only for not having a tail light and warns him for the other two offences (no head light, cycling on the pavement). The cyclist thanks the officer for that. The officer later says: 'you have to give and take, this way people can still understand that you give them a fine'. Some offences are solely dealt with with a warning, like once calling with a mobile phone while riding a moped, and often illegal parking by car drivers. The officers cannot always explain why they book one time and warn the other. But sometimes they can. In the Groningen city centre officers often warn cyclists that cycle on the pavement or in the wrong direction. As reason for not booking, the officers say: 'you can just keep on booking' and 'once you are standing here, you never get away again'.

We noticed that older and more experienced emergency officers issue warnings more often than younger colleagues. 'There is more than writing fines', is a much-heard remark of the older officers. In an observational study into the relationship between personal characteristics and the way in which officers act, one of the clearest findings was that young inexperienced officers charge more fines than their older and more experienced colleagues (Drupsteen, 2005).

Table 3.10a: Proportion of incidents at which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|-------|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 281 | 16.4 | ** 18.9 | 6.0 | 41.3 |
| Leeuwarden | 171 | 14.6 | 8.2 | 9.4 | 32.2 |
| Assen | 175 | 13.7 | 9.1 | 7.4 | 30.3 |
| Total PSE | 2.089 | 20.1 | 10.4 | 5.0 | 35.4 |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 179 | 15.1 | * 7.8 | 1.1 | 24.0 |
| Leeuwarden | 185 | * 11.9 | * 7.6 | ** 5.4 | 24.9 |
| Assen | 163 | 23.3 | 6.1 | 0.6 | 30.1 |
| Total PSE | 2.089 | 20.0 | 3.1 | 1.3 | 24.4 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

A comparatively high percentage of fines as in the Groningen emergency patrol was also found in The Netherlands, in Woerden (Table 3.10aa). The researchers wrote about this town: ‘Officers in Woerden actively check traffic and are absolutely quick in pulling out their ticket book for various traffic offences (...) Officers have a clear internal motivation to issue fines: management presses for certain numbers of charges (...). Setting a strict production norm, as in Woerden, seems to have an effect on the intensity with which officers book fines.’ (Stol e.a., 2006: 96-99). Although the Groningen percentage is remarkably high by Dutch standards (Table 3.10aa) it is not indicative of a situation that does not occur anywhere else in The Netherlands.

An other situation was found in previous research in Zevenaar, where officers booked remarkably little (Table 3.10aa). ‘They (the emergency patrol officers) ignore traffic more, and if they act against a traffic offence at all, strikingly often the citizen gets away with a warning. (...) This finding is not strange. The emergency patrol in Zevenaar is performed by community beat team members whose work should be community-oriented. They are considered to primarily focus on problems in the neighbourhood and not so much on traffic offences. Traffic surveillance is covered expressly outside the emergency patrol (in projects, motor surveillance, community beat officers).’ (Stol e.a., 2006: 98).

Table 3.10aa: Proportion of incidents in which emergency patrol officers take repressive measures – all incidents, current data compared with earlier research in The Netherlands (NL)

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|-------------------------|-------|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 281 | 16.4 | 18.9 | 6.0 | 41.3 |
| Leeuwarden | 171 | 14.6 | 8.2 | 9.4 | 32.2 |
| Assen | 175 | 13.7 | 9.1 | 7.4 | 30.3 |
| Amsterdam | 215 | ** 7.9 | 8.8 | 3.7 | ** 20.5 |
| Wageningen | 199 | 12.1 | 7.5 | 8.5 | 28.1 |
| Zevenaar | 171 | ** 34.5 | * 4.1 | 4.7 | 43.3 |
| Woerden | 288 | ** 28.5 | * 17.0 | * 1.7 | ** 47.2 |
| Total NL | 1,500 | # 18.5 | 11.5 | 5.6 | 35.6 |
| Total B/D/DK/N | 1,462 | 23.3 | 9.7 | 4.0 | 35.3 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total NL); # p<0.01; ## p<0.001 (with respect to Total B/D/DK/N).

The focus in Groningen on booking fines is also seen with the community beat patrol officers (Table 3.10a). They participated in a roadside check related to cycling without light, and issued seven fines. The fact that community beat officers perform a roadside check is rather special, and we have only also seen that in Münster; previous Dutch studies also did not show this. The Groningen field work notes about the community beat officers of December 28, 2005 read: ‘The officers agreed with other officers to keep a road side check in front of the station. The reason for this is the number of fines that needs to be booked each year.’ If we ignore this check, the percentage of incidents ending with a booking will be at an average of 3,9 per cent.

In the community beat patrol we also observe a deviating pattern in Leeuwarden with regard to repressive measures (Table 3.10a). This is caused by, as we described earlier, the fact that the Leeuwarden community beat control with its 3/4 teams is like the emergency patrol in character.

In Table 3.10a with community beat patrol, the percentages form a pattern in the column ‘summons’ that raises the question whether Dutch community beat officers book sooner than their colleagues elsewhere.³⁴ Further analysis shows the following. Oslo has a percentage (7.1%) comparable to Dutch values (Appendix 3, Table A.10a). In earlier Dutch studies percentages were found that are clearly lower than the percentages from Groningen, Leeuwarden and Assen (Table 3.10ab). Also in Woerden, where management clearly steered towards certain numbers of summons, in community beat policing the percentage of incidents ending with a summons is no more than 2.2 per cent. So, we cannot speak of a consistent and sharp division between community beat patrol in The Netherlands and elsewhere. Yet, the total number of summons in the Dutch community beat patrol (3.5%) is higher than the same percentage calculated over the other countries (Table 3.10ab). This is caused on the one hand by the high percentages in Groningen and Leeuwarden that we have described and explained before, and on the other hand because of the fact that the community beat patrol officers in the three towns in Belgium have not made one summons during an incident (Appendix 3, Table A.10a). If there is to be one place where community beat policing is distinguished by a structural deviating percentage of summons, Belgium seems to be it. This will be dealt with in chapter 6.

Table 3.10ab: Proportion of incidents in which community beat officers take repressive measures – all incidents, current data compared with earlier research in The Netherlands (NL)

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|-------|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Groningen | 179 | 15.1 | * 7.8 | 1.1 | 24.0 |
| Leeuwarden | 185 | 11.9 | * 7.6 | ** 5.4 | 24.9 |
| Assen | 163 | 23.3 | 6.1 | 0.6 | 30.1 |
| Amsterdam | 294 | ** 3.7 | 2.0 | 0.0 | ** 5.8 |
| Wageningen | 169 | 14.2 | 3.6 | ** 4.7 | 22.5 |
| Zevenaar | 360 | ** 30.6 | ** 0.0 | 0.3 | * 30.8 |
| Woerden | 229 | * 26.2 | 2.2 | 0.9 | 29.3 |
| Total NL | 1,579 | 18.6 | # 3.5 | 1.5 | 23.5 |
| Total B/D/DK/N | 1.567 | 21.1 | 1.9 | 0.9 | 23.7 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total NL); # p<0.01; ## p<0.001 (with respect to Total B/D/DK/N).

³⁴ Over the three Dutch cities the percentage of summons amounts to 7.2% (of a total of 527 incidents) and that percentage is significantly higher than the 3.1 over all cities (p<0.001).

So far, we have looked at the percentage of summons calculated over all incidents. Due to the fact that police officers mainly book people in the field of traffic, we have performed an additional analysis at which we divided the incidents into incidents within and outside traffic. The findings are in line with the findings from the analysis of all incidents (Appendix 3, Table A.10b en A.10c):

- in traffic, Groningen has a high percentage incidents ending in a charge, in emergency patrol as well as in community beat patrol (because management presses for numbers of charges);
- in traffic, community beat policing in Leeuwarden has a high percentage incidents ending in a charge (because the 3/4 teams partly have the character of emergency patrol);
- outside of traffic, community beat policing in Leeuwarden has a high percentage incidents ending with an arrest (because the 3/4 teams partly have the character of emergency patrol).

3.8 Use of Information Sources

Police work in information perspective

Information is essential in police work, and probably even the essence of it. In their work police officers continuously face the question who is who and who did what when, and so who can be held responsible for what. Police work essentially evolves around information about persons. But police officers are also interested in information about locations (especially buildings) and goods (especially cars). This kind of information is interesting for police officers, because goods and locations are linked to people and information about that can help to localize persons, link people and gain insight in who did what when. Summarizing, police work knows two information issues. First and foremost is obtaining detailed information about (the behaviour of) persons. The second issue is supportive of that, and concerns making links between people, locations and goods. If you watch police officers in the execution of their work, you will see them constantly looking for, interpreting and using information about people, locations and goods.

Officers obtain information from various sources. More important than the information itself are the *clues* that can be used to relate information from a source to something or – preferably - someone. The relationship between information and the individual, the location and the good the information is about, the officers primarily make with names, addresses and registration numbers (especially number plates). Police work in information perspective is mainly controlling these clues for information. Individuals who wish to withdraw from police control not seldomly apply themselves to keeping names, addresses and numberplates secret or faking them. Police officers in their turn are primarily on the lookout for names, addresses and number plates during an incident.

The pivotal question in this study is what determines what police officers do. As information is crucial to police work, it is to be expected that the availability and subsequently finding the information affects the actions of the police officers. From an information perspective the question is which role the information sources play in police work and whether the availability and deployment of certain sources are contributory to the nature of the work. We immediately remark, though, that intensive use of information cannot be the sole reason for certain police actions (for example many fines for uninspected or uninsured cars as a result of frequent consultation of certain registers) but can also be the cause of that (for example consulting the number plate register frequently because of intensive traffic checks). We discern information from citizen sources and police sources. We also discern between information from manual or digital sources.

Because information about individuals takes up a central position in police work, people's names are important for police officers. After all, a name is a clue for information

about a person. For that reason, many countries have an obligation to carry identification papers. In The Netherlands, just before the start of our field work, the scope of this obligation was widened.

Obligation to carry identification papers

After a long political discussion, the then limited obligation for identification was widened on January 1, 2005. The obligation to be able to identify oneself is a sensitive subject in Dutch society. A general obligation was not implemented. Section 2 of the Act on the Obligation to Carry Identification Papers (Dutch: WID) determines that anyone who has reached the age of fourteen is obliged to show identification papers upon the first claim of a police officer. Section 8a of the Police Act 1993 subsequently determines that a police officer is authorised to claim inspection of an identity card ‘insofar as that can be reasonably considered to be necessary for the execution of police matters.’ The Directions given with the Act further explains what is meant by a ‘reasonable execution of tasks’. The examples given in the Direction concern:

- suspicious situations (a car drives round in an industrial estate at night);
- disturbance and public order (loitering teens, riots, rave violence);
- detective work (an unknown dealer, witnesses at a shooting, public at fire-raising).

The Netherlands therefore do not have a general obligation to carry and disclose ID in a sense that any citizen can be asked at any time to produce ID papers. There should be circumstances that make it reasonably necessary for the execution of police matters. The obligation to carry ID papers is not meant to give police officers the possibility to ask for ID papers solely out of curiosity after someone’s identity, for example. Police officers can ask motorists to stop, during a routine check, and ask for their driver’s license and vehicle registration certificate, they cannot stop motorists during a routine check and ask for an identification card. The before-mentioned Direction states for instance that people who are preventively body-searched by police officers (a regulation where the police is allowed at certain times to body-search random passers-by for weapons in the fight against rave violence) and at which body-search no weapons or drugs are found, cannot be asked for their identification papers: ‘after all, application of preventive body-searching does not imply asking for identification papers’, according to the Directive.

The fieldwork for our study was performed in the period from September 2005 up to and including January 2006. The above-described extensive obligation to carry ID papers was valid then and police officers made use of it. In police circles there was a discussion going on about the situations in which a citizen could be asked for his ID papers, and about whether or not to book him/her for not being able to show an ID.

Information use in police street work concerning traffic

Information sources officers most frequently consult during street work are manual sources from citizens, such as driver’s license, vehicle registration certificates, and digital sources from the police, such as the national vehicle registration certificate register and the investigation register. The use of information sources is closely connected to the kind of work police officers do. In case of incidents in the field of traffic they consult, over all incidents, in more than half of the cases an information source (Table 3.11b). In case of incidents outside traffic that is less than half as much (Table 3.11c). That is the reason we discuss these two types of work separately.

Table 3.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – with

regard to traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 122 | 38.5 | 0.0 | 7.4 | 25.4 | 57.4 |
| Leeuwarden | 36 | 44.4 | 2.8 | * 13.9 | 22.2 | 58.3 |
| Assen | 58 | * 27.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 36.2 | 51.7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 46.9 | 0.2 | 3.6 | 32.1 | 57.1 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 46 | 26.1 | 0.0 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 28.3 |
| Leeuwarden | 35 | 28.6 | 0.0 | ** 25.7 | * 28.6 | * 45.7 |
| Assen | 58 | 15.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | * 0.0 | 15.5 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | 23.0 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 11.8 | 25.5 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 3.11b represents the observations regarding the use officers make of the various information sources during traffic incidents. The column at the far right (column 7) indicates in which percentage of all incidents the officers have consulted an information source. The columns 3 up to 6 indicate how often a certain source was consulted. Officers can consult several sources per incident. The question in our study is now not so much what causes the differences in information use, but if information use affects the contents of police work (although the contents of street work, as we will see, also affects the use of information). In particular, the question is whether information systems and information use determine when police officers come into action and/or the way in which they settle the incident.

To start with, we see that (Table 3.11b) police officers in Leeuwarden often use a manual police information source, during emergency patrol as well as community beat patrol (the emergency-like 3/4-team). Each time the officers in Leeuwarden consulted a manual source it concerned the ‘facts book’ – a book in which officers look up which fact code goes with a certain offence and how high the corresponding fine must be (code and fine amount are then filled in on the fine). It is also the facts book the officers in Groningen have consulted each time they consulted a manual police source. It seems perhaps contradictory that officers in Groningen book someone *more* often and still consult the facts book in a *smaller* percentage of the cases. This is explained by the fact that when officers charge a series of fines, for example, for cycling without lights during a roadside check (as happened in Groningen), they quickly know the facts by heart, and are able to just fill them in on the next ticket. Just to make sure, they will probably quickly check the copy of the previous ticket, but we have not marked that as consulting a police information database. The figures indicate that the officers in Assen never consulted the facts book, although they did issue fines (see Table 3.10a). The researcher who carried out the field work in Assen stated afterwards that he did not mark consultation of the facts book as ‘consulting an information source’.³⁵

When officers consult the facts book, they do so after the intervention has started and after they have decided to issue a fine. Consulting this information source does therefore not influence the moment officers decide to act nor the way in which they will act.

In Assen the officers consulted the manual information source of a citizen less often than average, during emergency patrol. During community beat patrol in Assen the officers never consulted a police computer. We have not been able to find a univocal explanation in the research material for these two significantly deviating observations. The emergency patrol

³⁵ At the time this was revealed, it was not possible anymore to find out when the officers had or had not consulted the facts book, also because it is a rather inconspicuous routine act and not decisive for the outcome of the incident.

figures in Groningen, Leeuwarden and Assen seem to suggest that when police officers consult a computer more often, they consult citizen documents less often. That seems plausible (the information will come from one source or the other) but the connection is not significant ($p=0,09$). A similar connection is non-existent when we look at the figures relating to all the cities in our study.

The figures also tell us that community beat patrol officers in Leeuwarden consult a police computer more often than average. That can be explained by the way the police have organised this type of surveillance: with 3/4-teams that perform the work in an emergency patrol fashion. Community beat officers in Leeuwarden book people more often than average in the field of traffic (28.6%: Appendix 3, Table A10b) and so they also consult the facts book more often than average (25.7%, Table 3.11b). So here we see that the way in which the work has been organised affects the information use of the officers. The question that occupies us here is, however, whether the availability of information sources affects the content of police work.

We will now therefore discuss the consultation of police computers in more detail. After all, that could be a *cause* in addition to being a result of police actions. Officers can start a computer inquiry based on a number plate, and as a result of the obtained information, decide to stop and address the citizen concerned. We now zoom in on column 6 of Table 3.11b. Table 3.11bb indicates during which phase of the intervention the officers consult the computer: prior to the contact with the citizen or after.³⁶

Over all cities in our study, a computer inquiry precedes the actions in a little over 10 per cent of the cases. In Groningen that is significantly less with 0.8 per cent ($p<0,01$). The one time a computer inquiry preceded action was a car driver who overtook the police car and attracted the police's attention with his style of driving. The officers traced the number plate and obtained information that the car was not insured. When the car stopped shortly after the officers addressed the driver. He immediately admitted that car was not insured, the officers confiscated the car and fined the man.

In Leeuwarden we never observed the officers consulting a police computer prior to an incident.³⁷ In Assen a computer inquiry preceded an incident five times. The first time, the officers think they see a driver using a non-handsfree mobile phone, after which they immediately check the number plate before they summon the driver to stop. It appears that they have made a mistake. The man does have a handsfree phone in his car. On an other occasion they see a car entering a one-way street from the wrong direction. They check the number plate and are informed that there are no insurance records concerning this car. They stop the car. The driver says he recently put the registration in his name. Possibly the computer file had not been updated yet. The officers give the man the chance to come to the station and demonstrate that the car was insured on the day of the check. In an other case the officers see a car with a broken rear light. They check the number plate and stop the car. The driver manages to repair the light on the spot and is free to go. Once the officers check a car and again receive information that there are no insurance records. (The reason for this check was not noted by the researcher). The officers stop the driver. He claims that the car is insured and the officers give him a week to come and demonstrate this at the station. Finally, the officers observe a car turning off in a dangerous manner. They ask the incident room for information about the number plate and then stop the driver. The man receives a warning for his driving manners.

So, there are six cases in which emergency patrol officers ask the computer for information before they contact the citizen. The tenor is that officers act upon a concrete

³⁶ Situation in which officers check a number plate and have not further contact with a citizen, were not marked as 'incident' (chapter 2) and so are not part of this study.

³⁷ But that is not a significant difference with the average of 10.3% ($0.05>p>0.01$).

observation, such as a broken rear light or dangerous driving. They do not check the number plates of random cars just see if that will yield any results. Three times the computer inquiry did not result in anything particular, and so it also was not the reason for the actions. Three times the computer inquiry yielded information that the car the police officers has become interested in, had no insurance. In how far that information affected the actions, we cannot make out precisely from the field work notes. The officers would probably have stopped these cars anyway, so without a result from the inquiry, because of driving in the wrong direction or dangerous driving. Possibly the officers would have left the driver alone in one or more of these cases if the computer had not given any specific information. Once the driver admitted that the car had no insurance. Twice the drivers say that the car does have insurance. In the last two cases the reason was possibly a not updated computer file - a well-known problem in Dutch police computer use, that has been described before (Stol, 1996).

Table 3.11bb: Incidents in which officers consult a police computer before the incident starts, with regard to traffic

| | N | Computer use before the incident started |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | |
| Groningen | 122 | ** 0.8 |
| Leeuwarden | 36 | 0.0 |
| Assen | 58 | 8.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>10.3</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | |
| Groningen | 46 | 0.0 |
| Leeuwarden | 33 | 5.7 |
| Assen | 58 | 0.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>4.4</i> |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

For community beat patrol the figures do not deviate significantly from average with regard to all cities in our study (Table 3.11bb). In community beat policing in Leeuwarden we observed twice that a computer inquiry preceded the contact with the citizen. Once the officers see a car parked crookedly in a parking space. They check the number plate, and receive information that the MOT is no longer valid. They decide to watch the car. Then the owner shows up. She says that the car did not pass the MOT and will be retested soon. The officers tell her that the car can be left by the road untested for two months. In an other case the officers see a car driving aimlessly or searchingly through the city centre, with the driver unbalanced in his seat. They check the number plate. It appears that the car comes from Groningen but the owner of the car lives in Rotterdam. This is sufficient reason for the officers to check the car; they find no irregularities. These two cases fit the picture that we got from the observations of the emergency patrol. Officers see a reason to act and subsequently consult a computer file.

The findings show that officers in The Netherlands do not use the computer systems at their disposal to routinely and pro-actively check number plates in a search for initially invisible irregularities. The computer use follows the actions of the officers, and not the other way around.³⁸ When the officers come into action and they consult a computer, then it is

³⁸ Routine pro-active questioning was particularly observed during emergency patrol in Roskilde and Hillerød, both in Denmark (see chapter 4) and, to a lesser extent, in Lillestrøm in Norway (see chapter 7).

possible that they come across irregularities that would have remained hidden if they had not had that information (a car was registered as uninsured three times, once the MOT appeared no longer valid). This information influences the way the officers act and deal with the incident. In one case the owner confirmed that his car was not insured, and the officers seized the car. In two cases the computer file was possibly not up-to-date and the officers ordered the owner to come to the station and show a document to prove the car was insured. In case of the expired MOT the owner got ahead of the officers' admonition with the announcement that the car would be retested soon.

An other way the officers can use to detect irregularities is to demand inspection of an ID-card. As mentioned before, officers in The Netherlands do not have the right to ask random citizens for their ID-cards. They can only do so when inspection of the document is considered 'reasonably necessary for the execution of police matters'. So, there has to be, according to the official requirements, a reason for the officers to act.

Let's now focus on ID-cards as information source for police officers. Table 3.11bc shows the percentage of incidents where officers demand inspection of an ID-card on the basis of the ID-legislation. They usually only ask to see the ID-card of one person, a few times of two or more persons. In total (emergency and community beat policing taken together) we observed 59 incidents where the officers asked a citizen for his or her ID-card. In accordance with the intention of Dutch law the police officers only ask for an ID card in a traffic situation after they have observed an offence and have already addressed the person involved about it. Not surprisingly this does *not* involve drivers of motor vehicles, because the Road Traffic Act already obliges them to show their driver's and registration licenses 'upon the first claim' to a police officer. Moped drivers also already have the obligation to show documents with personal data: an insurance certificate linked to a certain moped, and the so-called moped licence in the name of the driver and which shows that the person involved has passed the moped theoretical exam.³⁹ In 7 cases a car or moped driver did not have the required papers on him/her, and the police officers demanded inspection of an ID-card. Once the officers were on their way to an incident, when they came across a group of youths standing on the road near their school. When the police car approaches the youths step aside, except one. This boy stays defiantly on the road. The officers address the boy and demand inspection of his ID-card. The boy shows the card and the officers fine him for standing in the middle of the road. A moment later a teacher inquires what is going on. The officers explain the situation. The teacher thanks the officers and tells them that they have given the fine to exactly the right person. In all the other 51 cases it is a cyclist who commits an offence: once passing a red sign, once riding in the wrong direction and all other incidents riding without proper lights. The incident where officers take measures against cycling in the wrong direction involved a drug addict near the methadone post in Groningen – and in fact the officers do not act upon a traffic offence, but the actions should be considered as a part of the surveillance of vagrants and junkies. The junkie is unable to show an ID-card, for which he is subsequently fined, and not for the original traffic offence.

During the field work period the extended ID-obligation was still relatively new and there was still a discussion going on in police circles as to how this power should be dealt with. Not being able to show an ID-card is an offence. But police policy was (and is) not aimed at separate checks to ascertain whether or not citizens carry their ID-cards. The attention should remain directed at the original goals, such as traffic safety. In the case of the addict who cycled in the wrong direction, the officers observed an offence. Their actions against that offence gives them the authority to demand inspection of an ID-card, they make use of that power. They subsequently do not issue a fine for the original offence, but for not

³⁹ A practical exam for mopeds is not (yet) obligatory in The Netherlands.

being able to show an ID-card. This does not seem to be in accordance with the basic policy that carrying an ID-card is not an separate subject for police surveillance.

In total, we observed eight instances where a citizen did not show an ID-card; in three cases the officers issued a fine for that. Apart from the case with the addict described above, it twice concerned a cyclist who cycled without lights, who was fined for that too.

The question is now whether the ID-legislation affects the nature of police work: whether this possibility to obtain information about citizens affects what officers do and how they deal with incidents. Officers act against traffic offences because police policy is aimed at that, and especially because the performance agreements stress the number of summons. It is the end of the year (dusk settles early) and the police officers, mainly those in Groningen, regularly check cycling without lights to meet the number of required summons before the year is out. That, and not ID-legislation, basically explains police actions against cyclists. The fact that police officers now also have the authority to demand inspection of an ID-card does give the police a more strict or, if you like, more repressive character. A person of 14 years old or older who commits an offence should reveal his or her identity, and when he or she cannot produce any ID-papers for that, he or she runs the risk of a summons for that too. In a single case the police officers used the IC-legislation to, as a result of a traffic offence, act repressively against the junkie because he could not produce his ID-card.

Table 3.11bc: Use of ID-legislation, with regard to traffic

| | N | one or more ID-cards asked |
|--------------------------------|-----|----------------------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | |
| Groningen | 122 | ** 27.0 |
| Leeuwarden | 36 | 5.6 |
| Assen | 58 | 19.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 13.2 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | |
| Groningen | 46 | * 17.8 |
| Leeuwarden | 33 | 2.9 |
| Assen | 58 | 6.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | 6.9 |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

Information use in police street work not traffic-related

We will now focus on information use during incidents not related to traffic. Most differences between the observation in The Netherlands and the average over all cities can be found in the column ‘manual source from a citizen’. Particularly police officers in Groningen and Assen do not use this very often: we find the lowest percentages of all studies in these cities, respectively 4.4 and 6.0 per cent. Opposed to that are Bochum and Brussels, with respectively 31.0 and 33.8 per cent (Appendix 3, Table A.11c).

In Leeuwarden we observed a total of – emergency patrol and community beat patrol taken together – 32 incidents where police officers inspected a manual information source of a citizen. In over half of these cases this is an ID-card. But police officers also use other documents of citizens, such as an envelope with an address on it, a passport, a copy of a report, copy of a surveillance report of a security firm, cards and purchase receipts, in short: anything that can help. This involves various incidents. Vagrants, addicts or loitering youths who have to show their ID-cards are involved in 12 cases, in the same way as with emergency patrol. This fits the order-maintaining actions of the police force in Leeuwarden. Of a very different nature are the following examples of incidents where officers also inspect a manual

information source from a citizen: finding a body, a shoplifting, a lost bag with drugs, a case of vandalism in a playground, a quarrel between the tenant and landlord of a student's accommodation, and a man who walks on the street carrying number plates. When the citizen's document is at hand and it can help the police officers with their actions, then they will use it. We cannot detect any other pattern.

In Groningen and Assen officers make relatively little use of manual information sources of citizens. The material does not suggest any explanation for that. As in Leeuwarden, Groningen stresses demanding inspection of ID-cards from vagrants and addicts. In Assen police officers once took action against a person standing in a doorway and youths smoking a joint. Police actions in Assen also involve situations that the officers considered suspicious. They sometimes ask for an ID-card, but also sometimes, when the suspect person is sitting in a parked car, for his driver's licence or registration certificate.

Table 3.11c: Proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|------------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>PSE – EP</i> | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 159 | ** 4.4 | 0.6 | 3.1 | 18.9 | 22.0 |
| Leeuwarden | 135 | 12.7 | 1.5 | ** 8.9 | 12.6 | 29.6 |
| Assen | 117 | * 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 4.3 | ** 6.8 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>1.0</i> | <i>2.1</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>27.7</i> |
| <i>PSE – CBP</i> | | | | | | |
| Groningen | 133 | * 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.3 | ** 4.5 |
| Leeuwarden | 150 | 10.0 | 1.3 | ** 20.0 | 6.7 | ** 34.0 |
| Assen | 105 | * 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | ** 2.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>10.3</i> | <i>0.5</i> | <i>3.9</i> | <i>3.6</i> | <i>16.2</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

In Leeuwarden the police officers consult a manual *police* information source relatively often. In emergency patrol this sometimes is the facts book, in relation to the fining of a vagrant, and also a couple of times judicial papers that the officers hand out. It sometimes also concerns papers with information from the briefing, used by the officers when they work on a specific assignment from the Chief of Operations, such as re-visiting a victim of a burglary to see how the victim is doing and to find out if there is any new information to report about the burglary. At a re-visit the officers have a 're-visit form' with them, with the questions they have to ask the victim. In the community beat patrol we observed more often than in emergency patrol that officers were on route with a form that is intended to serve as a handle during police actions. We also saw the officers of the 3/4-team use a re-visit form in connection with a burglary. We also saw them visit a coffee shop twice, at which they consulted a form to make sure what to ask and check. The officers ask questions about the licence, check the stock of soft drugs, look at the price list, check whether information is given about the use of soft drugs, look at the stock of liquor and they check the age of visitors (minors are not allowed). Twice we experienced that the officers raided a hemp nursery. They take with them a heat-sensitive photo, an interrogation plan in case they find a suspect and a list of goods to be impounded. In three other cases we saw officers interviewing residents in connection with a crime. They used a standard list with questions to be asked. Once we also saw that they carried a printout with them on the street about a fire they were going to ask questions about. In short, much of the manual information sources we saw the police officers use in

Leeuwarden are related to the steering of the work in the street. In those cases the officers are not only informed by their chiefs what to do (check a coffee shop, interviewing residents about a car fire, round up a hemp nursery), but they are also given rather detailed instructions on paper about what exactly they are supposed to do on site. We actually witnessed the officers consulting the documents concerned and act accordingly.

Finally, we see in table 3.11c that the emergency patrol officers in Assen use the information from police computers relatively little (4.3%). We cannot find an explanation for this in our observations.

Summary

With regard to one aspect the police officers in The Netherlands make more than average use of information: officers in Leeuwarden consult a manual information source more often than average. This usually concerns the facts book during emergency patrol, which they consult when issuing a fine. In community beat patrol it mainly concerns forms the officers are given for special assignments given by their direct supervisor. The forms contain instructions about how the officers should act in the given situation (what to look out for, which questions to ask, which goods to impound), or they contact background information about the incident in relation to which they are acting. The information use is part of the steering by supervisors of what the police officers do, a steering that is quite manifest in Leeuwarden, as discussed earlier.

All other differences indicate a less intensive use of information than average. Apparently police officers in The Netherlands are not particularly focused on information use. Except the use of documents with work instructions in Leeuwarden, we can also not speak of a certain information provision that gives notably direction to the actions of police officers in the street. The main finding is that information use follows police activities, not the other way around.

3.9 What Determines What is Involved in Police Patrol Work

We now come to the question what determines the way police officers substantiate their work on the beat. For this chapter we have been looking at street work in The Netherlands, in the towns of Groningen, Leeuwarden and Assen. We have already observed that in these three towns the street work deviates at several points from the average of all twelve cities in our study. We have also given explanations for the differences. We will now change this perspective. In this section, we will take the explanations we have found for the differences as our starting point, instead of the work on the beat.

Local police policy and day-to-day management has a clear effect on the work of the police officers on the beat in Leeuwarden. To start with, traffic control is the responsibility of other police officers than those actually doing Emergency Patrol (EP) or Community Beat Patrol (CBP). At the same time, it has been specified concretely how the inconveniences caused by addicts and vagrants have to be dealt with. Agreements have been made with the Public Prosecutor with regard to fast(er) procedures, and cells have been reserved especially for addicts that are arrested following this policy. This policy also really 'lives' on the work floor: police officers are not so much focused on traffic offences; when given the space for own initiatives they give a lot of attention to loitering addicts and vagrants in their neighbourhood. It is their 'thing', it is what they feel is important to do. In that respect local police policy in Leeuwarden clearly affects what officers do when they are on the beat.

The police officers in Leeuwarden are also given specific assignments when they go out on the beat by the Chief of Operations, mostly in the field of crime fighting (such as second visit after burglary or check of a coffeeshop). These kinds of assignments are not only oral requests, but we have often observed that the officers are given forms which states where

they have to go and why, which information they should collect, and so how exactly they should act when they are on the scene. The fact that these forms exist, and that officers consider it quite normal to use them in their work, indicates that this rather detailed steering is embedded in daily practice and constitutes an accepted part of it. One of the assignments given to the officers is the interviewing of residents as a result of a burglary. This brings them in contact with a number of inhabitants of their neighbourhood.

The way in which CPB is organised in Leeuwarden is also special. The work is subdivided into a policy part, or if you like, an ‘office part’, and an executive part on the street.⁴⁰ The Neighbourhood Coordinator is in charge of the office part – although he also participates in the EP and the CBP. This Coordinator has the daily management of the community policing. The CBP on the street is mainly executed by younger, less experienced police officers. They are steered by the incident room (headquarters) for non-urgent citizen calls and, as described in the last paragraph, the Chief of Operations. In Groningen and Assen the police officers assigned to CBP hardly are given any assignments or tasks when they go out on the street. Apparently, there is no supervisor there who directly interferes with how they do their daily job. In these two towns the community beat officers fall directly under the unit leader – and he does not have the time to deal with the daily supervision of the work. Due to the fact that the community beat officers report directly to the unit leader, there are no other persons within the unit who can give the community beat officers steering assignments.

In Leeuwarden as well as in Groningen and Assen we have observed police officers in the EP interviewing residents with regard to a crime. This is a consequence of the way Dutch police policy views work at the basis of the police organisation. Police officers on emergency patrol are available to the incident room for deployment in urgent situations, but their labour time is not the exclusive ‘possession’ of the headquarters. Police officers in EP are considered to contribute to local police work whenever they are not involved in an urgent citizen call. The Chief of Operations can give them assignments to that end, and so they can be deployed for the interviewing of residents as part of an investigation. We should not regard that as a consequence of the concept of community policing. It is at any rate not about creating and maintaining social relationships between police and local residents. Interviewing residents is rather about contributing to law enforcement and investigation work. The fact that police officers also work on investigations (which may or may not be part of their own workload) during their surveillance, is a thought that stems from the 1980s, when neighbourhood police teams were implemented that had a ‘broad basic police function’ (cf. Stol, 2009). The concept of a ‘broad basic police function’ implied, to put it simplistically, that all police officers had to do all kinds of police work. In those years specialisms were mostly abolished, even the position of the community police officer disappeared, because the members of the neighbourhood police team were expected to perform all recurrent matters themselves: from detective work to maintaining social contacts. The concept of the ‘broad basic police function’ was abandoned in the 1990s (the broad function appeared to be too broad) and was replaced by the concept of ‘area-related police care’ or community beat policing (see paragraph 3.1). The difference with the concept of the broad basic police function is that community beat policing is primarily executed by community beat police officers (specialists), who are also expected to steer the work of other police officers (paragraph 3.2). For now it is important to state that the interpretation of the broad basic police task clearly affects the kind of work of the emergency police officers.

Observations in the police force in Groningen show that the national performance contracts affect the work of the officers on the beat. The requirements made here to the

⁴⁰ This is a textbook case of ‘division of labour’ (Smith, 1776). Successful division of labour requires a good tuning in of the parties between which the labour has been divided, to keep the entire work, despite the division of labour, still a whole. In this case the coordination mechanism is ‘direct supervision’ (Mintzberg, 1979).

number of fines the officers issue, translates into more repressive police actions – exactly the way it was intended. The fact that the observations in Groningen took place at the end of the year, and that a number of police officers still had to meet the required number of fines, also played a role. Sometimes in a police team, there is a feeling that frequently issuing fines is a good thing to strive for. It is not always clear how such a collective repressive attitude exactly arises. A recurrent observation is in any case, that the management strongly emphasizes issuing fines in these cases, like what is happening in Groningen now. In The Netherlands something similar was observed earlier in Wageningen and Woerden (paragraph 3.7).

In Groningen, same as in Leeuwarden, many vagrants and addicts loiter the streets. The reason is that in this neighbourhood of Groningen, there are several day shelter centres for addicts as well as a methadone post of the Care and Treatment of Drug Addicts North Netherlands. Police policy in Groningen has not been as detailed as in Leeuwarden with regard to monitoring addicts, but still the presence of addicts also affects the work on the beat. For instance, officers see to it that the addicts do not gather and cause nuisances.

An other special circumstance in Groningen North is the presence of a football stadium with a football team that plays in the premier league. Community beat officers are present at the matches, and that is exemplary for their street work: in the regular ‘football world’ – something they are well up in – they meet relatively many acquaintances, whom they have a chat with.

If there is a matter of relatively many contacts with acquaintances in the police work, it is usually either because emergency patrol officers frequently give attention to the same persons (mainly vagrants in Leeuwarden), or because we are observing the work of more experienced and somewhat older community beat officers – who are also patrolling on foot or by bicycle. What we see here is that experience and way of patrolling also determine the character of the street work.

Table 3.12 summarizes the finds. The first seven columns express the seven independent variables in the conceptual model (figure 1.2). The first three columns concern the environment of the organisation. The fourth column concerns ‘information facilities’ which can be found in the environment (for example documents citizens carry with them) or be a part of the police organisation (for example investigation registers per police computer). Columns four up to and including six concern police policy. ‘Basic assignment’ refers to the kind of tasks officers are allocated to in the police policy (the ‘what’) and ‘basic strategy’ refers to the way the police officers perform these tasks (the ‘how’). ‘Management control’ or direct supervision refers to the daily management by supervisors, at incident level, and can also refer to the what and the how (‘you have to do this job now, and you’ll do it in this way’). In the last column (‘other’) various factors have been collected that substantiate police work on the beat – factors that present themselves during the investigation, but that cannot be placed in the conceptual model.

It is too early to draw conclusions. We will also be looking at the finds from four other countries after this. But the following is important now. We are looking for elements that determine how police work on the beat is performed. We have established the points where the street work of three Dutch towns deviates from the average over the twelve cities in this study, and we have given causes for the differences. We have not, in other words, looked for explanations for the elements the police street work does *not* deviate locally in. Yet, there are of course factors that determine what that part of the street work looks like. Here this remark suffices, in the closing chapter we will come back to the importance of this for the conclusions of our study.

Table 3.12: features that determine what is involved in police patrol work in The Netherlands

| National Features (legislation, culture) | Local Urbanisation | Exceptional local circumstances | Information facilities | Basic assignment | Basic strategy | Management control | Other |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Groningen and Assen: actions in a small community ('football community, less urban quarters) (particularly CBP) | Groningen: concentration of shelter locations for addicts (particularly EP) | | Leeuwarden: subdivision CBP in an office and a street part, in which the officers on the beat are also deployed for non-urgent citizen calls and internal jobs | Groningen and Assen: surveillance of CB-officer on foot or by bicycle | Leeuwarden: issuing work assignments (EP as well as CBP) | Groningen and Assen: experience years of officers (knowledge of – persons in – the neighbourhood) (particularly CBP) |
| | | Groningen: football stadium with team that plays in premier league (particularly CBP) | | Leeuwarden: policy of monitoring vagrants/addicts (particularly EP) | | Groningen: performance contracts (EP as well as CBP) | |
| | | | | Groningen, Leeuwarden, Assen: policy of broad basic police function (particularly CBP) | | | |

One factor missing in Table 3.12 is the implementation of the extensive requirement to carry ID papers. We have observed that particularly the police officers in Groningen have made use of this (for Dutch police officers new) power more often than average. They did so in relation to their actions against cyclists without proper lighting. The fact that police officers in Groningen act frequently against cyclists without lighting and in doing so often issue a fine, is however not a consequence of the implementation of the obligation to carry ID-papers, but of the national performance contracts. However, the frequent use of this new power leads to new elements in the work: the repressive actions become more strict because citizens who did not have to show identification before have to do so now, and officers sometimes issue fines for not being able to show identification papers – something which before simply did not exist in Dutch police street work.

None of the tables presented before showed a change we could lead back to the implementation of the extensive obligation to carry ID papers. But our observations do show that repressive actions because of this extensive identification obligation have become more strict – but 'level of strictness during repressive actions' was not an aspect we have assessed and compared the street work upon. So that change did not show in the tables. We have observed the level of repressive actions, particularly the percentages of incidents that ended with a summons. The EP in Groningen and Leeuwarden showed a high percentage of incidents that ended in a summons (Table 3.10a). We found an explanation in Groningen in the performance contracts and in Leeuwarden in the way community beat patrol is organised (3/4-teams with an emergency-type character). The implementation of the ID-obligation was not found as a cause of the high percentage of incidents resulting in a summons. The following seems to be the case: essentially, the police work is determined by police policy. Officers subsequently use the new law to make their work easier. In other words: the ID-obligation facilitates the set policy, but is in itself not a sufficient condition for change. We

can compare this with the supervision of addicts and vagrants in Leeuwarden. Special cells were made available to the police station for arrested addicts. The presence of these cells facilitates the repressive actions of officers against these addicts and vagrants, but the mere fact that these cells are available is not the *cause* of this specific surveillance.

Bibliography chapter 03

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Appendix

Table 3.5: Patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)

| | Traffic | | | | Law | | Order/ Assistance | | | | | Other | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|-------|---------|-------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|-------|--------------|-----------|-------|
| | Coll. | Viol. | Check | Other | Crime | Other | Social problem | Quest. from public | Trouble-some youth | Public order | Other | Net-workin g | Int. job. | Else |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gron | 6.4 | 17.8 | *16.7 | 2.5 | 18.9 | 4.3 | 8.2 | 1.8 | 0.7 | * 10.3 | 6.4 | 3.6 | 1.1 | 1.4 |
| Leeuw | 5.3 | *12.9 | ** 1.8 | 1.2 | 21.6 | 5.3 | 11.1 | 5.8 | 1.2 | 8.2 | 8.8 | 7.0 | * 7.6 | 2.3 |
| Assen | 8.0 | 21.1 | * 2.3 | 1.7 | 22.3 | 6.9 | 8.6 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 8.6 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 3.4 |
| Tot PSE | 6.1 | 21.9 | 10.1 | 3.4 | 15.5 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 3.8 | 1.2 | 5.3 | 7.6 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 2.8 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gron | 0.0 | 17.2 | 4.5 | 3.4 | 5.6 | 1.7 | * 8.4 | 10.1 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 7.3 | ** 34.6 | ** 1.7 | * 0.0 |
| Leeuw | 1.6 | 14.1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | ** 23.8 | 5.4 | 3.8 | 7.0 | 4.3 | 6.5 | 4.9 | ** 10.8 | 13.5 | 1.1 |
| Assen | 0.0 | * 31.9 | 1.2 | 2.5 | 4.9 | 3.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 3.7 | 2.5 | 3.7 | * 31.1 | ** 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Tot PSE | 0.7 | 21.5 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 7.4 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 11.4 | 1.3 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 21.3 | 11.6 | 3.8 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

CHAPTER 4


4. Policing the Streets in Denmark*Peter Kruize***4.1 The Danish Police*****The Present Organization***

The Danish police are national corps under the authority of the Minister of Justice. Contrary to some other countries the local authorities have no direct say about the police. The police, however, aim after being rooted locally by – for instance – cooperation with local authorities about public order matters and crime prevention.

Recently major changes in the organization of the police have been implemented. Since 2007 the country is divided in 12 police districts. The National Commissioner is head of the police. The Police Director is the head of a district. In addition the Police Director is head of the Local Public Prosecution at the level of the District Court.⁴¹

The Police Director is placed under the authority of the National Commissioner, but criminal investigation and public prosecution takes places under the authority of the National Public Prosecutor.

Figure 4.1: Authority of the Police (since 2007)



There are six National Departments taking care of Personnel and Education (Police Academy), Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Police Tasks (like crime analysis, computer crime and forensic investigation), Accountancy, Finances and Logistics, and Intelligence Service.


⁴¹ This system is only found in Norway and Denmark. In the rest of the western world police and public prosecution are separated. Even though this specialty of Denmark compared to other EU-countries has been subject of discussion in regard to the police reform, the system is (still) unchanged.

Every police district is divided into three major sections: Police, Public Prosecution Section and Administration. The Police section is, again, divided into three subsections: Emergency Patrol, Criminal Investigation and Local Police. Nowadays the police are a one-string organization; there is at management level no longer a distinction between Uniform Branch and CID.

The Organization Prior to 2007

Before 2007 – at the time of data-collection for this study – the country was divided in 54 police districts. Also the hierarchical structure of the police was different prior to 2007. The National Commissioner did not have the possibility to direct or interfere with concrete public order activities of the police districts. The head of a police district was ‘its own boss’. Only the Minister of Justice could – in theory – interfere in police matters in the districts. This system was rooted in the municipal police forces of the early 20th century and first abolished with the police reform of 2007.

Figure 4.2: Authority of the Police (prior to 2007)



Before 2007 the police were a two-string organization, in the sense that also at management level a distinction existed between the Uniform Branch and the CID.

Duties and tasks of the Police

The duties of the police are described in the Police Act of 2004. According to this act the police stand for security, peace and order in society. The police are the only organization with investigation powers. For instance Tax and Custom authorities are allowed to check and control citizens, but do not have the power to investigate a criminal act.

The police in Denmark have many tasks. With the reform of 2007 it is decided that issuing of passports and driving licenses are gone over to the municipalities. Since 2008 issuing of license plates (cars, motorcycles) and collecting road tax are gone over to the Tax Authorities. But prior to 2007 – during the observations for this research project – these tasks still belongs

to the competence of the police. Especially license plates play a key role in the work of community beat officers, as described later in this chapter.

National Computer Data Bases

The police have access to several national data bases. Not all those registers belong to the responsibility of the police. For instance the CPR Register operates under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, but the police have access to relevant parts of this register through a so-called Index Register. All data bases of the police are nationally created and under national service; probably due to the fact that the Danish Police is a national corps. The most relevant national data bases in regard to patrol work are:

- **Crime Register (Police)**

This register consists of two parts. The first part contains persons charged for a criminal act (not necessarily convicted). Also in cases the charges are waived by the prosecutor, the person involved is registered. Only in cases the charges are considered 'groundless' no registration takes place. Dependant of the nature of the charges/conviction the information is deleted after five, ten or twenty years. Information of the most serious offenders is never deleted. The second part of the Crime Register contains information of 'police interests'. It is called the investigation part of the Crime Register.

- **CPR Register (Ministry of Interior)**

CPR stands for Central Person Registration. Every citizen in Denmark has a unique CPR-number. This register contains information about a citizen's age, civil status, place of birth, present and former addresses, possession of driver license, et cetera.

- **Motor register (Tax Authorities)**

All motorized vehicles are registered in this data base. The register contains information of the owner and specification of the vehicle.

- **Stolen items register (Police)**

Stolen property of a certain value and identifiable by a registration number are registered in this data base.

Specific Police Computer Systems

Besides access to the above mentioned national data bases several computer systems are used to support police work. The most important system is Polsas. Polsas is the most central police system. Police officers write their reports in Polsas. Also public prosecutors use this system for their daily paper work. Polsas may be utilized for management information (Polis). For instance the (national) crime statistics are partly based on Polsas data.

Not only violations of the law are recorded in Polsas. The system also has a feature for every police activity or observation of interest: the so-called '24 hour reference'. This feature enables (simple) searching on key words. This function is typically used by community beat officers to prepare 'problem oriented policing' projects. The '24 hour references' are also input for duty meetings and to keep police officers informed about what is going on in their district or local beat.

If a person is wanted by the police, firstly the registration takes place in the local Polsas environment of the police district. The Polsas registration is taken over in the Crime Register,

which makes the information accessible for all police districts. Also registration in the Schengen Information System is possible, but this is not linked automatically.

Every patrol car is equipped with a board computer (Thor-terminal) and GPS. The board computer has access to several data bases. When a police officer for instance searches the license plate number of car, the computer provides information about the car owner, whether all levying are paid, whether the driver has a driver license and whether the car owner has been convicted previously. The registers are, however, not connected in the sense that one question allows a search through several registers.

Every police officer has a radio connection to the Central Dispatch Room. Since 2007 every police district has a Central Dispatch Room in collaboration with the Fire Patrol and Emergency Services. Before 2007 every police officer was connected by radio to the headquarters of their police district. Even though every patrol car has a board computer we observed that police officers in the Police District of Roskilde often ask for information by radio, because of the slowness of the board computer. This is, by the way, not often observed in the Police District of Hillerød.

Performance Management

In the 1990ies the Ministry of Finance demanded a system to measure police performance. The goals are part of a contract over several years. The most recent contract covers the period 2007-2010. On the basis of this overall contract the National Commissioner and the Police Directors are bounded to yearly performance contracts as well. The performances are measured by a system called PRES (Police Results and Evaluation System).

PRES covers nine items of which five are related to internal performance (leadership, strategy, employees, cooperation and work processes) and four to results achieved (citizens, employees, key numbers and society). In the performance contract the measurable goals are formulated, like the satisfaction of victims of crime, the response time of the police and the number of cleared cases. This system intends to provide politicians and chiefs of police real influence on priorities in police work.

Under each item one or more priorities are listed. In 2006 – the year of the observational study – priority is for instance given to traffic offences and crime which causes fear among citizens (burglary, violence). These national priorities are also visible at the local level. During the observation period the field worker noticed priority to traffic offences like no use of car belts, talking in a cell phone while driving and proper (car) lights. In regard to burglary the policy was to visit every burglary crime scene to search for forensic tracks and – probably mostly - to give the victim moral support.

Community policing

The concept of community policing is introduced in Denmark in 1984 by pilots in nine police districts. Later on these pilots got a permanent status, but are not systematically evaluated. Community policing is in Danish called ‘close by police’ (*nærpoliti*). This covers fairly well the intention of this kind of police work: as close as possible to the local community. First in 1994 the concept of community policing is evaluated in a more systematic way (Holmberg, 1996). In 1996 the National Commissioner states that community policing should be the main focus, besides emergency policing and investigation of serious crime. As result of this ambition of the National Commissioner an analysis of the existing practice of community policing has been carried out. The most important finding is that community beat officers are

spending around 70% of their time on paperwork (for instance legal notices). Local patrol appeared to be a less important ingredient of community policing as meant (Boddum, 1996).

As a result of Boddum's analysis the concept of community policing got a boost by six pilots launched in 1998. In the evaluation (Balvig & Holmberg, 2003), however, is concluded that only the pilot in the Police District of Helsingør may be considered as a major change and worth to evaluate in detail. The results and experiences of the pilots were the basis of a handbook about community policing (2001). Many new initiatives were started (31 in total) afterwards.

So the concept of community policing has been in focus the recent years. In the next section the actual situation (at the time of the observational study) of community policing in the Police District of Roskilde and Hillerød is described.

4.2 Police in Roskilde and Hillerød

Some General Characteristics of the Police District of Roskilde

The Police District of Roskilde lies west of Copenhagen on the island Zealand, covers 552.1 km², consists of eight municipalities with a total population of 175,500 inhabitants.⁴² The town of Roskilde, with approximately 46,000 inhabitants, is one of the oldest cities of Denmark.⁴³ For more than thousand years ago the Vikings founded the city. In earlier days Roskilde was one of the most important cities of Denmark. Both the King and the Bishop had their residence in Roskilde. The most famous building of Roskilde is the *Domkirke* (church).

Nowadays Roskilde is known for its rock music festival in June. During this one week lasting festival the population increases with about 100,000 people. Roskilde University is founded in 1972. Located a few kilometers to the east of the town of Roskilde, the University is the daily place of work for around 8,000 students, 700 researchers and lecturers as well as 250 technical/administrative staff in the 50 buildings which comprise the campus.

Roskilde is a regional infrastructural junction with a highway (since the 1960ies) connecting Copenhagen from the east side and a local airport (since the 1970ies). More to the east the Police District of Roskilde also includes a part of the highway reaching Copenhagen from the south.

Besides Roskilde the Police District covers seven other municipalities. Greve and Solrød may be considered as suburbs of Copenhagen. These suburbs are founded in the 1960ies and are characterized by relatively cheap housing. The municipalities Gundsø, Bramsnæs, Ramsø, Lejre and Hvalsø are typically countryside villages. Because of the price explosion of houses in Copenhagen the last ten years these villages have become popular alternatives for house seeking citizens of Copenhagen.

⁴² Not only are the police reformed in 2007, also the number of municipalities is reduced. The description of the Police District of Roskilde is based on the situation prior to 2007, because the observational study is carried out in 2006. Nowadays the former Police District of Roskilde is part of the Police District Mid- and West Zealand. The headquarters of the Police District Mid- and West Zealand are situated in Roskilde.

⁴³ The town of Roskilde is part of the municipality Roskilde which has a population of 55.000 inhabitants. Roskilde is the 10th largest city of Denmark.

Some General Characteristics of the Police District of Hillerød

The Police District of Hillerød lies north of Copenhagen, also on the island Zealand. It covers 629 km², consists of seven municipalities with a total population of 143,500 inhabitants. The history of the town of Hillerød, with nearly 30,000 inhabitants, goes back to 1200.⁴⁴ In the 16th century King Frederik II built the famous Castle *Frederiksborg Slot* which is situated besides the inner city of the town. The city of Hillerød has a regional function and is connected to Copenhagen by S-train.⁴⁵

The other municipalities of the Police District are Allerød, Græsted-Gilleleje, Farum, Helsingør, Slangerup and Skævinge. Especially along the coast of Græsted-Gilleleje many summerhouses are located. Allerød and Farum are together with the city of Hillerød the most urban areas of the Police District. Farum has a soccer team playing in the primary league. Denmark is not known for football hooliganism, but matched to FC København and Brøndby IF demand special security measurements.

Strength of the Police Districts of Roskilde and Hillerød

As Table 4.1 shows the Police District of Roskilde has 270 employees, corresponding with 650 inhabitants per employee. Compared to the average in the European cities included in this study the police density is rather low in the district of Roskilde. The same goes for the Police District of Hillerød.

Table 4.1: strength of the Danish police teams under observation, police-inhabitant ratio and population density

| | Strength (number of employees) * | Area covered by EP (km ²) | Inhabitants in this area # | Inhabitants per employee | Population density (inh./km ²) |
|------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Roskilde (DK) | 270 | 552.1 | 175,500 | 650 | 320 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 194 | 629.0 | 143,500 | 740 | 230 |
| TOTAL PSE | 1,741 | 1,646.9 | 837,420 | 480 | 510 |

* : including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.

The police strength includes all employees. Around 80 percent of the employees are educated as police-officers. The main part belongs to the Uniform Branch; the other executive officers are part of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). As pointed out in § 4.1 the local public prosecution is also part of the police organization. Logically lawyers are employed by the police. The last kind of employee is civil servants conducting clerical support and administrative tasks.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ The municipality of Hillerød has a population of 45,500 inhabitants. Also the description of the Police District of Hillerød is based on the situation prior to 2007, because the observational study is carried out in 2006. Nowadays the former Police District of Hillerød is part of the Police District North Zealand. The headquarters of the Police District North Zealand are situated in Helsingør.

⁴⁵ The S-trains is a light rail system with Copenhagen as center connecting the suburbs and regional towns to the capital. Seen from the air the S-train system looks like a hand with five fingers. Copenhagen is the palm of the hand.

⁴⁶ Compared to many other countries the Danish Police take care of many administrative tasks, like issuing driver licenses, passports, collecting road taxes and fines. Some of those tasks are moved to the municipalities with the reform of 2007. But not only are the tasks, also the clerical support is moved from the police to the municipalities.

Table 4.1.1: different types of employees (pr.2006-12-31)


| | Roskilde | | Hillerød | |
|---------------------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|
| | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| Lawyers | 13 | 5 % | 8 | 4 % |
| Uniformed police officers | 165 | 61 % | 133 | 69 % |
| Detectives | 48 | 18 % | 29 | 15 % |
| Civil servants | 44 | 16 % | 24 | 12 % |
| Total | 270 | 100 % | 194 | 100 % |

Source: National Commissioner (www.politi.dk)

Organization of the Police in the Districts Roskilde and Hillerød

The way the police are organized is similar in Roskilde and Hillerød. Figure 4.3 shows the several departments and the place of emergency patrol and community beat patrol in this chart.

Figure 4.3 Organizational chart a Police District (both Roskilde and Hillerød)



Emergency Patrol

Emergency patrol and community beat policing are both in Roskilde and Hillerød part of the Uniform Branch. In the Police District of Roskilde the emergency patrol is organized in three shifts (7.00-15.00; 15.00-23.00 and 23.00-07.00). To assure the duty shift is done properly one couple of officers meet one hour earlier, and likewise leaves one hour before the end of the shift. Every shift consists of 10 police-officers: two station officers and four couples to drive around in a patrol car. The couples are not constantly on the road, so in average two to three patrol cars are available for emergencies. The headquarters in Roskilde are the base for emergency patrol.

Emergency patrol in the Police District of Roskilde, as well as other Police Districts in Denmark, is characterized by its large extent of freedom for police officers to decide what to do. Of course, in case of emergency the patrol car is directed by the station officer, but so long no emergency call is received the officers decides what to do.

The local stations offer service to the public (passport, driver license) and the beat officers take care of the non-emergency events. Community beat policing is part of the Uniform Branch and the police officers attached to this kind of policing are also now and then on duty as emergency patrol officer. They are scheduled for weekend shifts. And if there are not enough regular emergency patrol officers on duty they fill in the gap.

The emergency patrol of the Police District of Hillerød is divided into four shifts, which creates an overlap in time between the shifts to facilitate the turnover of work. A shift consists typically of two station officers and three patrol couples and one dispatch officer. One patrol couple drives to and stays at the asylum center called *Sandholmlejeren*. Only in exceptional cases they are used for an emergency task. On Friday and Saturday evening/night one extra patrol couple is on duty, as well as special task force (in Danish *uropatrulje*; to translate as disturbance patrol).

Community Beat Patrol

Community beat policing in the district of Roskilde is spread out over three police stations: the Headquarters in Roskilde, a station in Karlslunde and a station in Hundige. Besides those stations community beat policing has two small offices in Roskilde to its disposal. The countryside villages of Gundsø, Bramsnæs, Ramsø, Lejre and Hvalsø have a countryside officer (*landbetjent*). This police-officer lives in the village. His private house is at the same time 'police office', in the sense that citizens may come over if they need a certain police service. The Police District also houses an asylum center (Avnstrup) where two beat officers are connected to. In total the formal strength of the community beat section is 30 officers at local stations, 5 countryside officers and 2 officers at the asylum center. In reality – at the time of observation – the section suffers around 10 vacant positions. Because of lack of personnel community beat officers are often busy with paperwork and legal notices (writs).

Community policing in the district of Hillerød is organized in five stations: the Headquarters in Hillerød and four community beat stations in Farum, Allerød, Helsingør og Gilleleje. Community policing in the *city* of Hillerød consists of five beat officers and one team leader. The other four community policing stations consist on paper of four police officers each, but during the observational period the stations were understaffed. In general beat officers work in the day time, typically from 7-15 or 8-16. The observational study of community policing in the Police District of Hillerød is limited to only the city of Hillerød.

Workload

The number of observed incidents – as defined in this study – is 250 for the Police District of Roskilde and 362 for the Police District of Hillerød. Most incidents are observed during the emergency patrol. Most incidents are on initiative of the patrol officers; 131 incidents of the total number of 612 (250+362) is the result of a (citizen) call (21.4%).

Compared to the other European cities involved in this study the number of observed incidents per hour is more or less the same in the Police District of Roskilde. Hillerød scores higher during emergency patrol, but lower during community policing than the PSE-average. The number of calls per hour indicates that patrol officers in Denmark more often work on own initiative compared to the other countries involved in this study.

Table 4.2: Work load

| | Observed incidents | ... of which are calls * | Inc./hour | Calls/hour |
|------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-----------|------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | |
| Roskilde (DK) | 136 | 42 | 1.8 | 0.6 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 246 | 59 | 2.4 | 0.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 2.089 | 911 | 1.8 | 0.8 |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | |
| Roskilde (DK) | 114 | 16 | 2.4 | 0.3 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 116 | 14 | 2.0 | 0.2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 2.094 | 323 | 2.6 | 0.4 |

*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding 'answering a question from the public' (var06=65) and 'chatting with the public' (var06=84).

4.3 Sort of Incidents Involved in Patrol Work

Traffic

Nearly half of all incidents (47.2%) of the observed patrol work in Denmark are related to traffic incidents. Compared to the other countries included in this study, traffic incidents in Denmark are overrepresented during patrol (see Table 4.3). When splitting patrol work up in emergency patrol and community policing the picture is slightly different. Traffic incidents are more often observed during emergency patrol in Denmark; this goes for the Police District of Roskilde as well as Hillerød. On the contrary community policing shows an overrepresentation of traffic incidents in Hillerød, but an underrepresentation in Roskilde.

Table 4.3: proportion of traffic

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------|------------------------------------------|------|---------------|---------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Roskilde (DK) | 91 | 74.7 | 45 | 15.6 | 136 | * 55.1 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 176 | ** 77.3 | 70 | 14.3 | 246 | ** 59.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 1.074 | 62.9 | 1.015 | 18.9 | 2.089 | 41.6 |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Roskilde (DK) | 78 | ** 12.8 | 36 | 2.8 | 114 | ** 9.6 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 97 | ** 58.8 | 19 | 0.0 | 116 | ** 49.1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 567 | 39.5 | 658 | 6.7 | 2.094 | 29.2 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

A more detailed look at the nature of traffic incidents learns that random checks and traffic violations are responsible for the large majority of traffic incidents. Only 7.6% of all traffic incidents are related to collisions, drunken driving, traffic regulation and other incidents.

Table 4.3.1: detailed view on traffic incidents in Denmark

| | Roskilde | | Hillerød | | Total DK | |
|------------------|----------|-----|----------|-----|----------|---------|
| | EP | CBP | EP | CBP | Number | Percent |
| Collisions | 4 | - | 9 | 1 | 14 | 4.8 |
| Random checks | 27 | 3 | 21 | 10 | 61 | 21.1 |
| Road side checks | - | - | 50 | - | 50 | 17.3 |
| Violation | 42 | 8 | 63 | 43 | 156 | 54.0 |
| Other incidents | 2 | - | 3 | 3 | 8 | 2.8 |
| Total | 75 | 11 | 146 | 57 | 289 | 100.0 |

The most likely explanation for the relatively few traffic incidents during community policing in Roskilde is lack of personnel, as described in section 4.1. As stated community beat officers are often busy with paperwork and legal notices (writs) due to lack of personnel and as consequence not often on free patrol. When they are out, it is often to inform about people's address and to hand over legal notices.

Table 4.3.1 classifies 50 traffic incidents during emergency patrol in the police District of Hillerød as road side checks. This is a relatively large number and does not count in Roskilde at all. A closer look at the observation notes learns that these 50 incidents are related to two special activities of patrol officers. Firstly a patrol couple decides – at the first day of the observational study – to check 44 cars in the time frame of one hour by stopping drivers at both sides of the road. Three drivers were asked to take an alcohol test (all three negative). All citizens were asked for their driver license. In five cases the person involved could not show his/her driver license, but a computer check confirmed the possession of a driver license. So they slipped away with a warning.

The second activity patrol officers were involved in road side checks summed up to six incidents. During this occasion they assist another police couple with speeding checks (laser gun). Three observed incidents refer to speeding. While standing there, two incidents with kids on mopeds took place as well. The last incident during this session was related to a car driver who was spinning wheels while driving away.

Especially the first action (44 cars checked) is extraordinarily and has a 'misleading' effect on the number of traffic incidents. But, even when this number of 44 incidents is not taking into consideration, traffic incidents during emergency patrol in Hillerød is still overrepresented compared the PSE-average (50.5% versus 41.6%).

Traffic weights heavily measured in number of incidents. When taking the time spends on incidents into consideration the role of traffic incidents is less prominent. In general traffic incidents are less time consuming than other incidents (see Table 4.3.2)

Table 4.3.2: duration of traffic and other incidents in Denmark

| | Traffic incidents | | Other incidents | | Total of incidents | |
|----------------------|-------------------|-------|-----------------|-------|--------------------|-------|
| | Number | Perc | Number | Perc | Number | Perc |
| 0-1 minute | 100 | 34,6 | 48 | 14,9 | 148 | 24,2 |
| 1-5 minutes | 109 | 37,7 | 99 | 30,7 | 208 | 34,0 |
| 5-15 minutes | 56 | 19,4 | 80 | 24,8 | 136 | 22,2 |
| 15-60 minutes | 19 | 6,6 | 74 | 22,9 | 93 | 15,2 |
| More than 60 minutes | 5 | 1,7 | 22 | 6,8 | 27 | 4,4 |
| Total | 289 | 100,0 | 323 | 100,0 | 612 | 100,0 |

Maintaining the law and other main themes in policing

The traditional categories in police patrol work are: maintaining the law, maintaining public order and giving assistance; the traditional categories in regard to emergency policing. This classification is enlarged by adding 'networking' and 'internal job' as important elements of community policing.

Table 4.4: patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages)

| | <i>N</i> | <i>Maintain- ing the law</i> | <i>Maintain- ing public order</i> | <i>Giving assistance</i> | <i>Networking</i> | <i>Internal job</i> | <i>Else</i> |
|------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Roskilde (DK) | 136 | ** 75.7 | 3.7 | * 11.0 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 2.2 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 246 | ** 74.8 | 4.9 | ** 10.6 | 6.1 | 0.8 | 2.8 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>56.8</i> | <i>8.1</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>4.9</i> | <i>3.3</i> | <i>4.0</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Roskilde (DK) | 114 | 26.3 | 2.6 | 12.3 | * 32.5 | ** 23.7 | 2.6 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 116 | ** 55.2 | 2.6 | 12.9 | ** 6.9 | 16.4 | 6.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>37.1</i> | <i>5.8</i> | <i>18.4</i> | <i>21.4</i> | <i>11.6</i> | <i>5.8</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to 'Total PSE').

Maintaining the law is by far the largest category in regard to emergency policing in Roskilde and Hillerød (around 75%) and overrepresented compared to the PSE-average. Two out of three incidents under the heading of maintaining to law refer to traffic checks/violations (193 incidents). The other incidents refer to a variety of criminal offences, with burglary as number one (22 incidents), followed by assault (7 incidents). Another subcategory with more than a few cases is 'suspicious situation' (12 incidents).

But also when leaving out the traffic checks/violations maintaining the law is the major category in regard to emergency policing in Denmark, as illustrated by Table 4.4.1. The overrepresentation of maintaining the law and the underrepresentation of giving assistance are however not statistically significant.

Table 4.4.1: main categories of emergency patrol (percentages) without traffic checks/violations

| | DK | PSE |
|--------------------------|------|------|
| Maintaining the law | 46.9 | 36.0 |
| Maintaining public order | 9.5 | 11.9 |
| Giving assistance | 22.9 | 33.3 |
| Networking | 10.1 | 7.8 |
| Internal job | 5.0 | 5.1 |
| Else | 5.6 | 6.0 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to 'Total PSE').

In case of burglary the incident typically consists of a meeting with the victim and a quick inspection of the property. The following fieldwork note is an illustrative example.

“Two officers drive to the burgled address, where they meet the victim (a flat screen television is stolen). The victim shows the place where the burglar has entered the premises. The officers hand out the necessary paperwork which needs to be filled in and returned by the victim. Further they take some pictures of the entrance. After a chat about possible preventive measurements the officers leave the scene.” (Field note 200609221747; duration 28 minutes).

Unless the offender is got in action, property crime incidents consist of a meeting with the victim or informer. In case of violent crime the chance of meeting the offender(s) is – at least in theory – higher. In not one of the seven assault cases the patrol officers arrive in the heat of the moment. In three cases it is unclear what has happened. They meet some people, but not a clear clue is given about the event or the persons involved. In the other four cases the identity of the offender is known, but he is not at the scene anymore.

“A message is received about a boy (15 years old) who is beaten by his father. The patrol officers meet the boy, three of his friends and a community worker on a square in town. The boy tells his story: he quarrelled with his little brother while doing the dishes, his father gets angry, take him up to a room, where he beats him. The boy runs away for home. The boy appreciates an interference of the patrol officers. They drive over to the parents’ house. The mother tells the story and while she is doing so, the father gets upset and blames the officers for not being objective. His son better can stay away from home. The officers leave the house and advice the boy to stay the night somewhere else; and inform his mother about doing so.” (Field note 200609161952; duration: 44 minutes).

Under the heading of ‘suspicious situations’ a colourful variety of incidents are shared. It may refer to the suspicion of the patrol officers, like observation 200609280008 where officers see two men are sneaking around. The officers ask them what they are doing. “A girlfriend lives there, but is not home”, according to the men. A check of their CPR-numbers give no hit and they are allowed to go. It also may refer to the suspicion of citizen, like the following example.

“A call about a suspicious person with a tosh light is received. It is around midnight and a patrol car drives to the appointed area. After a long drive (25 km) they immediately see the suspect. They contact the man, who declares that he walking with his kittens. They are too energetic to be in the house constantly. He wonders why the police come by. After checking his CPR-number the officers continues their patrol.” (Field note 200609290001; duration 6 minutes)

Maintaining public order stands for only a few percent of the contacts to the public during patrol work. Most of the incidents of the category ‘public order’ are placed under the general heading with the same name. Looking to the observations related to this category it show police interference in cases like playing music in the public streets, begging and urinating in public places. Sometimes the police warn several people for this kind of violations in a row, like the following example of a community beat officer in the town of Roskilde:

“A police officer contacts on own initiative a street musician and orders to stop playing in public (field note 200604261341), a beggar is ordered to stop his activities (field note 200604261347) and again a musician is also asked to stop playing. All three men are Roma-gipsies of Slovenian origin. The police officer asks the third gipsy where they have parked their car because it is his experience they visit the town for a few days in a larger group (field note 200604261349). (Duration of all three incidents 10 minutes)

Giving assistance as category in Table 4.4 stands for wide variety of assistance situations: from collision to answering questions of the public. Assistance or mediation in social problems – often quarrels between citizens – contains the largest number of incidents (28) in this category, followed by answering questions (16) and collision (14).

There is a major difference in how much time the several assistance incidents ask. Social problems are time consuming – most incidents under the heading of social problems takes more than 15 minutes – while answering questions are all done within 5 minutes. A social problem often involves two opponents and the police officers use to talk to both parties, like in the following example:

“The police receive a call about burning garden trash late at night by neighbours. The police officers first contact the caller, his wife and another neighbour. They tell about nuisance on a regular basis (loud music, burning stuff) by the neighbour in question. Afterwards the officers go over to the neighbour. He is upset and cannot see why the police have to show up. The fire department already has been there to put out the fire. He knows it is not allowed to burn garden trash after sunset. In regard to the neighbours the story is the other way around, according to him. The police officers give the man a fine for burning trash after sunset – which he is not intend to pay – and advice him not to make trouble with the neighbours.” (Field note 200610010046; duration 26 minutes).

Community beat officers who take care of social problems is at the boundary of police work. Many would argue that this kind of incidents do not belong to the duties of police officers. Even though not many of these incidents are observed the few registered ones are time consuming.

“The community beat officer visit a woman because she feels blamed by her neighbours. The officer and the woman know each other well due to previous contacts. The woman tells that she is blamed for misusing private information giving to her during a clairvoyance session. She feels another woman speaks evil about her to neighbours. Neighbours talk about her behind her back. While she is telling her story she becomes sadder and finally starts crying. The officer listens to her story and gives her some advice to avoid problems.” (Field note 200610111232; duration 55 minutes).

Networking is the title for a chat with citizens or (local) officials. Networking is significant overrepresented in community policing in Roskilde compared to the PSE average. A closer look at this kind of incidents in Roskilde shows two types of contact; first of all street contacts with local citizens. A walk through town may quick give several contacts, like four contacts during a walk of 15 minutes (field notes 20060420 2100/2104/2110/2118). Kids speak to the officer or the officer chats with the kids. They know each other in advance. Walking through town often results in greetings and small talks to citizens, especially when the beat officer is well known by the local citizens. Around 25 percent of all observed incidents during community beat patrol in Roskilde are marked as a chat with the public.

Other networking contacts are related to internal jobs. The officer has to hand over a legal notice (wrist), but do not know where to find the person involved. An often proved method is to ask the administrator of the person’s previous address whether he/she has any clue to locate the person.

Internal jobs seem to be a part of community policing, also observed by Boddum (1996) as discussed in section 4.1. Some internal jobs expect contact to citizens, like handing over legal notices and confiscate license plates. It is not mandatory to hand over a legal notice in person, but it’s an advantage to do so. According to Danish criminal law procedures a person may only be judged in case he/she does not show up in court, if the legal notice is handed over in person. When a car owner for instance has not paid road taxes the car’s license plates are confiscated.

Patrol work subdivided into subjects

Another way of presenting the incidents observed during patrol work is done in Table 4.5. Here patrol work is divided into the subjects ‘traffic’, ‘law’, ‘order/assistance’ and ‘other’. This general picture of Table 4.5 confirms the analysis on basis of Table 4.4. On basis of Table 4.5 it is however possible to focus more in detail on differences between Roskilde and Hillerød on the one hand and between Denmark and the PSE average on the other hand. It is especially traffic *checks* that explain to overrepresentation of traffic incidents during emergency patrol in Roskilde as well as Hillerød.

The explanation for the overrepresentation of traffic checks in Denmark compared to the PSE-average may be found in the patrol set up. In Denmark emergency patrol officers (at least at the time the observations were made) are sometimes bounded to certain tasks and – of course – emergency calls, but when the radio is silent, they drive ‘free patrol’. The officers are free to decide what to do during patrol. The most ‘natural’ thing to do, while driving around in a patrol car, is to make traffic checks. In this reasoning the overrepresentation of traffic checks

during emergency patrol in Denmark is an expression of more free choice of patrol officers compared to other European countries.

Community beat officers in Roskilde do not spend much time on traffic violations, as observed before. They are busier with networking (chats with citizens) and internal jobs (legal notices). Community beat officers in Hillerød are, however, more focused on traffic violations/checks and less involved in networking. With other words community policing in Hillerød is more similar to emergency patrol than CBP in Roskilde. This assumption is supported by the additional field notes of the observant. She reports an overlap in emergency and community policing. They fill in the gap if necessary. It is also the impression that beat officers in Hillerød more often are using a patrol car than their colleagues in Roskilde. It is obvious that contact to the public (networking) is easier obtained by walking than by driving around.

Table 4.5: patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)

| | Traffic | | | | Law | | Order/ Assistance | | | | | Other | | |
|----------|--------------------------------|---------|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|-------|-------------|-----------|------|
| | Coll. | Viol. | Check | Other | Crime | Other | Social problem | Quest. from public | Trouble -some youth | Public order | Other | Net-working | Int. job. | Else |
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06 Rosk | 2.9 | 30.9 | **19.9 | 1.5 | 17.6 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 2.9 |
| 06 Hille | 3.7 | 25.6 | **28.9 | 1.2 | ** 9.3 | 8.5 | 3.7 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 6.1 | 0.8 | 2.0 |
| Tot PSE | 6.1 | 21.9 | 10.1 | 3.4 | 16.1 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 3.8 | 1.2 | 5.3 | 7.6 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 2.8 |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06 Rosk | 0.0 | ** 7.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 0.9 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 0.9 | 2.6 | 6.1 | * 32.5 | ** 23.7 | 0.9 |
| 06 Hille | 0.9 | ** 37.1 | * 8.6 | 2.6 | 6.0 | 2.6 | 6.0 | * 3.4 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 4.3 | ** 6.9 | 16.4 | 3.4 |
| Tot PSE | 0.7 | 21.5 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 7.4 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 11.4 | 1.3 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 21.3 | 11.6 | 3.8 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Crimes

In Table 4.6 special attention is giving to incidents where patrol officers are confronted with crimes (besides traffic crimes, like drunken driving). In case of crime the initiative to the contact is mostly taken by citizens. Of the 67 observed incidents 44 are on initiative of the citizen. Taking into consideration that in general most incidents take place on initiative of the police, it is logical why incidents on initiative of citizens relatively often relates to crime. The percentage of crime incidents on initiative of the public are overrepresented in Roskilde compared to the PSE-average. This goes for emergency patrol as well as community beat patrol.

As closer look at the crime incidents on initiative of citizens in Roskilde show that burglary is responsible for 12 incidents during emergency patrol. This contributes to a high percentage when the total number of incidents on initiative of citizens is only 45. In case of community beat patrol in Roskilde the number of incidents on initiative of citizens is even smaller (36). Here burglary and shoplifting counts for three incidents each.

Table 4.6: proportion of crimes

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 91 | 5.5 | 45 | * 42.2 | 136 | 17.6 |
| Hillerød | 176 | 3.4 | 70 | 24.3 | 246 | ** 9.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.074</i> | <i>8.0</i> | <i>1.015</i> | <i>24.6</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>16.1</i> |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 78 | 10.3 | 36 | * 22.2 | 114 | 14.0 |
| Hillerød | 97 | 6.2 | 19 | 5.3 | 116 | 6.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.436</i> | <i>7.4</i> | <i>658</i> | <i>7.8</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>7.5</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

4.4 Police Mobilization

Contact between police and public may take place on initiative of the police, but may also be the result of a request of the citizens or other authorities. In Denmark the majority of observed incidents are the result of an initiative by the police. This goes for emergency patrol as well as community beat policing. Both Roskilde and Hillerød show an overrepresentation of police initiatives compared to the European average. Exception to the rule is CBP in Roskilde which is in line with the PSE-average. The overrepresentation of incidents on the initiative of the police is mainly explained by traffic incidents. Also with non-traffic incidents the proportion of police-initiative in Denmark is higher than the PSE-average, but this difference is – contrary to traffic incidents – not statistically significant.

It is not surprising that traffic incidents for more than 90 percent are initiated by the police. Table 4.3.1 already showed that most traffic incidents are about checks and traffic violations. Obvious contacts which take place on initiative of the police.

Table 4.7: proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police

| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
| Roskilde | 75 | * 90.7 | 61 | 37.7 | 136 | ** 66.9 |
| Hillerød | 146 | ** 93.2 | 100 | 40.0 | 246 | ** 71.5 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>77.9</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>32.6</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>51.4</i> |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 11 | 90.9 | 103 | 66.0 | 114 | 68.4 |
| Hillerød | 57 | 100.0 | 59 | 67.8 | 116 | ** 83.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>92.8</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>58.6</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>68.6</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

A closer look at the nature of police mobilization in Denmark is given in Table 4.7.1. In case of emergency policing contacts on the initiative of the police are nearly always established by police officers involved, while police initiatives during community beat policing are also caused by internal requests (for example, as already described, handing over legal notices) or follow up actions (for example revisit a citizen after an earlier contact). Follow up actions may often be characterized as social invention and naturally belongs to the competence of community beat officers.

When the initiative is on the side of the public or other authorities contacts are often established by calling to the station or the general alarm number (112). This goes especially

for emergency policing. A very foreseen result, because the main task of emergency patrol is to respond to emergency calls of citizens or others. In case of community beat policing contacts on initiative by the public is mostly the result of a direct address to the police officer. Also this result is not surprisingly because beat officers often walk by foot through town.

Table 4.7.1: Initiative to incidents in Denmark

| | EP | CBP | Total DK |
|---------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Police | | | |
| Own initiative | 242 | 86 | 328 |
| Internal request | 20 | 59 | 79 |
| Follow up action | 4 | 23 | 27 |
| Else | 1 | 7 | 8 |
| <i>Subtotal</i> | <i>267</i> | <i>175</i> | <i>442</i> |
| Public/other authorities | | | |
| Through station/alarm central | 92 | 15 | 107 |
| Directly | 18 | 33 | 51 |
| Else | 5 | 7 | 12 |
| <i>Subtotal</i> | <i>115</i> | <i>55</i> | <i>170</i> |
| Total | 382 | 230 | 612 |

4.5 Knowledge of the People in the Neighbourhood

When the police are rooted in society patrol officers know many people in the neighbourhood. It is assumed that community beat officers are more rooted in society than emergency patrol officers, and therefore have better knowledge of people in the neighbourhood. Table 4.8 supports this assumption. In one out of three incidents observed the community officer know the citizen, while emergency patrol officers only know the citizen in around 10 percent of the cases.

Table 4.8 also indicates a difference of knowledge in regard to the nature of the contact. In case of social problems it is more likely that the police officers know the citizens in advance. In case of traffic incidents it is rare that police officers and citizens know each other. A remarkable exception to this rule is observed during community beat patrol in Hillerød. In 14 out of 57 traffic incidents the police officer was familiar with the citizen in advance. A closer look at these incidents learns that in 11 cases the incident is about license plates. Before 2007 (so during the fieldwork) the administration of license plates was a police task. When a person has not paid road tax, when a car is not approved safe by an official check or when the car has no assurance, the police are entitled to confiscate the license plates. This is often done by community beat officers.

Table 4.8: proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance: EP

| | Traffic | | Social problems | | Other | | All incidents | |
|-----------|--------------------------------|---------|-----------------|------|-------|------|---------------|------|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 75 | 1.3 | 5 | 40.0 | 56 | 10.7 | 136 | 6.6 |
| Hillerød | 146 | 4.1 | 10 | 20.0 | 90 | 21.1 | 246 | 11.0 |
| Total PSE | 868 | 2.8 | 294 | 35.7 | 927 | 14.5 | 2.089 | 12.6 |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 11 | 0.0 | 7 | 42.9 | 96 | 41.7 | 114 | 37.7 |
| Hillerød | 57 | ** 24.6 | 10 | 60.0 | 49 | 38.8 | 116 | 33.6 |
| Total PSE | 611 | 7.5 | 168 | 57.7 | 1.315 | 38.3 | 2.094 | 30.9 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

4.6 Marginal persons

Out of the 612 contacts between police and citizens observed in the two Danish areas, only in six cases (1 percent) the citizen is labelled as ‘marginal’ by the fieldworkers. A remarkable low number compared to the PSE-average. Five of the six incidents take place in the context of community beat policing. We may only speculate about the explanation for the few police contacts with marginal persons in the Danish study. Probably the high level of the social security system in Denmark is one of the explanations. An additional explanation may be found in the fact that most marginal persons are attracted by Copenhagen. A relatively high concentration of marginal persons in the larger cities of nations seems a universal phenomenon.

Table 4.9: proportions of incidents with marginal persons

| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
|------------------|--------------------------------|--|-------------|--|---------------|--------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 75 | | 61 | | 136 | * 0.0 |
| Hillerød | 146 | | 100 | | 246 | ** 0.4 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | | 1.221 | | 2.089 | 5.8 |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 11 | | 103 | | 114 | 1.8 |
| Hillerød | 57 | | 59 | | 116 | 2.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | | 1.483 | | 2.094 | 4.3 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

The six incidents observed with marginal persons are in three cases about a beggar, two times about a psychological disturbed person and finally about a homeless person. The beggars are sent away, but in one case the community officers know the person and are familiar with the fact that the person (Russian) is living in the asylum centre Sandholm. They tell the fieldworker that people get food and pocket money at the centre, so no need for begging. It sounds that they need to legitimize their action for themselves. Anyway the person is also warned for begging in Copenhagen, is in possession of a stolen bicycle, has a knife with a blade of more than 7 centimetres and at his room at the centre they find a gas pistol. Since the man is hardly speaking English, a translator is called. The police officers also check the EMEI codes of two cell phones without result (Field note 200610301048).

The two cases with disturbed persons are different of nature. In one case a woman talking, on her initiative, to a community officer in a shopping centre. In the other case an emergency call to police is made by a housing project for psychological ill persons. A man has been violent the whole day (damaging the inventory), and the police already have been there to talk him down. This is done again, but the man is told that he will be arrested next time he acts violent (Field note 200609121512).

4.7 The Outcome of Incidents

The outcome of incidents may be a repressive measure by the police officer. In this research three types of repressive measures are distinguished: warning, summon and arrest. The three measured are ranked by seriousness. The most serious measure is arrest. In Tables 4.10a-c is

no overlap between these three measures. In case a citizen is arrested and received summons, the incident is counted under the heading of arrest.

Table 4.10a shows a relatively high level of repressive measures by community beat patrol incidents in Hillerød, caused by the number of warnings. This may be explained by the high number of traffic incidents during CBP in Hillerød (see Tables 4.10b and 4.10c). Around half of the observed incidents during CBP in Hillerød are in the sphere of traffic, while the PSE-average for CPB not even contains one third of the incidents in the sphere of traffic. The level of warnings in traffic cases is much higher than incidents outside the sphere of traffic.

Community Beat Patrol in Roskilde shows the opposite picture. Only few incidents are in the sphere of traffic. This explains the relatively low level of warnings for CPB incidents in Roskilde.

Warnings and summons are mostly given in relation to traffic incidents. Arrests however are – if made – in connection the incidents outside the sphere of traffic. The explanation is rather simple. In traffic incidents the police are mostly talking to an offender, and a repressive measure is expected. Nearly all traffic violations may be settled by a fine (summons). In case the police won't fine the offender a warning is given: 'this time you get a warning, next time you get a fine'. In incidents outside the sphere of traffic the police are mostly speaking to a victim of crime or a citizen in general. Only in some cases an offender is involved. When the offender is in sight an arrest is expected. So this explains why Table 4.10b (traffic) show a relatively high level of warnings/summons and no arrests, while Table 4.10c (non-traffic) show some warnings and arrests, but nearly no summons.

Table 4.10a: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|-------|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 136 | 26.5 | 10.3 | 3.7 | 40.4 |
| Hillerød | 246 | * 27.6 | 9.8 | 2.0 | 39.4 |
| Total PSE | 2.089 | 20.1 | 10.4 | 5.0 | 35.4 |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 114 | * 9.6 | 4.4 | 1.8 | 15.8 |
| Hillerød | 116 | ** 35.3 | 3.4 | 1.7 | ** 40.5 |
| Total PSE | 2.089 | 20.0 | 3.1 | 1.3 | 24.4 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 4.10b: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|-----|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 75 | 36.0 | 18.7 | 0.0 | 54.7 |
| Hillerød | 146 | 38.4 | 15.1 | 0.7 | 54.1 |
| Total PSE | 868 | 35.7 | 21.4 | 1.2 | 58.3 |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 11 | 45.5 | 27.3 | 0.0 | 72.7 |
| Hillerød | 57 | 68.4 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 71.9 |
| Total PSE | 611 | 59.9 | 8.2 | 0.0 | 68.1 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 4.10c: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|--------------|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 61 | 14.8 | 0.0 | 8.2 | 23.0 |
| Hillerød | 100 | 12.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 18.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.221</i> | 8.9 | 2.5 | 7.7 | 19.2 |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 103 | 5.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 9.7 |
| Hillerød | 59 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 10.2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.483</i> | 3.5 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 6.3 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Besides the three repressive measurement discussed (warning, summons and arrest) the police may also attach goods. This may be stolen items or forbidden goods (narcotics, weapons). In total the police have attached goods in 21 incidents observed in Denmark (3.4 percent).

The outcome of incidents may not only be repressive measurements. The outcome may also be an advice to the citizen. In 87 incidents (14.2 percent) advice is given. Advice is mostly given in connection to non-traffic incidents. In non-traffic situations advice is given in 21.7 percent of the incidents, while in the sphere of traffic this percentage is down to 5.9. Advice is more often given during non-traffic incidents under emergency patrol (26.7 percent) than during community policing (16.7 percent). Advice is given in a variety of incidents, but break-ins (burglary) and social problems (quarrel between citizens) are topping the list.

4.8 Use of Information Sources

During field work is special attention given to the use of information sources. In the Tables 4.11a-c distinction is made between manual documents and digital information sources. As expected the citizen's information source is nearly always a manual document, like a driver license or another identification document. When the police use their available information sources it is nearly always a computer system.

The police in Denmark more often require a document from citizens than the European average as indicated in Table 4.11a. Tables 4.11b en 4.11c show the nature of this difference: traffic incidents. We may only speculate about the reason for this difference, but the explanation may be found in the identification regulation in Denmark. According to § 750 of the Administration of Justice Act citizens are obliged to tell their name, address and date of birth to police officers. It is common practice for police officers to ask for ID-document (driver license, medical insurance card) in case they want to check the citizen's identity. In Denmark medical care is free for all inhabitants and this card is also utilized for instance by libraries. Besides every inhabitant has a central person registration (CPR) number, which consists of data of birth plus four digits. The last four digits have a form for logic, which allows the authorities to reveal a false CPR-number. If no documentation can be showed, the police like to inform to the person's CPR-number.

Not only are citizens in Denmark more often asked to identify themselves in traffic situations than in other European countries, also the police more often check their computer systems. This is again the result of a standard procedure in Denmark. After identification the police

officer checks whether the person is wanted by the authorities. It is also possible to check for instance whether a bicycle is stolen.

Table 4.11a: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – all incidents

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 163 | ** 43.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | ** 41.2 | * 52.9 |
| Hillerød | 246 | ** 40.7 | 0.0 | 2.0 | ** 33.7 | ** 58.1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>28.8</i> | <i>0.7</i> | <i>2.7</i> | <i>22.6</i> | <i>39.9</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 114 | 7.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.8 | 10.5 |
| Hillerød | 110 | 19.8 | 0.0 | 0.9 | ** 14.7 | 27.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>14.0</i> | <i>0.4</i> | <i>3.4</i> | <i>6.0</i> | <i>18.9</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 4.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--------------------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 75 | ** 70.7 | 1.3 | 1.3 | ** 60.0 | * 74.7 |
| Hillerød | 146 | * 61.0 | 0.0 | 3.4 | 33.6 | ** 71.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>46.9</i> | <i>0.2</i> | <i>3.6</i> | <i>32.1</i> | <i>57.1</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 11 | * 63.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 54.5 | * 63.6 |
| Hillerød | 57 | 26.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 35.1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>0.0</i> | <i>2.1</i> | <i>11.8</i> | <i>25.5</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 4.11c: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 61 | 9.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 18.0 | 26.2 |
| Hillerød | 100 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 33.0 | 38.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>1.0</i> | <i>2.1</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>27.7</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Roskilde | 103 | * 1.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.9 | * 4.9 |
| Hillerød | 59 | 13.6 | 0.0 | 1.7 | * 10.2 | 20.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>10.3</i> | <i>0.5</i> | <i>3.9</i> | <i>3.6</i> | <i>16.2</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

There are remarkable differences between the two Danish police districts. In the sphere of traffic the emergency patrol officers in Roskilde more often use digital information sources than officers in Hillerød. For non-traffic incidents the picture is reverse. The number of traffic incidents observed during community beat patrol in Roskilde is too small to draw solid conclusions (n=11).

To get a better view on the use of information sources, and differences between Roskilde and Hillerød, the research material is analyzed in detail (Table 4.12). During one incident several computer systems may be used. The field notes of emergency policing in Roskilde indicate the use of computer information in 56 cases. In most of these cases both the motor and a person related system is consulted. In Hillerød computer systems are less used during emergency patrol (33.7 percent in Hillerød versus 41.2 percent in Roskilde), while GPS is used in Hillerød and not in Roskilde. So if GPS – to find an address – is taken out of the comparison, the difference is even more evident. There is not a solid explanation for this difference, but may point to a difference in police style in the two areas.

The difference between emergency patrol in Roskilde and Hillerød in the sphere outside traffic (Table 4.11.c) may be explained by the use of GPS in Hillerød. GPS was also available in the patrol cars in Roskilde during the field work and the fieldworker notes in his additional report that GPS is used frequently. Apparently the fieldworker in Roskilde regarded GPS – in contrary to the fieldworker in Hillerød – not as an information system.

Table 4.12: Information sources police in Denmark

| | Roskilde | Hillerød |
|-------------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | |
| Motor register | 49 | 34 |
| Person register (cpr/crime) | 42 | 52 |
| GPS | - | 23 |
| Other system | 1 | 2 |
| <i>Use of information from police (n)</i> | 56 | 83 |
| <i>Percentage of cases</i> | 41.2 | 33.7 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | |
| Motor register | 7 | 11 |
| CPR / crime register | 6 | 10 |
| GPS | - | 2 |
| Other system | 1 | 2 |
| <i>Use of information from police (n)</i> | 10 | 17 |
| <i>Percentage of cases</i> | 8.8 | 14.7 |

4.9 Some Conclusions of Police Patrol Work in Denmark

Emergency patrol

The overall impression of emergency patrol work observed in the Danish cities compared to the other European cities is an overrepresentation of incidents between police officers and citizens in the sphere of traffic. To be more specific: interaction between police and public because of traffic control (checking driver license et cetera) and because of traffic violations by citizens.

The question is how this observation should be interpreted. The most likely explanation is that emergency patrol officers in the Danish cities receive less emergency calls and therefore have more opportunity to act on own initiative; and what is more easy than looking after traffic? The officers are themselves in a patrol car, cars has license plates which offer the possibility to check the record of the car owner. This hypothesis is overwhelmingly supported by the data. During emergency patrol in Denmark 382 incidents were observed, and 101 of these stem from an emergency call (26.4 percent). In all European counties 2.089 incidents were

observed during emergency patrol of which 911 stem from a call (43.6 percent). If we take into consideration that the European number also includes Denmark, the proportion of incidents caused by a citizen call in other European cities is even more prominent (810 calls out of 1.707 incidents; 47.5 percent).

As pointed out in § 4.3 the number of traffic incidents on initiative of the police is influenced by one exceptional action (in regard to emergency patrol) of a side road check of 44 cars. When these 44 incidents are left out of the calculation the proportion of incidents during emergency patrol in reaction on calls from citizens is still significant lower in the Danish cities than in the other European cities (29.9 percent versus 47.5 percent).

So it is most likely that the overrepresentation of traffic incidents during emergency patrol is due to fewer calls from citizens. The next question to address is why citizens in Denmark less often call the police for reasons of emergency. The answer may be found in the population density of the patrol areas under observation (see Table 2.2). The two Danish areas represent the lowest population density. It is common knowledge that urban areas demand more police intervention than rural areas. So when the police districts of Roskilde and Hillerød are compared to the city centre of Brussels, it is clear that the need for assistance of the police is of another dimension.

Community beat patrol

The observations of community beat patrol in Roskilde and Hillerød show remarkable differences. During the time of observation (2006) community policing in Hillerød was actually not much different from emergency patrol. May be community police exists (on paper) because of ‘political correctness’, but the idea of problem oriented policing or even foot patrol on regular basis was hardly found. In this light it is not surprising that ‘community policing’ in the district of Hillerød has many similarities with emergency patrol. The only major difference is that many internal jobs, like legal notices and to attach license plates of cars, are specific tasks of community patrol.

Community beat patrol in Roskilde during the observation period is another story. Here there is the intention to another angle of patrol than emergency patrol. If the time is available foot patrol is carried out, and contacts in the local community are reinforced (networking). But, during the period of observation, community policing was also characterized by lack of personnel, with the result that much time was spent on paper work instead of patrol work.

This difference of community policing in Roskilde and Hillerød also explains why nearly half (49.1 percent) of the incidents observed during community beat patrol in Hillerød are in the sphere of traffic, while this percentage in Roskilde is only 9.6 percent (see also Table 4.3).

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CHAPTER 5

5. Policing the Streets in Germany

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5.1 The German Police

Describing policing in Germany in general is hardly possible, as there is no nationwide German Police force nowadays. Like culture, universities, schools and other issues, law enforcement is rather reserved to the 16 federal states (“Bundesländer”). Each state maintains its own police force, where both patrol police (uniformed) and detectives (plain clothes) are working together in the same force. Branches of the police force include the general or patrol police force, the criminal police (detectives), the emergency police force and the water police. Their duties range from averting dangers to prosecuting crime. Whereas the uniformed patrol police force is mainly concerned with petty crime and minor offences, the criminal police deal with serious crimes and criminal offences. The exact assignment of responsibilities is yet dependent on the legislation of the respective federal state: in some states, the uniformed police deals with more than 70% of all crimes, in other states the percentage is less than 30%. With regard to the prosecution of crime, the police are subordinate to the public prosecutor's office.

The **uniformed or patrol police** deals mainly with general public security functions, with traffic problems and accidents, conflict solutions and minor crimes and with “helping people” in different situations. Empirically, the usual task of a patrol police officer divides into 20-40% “crime fighting” (which is in fact the administration of crimes), 20% conflict solution (disputes, family arguments), 20% “helping people” (drunken, helpless, elderly...), and 20-40% traffic related work (accidents, controlling traffic and drivers). These tasks are mostly reactive and generally carried out by emergency patrols. Their work, however, is often supplemented by their colleagues from the district police (Bezirksdienst), who perform a more pro-active style. The officers are seen to have a positive impact on the relationship between police and citizens, by showing clear presence and establishing a trustful contact. It is suggested that their actions should improve the acceptance of policing and enhance the overall feeling of safety (Posiege & Steinschulte-Leidig; 1999). They usually carry out foot patrols within their specific ‘own’ district, in particular in areas with a difficult social context. Their knowledge of place and people facilitates access and acceptance among the citizens and enables them to solve conflicts informally and at an early stage. According to Lange (1999)⁴⁷ community beat patrol officers dispose of high job satisfaction and motivation – in contrast to a lesser job satisfaction of colleagues from the emergency patrol. An emphasis of their work is put on networking and interaction in the neighbourhoods and the need for close cooperation of residents, police and administrative and organisational bodies. In the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen, for example this led to the build up of specific security partnerships. In some way this work can be regarded as community policing, though community policing as a distinct concept is rather novel in Germany and the work of the district police is often seen in terms of ‘nice to have’. Their deployment and handling differs not only between the states but also between different cities within a state. With regard to the current chapter, we will therefore describe the specific tasks of district officers as they are applied in the two cities that have been examined.

⁴⁷ Lange’s (1999) results are based on a field study using expert interviews and participant observation in the cities of Dortmund and Kleve in Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW).

Detectives or criminal investigation police is responsible for all other, mainly severe crimes (usually starting from robbery, heavy assault, break and enter). The of police officers on duty (patrol police, detectives, border emergency and water police) was about 266.000 in 2006, resulting in one officer per 309 inhabitants. In fact, considering losses due to the shift system, illness, training, administrative tasks in ministries etc., the ‘real’ number is somewhat between one officer available for 8.000 to 10.000 inhabitants at a given moment. Every state maintains organizationally separate emergency police force units within its police force. These are supplied with the necessary control structures and operational equipment by the Federal government. The emergency police forces are responsible for dealing with exceptional circumstances including dangerous situations in the case of natural disasters or accidents, as well as for assisting with individual police duties. The emergency police force (or standby police reserve) is also used as a riot police in each state. Usually police recruits have to join this police force for between one and three years after their initial training and before they are submitted to a local police force.

The mandatory prosecution of offences

An important feature of German legislation, that has substantial impact on police work, is the principle of the mandatory prosecution of offences, which means that the German Police must investigate all crimes which come to their knowledge: The principle, laid down in the Penal Prosecution Code (StPO), regulates that the police is not allowed to dismiss a case. This is only possible by the public prosecutor. Numbering slightly more than 5,000, the public prosecutors are for the most part concerned with criminal proceedings and the enforcement of sentences. When a person is suspected of a crime, it is their duty to lead the investigations with the assistance of the police who, in such cases, are subject to the supervision and factual instruction of the public prosecutor's office. Nevertheless, the police do factually more than 90% of all proceedings. Only in severe or in difficult cases, the prosecutor advises the police what (or what not) to do. Following completion of investigations, the office of the public prosecutor decides whether the proceedings should be terminated or prosecution instigated. During the last years, more than 70% of all cases, brought to the prosecutor's office by the police, have not been processed to court but dismissed by the prosecutor (the proceedings have been closed by the prosecutor). More than half of all preliminary investigation proceedings against known suspects are dropped by the public prosecutor due to the lack of sufficient evidence or due to reasons of discretionary prosecution. Some 25% are passed on to the courts by means of a charge/application for penal orders. The remaining cases are settled in other ways, e.g. by passing them on to another public prosecutor or by referring them for private prosecution. A conviction substantiated in a hearing before a deciding court has become the exception. The large scope for variation in assessment granted by these norms leads to considerable regional differences. With a share of more than 80%, fines are by far the most frequent form of punishment. The majority of all convictions are now dealt with in written summary proceedings without trial. The suspended sentence of imprisonment is the second most commonly applied sanction. Approximately 80% were sentenced to pay a fine, for approx. 14% their sentence was suspended and approx. 6% were given an unconditional prison sentence, which normally leads to the offender being actually imprisoned.

The *Federal Crime Agency (BKA, Bundeskriminalamt)* assists the federal and state units as a clearing agency regarding criminals and criminal actions. Federal officers investigate certain actions, however, notably those inimical to the security of the state or criminal actions that transcend the confines of any given state. The responsibilities and powers of the BKA are regulated in the German Constitution and in the “BKA Law”. The BKA is subordinate to the Federal Ministry of the Interior and has the task of coordinating police contacts at national

and international level. It serves as the international criminal police force of the Federal Republic of Germany, which means that the BKA is responsible for investigations and searches involving a large number of cases in the field of international organized crime. All official communications between the German police and other countries are (and have to be) routed through the BKA. More than 3 million persons are filed by the Federal Crime Agency. The electronic police information system at the BKA is known as INPOL. The INPOL wanted persons database currently contains about 892,000 arrest requests, including 667,000 expulsion orders/ deportations of foreigners. An additional computer-assisted information system designed to store and retrieve data on persons and property is the Schengen Information System (SIS), which can be used for searches in the countries that are parties to the Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement (CAS). The establishment of the SIS was a significant compensatory measure following elimination of border controls at the internal borders of the CAS countries. SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry) is the national central office for information exchange relating to SIS searches. Within seconds, the search data can be accessed from more than 30,000 terminals located throughout the Schengen area. More than 10 million wanted notices are included in the SIS (approximately 9.3 million property searches and 1.2 million searches for persons).

The conversion of Border Police into Federal Police

The Federal Border Police (BGS), now Federal Police (Bundespolizei, BP) is a special police branch of the federation. It was founded in March 1951 and was subordinate to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. In July 2005 the Border Guard was renamed in Federal Police. Its initial tasks concerned the protection and patrolling of the border and the railways and protecting aviation from attacks at most of the Federal Republic's major airports. Due to the Schengen agreement at 19 June 1990 and fall of the German domestic border 3 October 1990 the major task of the BGS concerning the control of more than 2600 km border area became obsolete. However, its brief as the border patrol is becoming more important with the rise of cross-border criminality on the country's eastern borders (such as smuggling of aliens, car smuggling and drug trafficking). Since 1998, the Federal Border Guard has had an extended brief allowing it to check people's papers beyond the 30-kilometer zone, on railway stations and at passenger airports in order to prevent illegal immigration. Furthermore, the BGS also has its own operational emergency forces departments. It also protects specific locations for selected constitutional bodies of the Federal government and the federal ministries. Moreover, it has been increasingly involved in international peacekeeping police missions abroad. The Federal Police currently has some 39000 members.

Police Rank System

The police system in Germany divides - as already mentioned - into three levels (in some states only two), according to the service of the police (middle, high and higher). Whether or not an officer ascends from one rank to the next or changes from one level of service to the next depends on his performance and special training.

Vehicles and Equipment

There is no nationwide, homogeneous equipment, due to the federal structure of the German police. This results e.g. in different patrol cars (from Mercedes, Audi, VW, BMA to foreign models like Renault or Fiat) and different equipment (firearms, pepper spray, batons etc.). The same is true for technology and communications. Usually modern forensic technology is provided either by the BKA or by a central state crime agency state (Landeskriminalamt – see above). Radio and other communication is also inhomogeneous and recently under discussion (introduction of digitalized radios; communication with other European police forces).

5.2 Police in Bochum and Münster

The German chapter is based on observational studies that were carried out in Bochum and Münster, two cities which are both located within the same federal state of Northrhine-Westphalia, NRW.

Bochum

General information

Bochum is situated in the heart of the Ruhr Area, Europe's biggest agglomeration with 5 mio inhabitants of which about 430000 are living in the city of Bochum. Having been a typical working class city, characterised by coal mining and steel industry, the economical situation has changed massively within the last decades. Today, companies like Opel, with a production line for the Zafira and the German subsidiary of BP (British Petroleum) are the biggest employers. Furthermore, the service industry, education and culture gain increasing attention and greater emphasis. Opened in 1965, the Ruhr-Universität now attracts about 40000 students and occupies a work force of research and administration around 6000. The university moreover attracts further institutes and technology firms. Together with other cities Bochum is capital of culture in 2010, though, it's theatre, the Schauspielhaus Bochum or the musical 'Starlight Express' have already exceeded the local boundaries and made Bochum culture known nationwide. Finally, like other cities in the Ruhr area, football plays a major role and the local VFL Bochum represents the city in the German league and has (once) in Europe. Nightlife industry concentrates particularly in the city centre, where three streets, the so-called 'Bermuda triangle' provide cafés, bars and clubs that attract people in- and outside of Bochum.

The city of Bochum is divided into the urban districts Mitte, Wattenscheid, Nord, east, south and southwest. The following table supplies an overview of the distribution of area and the inhabitants on the individual urban districts.


Table 1: Districts in Bochum

| <i>District</i> | <i>area (km²)</i> | <i>population figure</i> | <i>population/km²</i> |
|----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Mitte | 32,0 | 102.004 | 3182 |
| Wattenscheid | 23,9 | 74.326 | 3114 |
| Nord | 18,9 | 36.856 | 1954 |
| Ost | 23,5 | 54.903 | 2340 |
| Süd | 27,1 | 51.081 | 1884 |
| <i>Südost</i> | 19,5 | 56.393 | 2892 |
| | | | |
| <i>Germany total</i> | 357.093,9 | 82.310.000 | 231 |

Police in Northrhine-Westphalia, divides into 50 headquarters. Some encompass the area of a single city; others cover a main town and smaller villages. Bochum headquarters range from the whole city area to the smaller neighbouring cities Witten and Herne. About 2000 officials are employed. The headquarters have two main sections: administration/ logistics and preventive measures/ law enforcement. The latter subdivides into five police stations (Mitte, West, Ost, Herne/Wanne-Eickel and Witten), the riot police, special services and the centre for crime reduction. As our observations in Bochum were all carried out in the headquarters Mitte, the following descriptions will therefore relate to this location, albeit many procedures are similarly carried out in other districts.

The police headquarters Mitte unite the city centre and the quarters Ehrenfeld, Stahlhausen, Hamme, Hordel, Hofstede, Riemke, Grumme and Altenbochum, with approximately 123,000 inhabitants. From the core of the city centre, eight major roads lead into the outside urban districts. Two underground trams cross under the central station, in east-west direction runs the highly frequented motorway A40. Also part of PI Mitte is the Ruhr-Stadium, home of the local football club and the musical hall of “Starlight Express” musical. Furthermore, the area covers three main shopping streets, the discotheque and nightlife district “Bermuda triangle” the central station and the red-light-districts. All of these contribute to additional workload for police. Officers responsible for the city centre also have to deal with about 200 alcoholics, junkies and homeless persons. Two quarters within the headquarters Mitte: Stahlhausen and Grumme, can be regarded as socially deprived areas. Officers often have to deal with problems that are (in part) related to ethnical conflicts. On average, the PI Mitte deals with 38000 incidents per annum. Additionally there are 425 special operations (league games, cup games, demonstrations etc.) Of 17200 registered criminal offences, 9133 were resolved (52, 58%). 6430 suspects were detected. The traffic section counted 6250 accidents. The headquarters Mitte has a work force of 280, including both civilians and administration.

Figure 1: Organisational chart of the headquarter Bochum Mitte



The director is in charge of the station Mitte, together with his staff unit. Administrators in the staff unit deal with the areas deployment, crime, traffic and the internal service. *Deployment* concerns all actions that require a particular organisational structure, for example at football matches or demonstrations. The unit also collects all relevant data that are summarised in a regular report to the Nordrhein-Westfalen home office and the regional government. *Internal services* handle all aspects of personnel management; the *traffic* section is responsible for

surveillance, registration and regulation of traffic supervision. The administrators of the *crime section* collect all information and statistics that are connected with crime reduction, for example information about dangerous persons within the district or places of high crime rates. Information relevant for the practical work is passed on to the heads of the different groups in the daily meetings.

The headquarters of Bochum centre further divides into two substations: The main police station and the station Hofstede. A further unit are the investigation services that deal with misdemeanours and criminal offences (see figure 5.1). Both stations are staffed with groups of the emergency patrol (A to C) and a section for district policing. Bochum's main station further holds a traffic unit that carries out different actions of traffic surveillance, such as speed controls. This unit also contains a motorbike team and a team of plain-clothes officers that are deployed around the red-light-district and the drug scene, dealing with undercover work and observations. The heads of the stations (centre and Hofstede) (Wachleiter) coordinate the groups of the emergency patrol and the district policing. Observations for the current study were carried out in group A of the EP and the district police for the city centre, both within Bochum main police station. The further descriptions therefore concentrate on this section.

Structure of the emergency patrol in Bochum

Emergency patrol groups A to C work in three shifts from 6am to 2 pm, 2pm to 10 pm and 10 pm to 6 am). A group is headed by the group leader and his or her substitute. A distinction is made between the post and the actual function that is carried out. Each group has one fixed group leader and one substitute. During time off other officers (of lower rank) take over the respective function. Mostly the substitute takes over the head's position, while another officer then replaces her or his post, respectively.

The group leader is responsible for everything that takes place during the shift inside and outside the station. In uncertain or in controversial situations, officers can turn to the group leader who then supports his or her staff by radio or at the respective place of action. The group leader is responsible for the rosters and the delegation of tasks within the group and for the administration of work and vacation periods, the control of information, the examination and if necessary, the correction of all official correspondence as well as for the draft up of statements and appraisals of performance. Furthermore, the group leader is the (informational) interface between the director of the police station and the staff unit and the officers of his or her group. Information exchange between the staff unit and other executives take place either by writing or during the daily morning meeting, in which however only the leader of that group participates, that carries out early shift. This discussion contains past events and deployments, planned actions and potential alterations. Usually a discussion with the officers is then held at the beginning of each shift, in order to pass on these and other information, to distribute the relevant tasks and to prepare deployments. While the head of the groups also goes on patrol, if time permits, the head of service remains at the station permanently and makes first contact with citizen who have requests or report incidents. The head of service is further responsible for the expenditure, stocktaking and care of resources (e.g. radios, flashlights etc.). Furthermore, the group leader often delegates some tasks to the head of services, e.g. control and monitoring of the rosters.

At the beginning of each shift, the group leader assigns individual tasks to the group. Generally, three cars are staffed with two officers each, during late shift and at weekends, it is four cars. The teams are not fixed; the crews change every day so that different officers work together. In order to be more approachable for citizens, two officers are also out on pedestrian patrol in the city centre during all but the night shifts. In Bochum Mitte one officer deals with special indoor-services and manages the radio communication that is coming in either from

the central office or directly to the station by phone. However, this is not a standard function. The 50 police headquarters in Nordrhein-Westfalen all run one control room (Leitstelle) each, from which (amongst other tasks) radio traffic is carried out. Some stations have additional radio communication at their disposal, like for example in Bochum Mitte. The officer running the radio communication assigns incoming tasks to the officers on shift, dependent on their location and availability. By means of a computer program the officer is able to locate the officers and to check their accessibility (see below for a more detailed description of the digital and analogue equipment). At the same time, the radio operator settles all inquiries for his or her colleagues on the road (e.g. driving licence and vehicle checks, inquiries at the residents' registration office etc.). The gained information is then passed over to the officers on the spot. As NRW police do not have digital radio at their disposal, connection problems are vast. Some officers therefore carry their own mobile phone with them that can be used additionally. Officers vehemently complain about this situation.

Moreover, the station is staffed with a "support officer", who generally remains at the station in order to assist the group leader. This officer deals with complaints and accompanies the group leader on patrol, if necessary. Considering these different tasks, one shift consists of 10 to 14 officers, dependent on the number of cars that are used and if a foot patrol is deployed. However, due to dropouts because of times off, vacations, illness and educational measures, a group (A, B or C) needs a staffing of approximately 30 officers. Officers that do not carry out any of the jobs described above, are assigned to special tasks such as traffic surveillance (alcohol, belt or speed controls) and support, if necessary, their colleagues on patrol or carry out preventive tasks or intelligence and observational jobs (as plain-clothes officers, respectively).

The emergency patrol mostly deals with traffic accidents and obstruction, crime, misdemeanour and helpless persons. A further task is the protection of property and endangered objects, for example Jewish buildings or particularly after September 11, US-American objects. The patrols regularly call such places and check for suspicious persons. Specific sites are patrolled in order to enhance the citizens' overall feeling of security, for example under crossings. However, police work is also determined by orders from superiors reaching from the head of the groups to the Northrhine-Westphalian home office. This can involve intensified safety-belt controls or checks on motorists using mobile phones while driving.

District policing in Bochum

District policing aims to gratify the citizens' needs for a visible police that is openly present at their surrounding and among the people living there. The officer should talk to the people, be a direct partner for their requests, and have knowledge of their concerns and emergencies. The district police officers should provide close and trustful contacts. In doing so they should increase the overall feeling of security, enhance the understanding of police actions and influence the relation of police and citizens in a positive way. In particular, the officers shall initiate and keep up contacts in their district. This applies to official bodies to businesspersons, institutions and organisations but specifically contacts with citizens are volitional. The district police officers' scope of duties is vast. They deal with aspects of traffic, crime prevention and tracking. The officers' specific knowledge of a place and its people can furthermore add to crime investigation.

During the time of the observations, nine district policing officers were employed within the area of Bochum centre. In total, this results in a ratio of officer per 13600 inhabitants. Officers responsible for the city centre usually work on their own responsibility, however, often co-operations are built with other persons or organisations (see section 5.2.1). Superior to the district officers is the head Bochum central police station (see figure 5.1). Observations

for this study were carried out in the city centre, where the observer accompanied one officer during 20 of his shifts. These involve the nightclub and the red-light-district, the main shopping street and centres. In addition, some important official buildings are situated in this area, e.g. the city hall of Bochum. The district officer generally is on foot patrol sometimes he uses public transport. Police cars are only used in exceptional cases. Usually the officer is on early shift, starting at 7 am. Regularly, however, also late shifts have to be carried out. For financial reasons the number of district officers was more and more reduced in Bochum. Naturally, district policing should be without any operational specifications so that the officers can merely concentrate on their district, de facto, however, each officer has to fulfil a number of orders every day. The tasks are summarised as:

- foot patrols, making contact with the citizens and business people, keeping informed about the happenings, areas of problems and conflict
- taking youngsters to court, to the youth welfare office, or the prison
- investigations of wanted persons for other services (other police services or the office of public prosecutor)
- taking young men to the recruiting office, in case they don't appear voluntarily (this is due to the liability to a military service in Germany)
- victim support after break-ins, robberies and thefts
- giving statements for requests
- cooperation with the crime prevention unit
- working with kindergartens and primary schools (e.g. information, pedestrian training, bicycle training, checking child safety seats of parents who take their children to school by car, etc.)
- investigating motorists with radar photos
- check of persons with regard to the law on firearms
- small investigations supporting the emergency patrol unit
- research on false alarms caused by private systems
- everything that occurs on the spot or what the officers observe

Interpreting the observations around the emergency patrol and the district policing, one has to consider that the officers' tasks differ from a policing that is carried out in the other, more rural areas of Bochum. Differences come about due to a different traffic volume, population densities and special locations of deployment, as for instance the main station or the red-light district.

Cooperation of EP and CBP and other institutions and organisations

Official cooperation between EP and CBP from the same station are coordinated by the head of the station, who also passes on information that is relevant for both units, such as repeat offenders or dangerous persons or sites. This happens either during irregular joint meetings or in written form. Securing children's way to school, in particular at the beginning of a school year, are characteristic occasions where cooperation between EP and CBP is officially ordered. Apart from that, cooperation is carried out more informally, depending on the individual activities of the officers. During the Bochum observations, district officers were often seen to inform the EP colleagues about specific incidents or circumstances that occurred in the district; either by radio or personally. Emergency patrol officers, on the other hand also addressed their CBP colleagues, though this happened less often. Information there often referred to specific persons or sites the district officer was more familiar with. While on duty, the district officer is connected to the overall radio traffic of the main police station and is able to react when he or she is close to an incident. Direct orders from the radio

communicator to the district officers are rare, and only occur when all patrols are engaged elsewhere. The district officers have the same information technology and databases at their display as their colleagues from the emergency patrol. Other cooperation concerns municipal and public organisations. An official partnership between police and the city of Bochum, for example considers regular joint patrols of district officers and officials from the municipal department for public order. These are occasionally accompanied by the security service of the public transport company, who are responsible for safety and order around the central station and the bus and tram stops. Information exchange between these parties is regularly initiated.

Computer systems and information sources in Bochum

Incidents can be reported to the police by the national emergency number 110, by addressing an individual station by phone or personally. Recently it was also introduced to report to the police using email. Officers in patrol cars are ordered via radio, either directly by the central operation centre that deals with the incoming emergency calls or by the radio operator in their own station (see above), who passes on incoming calls, dependent on the officers' availability and their actual position. In addition to the regular radio communication, the officers use a transmission system, with numeric keyboard and display that is attached to the radio in the vehicle. By typing in number codes, the officers transfer information about their status and availability to the operation centre. The system is furthermore used to transfer requests of checks on persons, vehicles and items to the operation centre. In contrast to other European countries, the officers have no mobile data terminal in their patrol car (i.e. computer equipment that allows consulting a computer system without intervention of a colleague). In Bochum, as well as in the most other regions in Germany officers can only do their checks via the control room, using the radio or the transmission system.

The central operation centre and the local radio operator are both using software called CEBIUS, in order to administer all relevant information and means. All information concerning an incident are fed into the program CEBIUS, where they are stored and can be retrieved whenever needed. This involves for example who reported an incident at which time, when the officers arrived at the spot and which measures were taken.

Nearly all checks, concerning persons, vehicles or the tracing of items and goods are being dealt with using a system called POLAS. It allows countrywide access to a pool of data on wanted or previously convicted persons, stolen vehicles and items. When officers on duty want to check persons, vehicles, owner or items, they pass the relevant data to the operation centre. The officer there then carries out the check, using POLAS and reports the results back to the officers on the street.

Information on a person's place of residence can be acquired by a request at the local registration office (EMA). In doing so, a computer program is used that logs on to a computer system of the Bochum registration office. If a person is checked that is registered elsewhere, the request has to be addressed to the registration office of the respective city, as each police station can only log on the EMA-data of their own city.

The administration of the official correspondence concerning reports, criminal complaints or misdemeanours is carried out using the IGVP software, where the information is stored and passed on for further process for example by other police forces or the public prosecution department. The program also allows a rather uncomplicated research of incidents.

Münster

General information

Münster is called the ‘city of students and administration’. Like Bochum it is situated in the state Nordrhein-Westfalen, in northern direction of the Ruhr area. Surrounded by smaller towns and villages, it is the centre of a region with more than 1.5 mio inhabitants. Münster itself is the home of 290000 people. 48000 of these are students, leaving their mark upon the city’s character. The main centre of education is the ‘Westfälische-Wilhelms-Universität’ with about 38000 students and further colleges and high schools. Another focus lies in the service industry and administration. Münster seats not less than 11 courts, it hosts the German Police University, the first German-Dutch corps, regional authorities and more than 30 banks⁴⁸

With its picturesque old town, galleries, theatres and museums, Münster also attracts tourists and visitors from the wider region. The city is furthermore famous for its ‘bicycle-friendly’ infrastructure that contains a wide network of cycling paths and streets that are integrated in the wider transportation network. The number of cyclists is widely about German average and has an effect on policing practices, as we will see in the further part of this chapter.

Table xx: Picture of the observed area in Münster

| District | share (in %) | inhabitants |
|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Mitte | 41% | 115.000 |
| Nord | 10% | 28900 |
| Ost | 7% | 29400 |
| Südost | 10% | 27400 |
| Hiltrup | 13% | 36700 |
| West | 19% | 52900 ⁴⁹ |
| total | 100% | 290300,00 |

The current study: Observation sites

Three quarters have been observed in the district “Nord”: *Coerde*, *Kinderhaus* and *Sprakel*. *Coerde* is a mere residential quarter that was built all in one piece. Between 1962 and 1970 2371 homes were built for about 7500 persons. In the 80ies and 90ies, additional areas were developed for house building, including the use of real estate formerly owned by the British Army. Today about 10000 people are living in *Coerde*. A high proportion of which is migrants from different cultures and nationalities. Containing some small shops, a post-office, a bank and some medical surgeries, the market forms the centre of *Coerde* and is a focus of police patrol work. Police cooperate with the local office of public affairs and offers weekly office hours for citizens. Once a rural suburb, the population in *Kinderhaus* increased massively in the 50ies. From 1972 to 1978 housing estate “Brüningheide” was built with 12-storey tower blocks. About 16000 persons are living in *Kinderhaus* at present. The centre at “Idenbrock”square offers shops, an in-door swimming pool, and a community and youth centre. The square and the youth club are the central focus point for community patrols. As in *Coerde*, *Kinderhaus* also has a high percentage of migrant population. Both quarters are regarded as socially deprived areas. With 2700 inhabitants, *Sprakel* is the smallest quarter, situated about 9 km north of the city centre. First housing estates were built between 1960 and 70. The little centre contains a primary school, a kindergarten and the church. Today *Sprakel* attracts mainly young families, looking to build or buy a house. The atmosphere is

⁴⁸ Quelle: www.wfm-muenster.de/index59.htm Stand 10.01.2007

⁴⁹ Quelle: www.wfm-muenster.de/index57.htm Stand 10.01.2007

more quiet compared to the other quarters. As community patrol work more focuses on socially deprived areas, Sprakel is less targeted by their work than other quarters.

Observations at the station “West” were carried out in the quarters “Mecklenbeck” and “Albachten”. Mecklenbeck is characterised by detached residential areas, agricultural land and a commercial zone. On the initiative of a local historical circle, a citizen’s centre was set up inside a historical building. Mecklenbeck is a quarter with 9000 inhabitants that is shaped by cultural and concerted diversity. Many old-established people represent the quarter. Albachten emanates from a farming community that only developed after 1945 into a modern suburb. With regard to police work, Albachten and Mecklenbeck are both socially unobtrusive areas. In the smaller quarters, community beat patrols are present at central locations. Office hours for citizens are realised by placing a police patrol car at the same place at recurrent times.

Local organization of police patrol work in Münster

The police headquarters in Münster are staffed with about 1300 persons. Like Bochum it is divided into the departments of administration/ logistics and preventive measures/ law enforcement. Münster police is dealing with all general policing tasks. The scope of responsibility covers the area of the city centre and the further districts of Münster, with a total area of approximately 300 m² 50

Emergency patrol in Münster

Emergency patrol service is subordinated to the police stations of „Mitte“, „Nord“ and „Süd“. *Mitte*. Due to their size, both Mitte and Nord have fixed group leaders. The head of “Mitte” is in charge of eight groups. The head of “Nord” runs four groups and the section for preventive custody. The area south is an independent station in which the group leaders are not set but come from a pool of officers in charge.

Table xx: Internal organisation chart, Münster police headquarters.

| station | number of staff | area |
|---------|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Nord | 52,42 EP officers 4 group leaders 4 substitutes | Northern half of the city from Roxel (west) to Handorf (east) |
| Mitte | 70,83 EP officers 4 group leaders 7,82 substitutes | City centre |
| Süd | 26,02 EP officers 6 group leaders | Albachten, Mecklenbeck, Berg Fiedel, Loddenheide, Gremmendorf, Wolbeck, Hiltrup, Amelsbüren, Angelmodde |

The groups work on a 4-week-rotation basis with shifts from 6am to 1pm, from 1pm to 9pm and from 9 pm to 6 pm. The group leader is responsible for the professional and personal supervision, administration, facilitation of compliance to working hours and holidays, time co-ordination, controlling of information. The focus of his or her work may vary, as for example one group leader assigned administration work to the substitute while he is dealing with the revision of reports, supervision of police custody and staff reports.

⁵⁰ Quelle: <http://www1.polizei-nrw.de/muenster/Organisation/> Stand 14.01.2007

The deployment of emergency beat patrols is generally organized from the dispatch room, who assign the officers to the respective situations or incidents. The unit that arrives first is then in charge of the operation and feeds the information back to the control room. The main task is the prosecution and prevention of criminal acts, the establishment of public order and security and law enforcing. Officers are managing tasks that are forwarded by the dispatch centre. These include congregations, criminal acts, misdemeanours, missing persons, traffic accidents and accidents at work, suicides, domestic violence, alarms, suspicions, fire, search warrants, riots, harassments, assistance, the obstruction of traffic, enquiries, mentally ill persons and escaped convicts. Prevention is also a task of the emergency beat units, usually brought about by the open presence of officers. Moreover, police patrols also serve for the detection of situations that would not be covered by the control room.

In emergency situations the operation is built up by the control room who assign officers to a specified location. From there, officers notify the control room of the situation. This is generally done by radio. An information system provides the officer in charge with an overview on the officers' actions and availability. Nearly every action consists of direct measures and further processing, that can reach from arresting to questioning, searching, photographing, reporting etc.

Specific local circumstances in Münster

The focus of the emergency patrol services in “Nord”, “Mitte” and “Süd” differ in accordance to the character of the respective areas in which they are deployed. Beside the occurring deployments, policing within district “Nord” comprises the protection of buildings and the supervision and patrolling of the social hotspots Gievenbeck, Kinderhaus and Coerde in order to enhance the citizens' overall feeling of safety. Police work in “Mitte” focuses on routine work, as well as on the policing of special events, which occur quite frequently. Main points are the central station, the promenade, the Aasee lake and the harbour. The *southern* district is regarded as rather quiet, resulting in fewer deployments of officers. However, during observation time, a street gang was active in the areas of Berg Fidel and Osthuesheide so that this had been of additional interest. Besides the daily routines, officers also have to accomplish special tasks that are ordered by the home office, such as alcohol controls or belt screenings.

District policing in Münster

District policing in Münster is carried out by 30 officers, allocated to 19 areas, which are again subdivided into 5 locations. Generally, one officer is allocated to an area covering 10000 citizens. However, due to its specific structure and higher numbers of incidents, more officers are deployed in the inner city centre and the northern areas of Münster that can be described as socially deprived. Contrary, fewer officers are deployed in the more quiet areas such as Mecklenbeck and Albachten. With more than 45 years, district officers are on average older than their colleagues from the emergency patrol. Recruiting procedures for this service make a point of an officers' ability to communicate and to act self-reliant, as they will need to self-allocate working procedures, and tailor them to the circumstances and needs of their respective district. District officers in Münster are working from Monday to Friday within a period from 6am to 10pm. Working times also have to be allocated individually, only two late shifts are required. However, during specific projects, such as traffic screening, the head of the district police can officially order working times.

According to the interviews and observations, district police generally patrols on foot, by bicycle or moped. A main task of the work is the constant engagement in communication with the citizens, this may be related to an official cause or not. In so doing, the officers are openly present at public squares, playing grounds, schoolyards and parks. During official and

unofficial conversations with citizens, officers gain information about local circumstances, her or his presence also aims to provide a feeling of protection and security for the citizens. Officers further monitor delinquents in their district, persons that can be found regularly on specific locations. Often the officers know these persons by name and engage in talks about the situation in the area and within their social peer group. In general, district officers are well-known contact persons for the citizens in their district. Their work is designed to mediate between citizens and the police as a governmental institution. Sometimes their work exceeds the normal police work and officers may also help people to deal with application for social benefit or to get in touch with social institutions.

In addition to their direct presence in the district, officers provide their own consultation hour. Dependent on the district this can be in a mobile station (that would be a police van, used as a small office), or inside a youth club or citizens' organisation. The consultation-hours are announced verbally, by posters or by using the internet. Further, district officers are in contact with the societal groups, institutions and organisations of his or her area and take part in meetings and workshop. They gain information about citizens' concerns, developments, incidents and special focus points; on the other hand, they can serve as a contact person for all aspects of police work.

The officers also engage in road safety education and consultation in nursery and primary schools, old-people's homes and other facilities. Particularly the work with children has been an essential part of the current observations, also exceeding the mere traffic education. Working with children often starts during circle time in the kindergarten or school. Children shall be familiarised with the police as somebody who can support, facilitate or protect them. This counteracts a threatening image of the police which is communicated in some families and the children are threatened to be taken away by police, when they misbehave or disobey parents' orders. The officers' aim is rather to encourage children to turn to the police in dangerous or threatening situations. With the start of primary school, police officers conduct trainings with the children where they walk along the school way and particularly avert to dangerous spots. However, officers also take on a protective role, when they monitor dangerous sectors and spots close to the school. A lot of communication between police and children, but also between police and parents is taking place here and the children often know the officers already from their times in nursery school. This positive relationship facilitates officers' aims to point at dangerous situations and explain safe behaviour. With regard to traffic, officers are also deployed at actual traffic spots, due to accidents or road works.

The daily work of district officers furthermore comprises the enforcement of arrest warrants and court summons and the execution of requests of administrative assistance from other institutions. The district Nord even runs an own "arrest warrant"-team, consisting of two officers, respectively. In the smaller areas (Mitte, Ost and Geist), these tasks are individually allocated and the officers decided – dependent on the particular circumstances – if a job should be carried out in a team or by a single officer. If a known person is to be arrested, the officers sometimes settle an agreement with the district attorney for a payment in instalments. Sometimes officers are allocated to spanned tasks, such as traffic screenings or crowd events, (this is generally ordered from the HQ-staff). These tasks are then coordinated by the head of the district police.

Cooperation between EP and CBP

At specific locations, EP officers support their colleagues of the community patrol, particularly in order to show open presence. This support is seen to have a preventive impact and is carried out at social hot spots, meeting points of youngsters, locations that are known starting points for criminal actions or where conflict between citizens occurs repeatedly. The

information about these deployments is passed on to the EP officers by internal mail from the district unit. Email is used for direct information of the respective group leader. Important information that district officers gain during their shift is also filed in a computer system, so that, for example in cases of stalking, information can be retrieved if further institutions like the municipal department of public order has already been informed. The cooperative activities can also involve the crime investigation unit. In cases of domestic violence, German law allows a 10-day order to stay away from the house against the offender. The case is registered at the crime investigation unit, who store the data of the offender in their system for 10 days. A copy of the operation is passed to the district officers who then check the abidance of the order, again using a computer system (see also below). Dependent on the situation, CBP also takes over tasks from their EP colleagues, particularly in time of high pressure or emergencies, when all EP patrols are unavailable. Such deployment is agreed on between the heads of the district police and emergency patrol. In addition, in cases of major incidents, EP patrol is called in to support their colleagues. However, this is carried out situational but not on a regular basis.

Computer systems and information sources in Münster: EP

The common operational picture

The situational picture is one of the most important information sources for EP work. It is set up by the central operation centre, and contains all incidents and information that are relevant for police work in a certain district. The report appears each morning and serves as a basic feature within the daily group meetings and as a basis for further planning of actions. The common operational picture may for example report a series of car break-ins. Based on this information the officers will increasingly check on persons in that particular area. The data gained there is forwarded to the criminal investigation unit who will check if these persons have been involved in criminal acts on other occasions. If so, this may then initiate the deployment of further officers for tracing and search.

The daily briefing

Emergency patrol starts with a briefing, headed by the group leader, who informs the officers about the common operational picture and further information that is relevant for their work, for example legal information concerning traffic regulations. A further aspect of the briefing is the preparation of special deployments, for example, when a demonstration is announced within the area, or focus points that arise due to actual occasions, such as strikes or flooding. A very important part of the briefing is the information about dangerous persons, particularly those who have openly threatened the police, announcing the use of fire weapons. Supplementary to the briefings, information can also be passed on to the officers using email.

Information the group leader gets

The head of a group is informed by the common operational picture, generally via email, specific traffic information is passed on by the traffic section, meets with the head of the previous shift where information about the past incidents is passed on. Special actions (such as safety-belt or alcohol controls) are ordered by the home office, other super ordinate instructions come in via email to the head of the station and are passed on to the group leaders.

Control room (Leitstelle)

While on patrol, information is also directly transferred from the control room by radio. The officers; on the other hand, inform the centre about a situation or ask for supporting colleagues. The centre records the incidents in writing, which is filed for future deployment or fed in the common operational picture. Analogue radio is the main – official – communication device between the control room and the officers on patrol (see Bochum section).

Databases

In cases of checks on persons, vehicles or items, such as stolen goods, the officers on patrol address the operational centre, which then carry out the respective databases. However, while demands can be put forward by all officers, the access to the data bases is limited to operation centre-staff, superiors and the heads of the groups.

Typical searches concern: checks at the residential office (EMA), Schengen-wide person checks using POLAS. Checks on motorists are forwarded to the “city’s program of driving licences” and the Federal Motor Transport Authority in Flensburg.

Computer systems and information sources in Münster: CBP

Radio communication and mobile phones

District officers on patrol are using the same radio system and procedure as their colleagues from the emergency patrol unit, i.e. information and checks are transmitted via the central operational centre. One team also used a mobile phone. Some officers, however, have also organised private mobile phones, as a reaction to difficult and poor radio communication.

Persons

The head of the district police receives about 80 to 100 messages per day, according to the operational picture or single information that come in via email. Those relevant for the officers on the ground are then forwarded to the individual units or used in briefings.

Criminal files

Internal criminal files are an important source for administrative assistance, in particular in cases of arrests warrants or checks on the residential status of a person. The officers for example take a copy of a photo in order to recognise the person or check on information on potentially dangerous or violent persons. This is primarily important for the officers’ own safety.

The grounds under observation

The research in Bochum and Münster was carried out according to the empirical design of the overall PSE study. The two police forces and the areas that they covered differ substantially, both from each other and from the average PSE numbers (table 5.1). Emergency patrol police in our Bochum observation was staffed with 275 officers, covering an area of 32km² with 123000 inhabitants, while in Münster 68 EP officers covered an area of 155.5 km², nearly five times larger than the one in Bochum, with 10000 inhabitants. This compares to an average of 145 employees of the total PSE observations – of which the two German cities diverge in two directions, respectively. The average ratio of inhabitants per employee amounts to 480, which is nearly matched by 450 in Bochum, one officer in Münster statistically deals with 1470 persons, this being about three times as many as their colleagues in Bochum and in most of the other cities that had been observed. The average of the PSE observations amounts to 480. The population densities of the areas differ similarly, with 3800 inhabitants per km² in Bochum, compared to 640 in Münster. With regard to the average PSE, the low population

density of Münster – though being seen as a rather rural area – still exceeds the average of 510 inhabitants/ km².

Table 5.1: strength of the German police teams under observation, police-inhabitant ratio and population density

| | Strength (number of employees) * | Area covered by EP (km ²) | Inhabitants in this area # | Inhabitants per employee | Population density (inh./km ²) |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Bochum | 275 | 32.0 | 123,000 | 450 | 3,800 |
| Münster | 68 | 155.5 | 100,000 | 1,470 | 640 |
| <i>Average PSE</i> | <i>145</i> | <i>137.2</i> | <i>69785</i> | <i>480</i> | <i>510</i> |
| <i>TOTAL PSE</i> | <i>1,741</i> | <i>1,646.9</i> | <i>837,420</i> | <i>480</i> | <i>510</i> |

* : including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.

In total, 2089 incidents around EP deployments and 2094 of community beat patrols were observed in this study, with about 174 incidents on average. Both Bochum services dealt with more incidents than their colleagues in Münster; 167 of the emergency patrol compared to 129. The Bochum community beat patrol dealt with 196 incidents, while the numbers in Münster amount to 162. Put down to numbers of incidents per hour, Bochum matches the average PSE numbers of 1.8 incidents per hour for EP and 2.6 for CBP (2.7 in Bochum). In both cases, the workload of Münster police is lower. The EP officers deal with 1.3 and their CBP colleagues with 2.1 incidents per hour. In about half of the cases a citizen calls the emergency patrol: 79 of 167 in Bochum and 72 of 129 incidents in Münster. The calls for community beat patrols are substantially lesser. In Bochum the CBP is called in 20 of 196 incidents, similarly Münster community officers are called in 18 of 162 cases. However, the numbers do not include incidents that involved answering questions from the public or chatting with citizens, which accounted for high numbers of incidents, particularly in Bochum (see below).

Table 5.2: work load

| | <i>Observed incidents</i> | <i>... of which are calls *</i> | <i>Inc./hour</i> | <i>Calls/hour</i> |
|--------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | |
| Bochum | 167 | 79 | 1.8 | 0.9 |
| Münster | 129 | 72 | 1.3 | 0.8 |
| <i>Average PSE</i> | <i>174</i> | <i>76</i> | <i>1.8</i> | <i>0.8</i> |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>911</i> | | |
| | <i>Community Policing</i> | | | |
| Bochum | 196 | 20 | 2.7 | 0.3 |
| Münster | 162 | 18 | 2.1 | 0.2 |
| <i>Average PSE</i> | <i>175</i> | <i>27</i> | <i>2.6</i> | <i>0.4</i> |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>323</i> | | |

*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding ‘answering a question from the public’ (var06=65) and ‘chatting with the public’ (var06=84).

5.3 Sort of Incidents Involved in Patrol Work

Traffic

With regard to the total PSE numbers, traffic rather seems to be an issue of emergency patrol than of community policing. It further seems to be a rather German issue as the two German cities both exceed the average PSE numbers of 41.6 by nearly 16 points in Bochum (57.5) and 10 points in Münster 41.6, though this value is not statistically significant (table 5.3). The share of those incidents that were initiated by citizens is particularly high in Bochum, with 38.6, where it nearly doubles the average PSE of 18.9. Citizens initiated more than half of the traffic incidents in Bochum. They reported an accident they either caused themselves, or that they witnessed (see example below). This also included cases of hit-and-run driving. Further incidents were reported due to illegal parking, particularly when this hindered other motorists.

A citizen reports to have damaged another car on a parking site. Having arrived at the location, the officers check the man's driving licence and the vehicle documents. They ask for his mobile number and issue a ticket of 20 Euro (this is the minimum in such cases). The officer attaches a note to the damaged car, informing the owner about the happenings and informs the man who caused the damage about the further proceedings considering the insurance.

Incident on May 18, 2006, code 200605051143

In Münster, it is more the officers who initiate the incidents. The rather high score of 82.7 versus the PSE average of 62.9, however, has to be seen in the light of the specific context of the city. More than any other city in Germany, Münster is known for its high proportion of cyclists. This does also show up in the numbers measured here as nearly a quarter of the incidents relates to cycling, e.g. riding without light at night or the illegal transport of an additional person (see example below). This is only exceeded by incidents that occurred during a special speed control that was carried out during observation time and that itself accounts for a quarter of the incidents – all of which were observed on one day. Further, incidents observed in Münster concern to the use of safety belts.

The officers observe a father cycling along the wrong direction, his son on the carrier. They stop the man and inform him about his wrongdoing, then one officer asks for an ID. The man said that his son (about 7 years) had persuaded him to this action. The officer quite firmly explains that he, being the father, was responsible for the behaviour, not the son. The fault was on him. The father is issued a bill and the officer notes the personal data. Then he asks the father – also referring to his function as a role model, for a more responsible behaviour in future. The officers say goodbye.

Incident on May 18, 2006, code 200609041245

Table 5.3: proportion of traffic

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|--|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Number of traffic and non-traffic incidents | Percentage of traffic incidents | Number of traffic and non-traffic incidents | Percentage of traffic incidents | Number of all incidents | Percentage of traffic incidents on initiative of police or public |
| | | | | | | |

| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
|------------------|---------------------------|--------|-------|---------|-------|---------|
| Bochum | 84 | 76.2 | 83 | ** 38.6 | 167 | ** 57.5 |
| Münster | 52 | * 82.7 | 77 | 29.9 | 129 | 51.2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 1.074 | 62.9 | 1.015 | 18.9 | 2.089 | 41.6 |
| | <i>Community Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Bochum | 111 | 35.1 | 85 | 10.6 | 196 | 24.5 |
| Münster | 113 | 41.6 | 49 | 6.1 | 162 | 30.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 567 | 39.5 | 658 | 6.7 | 2.094 | 29.2 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Maintaining the law and other main themes in policing

For the total PSE observations, the highest numbers were found for “maintaining the law” in both EP and CBP incidents. However, the community police work in Bochum differs substantially from this category with significantly lower numbers: 21.9% as opposed to the average of 37.1% for all PSE observations. Accordingly, very few incidents relating to serious crimes were observed with CBP in Bochum (see tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6). Also internal tasks do rather seem to play a minor role for community policing in Bochum and only account for 1.5% compared to a share of 11.6% for the overall PSE observations. The CBP work in Bochum is largely concerned with “networking” and “giving assistance”, particularly answering questions from the public, which differed highly significantly from the total PSE numbers with 27.6 versus 11.4% (see table 5.5).

These differences are in no point paralleled by the other German city and the Bochum-approach seems to be somehow unique for community policing within this study, as about 60 percent of the work refers to ‘answering questions from the public’ and ‘networking’, tasks which are totally in line with the community policing philosophy. The qualitative data reveals that CBP in Bochum was carried out by one officer only. As officers are rather free in determining their style of policing, the explanation for these huge differences may be ascribed to personal traits or preferences. In Münster, on the other side, numbers for “Giving assistance” differ significantly from the average PSE with regard to the work of the emergency patrol. Officers here were for the most part engaged in the acquisition of accident data, assisting helpless persons (see example below) or helping out with rioting people, e.g. at psychiatric departments. Particularly during night shifts, the officers assisted in calls due to the disturbance of the peace.

“Giving assistance, EP Münster”

A female citizen stops the patrol car in the pedestrian zone. She asks for help for an elderly woman with a walking frame. Due to unforeseen road works, she had missed her bus. Now the woman, exhausted because of her handicap, would not know how to get back home. The officers offer to take the woman home. They fold up the walking frame and put it in the boot. Then the infirm lady gets into the patrol car and the officers take her home. In front of her door, she asks the officers how she can make up for it. They say, they had been happy to help. She thanks them and goes home.

Incident on September 13, 2006, code 200609131155

Table 5.4: patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages)

| | N | Maintain- ing the law | Maintain- ing public order | Giving assistance | Networking | Internal job | Else |
|------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Bochum | 167 | 61.1 | 8.4 | 22.2 | 3.0 | 0.6 | 4.8 |
| Münster | 129 | 47.3 | 3.9 | ** 38.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 7.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>56.8</i> | <i>8.1</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>4.9</i> | <i>3.3</i> | <i>4.0</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Bochum | 196 | ** 21.9 | 4.6 | ** 32.7 | * 31.6 | ** 1.5 | 7.7 |
| Münster | 162 | 34.0 | 9.3 | 17.3 | 22.2 | 14.2 | 3.1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>37.1</i> | <i>5.8</i> | <i>18.4</i> | <i>21.4</i> | <i>11.6</i> | <i>5.8</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to 'Total PSE').

Table 5.5: patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)

| | Traffic | | | | Law | | Order/ Assistance | | | | | Other | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|-------|--------|-------|------------------|-------|-------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|-------|-----------------|-----------|------|
| | Coll. | Viol. | Check | Other | Serious crime | Other | Social problem | Quest. from public | Trouble -some youth | Public order | Other | Net- working | Int. job. | Else |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06 Boch | *12.0 | 28.1 | 13.2 | 4.2 | 14.4 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 1.2 | 0.6 | 4.2 | 7.8 | 3.0 | 0.6 | 3.0 |
| 06 Munst | **17.8 | 25.6 | 5.4 | 3.1 | 10.1 | 3.1 | 13.2 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 10.1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 5.4 |
| Tot PSE | 6.1 | 21.9 | 10.1 | 3.4 | 15.5 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 3.8 | 1.2 | 5.3 | 7.6 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 2.8 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06 Boch | 1.5 | 15.8 | 3.6 | 3.6 | ** 1.0 | 0.5 | 2.0 | ** 27.6 | 0.0 | 4.6 | 4.1 | ** 31.6 | ** 1.5 | 2.6 |
| 06 Munst | 0.6 | 15.4 | ** 9.9 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 13.0 | 0.6 | 6.8 | 3.7 | 22.2 | 14.2 | 0.0 |
| Tot PSE | 0.7 | 21.5 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 7.4 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 11.4 | 1.3 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 21.3 | 11.6 | 3.8 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Serious crimes

Considering the total PSE numbers, serious crimes are generally dealt with by the emergency patrol work, with the majority of incidents initiated by citizens; this is rather clearly matched by the observations carried out with the emergency patrol in Bochum, with 25.3 percent compared to 24.6 to the total PSE. In general, however, the proportion of serious crimes in police patrol work in Germany is in all four forces lower than the average PSE. The CBP in Bochum hardly deal with serious crimes at all, where the number of 1 percents differs highly significantly with the total PSE of 7.4. This goes along with the above findings about the work of Bochum CBP, where the officer is for the main part engaged in mostly positive interaction with citizens. Though not statistically significant both EP and CBP in Münster also deal to a lesser degree with serious crime than the average in PSE.

Table 5.6: proportion of serious crimes

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Bochum | 84 | 4.8 | 83 | 25.3 | 167 | 15.0 |
| Münster | 52 | 1.9 | 77 | 15.6 | 129 | 10.1 |
| | 90 | | 85 | | | |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.074</i> | <i>8.0</i> | <i>1.015</i> | <i>24.6</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>16.1</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| Bochum | 111 | * 0.9 | 85 | 1.2 | 196 | * 1.0 |
| Münster | 113 | 3.5 | 49 | 8.2 | 162 | 4.9 |
| | 120 | | 55 | | | |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.436</i> | <i>7.4</i> | <i>658</i> | <i>7.8</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>7.5</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

5.4 Police Mobilization

Questioning what determines police patrol work we are now looking more closely into those incidents that occurred on the initiative of police officers (table 5.7). Broadly distinguishing between traffic and non-traffic incidents the observations in both Münster and Bochum go along with the average numbers of the overall PSE observations in which about $\frac{3}{4}$ of the initiated incidents relate to traffic. Regarding non-traffic incidents the numbers in Münster differ significantly from the total PSE with 14.3 percent in Münster versus 32.6. The qualitative descriptions reveal that approximately half of these took place during nightshifts: concerning the assistance of colleagues, actions due to calls from the radio or dealing with helpless people and examining conspicuous sites. Further activities during the day also involved the reuptake of traffic incidents. Like we already suggested from the above data concerning traffic (Table 5.3), the high proportion of cyclists in the city of Münster also accounts for a great deal of traffic incidents that emergency patrol deal with. As table 5.6 reveals, Münster scores rather low with regard to the numbers of serious crimes, indicating that in only 1.9 percent EP deal with serious crimes on their own initiative, compared to an average of 8.0 percent of the total PSE observations.

As was noticed earlier, the community beat patrol in Bochum differs from the average and the numbers further vary concerning the initiation of incidents. With regard to both traffic and non-traffic incidents, the pro-active activities in Bochum are significantly lower than in the total PSE and the Münster data (which roughly matches the total PSE). However, this does not mean that community policing officers in Bochum also deal with fewer incidents: Considering the numbers of incidents, Bochum even scored higher (with 196 incidents) in comparison to both Münster (162) and the average PSE (175). Therefore, there seems to be a 'demand' of community police work among the citizens and a rather positive reaction from the public to this kind of police work. Further analyses reveal that the incidents that were initiated by citizens comprised 78.8% questions and other aspects of networking with the public. Incidents that were initiated by the officer comprise of 33.3 percent traffic, 7.2 percent social order and again aspects of networking (44.1%). All but one were carried out face to face and the qualitative data suggests that the reactions of the public to pro-active police actions were generally positive.

“The officer notices an older man who grips to a bin. He approaches and addresses him. The man appears a bit confused. The officer asks for his ID. The man does not carry any. The officer asks for his name and date of birth and carries out a check via radio (DST and EMA). It turns out that an old peoples' home had posted him as missing. The officer orders a patrol car in order to get the man back. When the car arrived, the officers quickly consult each other, and then the old man is carried back.”

Incident on August 30, 2006, code 200608301103

Table 5.7: proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police

| | |
|--|-------------------------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> |
|--|-------------------------|

| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
|------------------------------|------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| Bochum | 96 | 66.7 | 71 | 28.2 | 167 | 50.3 |
| Münster | 66 | 65.2 | 63 | * 14.3 | 129 | 40.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>77.9</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>32.6</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>51.4</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Bochum | 48 | 81.3 | 148 | 48.6 | 196 | ** 56.6 |
| Münster | 50 | 94.0 | 112 | 58.9 | 162 | 69.8 |
| | <i>51</i> | | <i>124</i> | | <i>175</i> | |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>92.8</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>58.6</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>68.6</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

5.5 Knowledge of the People in the Neighbourhood

In Bochum, both emergency patrol and community police officers meet significantly less persons they know during patrol work. For EP this accounts for the incidents in general, while the low numbers for community police only account for other than traffic and social problems. As the above analysis shows, the main contacts of CBP in Bochum referred to traffic and social problems and people asking for the way. This result is therefore explainable; however, the low numbers of EP are surprising. Regarding the area that is covered by EP it turns out that the officers in Bochum cover a rather low area, with 32 km² compared to an average of 137.2. Equally, the ratio of inhabitants per officer comprises only a third of the Münster numbers (450 in Bochum, compared to 1470 citizens per officer in Münster; see also Table 5.x). However, the numbers can be explained by the fact that EP work is often carried out from the police car, thereby not allowing to make any further contacts, additionally, EP officers do mostly deal with traffic – and here this mainly refers to car incidents – which may also involve a number of people who only pass by the highly frequented area.

“Two women address the officer. They say a man insulted and threatened them. The description sounds familiar to the officer. He promises to care for it. He explains to me that the person is a well known psycho, who looks like Elvis and everybody would therefore call him Elvis. The officer asks a man if he saw Elvis. He explains to him that Elvis had been walking into a passage. The officer goes along there and finds Elvis short time later in a shop. He addresses him and asks what had happened. The officer also calls him Elvis, which seems to be absolutely okay for the man. The officer asks him to leave the people alone, otherwise he would get arrested.”

Incident on August 31, 2006, Code 200808311340

Table 5.8: proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance: EP

| | Traffic | | Social problems | | Other | | All incidents | |
|------------------------------|------------|------------|-----------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Bochum | 96 | 1.0 | 18 | 22.2 | 53 | 7.5 | 167 | * 5.4 |
| Münster | 66 | 1.5 | 20 | 15.0 | 43 | 9.3 | 129 | 6.2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>2.8</i> | <i>294</i> | <i>35.7</i> | <i>927</i> | <i>14.5</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>12.6</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Bochum | 48 | 0.0 | 27 | 74.1 | 121 | * 24.0 | 196 | 25.0 |
| Münster | 50 | 16.0 | 10 | 80.0 | 102 | 36.3 | 162 | 32.7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>7.5</i> | <i>168</i> | <i>57.7</i> | <i>1.315</i> | <i>38.3</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>30.9</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

5.6 Marginal persons

Incidents involving marginal persons, like alcoholics, drug addicts or homeless people rather – and obviously – occur in non-traffic situations. Of these, most incidents are dealt with by the officers working on community beat patrols. Here, Bochum district police again scores very high with a highly significant number that more than doubles the average PSE results, while Münster data exactly matches the average PSE numbers of 4.3 versus 11.7 in Bochum. The qualitative data suggest a relation of these high numbers and a specific style of policing. The district officer seemed to have a very good knowledge of the marginalised persons in his district. When patrolling, he pro-actively approached and talked to marginal groups or individuals. The encounters were always friendly, even when the officer had to ask them to leave a certain place. He knew the people by name and was known to them and accepted, as his orders were generally complied with.

“The drug counselling centre is a well known meeting point of the Bochum Junky scene. The officer greets the group of about 20 persons, who assembled in front of the building, he asks if things are all right and if they can keep the pavement clear. Friendly encounter. The group complies with his request and gets out of the way “

Incident on August 28; 2006, code 200608280958

On several occasions the observer noted that the CBP officer went up to persons he did not know, introduced himself and his job and asked for the person’s name. Nearly all incidents that involve marginal persons were initiated by the officer (84%; or 20 incidents respectively). Twice a person addressed the officer, once somebody hinted to a drunken person on a bench. In all cases, those self-initiated and when he was addressed, the officer reacted friendly and calm.

“The officer is addressed by an older man. His looks are odd and rough, he wears leather gear, carries a radio on his belt and headphones. On his chest, a sticker he attached, saying “POLICE”. Later the officer told me that the man is a well-known psycho, who sees himself as a special police agent. The Bochum police call the man “Herrminator”, because his first name is Herrmann. Each day he cycles around the city and plays police. The citizens got used to him, there is hardly any trouble, the officer explained. The officer is friendly with “Herrminator”. He tells him about reconstructions at the central station and that he could keep an eye on that. He does not make fun of the man but tries to involve him, as far as that is possible. “Herrminator” patrols with us for a while and then says good-bye again.”

Incident on September 05, 2006, code 200609051058

Table 5.9: proportions of incidents with marginal persons

| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
|-----------|----------|--|-------------|--|---------------|-----|
| | PSE – EP | | | | | |
| Bochum | 96 | | 71 | | 167 | 6.6 |
| Münster | 66 | | 63 | | 129 | 4.7 |
| Total PSE | 868 | | 1.221 | | 2.089 | 5.8 |

| | <i>PSE – CBP</i> | | | | | |
|------------------|------------------|--|--------------|--|--------------|------------|
| Bochum | 48 | | 148 | | 196 | ** 11.7 |
| Münster | 50 | | 112 | | 162 | 4.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | | <i>1.483</i> | | <i>2.094</i> | <i>4.3</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

5.7 The Outcome of Incidents

The outcomes of incidents are measured in terms of repressive measures taken by the officers, divided into warnings, summons or tickets issued to citizens and arrests. Considering the overall numbers, German emergency policing looks rather repressive, as lot summons are issued, where the numbers in both cities double the average PSE (table 5.10a). On the other hand, the Münster district police scores significantly low with regard to warnings that they take out to citizens, and also summons and arrests in Münster are below the PSE average, though not significant.

Table 5.10a: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Bochum | 167 | 21.6 | ** 22.8 | 4.8 | ** 49.1 |
| Münster | 129 | 22.5 | ** 20.9 | 3.1 | 46.5 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>20.1</i> | <i>10.4</i> | <i>5.0</i> | <i>35.4</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Bochum | 196 | 18.4 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 20.9 |
| Münster | 162 | ** 6.2 | 1.9 | 0.6 | ** 8.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>20.0</i> | <i>3.1</i> | <i>1.3</i> | <i>24.4</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Dividing the incidents into traffic and non-traffic observations, a clear distinction must be drawn between the two cities, as the high numbers of summons in Münster that are issued by emergency patrol officers relate to traffic incidents (table 5.10b), while in Bochum a significantly high number of summons are issued in non-traffic incidents (table 5.10c). The numbers here are nearly four times as high (9.9) as in the average PSE observations (2.5).

Table 5.10b: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| Bochum | 96 | 30.2 | 32.3 | 0.0 | 62.5 |
| Münster | 66 | 30.3 | ** 39.4 | 1.5 | 71.2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>35.7</i> | <i>21.4</i> | <i>1.2</i> | <i>58.3</i> |
| <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| Bochum | 48 | 54.2 | 4.2 | 0.0 | 58.3 |
| Münster | 50 | ** 20.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | ** 22.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>59.9</i> | <i>8.2</i> | <i>0.0</i> | <i>68.1</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

The huge differences, however, become more obvious by looking into the qualitative descriptions: In Münster, EP officers carried out a speed control during observation time. The summonses that were issued for the period of this control (that only lasted one hour), account for nearly 30% of the Münster EP summons in traffic situations. About half of the remaining cases related to misdemeanours (no seat belt fastened, cycling in the wrong direction), the officers detected while they were out on patrol. This can be related to the awareness of the officers and the focus they have while on patrol and the principle of the mandatory prosecution of offences (section 5.1). Further, the local circumstances of Münster as a ‘cycling city’ is mirrored in these results: Three of the summons (26 in total) involved cyclists both as offender and as a casualty, involved in an accident.

Big differences are found with regard to the kind or style of policing. Münster CBP carries out more roadside stops than any other police (table A.13). However, none of the checks resulted in a summon and only few warnings were taken out. The warnings concerned: speed, use of seat belts, cyclists disregarding traffic lights or one-way street. On two occasions, the officers allowed motorists to hand in their driving licence at a later occasion and refrained from an official summon. At both occasions, the respective citizens complied with this offer. Compared to the work of emergency patrol officers, CBP more often issue warnings instead of summons, though often dealing with the same offences. Two examples of how community beat patrol and emergency patrol deal with the same incident, are given below:

Community beat patrol, Münster

Being on patrol, the officers notice a motorist without a fastened seat belt. The officer turns and stops the man. In the meantime, the man has his belt fastened. The officer explains the law and that he was actually due a fine of 30€. He only issues a warning because the man showed some insight in his behaviour. Having checked the papers, the officer said goodbye, again referring to the seatbelt law. Incident on May 15, 2006, code 200605151750

Emergency patrol, Münster

During patrol, the officers stop a man driving without seat belt fastened. They inform him about this. Then they carry out a check on the driving licence and the vehicle registration certificate. Both results are negative. Then one officer issues a fine of 30 €. This was payable within a week also the man should have his belt fastened in future occasions. He said goodbye and the officers proceed their patrol.

Incident on September 26, 2006, code 200609261847

Table 5.10c: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|-----------|-------|------------|---------|--------|--------------|
| | | | | | |
| | | <i>PSE</i> | | | |
| Bochum | 71 | 9.9 | ** 9.9 | 11.3 | 31.0 |
| Münster | 63 | 14.3 | 1.6 | 4.8 | 20.6 |
| Total PSE | 1.221 | 8.9 | 2.5 | 7.7 | 19.2 |
| | | <i>PSE</i> | | | |

| | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Bochum | 148 | 6.8 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 8.8 |
| Münster | 112 | 0.0 | 1.8 | 0.9 | 2.7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>3.5</i> | <i>1.0</i> | <i>1.8</i> | <i>6.3</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Emergency patrol police in Bochum issues summons in non-traffic incident four times more often than the average PSE. The summonses refer to situations of assault, theft and fare dodging. These numbers also go along with the incidents police deal with in general. Bochum EP is more than any other force dealing with cases of assault, with 5.4, compared to a PSE average of 1.3. Local circumstances related to the city's high grade of urbanisation and population density may account for this, though even large cities like Oslo or Brussels not even come close to these numbers (0 cases in Oslo and 2.5 in Brussels). However, according to statistics of criminality 2006 of NRW that were issued by NRW police, Bochum was among the three cities with the highest frequency of crime. This is related to the fact that in 2005 and 2006 several large cases of fraud had been completed in Bochum (Landeskriminalamt NRW, 2007, p. 16).

5.8 Use of Information Sources

The use of information sources refers to the officers consulting additional sources in order to proceed with incidents and to check on persons. A source from a citizen can be a personal ID, a driving licence, the vehicle registration certificate or other documents, but also other information provided. Though citizens in Germany generally prove their identity by the personal ID, the Personalausweis, it is not mandatory to carry it. Motorists, on the other hand, are obliged to have their driving licence and the registration certificate of the vehicle they are using, at hand. Sources from a citizen in Germany are therefore, generally manual.

Checking on persons' identities, places of residence, car ownerships and so on, police however refer to digital sources, stored in various databases. A check is generally carried out via the general operational centre, which then inform the officers on the street. Being at the station, the officers can also carry out the search themselves (see also section 5.2 above). These outer circumstances and procedures are reflected in the results of our observations: Hardly any sources from citizens are digital and reversely, the police hardly draws on any manual sources. An exception is found however in Münster, where the CBP made highly significantly more use of manual sources 11.1% versus a European average of 3.4%, table 5.11a). Bochum EP on the other hand draws highly significantly more on manual information sources from citizens and digital information from the police than the PSE average (50.9 versus 28.8 and 41.3 versus 22.6%, respectively, see table 5.11a). A deeper analysis of the data will account for these differences:

Table 5.11a: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – all incidents

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Bochum | 167 | ** 50.9 | 0.6 | 0.6 | ** 41.3 | ** 60.5 |
| Münster | 129 | 30.2 | 0.8 | 3.1 | 29.5 | 41.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>28.8</i> | <i>0.7</i> | <i>2.7</i> | <i>22.6</i> | <i>39.9</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Bochum | 196 | 13.3 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 5.1 | 14.3 |
| Münster | 162 | 13.6 | 1.2 | ** 11.1 | 6.2 | * 27.8 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>14.0</i> | <i>0.4</i> | <i>3.4</i> | <i>6.0</i> | <i>18.9</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Traffic incidents

In traffic incidents, Bochum emergency police uses information sources (manual from citizens and digital police information sources) significantly more often than the average PSE (see table 5.11b). In traffic incidents, the Bochum emergency patrol refer to their own observations, contributions from the persons involved and on information from a computer file, they had consulted. The sources were used for dealing with accidents with and without casualties, traffic stops and traffic violation.

Tabel 5.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| | <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| Bochum | 96 | ** 65.6 | 0.0 | 1.0 | * 47.9 | ** 75.0 |
| Münster | 66 | 48.5 | 0.0 | 6.1 | 43.9 | 60.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>46.9</i> | <i>0.2</i> | <i>3.6</i> | <i>32.1</i> | <i>57.1</i> |
| | <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| Bochum | 48 | 31.3 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 6.3 | 31.3 |
| Münster | 50 | 38.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 38.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>0.0</i> | <i>2.1</i> | <i>11.8</i> | <i>25.5</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Non-traffic incidents

The consultancy of manual sources from citizens and digital police sources are both significantly more often carried out by the Bochum EP service than the PSE average, with 31.0 versus 15.9 for manual sources from citizens and 32.4 versus 15.9. for digital sources from the police. The information from manual sources from citizens was used in cases of shoplifting, assault, in suspicious situations and when dealing with cases of public or social order. The use of digital police sources was carried out in connection with the same kind of incidents, thereby corresponding with the citizens' sources.

Only Münster police often consults a specific manual information source (see table 5.11c). The community beat patrol here score more than four times as high with a number of 16.1 versus 3.1 in the average PSE observations. The explanation for these differences however is simple: The officers carry a map with them, which they use whenever asked for direction. It is a city map, issued by the tourist information, that then can even leave with the citizens if necessary. Most of the other incidents where the officers consulted manual information sources related to the search of persons in connection with arrest warrants. Carrying out arrest warrants is a basic component of Münster district policing. Here, the officers gained information from the persons involved themselves or from third parties. Also their own experience played a role and documents they had been issued at the station or from another institution, for example the documents used for an arrest warrant. In contrast, the manual sources from citizens are hardly playing a role for Münster CBP. The number of 2.7 is significantly low compared to the average of 10.3 in the overall PSE observations.

Table 5.11c: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|------------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>PSE – EP</i> | | | | | | |
| Bochum | 71 | ** 31.0 | 1.4 | 0.0 | ** 32.4 | 40.8 |
| Münster | 63 | 11.1 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 14.3 | 22.2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>1.0</i> | <i>2.1</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>27.7</i> |
| <i>PSE – CBP</i> | | | | | | |
| Bochum | 148 | 7.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.7 | 8.8 |
| Münster | 112 | * 2.7 | 1.8 | ** 16.1 | 5.4 | 23.2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>10.3</i> | <i>0.5</i> | <i>3.9</i> | <i>3.6</i> | <i>16.2</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

5.9 What determines what is involved in Police Patrol Work?


Before turning to the determinants of police patrol work we summarise the above analysis and present an overview of what is involved in the work of the emergency patrol and the community beat patrols in Bochum and in Münster. In doing so we draw on the main categories of 1) traffic, 2) maintaining the law, 3) order and assistance and 4) networking, internal jobs and other issues. (The numbers are drawn from table 5.5 and A.5 respectively).

Table 5.12: patrol work subdivided into the main subjects (percentages)

| | Traffic | Maintaining the law | Order/ Assistance | Networking / Internal job/ other |
|------------------|---------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>PSE – EP</i> | | | | |
| Bochum | 57,5 | 18,0 | 18 | 6,6 |
| Münster | 51,9 | 13,2 | 27,2 | 8,6 |
| PSE | 41,5 | 20,9 | 26,5 | 11 |
| <i>PSE – CBP</i> | | | | |
| Bochum | 24,5 | 1,5 | 38,3 | 35,7 |
| Münster | 30,8 | 6,8 | 26 | 36,4 |
| PSE | 29,2 | 10 | 24 | 36,7 |


Summarising the above analysis, the majority of emergency police patrol work in the two German cities is concerned with traffic issues (57% in Bochum and 52 % in Münster, while the average PSE amounts only to 41, 5%). Accordingly, most of the other tasks are below the PSE average. While issues of ‘order and assistance’ in Münster slightly exceed the PSE average (27,2% versus 26,5%) , the two forces do not so much deal with ‘maintaining the law’ which would actually be seen more as a task of emergency patrol.

Figure 5.1: Main subjects involved in Emergency patrol work in Bochum and Münster (percentages).



Looking at the work distribution of the community beat patrols, the differences in the profile of the two approaches becomes obvious. Networking plays a more subordinate role for EP, CBP officers do little deal with maintaining the law while their other tasks seem to be more balanced with similar shares in dealing with traffic, order and assistance and networking.

Figure 5.2: Main subjects involved in community beat patrol work in Bochum and Münster (percentages).



In a second step we now to turn to the determinants of such differences and refer to the conceptual model of police patrol work that was presented on page 14, earlier in this book. The model considers that police patrol work is determined by basic assignment, basic strategy, management control and police leadership, exceptional local circumstances, local urbanization and national features. In this section we will now describe how the police work that was observed in the two German cities is informed by these different factors. In order to do so we will go through the results looking how the respective factors do account for what and how police patrol work is carried out in Bochum and in Münster.

The high numbers of traffic incidents that the German police, in particular the EP officers deal with may be ascribed to specific **national features**. Of all countries that have been observed in this study, Germany has a very dense traffic infrastructure (here especially in Bochum) and it has the highest proportion of cars per 1000 inhabitants: with 573, compared to for example 458 for the Netherlands in 2006 (welt in zahlen, 2009). This may also go along with the rather high numbers of summons that are issued by the EP officers in Germany, because as a result of an accident people are often summoned to give testimony. The results also revealed that about half of the traffic incidents in Bochum are initiated by citizens who called or reported about their own or witnessed incidents. In cases of accidents officers are then legally obliged to fine the person responsible for the accident. Although this is known to most motorists, even at minor crashes without casualties, people tend to rather call the police than to deal with the

accident privately. So this may also be an issue of national culture and it is not unknown of that the car is said to be the ‘the Germans’ dearest child’.

The high numbers of citizens’ calls in Bochum contradicts the assumption that a high degree of urbanisation goes along with fewer calls. On the other hand, it may particularly be the higher degree of anonymisation that may encourage people to call the police and to report an accident to an official body – while one may otherwise have dealt with things in private. Local urbanisation may also be responsible for the rather low numbers of serious crimes that Münster police deals with in the more provincial ‘Münsterland’.

In Bochum, on the other hand EP issued summons at non-traffic four times more often than the average PSE and they are more than any other force dealing with cases of assault. While this at a first glance may be determined by urbanisation, there must also be **exceptional local circumstances** that explain these differences because other large cities like Oslo or Brussels not even come close to these numbers (0 cases in Oslo and 2.5 in Brussels). As it was mentioned elsewhere, reasons for this may lie in the fact that several large cases of fraud had been completed in Bochum in 2005 and 2006 (Landeskriminalamt NRW, 2007, p. 16).

Another feature of the Münster observations relates to the high numbers of cyclists in this city. Rather than speaking of ‘exceptional local circumstances’ one may refer to **specific local circumstances**. So it was shown that the high proportion of cyclists accounted for a great deal of traffic incidents that EP officers deal with, so that the character of the city is reflected in the style of policing.

Management control and police leadership was also found to have an impact on what is involved in police patrol work, again relating to the sphere of traffic: It turned out that 30 percent of the incidents in Münster were noted during a one-hour long traffic check that was ordered by the Northrhine-Westphalian home office. The ‘management by objectives’, for example to require a patrol team to fine a specific number of motorists for no seat belts fastened or phoning while driving has more and more become part of police management in NRW.

The impact of the **basic policing strategy** and ‘the way we do things around here’ is reflected at several points in this study, especially with regard to the CBP work. In contrast to their EP colleagues the officers seem to have more freedom to frame their work and to incorporate aspects of their personality and interests. The analysis revealed that in particular the CBP in Bochum differs in a number of ways from the way this work is carried out by other forces. Surprisingly however, it was found that Bochum CBP initiates significantly fewer incidents. On the other hand the qualitative descriptions revealed that the officer was openly present in the city centre. He seemed to be well known and to have a distinct knowledge of the area and the people around him. In this respect he was not directly initiating incidents but his apparent open attitude welcomed people to approach him. A great deal of this work relates to ‘giving assistance’ after the citizens’ demand. This suggests that there is indeed a need for assistance among citizens and a ‘willingness’ to approach the police which only became evident because the officer was available and easy approachable.

Handling marginal persons is a further issue that is nearly solely dealt with by CBP and again, in particular by the police of Bochum. As the qualitative data suggest, the district officer seemed to have a very good knowledge of the marginalised persons in his district. When patrolling, he pro-actively approached and talked to marginal groups or individuals and in

contrast to the overall numbers of initiation, 80 percent of all incidents involving marginal persons were initiated by the CBP officer in Bochum.

In this respect, however, it should be noted that there may also be an **effect of the study** itself: The decision of Bochum police that our observer should accompany this specific officer during the research phase may not have been accidental. The district officer for the city centre is very engaged and enthusiastic in his work and experienced in dealing with people and media. He regularly appears as the local radio operator at the German reality TV Series ‚Toto und Harry‘, in which two officers of the Bochum emergency patrol service are accompanied by a TV production team (see also Spiegel, 2009). On the other hand, such enthusiasm can also be seen as something desirable.

Information sources play a determining role for police patrol work when they are used as a basis of the situational picture after which then tasks are assigned to the different units. Information sources are a channel to communicate citizen’s calls to the units. In most of the patrol work, however, they are being used as a tool for dealing with current issues.

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CHAPTER 6

6. Policing the Streets in Belgium

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The Belgian Police

A range of scandals in the police forces in Belgium that started in the 1980s and were the object of parliamentary research commissions (Enhus 1998) resulted in 1996 in a political consensus (Ponsaers and De Kimpe 2001) that only a radical change in the Belgian police system would give it back its lost legitimacy (Enhus and Ponsaers 2005). Decided in 1998 and implemented in 2001 the gendarmerie⁵³, the judicial police⁵⁴ and the 'local police'⁵⁵ were reformed to an integrated police service structured on two levels (a federal level and a local level). Both levels have the same core tasks -the maintenance of order (including traffic) and crime investigation- but are subsidiary to each other. The law⁵⁶ stipulates that both levels have no hierarchical bounds, they are autonomous. However, in order to realise an integrated police both levels have functional bounds.

The local level consists of 192 'zones'⁵⁷ of police. Each 'zone' is autonomous but has the obligation to deliver 'basispolitiezorg' or 'basic police care' to the citizens on their territory, which requires them to fulfill 6 functions: intervention, reception, crime investigation, care of victims, order maintenance and community beat patrol (KB, 2001; Vandevoorde, Vaerewyck et al. 2003). Besides this basic police care, the local police is obliged to fulfil a series of tasks for the federal level. The local level is the operational level, approximately 25.000 of the 45.000 police officers work at this level.

The subsidiary principle of the federal level dictates that police problems that are not linked to or transgress the boundaries of a zone are dealt by the federal level. It also means that problems that need a specialised knowledge and/or equipment are handled by the federal

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⁵³ The 'Gendarmerie' or 'Rijkswacht' was until 1992 the state police service, a military force with as there core tasks maintaining order and criminal investigation.

⁵⁴ The 'Gerechtelijke politie bij de parketten' or 'Police Judiciaire des Parquets' was a small specialised force with an exclusive judicial task.

⁵⁵ In Belgium there existed 598 forces of 'Gemeentepolitie' or 'Police Communal' at the time of the police reform. They had the same core tasks as the 'gendarmerie': maintaining order and criminal investigation at the local level.

⁵⁶ Wet 7 december 1998 tot organisatie van een geïntegreerde politiedienst, gestructureerd op twee niveaus, B.S., 5 januari 1999.

⁵⁷ A 'zone' can consist of one big city or of more municipalities. Because of the principle of the municipal autonomy the federal level was not allowed to propose any territorial restructuring of the police forces. The 'zones' were created on the personal initiative of the mayors who negotiated for a certain area a voluntary cooperation. As a result the creation of the 'zones' was purely motivated by political aims and not by policing needs. 598 municipalities were reformed to 196 zones. 50 police zones coincide with the territory of one city or town (one-city-zone) and 146 coincide with more than one city and / or town (multiple municipal zone). By creating the 'zone' a new administrative level was put into place. In the case of a multiple municipal zone the conduct of a police 'zone' is in the hands of the college of mayors. They appoint a president who is responsible for the daily conduct and contacts with the police chief. The college is accountable to the police Council that is composed of several municipality Council members from the municipalities concerned.

police. The federal level is obliged to give support to the local level. A local police force can ask for personnel and means⁵⁸ in certain cases.

So although both levels are autonomous, there are functional bounds that enable integrated and complementary work. Two important principles⁵⁹ make this integration possible: the functioning of the federal police is consolidated in the national security plan. This plan contains an outline of future functioning and priorities of the federal police. The functioning of the local police on the other hand needs to be stipulated in a police plan for the ‘zone’. This zonal plan has to take into account the priorities and plans of action defined on the federal level. Only when a certain problem is absent in the particular zone, the choice of own priorities is allowed. A second important principle is the obligation of the local level to send its information to a centralized information system (the national data warehouse). To enable this way of working, each local force works with the same software (ISLP) and is automatically linked to the central system. Daily the local information is automatically downloaded to this central system. As compensation the local level can receive information gathered on the federal level or in other zones. In order to develop functional information crossroads, a service (AIK) has been created at judicial district level to function as the link between the federal and local levels for operational, control and policy information.

After the implementation of the new police structure the minister of interior introduced the principle of community oriented policing in 2003 (CP1 en CP2). These guidelines instruct the Belgian police to develop COP by working on five important principles. They have to work (1) community oriented, (2) in partnership with other actors involved in certain security problems (3) problem oriented (4) while increasing the empowerment of both the public and the policemen (5) and be accountable for the followed police policy. Both the local and federal level should implement this philosophy. On the federal level the police chiefs were not convinced that this view would be applicable and some of the guidelines were translated into ‘intelligence led policing’. In reality the degree in which COP has been implemented in the Belgian local forces is highly diverse. Nearly every force do efforts to invest more in the community beat policemen. However, only in a small amount of them there are attempts to implement the philosophy throughout the whole force. (Vandevoorde, Vaerewyck et al. 2003) Due to resistance on the work floor (and even from the police chiefs themselves), the implementation of community oriented policing is generally evaluated as not really successful (Easton, Ponsaers et al. 2008)

Organisation of emergency intervention and community beat patrol in Belgium

Only the local level is responsible for the organisation of emergency intervention and community beat patrol. In order to guarantee every Belgian citizen the same level of basic police care, the six functions, that have to be delivered by each local level (KB, 2001), are described by law and norms are imposed (PLP10).

In the KB 2001 article 2 the function ‘**community beat patrol**’ is defined as: ‘delivering a visible, approachable and contactable police service that is maximally oriented to the needs and expectations of the setting’. The ministerial circular (PLP10) describes the function

⁵⁸ For example in case of public disorder problems a police force can get support from other police zones or/and from the general federal reserve and can ask for the Special Intervention Units (SWAT), the Dogs Division, the Air Support Division, the management of operational documentation or the documentation needed by the police services in the field in order to complete their missions, data processing, telephone and radio-communication and the international and operational police co-operation.

⁵⁹ Other principles are: a common selection and recruitment procedure has been developed and training has been harmonized, all police officers have the same status; a code of ethics is applied to all members of all police services.

‘community beat patrol’ as the cornerstone of a community oriented police. Therefore their tasks are much more diverse than the administrative tasks they traditionally execute. The traditional role of the community beat patrol can mainly be categorized under what is defined in this research as ‘internal affairs’. This category refers to a variety of administrative tasks such as checking newcomers, dispatching fines and convocations for the tribunal, getting declarations from people in running judicial cases, intervening in cold cases and conflicts, and so on... In important part of these administrative tasks can be categorized under the term of so called ‘kantschriften’. In Belgium police officers are obliged to report each criminal act to the public prosecutor. From that moment onwards the prosecutor has the leading role in deciding which steps are to be taken in the criminal investigation⁶⁰. By means of ‘kantschriften’, notes in the margins of the report, missions (often the hearing of suspects, neighbours, checking of alibis, decisions of the prosecutor ...) are ordered to the police. After a mission has been fulfilled by the police, the results are sent to the prosecutor. After studying the new information a new mission is given and so on. In the Belgian police lots there is a lot of criticism on this cumbersome and slow way of working. In every day work these missions are usually dispatched to the community beat officers. Because of the huge amount of paper work involved with these ‘kantschriften’, community beat officers are often called the ‘postman’ of the public prosecutor.

The ministerial circular clearly wants to change this traditional role of the community beat patrol. Following the new guidelines, community beat officers have to concentrate on enhancing their contacts with the public by executing new tasks that can consist of: collecting and giving information to citizens, communicating expectations of citizens to civil services, performing preventive controls and patrols to enhance the feelings of safety, listening to complaints and trying to find solutions for problems, detecting and trying to solve small conflicts (restorative approach), detecting sources of safety problems and crime, intervention in cold cases (instead of emergency patrols) where the specialised knowledge of the beat officer is needed, control and follow-up of persons under parole. The former administrative tasks are only to be exercised in a restricted manner: only when specialised knowledge is needed or former personal contact with the concerned citizen has taken place.

When organising this function the zone should take into account specific local circumstances and the density of the population to create beats with a geographical even dispersion. The compulsory norm is minimal 1 beat officer/4000 citizens. Later on the ministry of home affairs proposed a not compulsory adaption of this norm: in rural zones 1/4000 citizens, in towns 1/3000 and in big cities 1/2000. The average figures for Belgium are indicated in next table.

| | Wallonië | Brussel | Vlaanderen | België |
|----------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------|
| ZVP 2003-04 | 1.898 | 2.067 | 3.169 | 2.567 |
| ZVP 2005 – 08 | 1.851 | 2.245 | 3.171 | 2.497 |

⁶⁰ With exception of minor facts where the police is allowed to dress a limited report (VPV) and no further actions are taken. In certain minor cases with unknown suspects, defined on a list, the police dresses an APO (Autonomic police inquiry) that is send to the prosecutor and gets 3 months to start an inquiry.

The goal of the function of ‘**emergency patrol**’ is to respond to every call that requires a police intervention in a reasonable time (KB, 2001, art.4). Urgent calls have priority, non urgent tasks can be performed when there is time left over (PLP10). In quiet moments these tasks can be extended by tasks that can immediately be stopped in case of emergency, such as directed patrol work, tasks with a federal character (f.e. surveying money transports ..), certain prescribed controls (f.e. traffic controls, surveillance of places..), inquiries of limited scope (hearing a suspect..).

The emergency patrol has to be organised on a 24 hour base in each police zone. The frequency and nature of the calls in the zone have to be taken into account when determining the amount of shifts. The minimal norm is one intervention team during the 24 hours and one supplementary team 84h/week. At all times a chief officer has to be permanently reachable. Opposed to the community beat patrol, the ministerial circular doesn’t translate the working of the emergency patrol in terms of community policing.

Police in Brussels, Dendermonde and Aarschot

Socio-demographic characteristics of the cities

The multiple municipal police zone Brussels (capital)⁶¹ - Elsenne consists of three districts: Brussels-capital, Laken and Elsenne. In each district there are several police offices: five in Brussels-capital, six in Laken and four in Elsenne. Observations were made in the fourth police office of the district Brussels-capital. This area consists of two neighbourhoods: ‘Oude Markt’ and ‘Anneessens’. The neighbourhood around the ‘Oude Markt’ is known as the ‘Marollen’, one of the oldest parts of Brussels and a very typical and populist block. 47,30% of the population are workmen and 30,80% clerks. Quite a large proportion of these people are unemployed: 50% lives of a replacement income. The former industry has vanished and has been replaced by a growing tertiary sector that doesn’t recruit within the area itself, but outside the Marollen. Because of the low housing prices the Marollen have a growing attraction on young alternative people and the gentrification process is in full development. As a consequence it has recently become a bustling area. There are always many people wandering the streets, not so much the real locals, but especially visitors who stop by the many shops that are located there or the popular flea market on the ‘Vossenplein’. The area has a double-sided image: on the one hand there is a lot of poverty and many homeless people can be seen sleeping in small alleys or wandering the streets. On the other hand trendy bars and restaurants as well as higher-class people are settling themselves in this neighbourhood, by which its standard is changing to that of a trendy neighbourhood, including higher renting prices and renovations of degenerated buildings. The whole area is characterised by a very multicultural population. Several local circumstances influence the activity of the police. There are about 10 schools that require some degree of surveillance, there’s a community welfare centre that enquires the assistance of the police, there’s a university hospital and there are many shops and the coming and going of about 250 market traders. On top of that, there’s an intensive night life, mainly due to the presence of several popular night clubs such as The Fuse, Le Bazaar etc... There are also seven blocks of social apartments that inhabit about 4000 people, many of them of a foreign origin. The crime level is relatively high with a concentration of thievery of all sorts.

⁶¹ Brussels consists in 19 municipalities which were grouped to 4 police force zones. The zone where the research took place is formed by the municipality Brussels capital and the municipality Elsenne. Together they form the zone Brussel-Elsene.

Dendermonde is a city located in the East of Flanders and is being surrounded by three main cities: Ghent, Antwerp and Brussels. The city consists of eight sub communities: Appels, Dendermonde, Sint-Gillis-bij-Dendermonde, Baasrode, Grembergen, Mespelare, Oudegem and Schoonaarde. Dendermonde has a centre function in the area. There are 11 schools, there's the hospital St Blavius and the city is economically very active: it is the fourth most important trade centre in the East of Flanders. There's a relatively large industrial zone, several trade zones and a large number of companies are spread over the city and sub communities. There's a lot of agricultural land and quite some nature and forestry. Dendermonde is appealing to a lot of tourists: especially the old city centre and borders of the Schelde are popular districts. The nightlife takes place in the city centre and around the station. There are no night clubs. The crime rate in Dendermonde is relatively low compared to the surrounding cities. The police zone coincides with the borders of the city (one-city zone).

Aarschot is situated on the transition of the Kempen and the Hageland and is typified by a beautiful and diversified landscape. Aarschot can be characterised as a cosy and lively community. The only multinational in Aarschot is Duracell, all other companies are small and medium-sized enterprises. The current capacity of the industrial zone is slowing down the further growth of present companies and is preventing new companies to establish themselves in Aarschot. The nightlife in Aarschot is on the downfall. The two remaining night clubs that were left there have closed their doors and the night scene now evolves completely around the city centre. Several pubs are trying to increase their popularity by special actions. Some of them cause minor nuisances such as noise pollution and social nuisance. The centre of Aarschot is easily accessible, which comes in favour of a flourishing commercial life. The shopping centre attracts many visitors from out of town. Aarschot has a centre function and to meet the demands of such a function, there is a well-developed public transport network. The number of people travelling way and from Aarschot for business purposes is high and still rising. As in Dendermonde, the police zone coincides with the borders of the city (one-city zone).

General characteristics of the emergency and beat patrol in the three cities

With a very limited area, a very high population density and the highest police employee/inhabitants ratio⁶² the situation of Brussels is very different than the two other cities under observation. The high employee/inhabitants ratio can be expected in view of the particular characteristics of and problems in the area as described higher.

Table 6.1: strength of the Belgian police teams under observation, police-inhabitant ratio and population density

| | Strength (number of employees) * | Area covered by EP (km2) | Inhabitants in this area # | Inhabitants per employee | Population density (inh./km2) |
|---------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Brussel | 86 | 0,9 | 20.000 | 230 | 22.200 |

⁶² This is surprising because all Brussels police zones are confronted by a chronic shortage of police officers. This is partly due to the high standards of the (bilingual) language exams but also because the forces have problems to recruit out of Brussels inhabitants. To solve this problem police officers from outside the city are obliged after their initial training to work in Brussels. But most of them ask to get a mutation to more 'calm' forces with less problems after the legal 3 years of duty have been fulfilled. This results in a high turn-over and consequently a disproportionally high proportion of very young officers.

| | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|------------|------------|
| Dendermonde | 117 | 55,7 | 43.400 | 370 | 780 |
| Aarschot | 57 | 62,5 | 27.900 | 490 | 450 |
| <i>TOTAL PSE</i> | <i>1.741</i> | <i>1.646,9</i> | <i>837,420</i> | <i>480</i> | <i>510</i> |

* : including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.

In **Brussels** the head chief is assisted by two sub chiefs each of whom is responsible for one part of the district (Anneessens and Oude Markt). The community beat patrol unit consists of seven community beat inspectors who exclusively commit themselves to community work: they don't take care of reception work and they never do emergency patrol work. They patrol in their part of the district, they receive people whom they have summoned in the police office and they take care of administrative tasks. The number of inhabitants per community beat inspector is 2857⁶³. This is more than the average observed in the different zones in the region of Brussels (2242)⁶⁴.

The emergency patrol unit consists of seven teams, each of them led by a chief inspector (three teams for Anneessens and four for Oude Markt). Each team has six to seven inspectors who take care of the patrol work and the reception. Under ideal circumstances, thus when the team is complete, there are two inspectors who are designated to do the reception, two take care of the patrol work on foot and two patrol by car. In the middle of each shift there is a switch: the two inspectors who are taking care of the reception go on patrol, and the ones taking care of the patrol work, take over the reception.

Priorities on the level of the zone were⁶⁵: violent thefts, thefts in vehicles, burglaries, gang violence (as related to drug traffic, sexual offences, violent thefts, injuries and homicide), nuisance and incivilities (public tidiness, graffiti, vandalism, noise pollution) and traffic (drunk driving, speeding, dangerous parking and traffic aggression). Besides these priorities, special attention is being given to youth delinquency and crime on public transport.

The police plan of 2005 (of the zone Brussel – Elsene) didn't mention the implementation of community policing although the police chief of this area strongly supports COP in his district.

There is a connection between the emergency patrols and the community beat patrols: the seven community inspectors are linked to one of the seven emergency patrols.

In **Dendermonde** the community beat patrol unit consists of 12 community beat inspectors. The number of inhabitants per inspector is 3617. This is more than the average number observed in the whole region of Flanders (3171). Each inspector takes care of the reception a few hours a week and weekly has a nightshift. They use motorbikes and bicycles for transportation to enhance visibility and approachability. Complex problems are handled in cooperation with the project manager specialised in that specific domain. There's a unit 'project work' that is responsible for the different priorities of the area. The priorities as

⁶³ We recalculated the number of inhabitants as related to community beat policing (instead of to the strength of the entire police force as indicated in the table above) to compare these figures to the national average

⁶⁴ See table on page 3

⁶⁵ As defined in the police plan of the zone of 2005

defined in the police plan of the 'zone' in 2005 were: traffic (accidents with injuries / death), drugs, thefts, social problems and nuisance and environment. Special attention was to be given to shoplifting / pickpockets, theft of (motor)bikes and traffic accidents with material damage.

The plan stipulates internal reorganisations and priorities with the aim to enhance the functioning of the police force by integrating work processes, less administrative tasks and workload. These projects are meant to allow cultural changes to take place in the police force, enabling as such the introduction of community oriented policing. Five project-coordinators are responsible for these themes. If complex and persistent problems occur that go beyond the capabilities of emergency and community patrol work, the unit 'project work' is being set to work. After screening and elaborate analysis they set up action plans.

The tasks of the emergency patrol unit go beyond first line aid after a call. They also take care of the reception, do research, perform surveillances, etc... Each shift consists of two emergency teams. Apart from the traditional emergency patrols, there are also, since October 2004, special surveillance teams to watch over different forms of nuisance and crime. During the week two surveillance teams are active. At night and during weekends the second emergency patrol unit is mobilised as an extra surveillance team. Usually they are on foot or by bike in order to be on the spot faster. An additional advantage is that they can hear and observe more when they are on foot / by bike.

The emergency and community beat patrol units are interconnected through the project work. The project coordinator makes up a list with assignments for the surveillance teams. The community beat patrol units are an important source of information to make up this list: when they notice problems that require additional surveillance, they report this to the surveillance units. Surveillance units on their turn report relevant information to the community patrol units.

In **Aarschot** the community beat patrol unit is expected to be the cornerstone of a community oriented police organisation. However, the current community beat patrol unit still has a long way to go before reaching the ideal standards of community oriented policing. Their main task now still consists of assignments from public prosecution, thus preserving the traditional role of community beat officers. With the limited sources the police force has, the community beat officers try to implement community oriented policing in a rather limited way. Currently there are seven community inspectors, which means that the number of inhabitants per community beat inspector is 3986 (3171). Again this is more than the average observed in the region of Flanders.

The emergency patrol unit consists of 32 police agents. They are responsible for urgent intervention jobs. Calls that are not really urgent are being handled by the community beat patrol unit. Except for urgent administration, this team is constantly on the road. In case of heavy work load the emergency patrol unit is assisted by a special urgency team.

Priorities as defined in the zonal police plan of 2005 were: traffic, burglary, drugs and youth delinquency. The local environment, social and family problems and nuisances are points of attention.

Work load of the police in the three cities

Table 6.2: work load

| | <i>Observed incidents</i> | <i>... of which are calls *</i> | <i>Inc./hour</i> | <i>Calls/hour</i> |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | |
| Brussel | 191 | 89 | 1,6 | 0,7 |
| Dendermonde | 109 | 66 | 1,4 | 0,8 |
| Aarschot | 152 | 76 | 1,9 | * 1,0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>913</i> | <i>1,8</i> | <i>0,8</i> |
| <i>Community beat patrol</i> | | | | |
| Brussel | 175 | 19 | ** 4,2 | 0,5 |
| Dendermonde | 489 | 71 | ** 4,9 | * 0,7 |
| Aarschot | 78 | 8 | ** 1,3 | 0,1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>323</i> | <i>2,6</i> | <i>0,4</i> |

*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding ‘answering a question from the public’ (var06=65) and ‘chatting with the public’ (var06=84).

When we study the work load of the emergency patrol in the three cases, the police force of Aarschot seems to have the highest work load (1,9 incidents/hour and 1,0 calls of citizens/hour) As we discussed before: Aarschot has a low population density but the highest police/civilian rate of the three cities. In Brussels and Dendermonde the emergency patrol units treat less incidents/hour (1,6 and 1,4).

The community beat patrol of Aarschot on the contrary treat only 1,3 incidents/hour while in Brussels and Dendermonde this is nearly four times more. In the already cited police plan the Aarschot force management signal problems to build a community oriented beat patrol. The lack of officers to perform this function is one of the main explanations for the observed low work load: as they are clearly understaffed, they limit the scope of their activities, which can be observed in the following table. The community beat units only got two clear directives from the force management: they have to attend every morning and evening the schools in the city to regulate traffic and they are obliged to re-visit victims of burglaries in order to give them preventive advice.

| | emergency patrol | | | community beat patrol | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------|---------------|-----------------------|-----------|---------------|
| | % Aarschot | % Brussel | % Dendermonde | % Aarschot | % Brussel | % Dendermonde |
| Accident with casualties (with vehicle) | | | | 1,3 | | 1,0 |
| Accident without casualties (with vehicle) | 4,6 | 1,6 | 3,7 | | | 1,5 |
| Drunk driving / Driving ban | 3,3 | | | | | 0,5 |
| Directing traffic | | 1,0 | | 1,3 | | 1,5 |
| Defective street furniture / infrastructure | 3,3 | 0,5 | 3,7 | | | |
| Traffic stop (officers on the move) | 1,3 | | 2,8 | | | 5,5 |
| Traffic violation | 23,0 | 23,6 | 16,5 | 6,4 | 2,3 | 26,6 |
| Roadside stop (officers standing along the road) | 4,6 | | | | | |
| Other traffic | 1,3 | 3,7 | 3,7 | 1,3 | 1,1 | 1,0 |
| Break-in at a house/ business/hotel room/school | 2,6 | 6,3 | 4,6 | | | 2,5 |
| Car break-in | | 3,7 | 0,9 | | | 1,0 |
| Theft of a motor vehicle | | | | | 0,6 | 0,5 |
| Theft of a moped or bicycle | | | | | | |
| Picking up shop-lifter / shoplifting | 0,7 | 2,1 | 1,8 | | | 4,5 |
| Robbery - person / pick pocketing | 1,3 | 2,6 | 0,9 | | 1,1 | 2,0 |
| Hold-up of a bank / post office / shop / business | | | 0,9 | | | 0,5 |
| Narcotics | 0,7 | | | | | 0,5 |
| Weapons and firearms | | | | | 0,6 | |
| Assault (bodily harm) | 0,7 | 0,5 | | | 0,6 | 2,5 |
| Vandalism / Mischief | 4,6 | 2,6 | 1,8 | | | 1,5 |
| Fraudulent practices, Swindle, Fraud | | | | | | 1,0 |
| Sex offences | | | | | | 0,5 |
| Cafés and restaurants - check | | | | | 0,6 | |
| Standing Guard / looking at suspicious situations | 7,9 | 3,7 | 3,7 | | | 0,5 |
| Wanted person / stolen good | | 0,5 | 0,9 | | | |
| False name | | | | | | 1,0 |
| False report | | | | | | |
| Immigration law | | | | 2,6 | 2,9 | |
| Other (e.g. bomb alert, public drunkenness) | 0,7 | 0,5 | 2,8 | | 1,1 | 0,5 |
| Twist / quarrel / argument, problems between people (no relationship problems) | 4,6 | 11,5 | 5,5 | 2,6 | 2,9 | 3,0 |
| Relationship problems | 2,6 | 1,0 | 11,9 | 2,6 | 0,6 | |
| Noise nuisance from a house | 0,7 | | 3,7 | | | |
| Noise nuisance from a hotel / restaurant /café / or other business | 2,0 | 1,0 | 1,8 | | | |
| Environment (not noise nuisance) (but e.g. dog dirt) | 4,6 | 0,5 | 2,8 | 3,8 | 0,6 | |
| Disturbed/demented people; 'social'/pitiful cases | | | | | | |
| Dangerous situations (not traffic/weapons) | 3,9 | 2,6 | | | | 0,5 |
| Missing persons | | 0,5 | | | | |
| manifestations | 1,3 | | 2,8 | | | 2,5 |
| Assistance / mediation / caretaking / unwell person | 3,3 | 2,1 | 0,9 | | | 5,0 |
| Public order | 0,7 | 2,1 | 0,9 | 1,3 | 1,1 | 8,0 |
| Fire | 0,7 | 0,5 | | | | |
| Lost and found articles (also bicycles) | | 1,0 | 1,8 | | | 1,0 |
| Answering questions from the public | 2,0 | 11,0 | 1,8 | 10,3 | 10,9 | 9,5 |
| Nuisance from young people | 0,7 | 3,1 | 1,8 | | | |
| Other (e.g. finding a body, underground transport regulations, fare dodging) | | 0,5 | | | 0,6 | 0,5 |
| False alarm (break-in, fire, hold-up) | 1,3 | 1,0 | 2,8 | | | 3,0 |
| Internal job / message (e.g. transport of prisoners, delivering a postal item) | 2,6 | 2,1 | 7,3 | 28,2 | 36,6 | 2,0 |
| Questioning a suspect. | 0,7 | 0,5 | 1,8 | 26,9 | 4,6 | 0,5 |
| Helping colleague / support | 2,6 | 1,6 | | | 0,6 | |
| Chatting with the public / networking | 5,3 | 3,7 | 3,7 | 7,7 | 22,3 | 6,0 |
| Chatting or conferring with an official / networking | | | | 1,3 | | 0,5 |
| research in neighbourhood | | | | 1,3 | | |
| prevention | | | | | 0,6 | |
| Other | | 0,5 | | 1,3 | 8,0 | 1,0 |
| N | 152 | 191 | 109 | 78 | 175 | 489 |

The analysis of the tasks that are dealt with by the emergency patrol units, reveals a very similar pattern of activities: there are no major differences in the proportions of the fulfilled tasks. The main part of their activities concerns traffic violations (about 23% of all incidents). These findings confirm prior Belgian research on activities of emergency patrols. The high volume of traffic interventions is the result of ‘filling up’ time in between emergency calls (Eliaerts, Enhus, 1992, 80) It is also conform with the instructions on the functioning of emergency patrol units in the new Belgian police structure (see 6.2)

The activities of emergency patrol units that are not traffic related contain more than 50 domains of activity, each of them taking low to very low percentages. In general this indicates a great dispersion and a very broad police task. Between the three cities we find no major differences. In Aarschot ‘standing guard’ / looking at suspicious situations’ is the second most important activity (7,9%), the third is chatting with people/networking (5,3%). In Brussels the second and third most important activities were ‘twist / quarrel / argument, problems between people’ (11,5%) and ‘answering questions from the public’ (11%). In Dendermonde the traffic violations form the largest category, yet represent only 16,5 of all activities. The second important task is dealing with conflicts (11,9%), the third is ‘internal job / message’ (7,9%). This proportion is higher than in Aarschot or Brussels. Looking at the tasks of the community beat patrol units leads to the conclusion that both forms of patrol work – for not urgent interventions – act as communicating vessels.

While the similarity between the studied units of emergency patrol work is striking, we find a much larger diversity between the community beat patrols. First of all the dispersion in the tasks is different: in Brussels 70% of all activities consists of ‘internal jobs / messages’ (36,6%), ‘chatting with the public / networking’ (22,3%) and ‘answering questions from the public’ (10,9%). In Aarschot 65% consists of ‘internal jobs / messages’ (28,2%), ‘questioning a suspect’ (27%) and ‘answering questions from the public’ (10,3%). In Dendermonde the activities are the most divers of all three with as most important tasks: traffic violations (27%)⁶⁶, ‘answering questions from the public’ (9,5%), public order (8%) and ‘chatting with the public / networking’ (6%). Due to the clear orientation toward community oriented policing in Dendermonde, the community beat officers are released from a lot of administrative work and walk around their beat more frequently. This decision seems to have an important impact on the work of the emergency patrol: as indicated before, they are more involved in handling ‘internal jobs / messages’ than the other observed forces. The community beat patrol officers have informal chats with the inhabitants, intervene in conflicts and inform people. They frequently organize internal meetings were they discuss common problems and decide on actions. For instance, in the observed period the beat officers decided to organize an action to prevent the stealing of bikes (graving a unique number in the frame) and to tackle problems of cyclists crossing the central place during the big weekly market as an answer to complaints of the merchants. At the time of the observations only warnings were given. After running the project during one month fines would be given. These two actions explain the high amount of traffic related activities by the community beat patrol in Dendermonde. 36 people presented their cycle for engraving; 89 got a warning that it was not allowed to cycle while the market was going on. The officers in this force got the instructions to be present at school entrances every morning and look for traffic problems. This task also resulted in a high amount of warnings to students and parents about their traffic behaviour. The observations started at the beginning of the Belgian school year (the first of September). This new start influenced the attitude of the community beat officers who wanted to remind or state the rules of good traffic behaviour.

⁶⁶ See also table 6.3

More broadly speaking, it is clear that the implementation of community policing in Dendermonde resulted in broader job responsibilities for the community beat patrols. The officers have more space to implement their own priorities in their beat. The choice of traffic as highest priority could be due to the lack of other big problems in this city. Of all three cities Dendermonde seems to be the safest. Besides that, our findings could possibly be influenced by the time of the observations. Observations started on the first of September, in Belgium a date where the rhythm of work starts anew and schools restart after two months of summer holidays. Traffic congestions and problems re-enter society after a relatively quiet summer period and thus requires some guidance by the police. It could be that the priority for traffic was only temporal.

The strong focus on traffic problems by community beat officers in Dendermonde results in a lower level of traffic related activities by the emergency patrol units.

The observation of tasks in Aarschot and Brussels reveals that the community beat patrols still work in a more traditional way. Before the introduction of COP the community beat patrol inspectors fulfilled most of the administrative tasks in the police force. They had to control newcomers, dispatch fines and convocations for the tribunal, get declarations of people in running judicial cases, intervene in cold cases and conflicts, and so on. In both cities we find a high proportion of time spent on 'internal jobs / messages' (36,6 and 28,2%).

Sort of Incidents Involved in Patrol Work

Traffic

Table 6.3: proportion of traffic

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 79 | 65,8 | 112 | ** 5,4 | 191 | * 30,4 |
| Dendermonde | 41 | 48,8 | 68 | 19,1 | 109 | * 30,3 |
| Aarschot | 70 | 64,3 | 82 | 22,0 | 152 | 41,4 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.074</i> | <i>62,9</i> | <i>1.015</i> | <i>18,9</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>41,6</i> |
| | <i>Community beat patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 136 | ** 4,4 | 39 | 0,0 | 175 | ** 3,4 |
| Dendermonde | 343 | ** 57,4 | 146 | 4,1 | 489 | ** 41,5 |
| Aarschot | 61 | ** 9,8 | 17 | 11,8 | 78 | ** 10,3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>567</i> | <i>39,5</i> | <i>658</i> | <i>6,7</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>29,2</i> |

* $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

In general, emergency patrols seem to be confronted more with traffic incidents (41,6%) than community beat patrols (29,2%).

The proportion of traffic incidents in the total amount of emergency patrol incidents is in Brussels and Dendermonde about 30%, whereas it is 41,4% in Aarschot. Brussels and Dendermonde thus score significantly lower than the total proportion of traffic in all emergency patrol incidents (total PSE 41,6%).

Although these figures seem to suggest that a considerable amount of police-time is spent on traffic incidents, it might be interesting to look at the amount of time that is spent on each

type of incident. The average duration of traffic incidents in Belgium was eight minutes⁶⁷, whereas the average time spent on for instance serious crime was 27 minutes⁶⁸. For Brussels this implies that about 116 minutes in total were spent on traffic and about 595 minutes were spent on serious crime⁶⁹. In Dendermonde about 198 minutes in total were spent on traffic and 322 minutes on serious crime. In Aarschot 378 minutes were spent on traffic and 880 minutes on serious crime. These figures do put another perspective on the matter.

Within emergency patrol work traffic incidents mostly occur on the initiative of the police (in general 62.9% of total PSE), there are no significant differences between the proportions of the three Belgian cities and the total proportion. We do see differences within the incidents on the initiative of citizens: emergency patrol work in Brussels contains considerably less traffic incidents on the initiative of citizens (5,4% of all incidents on behalf of a citizen compared to the total proportion of 18,9%).

The proportions of traffic incidents within all incidents community beat policing officers were involved in, show significant differences between the three Belgian cities and the total proportion: whereas the proportion is smaller in Brussels and Aarschot, it is bigger in Dendermonde. As we already pointed out before, the community beat officers in Dendermonde spend more efforts on traffic incidents than in Brussels and Aarschot, and compared to the overall proportion. In Dendermonde the proportion of traffic incidents on behalf of the police is even bigger in community beat patrol work than in emergency patrols⁷⁰. In Aarschot and Brussels on the other hand the proportion of traffic incidents on behalf of the community beat police is a lot smaller than the overall proportion. The observed difference can not be explained by a difference in priorities, as traffic is defined as one of the top priorities in all three areas. The higher attention to traffic could be due to the relatively low crime level in this city.

The incidents involved are in large amounts small incidents with bicycles, e.g. when riding on pavements, crossovers or streets that are not allowed for bikes. Although we can conclude that traffic incidents get a relatively high level of attention from police officers, we will see later on that these cases are rarely handled in a punitive way. As we explained earlier in point 6.2, in Dendermonde the officers' reaction never went beyond giving a warning.

“The police officer is trying to stop traffic that is taking the wrong turn in a one-way street. Two girls on a bicycle ignore him and try to continue their track. The officer stops them and gives them a warning.” (Dendermonde CBP)

In table 6.5 we can see that the traffic incidents in Dendermonde mainly consist of traffic violations. However, whereas the proportion of traffic violations in community beat patrol work is bigger than the general proportion, it is smaller in emergency patrol work. Earlier in the text we already suggested that both forms of patrol act like communicating vessels when dealing with non-urgent problems. It seems that the smaller proportion that is spent on traffic violations by the emergency patrols is compensated by a more intense approach by community patrol work. The fact that emergency patrols are dealing with a lot of social

⁶⁷ Dendermonde: 6 minutes, Aarschot: 16 minutes, Brussels: 2 minutes

⁶⁸ Averages: Dendermonde: 23 minutes, Aarschot: 40 minutes, Brussels: 17 minutes

⁶⁹ During the observations not the exact figures on incident duration were reported, duration was reported using time intervals on which we calculated the duration by closing the last interval with the highest duration measured in the field reports.

⁷⁰ This is due to two projects on traffic (see 6.2)

problems could be an explanation for the smaller proportion of traffic violations and checks. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the average amount of time spent on social problems is bigger than the time spent on traffic incidents⁷¹. **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**

In Brussels and Aarschot on the other hand, community beat patrol work consists less of traffic incidents than the overall percentage. This is mainly due to a smaller proportion of traffic incidents on the initiative of the police (4,4% in Brussels and 9,8% in Aarschot, opposed to a general proportion of 39,5%).

Table 6.5 gives us more detailed information on the traffic incidents observed during patrol work: the emergency patrols in Brussels didn't do any traffic checks (0%), whereas the overall proportion for this type of incident is 10,1%. What is more, in Brussels there were no traffic checks at all, as the proportion in community patrol work is 0% as well. It is known that in highly urbanized areas traffic violations are taken less seriously than in the country. However, the proportions of traffic checks are low for all three cities and in emergency patrol work as well as in community patrol work. There are several explanations for these findings. In Aarschot the car speed is measured almost exclusively by unguarded cameras, in Brussels the main traffic problems are not speed but parking problems. To respond to this specific need, and because of the lack of police officers, a new kind of unarmed assistant police officer was created. They have limited police responsibilities and their task is controlling parking contributions and regulations. Alongside with this development, most Belgian cities installed administrative regulations for the payment of parking places. The contributions and fines in case of foul are checked and collected by private firms. The creation of this new police function and the involvement of private firms in the treatment of parking fees has reduced the activities of the community beat officer in this domain.

Maintaining the law and other main themes in policing

In the next table the nature of the incidents was divided into six main categories: maintaining the law, maintaining public order, giving assistance, networking, internal jobs and a leftover category 'else'.

Table 6.4: patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages)

| | <i>N</i> | <i>Maintain- ing the law</i> | <i>Maintain- ing public order</i> | <i>Giving assistance</i> | <i>Networking</i> | <i>Internal job</i> | <i>Else</i> |
|------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Brussel | 191 | 51,3 | 6,8 | 29,8 | 3,7 | 2,1 | 6,3 |
| Dendermonde | 109 | 46,8 | 7,3 | 31,2 | 3,7 | 7,3 | 3,7 |
| Aarschot | 152 | 59,6 | 9,9 | 19,7 | 5,3 | 2,6 | 3,9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>56,8</i> | <i>8,1</i> | <i>23,0</i> | <i>4,9</i> | <i>3,3</i> | <i>4,0</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Brussel | 175 | ** 14,9 | * 1,1 | 14,3 | 22,3 | ** 36,6 | * 10,9 |
| Dendermonde | 489 | 39,3 | 7,6 | 15,3 | 19,2 | 8,8 | * 9,8 |
| Aarschot | 78 | 41,0 | 2,6 | 16,7 | * 9,0 | ** 28,2 | 2,6 |

⁷¹ In Dendermonde the average amount of time spent on traffic incidents was 6 minutes, whereas the average amount of time spent on social problems was 23 minutes.

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-------|------|-----|------|------|------|-----|
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 2.094 | 37,1 | 5,8 | 18,4 | 21,4 | 11,6 | 5,8 |
|------------------|-------|------|-----|------|------|------|-----|

* $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,001$ (with respect to 'Total PSE').

Within emergency patrol work the different categories show no significant differences between the three Belgian cities and the overall proportions: maintaining the law is the largest category and takes up about half of the total amount of incidents. Giving assistance is the second largest category, followed by maintaining public order. Networking and internal jobs are the smallest categories in emergency patrol work. In Brussels and Aarschot the proportion of internal jobs in emergency patrol work is similar to the average, whereas it is significantly higher in community patrol work (36,6% in Brussels and 28,2% in Aarschot, as opposed to an average of 11,6%).

“Maintaining the law” does not refer exclusively to “criminal law maintenance”. It involves all sorts of law maintenance, including traffic offences. Almost 50% of all law maintaining incidents observed during emergency patrol work in the three Belgian cities are traffic related. These findings confirm the observations we made in the preceding section.

Maintaining the law: emergency patrol1

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Drunk driving / Driving ban | 5 | 2,1 | 2,1 | 2,1 |
| Traffic stop (officers on the move) | 5 | 2,1 | 2,1 | 4,2 |
| Traffic violation | 98 | 41,2 | 41,2 | 45,4 |
| Roadside stop (officers standing along the road) | 7 | 2,9 | 2,9 | 48,3 |
| Break-in at a house/ business/hotel room/school | 21 | 8,8 | 8,8 | 57,1 |
| Car break-in | 8 | 3,4 | 3,4 | 60,5 |
| Picking up shop-lifter / shoplifting | 7 | 2,9 | 2,9 | 63,4 |
| Robbery - person / pick pocketing | 8 | 3,4 | 3,4 | 66,8 |
| Narcotics | 1 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 67,2 |
| Weapons and firearms | 1 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 67,6 |
| Assault (bodily harm) | 2 | 0,8 | 0,8 | 68,5 |
| Vandalism / Mischief / Graffiti | 14 | 5,9 | 5,9 | 74,4 |
| 'Standing Guard' / looking at suspicious situations | 23 | 9,7 | 9,7 | 84,0 |
| Wanted person / stolen good | 2 | 0,8 | 0,8 | 84,9 |
| Other penal law (e.g. bomb alert) | 5 | 2,1 | 2,1 | 87,0 |
| Environment (not noise nuisance) (but e.g. dog dirt) | 11 | 4,6 | 4,6 | 91,6 |
| Nuisance from young people | 9 | 3,8 | 3,8 | 95,4 |
| False alarm (break-in, fire, hold-up) | 7 | 2,9 | 2,9 | 98,3 |
| Questioning a suspect / victim / witness. | 4 | 1,7 | 1,7 | 100,0 |
| Total | 238 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

1 Joint figures on incidents involving maintaining the law observed during emergency patrol work in Brussels, Dendermonde and Aarschot

Besides traffic incidents, in emergency patrol work ‘maintaining the law’ mainly consists of theft-related incidents, suspicious situations and nuisances such as vandalism and nuisances from youngsters.

“Dispatching informs the officers about a theft in the atelier of a cleaning firm. Arriving at the scene they establish obvious signs of burglary: several doors and locks have been forced. Several tools have been stolen and the empty boxes have been left behind. The officers take note of the serial numbers as indicated on the boxes and leave.” (Brussels EP)

Besides maintaining the law, emergency patrols also spend quite some energy (23% total PSE) on incidents that involve giving assistance. These incidents often consist of social problems as described later on in this text.

As table 6.5 later in the text indicates, emergency patrol work in Dendermonde involves significantly more social problems (22.9% opposed to a general proportion of 8,6%). Social problems mainly consist of relationship problems, conflicts between neighbours and problems related to alcohol and drugs. Often these incidents have a relatively low ‘danger-level’ yet do seem to require the assistance of a neutral go-between. In situations as such police officers often perform the role of social negotiators: when citizens are unable to resolve a conflict on their own, they turn to the police for assistance. In Dendermonde there are more social problems due to its demographic composition.

“The police officers are asked to intervene in a family conflict: the daughter –who isn’t living with their parents anymore- refuses to leave the house upon her parents’ request. As the situation seems to be getting out of control, the parents call the police. (...) The officers advise the daughter to leave the house; eventually she agrees.” (Dendermonde – CBP)

“The officers receive a call from a woman who’s having problems with an ex-boyfriend. Arriving at the scene the man tries to escape by taking the bicycle of the woman’s son, yet the officers manage to stop him. The man appears to be drunk and isn’t able to show his ID. However, the officers know who the man is, as he had been arrested about a week ago. (...) Ever since the relationship between the couple has ended, the man continues to harass the woman. This time he was trying to convince her to talk to him again, but she didn’t want to. The man kept on knocking on her door and refused to leave, upon which the woman called for police assistance. The police officers ask the man to leave the woman alone, take back the bike and return to the woman’s house. (...) The officers advise her to call them whenever the man is causing problems again.” (Dendermonde EP)

Besides social problems, giving assistance also consists of questions from the public.

In table 6.5 we can see that there are more questions from the public during emergency patrol work in Brussels (11% as opposed to an 3,8% average). Often these questions are of a very practical matter, such as road descriptions. As we described higher this area in Brussels is not only highly attractive to tourists, it also groups a lot of functions such as a community welfare centre and a big university hospital.

“A man driving a car is signalling the police officers. He wants to know how to get to the hospital. The officers explain him the fastest way to go, wish him a nice day and continue their patrol.” (Brussels EP)

Whereas emergency patrol work in the three Belgian cities hardly reveals any differences in types of incidents, community patrol work does seem to reveal several differences with the overall proportions. Like in emergency patrol work the largest proportion of incidents can be categorized under maintaining the law: 37,1% of all cases. In Brussels there is considerably less maintaining the law (and maintaining public order) than in general, only 14,9% of all incidents involves law maintenance. This is mainly due to a much less intense activity in traffic related incidents compared to the other observed cities.

Even stronger than in emergency patrol work, the incidents that involve maintaining the law observed during community patrol work are highly traffic related: about 70% consists of traffic incidents. Besides traffic, a large proportion of incidents involving law maintenance is occupied by questioning witnesses or suspects (16%). Far less than in emergency patrol work, community patrols are confronted with theft-related incidents or even criminal offences in general. This indicates that community patrols often act in the follow-up of criminal offences handled by emergency patrol units.

Maintaining the law: community beat patrol

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Traffic stop (officers on the move) | 1 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 0,4 |
| Traffic violation | 176 | 70,4 | 70,4 | 70,8 |
| Break-in at a house/business/hotel room/school | 1 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 71,2 |
| Theft of a motor vehicle | 1 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 71,6 |
| Robbery - person / pickpocketing. | 3 | 1,2 | 1,2 | 72,8 |
| Weapons and firearms | 1 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 73,2 |
| Assault (bodily harm) | 1 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 73,6 |
| Cafés and restaurants - check | 1 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 74,0 |
| Immigration law | 9 | 3,6 | 3,6 | 77,6 |
| Other (e.g. bomb alert) | 3 | 1,2 | 1,2 | 78,8 |
| Environment (not noise nuisance) (but e.g. dog dirt) | 9 | 3,6 | 3,6 | 82,4 |
| Nuisance from young people | 3 | 1,2 | 1,2 | 83,6 |
| Questioning a suspect / victim / witness. | 40 | 16,0 | 16,0 | 99,6 |
| Interviewing a local resident after a crime | 1 | 0,4 | 0,4 | 100,0 |
| Total | 250 | 100,0 | 100,0 | |

In pursuance of an intervention by the emergency patrol unit, the community beat patrol officer has to question a man whose garden had been damaged due to a fight on the public road. At the time of the incident, the man was not at home, so the emergency unit did not have the opportunity to take note of his declaration. This time he is at home, so his declaration can be written down. (Aarschot CBP)

The second largest category in community beat patrol work is -unlike emergency patrol work-networking.

In general 21,4% of all incidents handled by community beat officers involves networking. In Aarschot the amount of networking incidents is significantly lower, only 9% of all cases are networking-related. Networking incidents consist of conversations with citizens in order to find out about possibly relevant information, to inform citizens about new developments in cases they are related to or just to improve the relationship with the public. It is widely acknowledged that good police/public relationships are vital for successful policing (Bowling, Foster, 2002). The lower proportion of networking in Aarschot confirms the internal evaluation of the functioning of the community beat patrol in Aarschot, as diagnosed in the zonal police plan, where it was concluded that community oriented working had not yet been implemented as it should.

“We stop by a shop to buy some cigarettes. The shopkeeper and the police officer seem to know each other and they have a small conversation. The officer asks him if something has happened that is or could be important for him to know. The shopkeeper doesn’t have anything in particular to mention, so we continue our road.” (Aarschot CBP)

“The officer stops by a shop to inform the shopkeeper about a case of stalking in which she was the victim. He gives her an update of the current state of the case, as he just found out that the offender has been convicted to a conditional prison sentence of five years. (...) The woman thanks the officer for keeping her informed. The officer asks her to call whenever it should happen again.” (Brussels CBP)

“We stop by a bar to find information about someone who’s supposed to be member of the sports club attached to the bar. He asks the owner of the bar if he’s acquainted with X. (...) The owner takes his list of members and confirms the man’s membership. The officer takes note of the information and says they will contact him. They finish by having some small talk on sports, after which we leave again.

As described earlier, community beat patrol work seems to involve more internal jobs (11.6%) than emergency patrol work (3.3%). These internal jobs consist mainly of administrative tasks. Community beat inspectors are (over)loaded with administration. (Van Nuffel, 2006, 49) Especially in Brussels and Aarschot community beat officers spend significantly more time on internal jobs than average. These internal jobs consist in large amounts of checking addresses and doing missions for the public prosecutor. As mentioned earlier, the lower level of administrative tasks in Dendermonde can be explained by a more thorough adaptation of community oriented policing. In Aarschot and Dendermonde on the other hand, the high administrative burden is an obstacle to the development of the philosophy of community oriented policing. Although most people agree that the administrative workload of community beat officers should be decreased, it is sometimes

claimed that these administrative missions can be used as an opportunity to get in touch with the public (Van Nuffel, 2007).

The community officer stops by an apartment. When the woman who's living in the apartment opens the door, he explains what the reason is for his visit: he wants to check if she is really living at this address and if there are any other tenants living over there. The woman tells him that she is living in the apartment together with her daughter. The officer asks her about her professional occupation and what price she is paying for this apartment. She explains that she doesn't have a job yet but that she is looking for one and informs him about the price she pays for renting the apartment. The officer takes note of this information, thanks her and continues his patrol. (Brussels CBP)

The leftover category “else” is beyond average (3,8%) in the community patrol work of Brussels (9,1%) and Dendermonde (8,6%). In Dendermonde this category includes a large proportion of engravings of bicycles (before we also noticed that traffic incidents in Dendermonde often involve bicycles, which could indicate an intensive use of bikes in Dendermonde⁷²). In Brussels this category includes a considerable amount of incidents involving the guiding of ushers.

Table 6.5: patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)

| | Traffic | | | | Law | | Order/ Assistance | | | | | Other | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|-------|---------------|-------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|-------|-------------|-----------|--------|
| | Coll. | Viol. | Check | Other | Serious crime | Other | Social problem | Quest. from public | Trouble -some youth | Public order | Other | Net-working | Int. job. | Else |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06 Bruss | *1,6 | 23,6 | ** 0,0 | 5,2 | 18,3 | 4,7 | 13,6 | **11,0 | 3,1 | 2,1 | 7,9 | 3,7 | 2,1 | 3,1 |
| 06 Dend | 3,7 | *16,5 | ** 2,8 | 7,3 | 12,8 | 7,3 | ** 22,9 | 1,8 | 1,8 | 3,7 | 5,5 | 3,7 | 7,3 | 2,8 |
| 06 Aars | 4,6 | 23,0 | 5,9 | 7,9 | 11,2 | 8,6 | 9,9 | 2,0 | 0,7 | 2,0 | 12,5 | 5,3 | 2,6 | 3,9 |
| Tot PSE | 6,1 | 21,9 | 10,1 | 3,4 | 15,5 | 5,4 | 8,6 | 3,8 | 1,2 | 5,3 | 7,6 | 4,9 | 3,3 | 2,8 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06 Bruss | 0,0 | ** 2,3 | *0,0 | 1,1 | 7,4 | 4,6 | 3,4 | 10,9 | 0,0 | 1,1 | 1,1 | 22,3 | ** 36,6 | ** 9,1 |
| 06 Dend | 0,0 | * 34,2 | ** 0,2 | * 7,2 | ** 2,7 | 0,6 | 2,2 | 11,9 | 0,6 | * 1,0 | 2,9 | 19,2 | 8,8 | ** 8,6 |
| 06 Aars | 1,3 | * 6,4 | 0,0 | 2,6 | ** 28,2 | 2,6 | 5,1 | 10,3 | 0,0 | 1,3 | 3,8 | * 9,0 | ** 28,2 | 1,3 |
| Tot PSE | 0,7 | 21,5 | 3,2 | 3,8 | 7,4 | 2,6 | 3,7 | 11,4 | 1,3 | 3,3 | 4,3 | 21,3 | 11,6 | 3,8 |

* p<0,01; ** p<0,001 (with respect to Total PSE).

The figures as presented in the above tables suggest different roles for emergency patrols and community patrols: where emergency patrols intervene more directly in different kinds of conflicts, community patrols act predominantly on a second level: they do the follow up of incidents in which the emergency units took the first steps and try to keep a close contact with the public.

Serious crimes

Some controversy seems to exist concerning the extent of crime-related work in police tasks, in part because it is so dependent of the definition of crime (Mawby, 2000; Lanier & Henry, 2004). In the following section we will look at the amount of what we consider to be more or less serious forms of crime⁷³.

⁷² Because of a lack of adequate national statistics we were not able to answer this question.

⁷³ Following incidents were labeled as serious crime: break-in at a house/ business/hotel room/school, car break-in, theft of a motor vehicle, theft of a moped or bicycle, picking up shop-lifter / shoplifting, robbery - person / pick pocketing, hold-up of a bank / post office / shop / business, narcotics, weapons and firearms, assault

Table 6.6: proportion of serious crimes

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 79 | 2,5 | 112 | 29,5 | 191 | 18,3 |
| Dendermonde | 41 | 4,9 | 68 | 17,6 | 109 | 12,8 |
| Aarschot | 70 | 8,6 | 82 | 19,5 | 152 | 14,5 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.074</i> | <i>8,0</i> | <i>1.015</i> | <i>24,6</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>16,1</i> |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 136 | 7,4 | 39 | 7,7 | 175 | 7,4 |
| Dendermonde | 343 | * 3,2 | 146 | * 1,4 | 489 | ** 2,7 |
| Aarschot | 61 | ** 36,1 | 17 | 0,0 | 78 | ** 28,2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.436</i> | <i>7,4</i> | <i>658</i> | <i>7,8</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>7,5</i> |

* $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

In general emergency patrol work (16,1%) involves more incidents with serious crime than community beat patrol work (7,5%).

The incidents the emergency patrols are involved in, are mainly crime facts that are reported by citizens (24,6%), whereas only 8% of these facts are found on the initiative of the police. In community patrol work the proportion of incidents on the initiative of citizens (7,8%) is not so different from the proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police (7,4%).

Emergency patrol work in the three Belgian cities does not show significant differences in serious crime with the general proportion. In general (only) 16.1% of all cases involve serious crime. A large amount of these incidents are theft-related⁷⁴.

There has been a burglary in an office. An employee reported this incident and is waiting for the police to come, as she is afraid the thieves are still inside the building. When arriving at the scene, another unit has already checked the building on the possible presence of burglars. The woman shows the damage to the officers and reports what has been stolen. The officers take note of all relevant information, check for traces the burglars might have left behind and eventually continue their patrol. (Brussels EP)

In community patrol work the average proportion of incidents that involve serious crime is 7,5%. As mentioned earlier in the text, the community beat patrols in Aarschot seem to deal with a bigger proportion of incidents that involve serious crime (28,2%). What is more, all of these incidents occurred on the initiative of the police. As explained in point 6.2, as soon as a criminal fact is being handled by the public prosecution, research missions are given to the police. These missions mainly consist of the hearing of suspects or victims. In Aarschot the police plan diagnoses a heavy burden of these missions in the tasks of the community beat

(bodily harm), vandalism / mischief / graffiti, fraudulent practices, swindle, fraud, sex offences, false name, questioning a suspect / victim / witness, interviewing a local resident after a crime.

⁷⁴ 60% of the incidents labelled as serious crime that were observed during emergency patrol work in the three Belgian cities involve some kind of theft.

patrol, which could explain the high proportion of serious crime in this city.⁷⁵ In Dendermonde the proportion of serious crime is significantly below average: only 2,7% of all incidents in community patrol work involves serious crime. This could be due to a higher level of security compared to the other Belgian cities.

The above figures indicate that the crime fighting image that is often still attached to police work is more of a myth than reality. Indeed, former observational research demonstrates that far less police time is spent on crime-related activity than in providing a service by, for instance, calming disturbances, negotiating disputes and responding to a wide range of accidents and emergencies (Bowling, Foster, 2002). However, it should be noted that police work seems to be very difficult to categorize in terms of crime, as many incidents that at first sight might not seem crime-related, in fact are ‘potential crime’ (Shapland, Vagg, 1990). Several incidents that involve giving assistance are indeed potential crime.

The officers receive a call about a young girl that has been pulled inside a car with force. Apparently a thirteen-year old girl was trying to get out of a car and ran into some bushes. The driver of the car followed her and pulled her back in. Witnesses were able to take note of the car’s driving licence and called the police. The officers search the neighbourhood and question a man passing by who apparently witnessed the incident as well. His version of the story is slightly different and less alarming than the call they received from the other witnesses. According to this man, it was a 17-year old girl and the incident didn’t look aggressive at all. The officers check the man in their computer system, but he doesn’t seem to be known in the system. (...) As this could be a case of kidnapping, the officers decide to notify the police office of the district where the witness is resident for further follow-up. (Dendermonde EP)

6.4 Police Mobilization

Table 6.7: proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police

| | Emergency Patrol | | | | | |
|------------------|-------------------------|-------|-------------|---------|---------------|--------|
| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
| Brussel | 58 | 89,7 | 133 | * 20,3 | 191 | * 41,4 |
| Dendermonde | 33 | 60,6 | 76 | 27,6 | 109 | * 37,6 |
| Aarschot | 63 | 71,4 | 89 | 28,1 | 152 | 46,1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 77,9 | 1.221 | 32,6 | 2.089 | 51,4 |
| | Community Beat Policing | | | | | |
| Brussel | 6 | 100,0 | 169 | ** 76,9 | 175 | 77,7 |
| Dendermonde | 203 | 97,0 | 286 | 51,0 | 489 | 70,1 |
| Aarschot | 8 | 75,0 | 70 | ** 78,6 | 78 | 78,2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | 92,8 | 1.483 | 58,6 | 2.094 | 68,6 |

* $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

In general the proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police is bigger in community patrol work (68,6%) than in emergency patrol work (51,4%). The same pattern can be observed in the three Belgian cities.

⁷⁵ As hearings of suspect / witnesses were labeled as ‘serious crime’

These differences were to be expected when considering the goal of emergency patrol work, which is: answering any call necessitating a police intervention within a reasonable term (MO, PLP 10). As emergency patrol work is highly dependent of calls from citizens, it is often being compared to the activities of a fire-brigade (Vandevoorde ea, 2003). Community patrol work on the other hand is described as ‘a visible and easily approachable police service that is highly oriented to the needs and expectations of its surroundings’ (KB September 17, 2001). Community patrols thus have a significantly higher level of freedom, enabling a more proactive approach. Indirect calls from citizens do not distract their activities as they are not connected to dispatching during patrol work.

Emergency patrol work characterizes itself by a strong proactive approach in the domain of traffic: in general about 80% is handled on the initiative of the police (77,9% total PSE). These proportions are similar in the three Belgian cities, with Brussels ranking highest with 89,7% of all traffic incidents being on the initiative of the police.

“The officers notice a car driving from the wrong direction into a one-way street. They stop the car and confront the driver with the violation she has just made. The woman apologizes, says her GPS had sent her that way and that she wasn’t really paying attention to the traffic signs. The officers ask her identity card, driver licence and insurance papers, check them, tell the lady which way to go and continue their track.” (Brussels EP)

Non-traffic incidents are handled much less on the initiative of the police (in general in 32,6% of all cases). This proportion is smaller in Brussels: only 20,3%. Taking all incidents into consideration, about half of them are handled on the initiative of the police. This proportion is smaller in Brussels (41,4%) and Dendermonde (37,6%). In Brussels this is due to a less proactive approach in non-traffic incidents, in Dendermonde the proportion of incidents on behalf of the police is smaller in both fields.

Community patrol work is handled mainly on the initiative of the police: 77,7% of all incidents in Brussels, 70,1% in Dendermonde and 78,2% in Aarschot. The percentages are not significantly different than the general proportion. In Brussels and Aarschot we can establish a higher proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police in the non-traffic domain. Often these cases involve the treatment of missions given by the public prosecutor.

“The police officer has received a mission of the public prosecutor about the non-payment of a traffic fine. The officer now has to go to the offender in order to hand him over a transfer form to pay the penalty. If he doesn’t pay within the coming two weeks, the case will go to the court. The man, who is a truck driver, knows what the situation is all about and says he will give the fine as soon as possible to his boss, as he will take care of the payment. A limited declaration is being written down.” (Aarschot CBP)

6.5 Knowledge of the People in the Neighbourhood

Table 6.8: proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance: EP

| | Traffic | | Social problems | | Other | | All incidents | |
|-------------------------|---------|---|-----------------|---|-------|---|---------------|---|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| <i>Emergency patrol</i> | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-----|------|-----|--------|-------|---------|-------|---------|
| Brussel | 58 | 0,0 | 30 | **13,3 | 103 | 13,6 | 191 | 9,4 |
| Dendermonde | 33 | 6,1 | 26 | 38,5 | 50 | 26,0 | 109 | * 22,9 |
| Aarschot | 63 | 4,8 | 18 | 22,2 | 71 | 8,5 | 152 | 8,6 |
| Total PSE | 868 | 2,8 | 294 | 35,7 | 927 | 14,5 | 2.089 | 12,6 |
| <i>community beat patrol</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Brussel | 6 | 50,0 | 8 | 75,0 | 161 | ** 63,4 | 175 | ** 63,4 |
| Dendermonde | 203 | 3,9 | 17 | 47,1 | 269 | 42,4 | 489 | 26,6 |
| Aarschot | 8 | 12,5 | 4 | ** 0,0 | 66 | ** 13,6 | 78 | ** 12,8 |
| Total PSE | 611 | 7,5 | 168 | 57,7 | 1.315 | 38,3 | 2.094 | 30,9 |

* p<0,01; ** p<0,001 (with respect to Total PSE).

In general, in emergency patrol work about 10% of all incidents involves meeting an acquaintance. In Dendermonde this proportion is significantly bigger: 22,9%. Within every subdomain (traffic, social problems, other) police officers meet more acquaintances.

Community beat patrol work involves a lot more incidents with acquaintances: about 30% in general (30,9% total PSE), yet these percentages are a lot higher in Brussels (63,4%) and a lot lower in Aarschot (12,8%)⁷⁶.

The Brussels Marollen district is well-known for its ‘typical’ habitants who are nearly the only ones still left to speak the old Brussels dialect (a mixture of French and Flemish). Within this relatively poor population there is very little mobility. They are born in this area and it’s very likely that they will die there, resulting in a close connection between the people residing there. The older police men working in the Marollen know almost every one in their precinct. In Aarschot the connection with the public is much lower. As mentioned earlier, there seems to be a lack of engagement towards the public in Aarschot. The police zone is well aware of this problem and is trying to find solutions. In its new police plan 2009-2012 measures to ameliorate this situation are presented.

“A man whom the officer is acquainted with stops us while walking in the street. The officer has already met him several times due to problems related to his ex-wife. This time his motive is again his ex-wife. The man wants to make an appointment with the officer to talk about his problems. The officer asks him to meet him the next day in the police office, where he will see what can be done about his problem.” (Brussels CBP)

“The officer is being stopped by a woman he knows from the neighbourhood. She expresses her concern about a co-tenant of her apartment. Apparently this person has suddenly started to ask her for money (...). The woman is worried about the mental state of this person. The officer promises he will pass by the coming day to check out the situation. The woman thanks him and we continue our road” (Brussels CBP)

In Dendermonde we can see a slightly different pattern: whereas emergency patrols meet more acquaintances than in general, we can not conclude the same for the community patrols. Consequently, in Dendermonde there is no real difference in the level of meeting acquaintances between emergency patrols and community patrols. We can hypothesize that -

⁷⁶ We already noted earlier in the text that in Aarschot the proportion of networking is significantly less than the overall proportion of networking.

conform with our earlier observations - emergency patrol work in Dendermonde deals with a lot of social problems, thus meeting more people they are already acquainted with.

“We receive a call from a couple having problems. It’s not the first time the officers have to intervene in a conflict between these two people. The woman is addicted to heroin, the man has a drinking problem and is known to be aggressive towards his girlfriend. A few months ago the man was arrested for an attempt of murder on his girlfriend’s daughter. Now they are again in the middle of a fight. (...) The officers try to negotiate and calm them down. When the situation seems to be under control, they continue their patrol.” (Dendermonde EP)

6.6 Marginal persons

Table 6.9: proportions of incidents with marginal persons⁷⁷

| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
|------------------|------------------|--|-------------|--|---------------|--------|
| | <i>PSE – EP</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 58 | | 133 | | 191 | 2,1 |
| Dendermonde | 33 | | 76 | | 109 | 0,9 |
| Aarschot | 63 | | 89 | | 152 | 2,0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | | 1.221 | | 2.089 | 5,8 |
| | <i>PSE – CBP</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 6 | | 169 | | 175 | 1,1 |
| Dendermonde | 203 | | 286 | | 489 | ** 1,2 |
| Aarschot | 8 | | 70 | | 78 | 0,0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | | 1.483 | | 2.094 | 4,3 |

* p<0,01; ** p<0,001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Overall the proportion of incidents that involve marginal persons is very low: about 5% for both emergency patrol work as community patrol work (5,8% total PSE in EP; 4,3% total PSE in CP).

In Brussels the marginal persons are all homeless people. As we mentioned before, one of the main problems in this area are homeless people. Aarschot has problems with homeless people and alcoholics.

“Dispatching asks the patrol team to remove an unwanted person from a self-banking office. Arriving at the scene they establish that it’s a homeless person sleeping on the floor. The officers wake him up and ask him to go somewhere else. As the man is not able to show them his identity card, they just write down his name and date of birth. The man leaves the building and the officers continue their road.” (Brussels EP)

6.7 The Outcome of Incidents

Table 6.10a: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents

⁷⁷ In this research defined as: addicted person, mentally ill person, suicidal person, beggar, homeless person

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 191 | 22,5 | ** 3,1 | 3,1 | 28,8 |
| Dendermonde | 109 | 15,6 | ** 2,8 | 4,6 | * 22,9 |
| Aarschot | 152 | 17,8 | 4,6 | 3,3 | *25,7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>20,1</i> | <i>10,4</i> | <i>5,0</i> | <i>35,4</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 175 | ** 4,0 | *0,0 | 0,6 | ** 4,6 |
| Dendermonde | 489 | ** 35,4 | ** 0,0 | 0,2 | ** 35,6 |
| Aarschot | 78 | * 7,7 | 0,0 | 0,0 | ** 7,7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>20,0</i> | <i>3,1</i> | <i>1,3</i> | <i>24,4</i> |

* p<0,01; ** p<0,001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Emergency patrols seem to use more repressive measures than community patrols: in general emergency patrols use repressive measures in 35,4% of all cases, opposed to 24,4% used by community beat patrols. The difference manifests itself mostly in the use of summons and arrests. Warnings are used the most frequently, both by emergency patrol units as by community patrol units.

In a recent study (Easton, M., P. Ponsaers, et al., 2008) a particular culture was observed within the community beat patrol services. Almost every officer involved in this study was convinced that attempts to improve the relationship with the public (as prescribed by community oriented policing guidelines) were incompatible with a repressive attitude. To their opinion, repressive reactions jeopardize good relations with the public and undermine their status as accessible and friendly police officers.

The following incident was reported as atypical by our observer:

“The community patrol officer stops a car that is leaving its parking spot without a number plate. The driver of the car explains that he had to get a number plate after having a car accident. The officer checks the car’s documents and the driver’s identity card and dismisses the man.”

The incident was reported as atypical as community patrol officers usually do not intervene in situations as such. This approach is considered as too repressive, which could violate the level of trust citizens have in their community officer. In this particular case, the officer’s former function as an emergency patrol officer could explain his apparently different approach.

In general repressive measures are taken in 35,4% of all cases handled by emergency patrol units. In Dendermonde (22,9%) and Aarschot (25,7%) the emergency patrols are less repressive. More specific: about 20% of all incidents (20,1% of total PSE) are handled by giving a warning. However, not all incidents require a repressive approach. As not all incidents involve committing an offence, the level in which summoning can be considered, is of course limited to those incidents that involve violating the law. However, although police officers are legally obliged to report any crime they get acquainted with, it is a well known fact that police officers use a certain level of free space in their decision making (Reiner, 2002). An important reason not to react repressive is that they consider legal actions to be

inopportune in some cases (Eliaerts, Enhus, 1992). Police officers are sometimes used as a back-up solution in case an intermediary solution can not be achieved.

“A woman has been caught trying to steel several goods from a shop. Apparently she’s a resident of an institute for disabled and socially deprived people. The shopkeeper notes that the woman has been trying to shoplift before, however she wishes not take legal actions because of the woman’s mental state. The police officers explain her that they have to file a report, as they are obliged to take note of any criminal fact they know about except when it’s an offence that needs to be initiated by an official complaint. (...) They discuss for a few moments, where upon the shopkeeper adds important information about the incident: apparently the lady had been caught before leaving the shop, so she had not really committed a crime yet. They decide to settle the matter amicably, and all parties that are involved are satisfied about the way the case was handled.”(Aarschot EP)

“The officers are sent to a shop where a thief has been caught in the act: the man was trying to steal two ipods. Present are two officers who were accidentally passing by, two shop detectives and a guard. The shop keepers and the offender come to a compromise to avoid legal actions. In a way the presence of the officers was not needed in this case, however, it was due to their presence that the offender agreed to pay for the stolen goods.” (Brussels EP)

A second important motive not to work repressive is the expected reaction of the public prosecutor. Because of their high work-load, many so-called ‘minor’ criminal facts are dismissed. Police officers know from experience which cases will be prosecuted and which not and adapt their conduct to this knowledge. The following case serves as an example of what we mean by the above.

“We are informed about an accident on the public road: a lady fell due to road works that were not properly indicated. When the ambulance arrives at the scene, nurses give the lady first aid and take her to the hospital. The officers write down all necessary information, yet they decide not to write an official report. Their argument not to do so is the fact that they consider it as useless and waste of time because these types of reports are generally dismissed by the public prosecutors.”

In emergency patrol work generally 10.4% of all incidents are handled by writing a summon. In Belgium this seems to be a lot less: the proportions of summons in Brussels (3.1%) and Dendermonde (2.8%) are significantly less. In table 6.10b we can see that especially in traffic-related incidents the percentages of incidents handled by summons are considerably lower than in general.

Table 6.10b: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|-----|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>emergency patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 58 | ** 63,8 | * 5,2 | 0,0 | 69,0 |
| Dendermonde | 33 | 42,4 | 6,1 | 3,0 | 51,5 |
| Aarschot | 63 | 27,0 | * 7,9 | 4,8 | * 39,7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 35,7 | 21,4 | 1,2 | 58,3 |
| <i>community beat patrol</i> | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|------------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Brussel | 6 | 33,3 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 33,3 |
| Dendermonde | 203 | ** 82,3 | ** 0,0 | 0,0 | ** 82,3 |
| Aarschot | 8 | 37,5 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 37,5 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>59,9</i> | <i>8,2</i> | <i>0,0</i> | <i>68,1</i> |

* $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

In Aarschot and Brussels private firms are responsible for the control and collection of parking fees. This influences largely the tasks of emergency and community beat patrol. In Brussels the emergency patrol nearly exclusively give warnings, in Dendermonde this task is performed by the community beat patrol. We have already provided an explanation for the high proportion of warnings in Dendermonde earlier in the text (see 6.2)

“While patrolling one of the officers notices a car that is parked on the pavement. The officer is very upset about this incident because the person involved had already committed the same offence before on the exact same place. The officer decided then to let him go with a warning, but he told him he would get a fine if it ever happened again. The officer reprimands the man severely and asks him to show him his ID, driver licence and car documents. He writes a summon and gives the man a 100 € fine. Back on patrol the officers complain about the lack of respect some citizens seem to have towards the police.” (Aarschot EP)

The discretion of the police men is also influenced by the expectations of the citizens involved. In certain cases citizens are co-producers of the outcome of a problem. Their impact is greater in order maintenance problems than in problems with clear law breaking conduct.

“We are informed about a problem of aggression between a couple. Arriving at the scene, the woman is waiting for us at the entrance. She has several bruises and her teeth have been punched out by her partner. The police officers confront the two, but as they still seem to be relatively aggressive, they take the woman to the police office to take note of her declaration. The woman doesn’t want to file a complaint, but as this is not a criminal offence that needs to be initiated by an official complaint, the officers are legally obliged to file a report.”

In table 6.10c we can see that in general the level of repressive action is a lot lower in the non-traffic sphere than in the traffic sphere: in 19,2% of all incidents handled by emergency patrols repressive measures have been taken. In Brussels and Dendermonde these percentages are lower: 11,3% (Brussels) and 10,5% (Dendermonde). These differences are not statistically significant. In community beat patrol work 6.3% of all incidents are handled with a repressive measure. In Dendermonde this is only 2.4%.

We already mentioned earlier that warnings are used the most frequently, by emergency units as well as by community patrol units. In general, warnings are given in 20% of all incidents handled by community beat officers. In Brussels and Aarschot however, this is a lot less: 4% in Brussels and 7,7% in Aarschot. In Dendermonde on the other hand, we establish a much higher percentage of warnings (35,4%). In table 6.10b we can see that this higher percentage is mainly due to warnings given in the sphere of traffic. Earlier in the text we established a higher level of traffic incidents in the community patrol work in Dendermonde⁷⁸. These incidents mainly consisted of minor offences such as riding one’s bike on the pavement, driving in one-way streets, etc...

⁷⁸ See traffic projects in this city. The high proportion of warnings is due to the traffic project that first started by giving warnings.

No summons were written during the community patrol work observed in the three Belgian cities, whereas in general 3,1% of all CBP incidents are handled as such. As noted earlier, community patrols seem to have a less repressive approach than emergency patrols, However, this is not the only explanation for these low figures. We already noticed earlier in the text that community beat patrols have a relatively low proportion of incidents that involve crime in a first line approach. Often it is first the emergency police that acts, the follow-up is being taking care of by the community patrols.

Table 6.10c: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|
| <i>emergency patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 133 | 4,5 | 2,3 | 4,5 | 11,3 |
| Dendermonde | 76 | 3,9 | 1,3 | 5,3 | 10,5 |
| Aarschot | 89 | 11,2 | 2,2 | 2,2 | 15,7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>8,9</i> | <i>2,5</i> | <i>7,7</i> | <i>19,2</i> |
| <i>community beat patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 169 | 3,0 | 0,0 | 0,6 | 3,6 |
| Dendermonde | 286 | 2,1 | 0,0 | 0,3 | * 2,4 |
| Aarschot | 70 | 4,3 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 4,3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>3,5</i> | <i>1,0</i> | <i>1,8</i> | <i>6,3</i> |

* $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

6.8 Use of Information Sources

Table 6.11a: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – all incidents

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Brussel | 191 | 25,7 | 0,0 | 0,5 | ** 3,1 | ** 27,2 |
| Dendermonde | 109 | ** 7,3 | 1,8 | 0,0 | * 10,1 | ** 16,5 |
| Aarschot | 152 | 29,6 | 0,0 | 0,7 | * 11,8 | 38,2 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>28,8</i> | <i>0,7</i> | <i>2,7</i> | <i>22,6</i> | <i>39,9</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Brussel | 175 | 14,9 | 0,0 | 1,7 | * 0,6 | 17,1 |
| Dendermonde | 489 | * 9,4 | 0,0 | ** 0,0 | ** 0,2 | ** 9,4 |
| Aarschot | 78 | ** 26,9 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 26,9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>14,0</i> | <i>0,4</i> | <i>3,4</i> | <i>6,0</i> | <i>18,9</i> |

* $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

In general, emergency patrols seem to use more specific information sources than community beat officers: information sources are used in 39,9% of all cases handled by emergency

patrols, whereas this is only 18,9% of all cases handled by community beat patrols. In Brussels and Dendermonde the percentages for the emergency patrols are significantly lower. Compared to the general proportions the Belgian police seems to use less police information sources. Especially the percentages of the digital police sources are significantly lower, both for emergency patrol work as for community patrol work (emergency patrols: 3,1% in Brussels, 10,1% in Dendermonde, 11,8% in Aarschot, compared to 22,6% in general). In Dendermonde there is also considerably less usage of (manual) information sources from citizens (7,3%, whereas it is 28,8% in general). Manual sources from citizens often refer to their identity cards.

As we can see in table 6.11b the use of information sources in the sphere of traffic is generally higher than the average values described above, both in emergency patrol work as in community patrol work: 57,1% in emergency work and 25,5% in community patrol work.

Again the proportions for police sources are significantly lower in the three Belgian cities. And again it is especially the use of digital police sources that is severely below average: whereas in general emergency patrols use digital police sources in 32,1% of all cases, these proportions are less than half in Belgium (12,7% in Aarschot, 6,1% in Dendermonde and 0% in Brussels). In community patrols digital police sources are used in 11,8% of all cases, whereas no digital police sources were used in the three Belgian cities.

Tabel 6.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| | <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 58 | ** 6,9 | 0,0 | 0,0 | ** 0,0 | ** 6,9 |
| Dendermonde | 33 | ** 15,2 | 0,0 | 0,0 | ** 6,1 | ** 18,2 |
| Aarschot | 63 | 38,1 | 0,0 | 1,6 | ** 12,7 | 46,0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | <i>46,9</i> | <i>0,2</i> | <i>3,6</i> | <i>32,1</i> | <i>57,1</i> |
| | <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 6 | 16,7 | 0,0 | 0,0 | ** 0,0 | 16,7 |
| Dendermonde | 203 | ** 1,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | ** 0,0 | ** 1,0 |
| Aarschot | 8 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | ** 0,0 | ** 0,0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | <i>23,0</i> | <i>0,0</i> | <i>2,1</i> | <i>11,8</i> | <i>25,5</i> |

* $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

When considering cases that are not traffic-related, the observed Belgian proportions do not differ so much from the general proportions. Only in emergency patrol work in Brussels and community patrol work in Dendermonde there is significantly less use of digital police sources.

Table 6.11c: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--|---|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |

| | <i>PSE – EP</i> | | | | | |
|------------------|------------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Brussel | 133 | ** 33,8 | 0,0 | 0,8 | ** 4,5 | 36,1 |
| Dendermonde | 76 | * 3,9 | 2,6 | 0,0 | 11,8 | 15,8 |
| Aarschot | 89 | 23,6 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 11,2 | 32,6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>15,9</i> | <i>1,0</i> | <i>2,1</i> | <i>15,9</i> | <i>27,7</i> |
| | <i>PSE – CBP</i> | | | | | |
| Brussel | 169 | 14,8 | 0,0 | 1,8 | 0,6 | 17,2 |
| Dendermonde | 286 | 15,4 | 0,0 | ** 0,0 | * 0,3 | 15,4 |
| Aarschot | 70 | ** 30,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | * 30,0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>10,3</i> | <i>0,5</i> | <i>3,9</i> | <i>3,6</i> | <i>16,2</i> |

* $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

In theory the Belgian emergency patrol units have easy access to digital police sources. Their cars suppose to be connected by radio with the central dispatching and should have a built-in terminal to consult information. In practice however these plans -to be developed by the 'Astrid' project- are not yet fully implemented.

The community beat patrol officers have only a radio or/and gsm at their disposal while walking their beat. Depending of the time the officers have spent in their beat, the oldest have gathered a considerable knowledge of the people residing there. The beat officers in the study of Easton, Ponsaers (2008) distrusted the police sources and preferred to work with information they could gather in their beat. Only in case of the verification of cars they contacted the central dispatching to get information.

6.9 What Determines What is Involved in Police Patrol Work

When comparing the sorts of incidents emergency patrol work is involved in, we found very limited variation in the sort of incidents they deal with: their most important activity is traffic. The second most important activity was for Brussels 'Twist / quarrel / argument, problems between people' and in Dendermonde it was dealing with 'Relationship problems'. In Aarschot the second was 'Standing Guard' / looking at suspicious situations'. The traffic interventions are predominantly proactive and the interventions concerning conflicts are reactive police work. These findings confirm former insights mentioned in chapter 1: proactive emergency work consists mainly of traffic incidents (routine controls, stops ...) As former Belgian research demonstrates (Eliaerts, Enhus, 1992), emergency patrols fill the gaps between interventions with proactive activities related to traffic. These interventions usually have a short duration and can be stopped whenever an emergency call comes in.

The second most important activity in both Brussels and Dendermonde is dealing with social conflicts (in relationships or with others). In both settings the proportion of inhabitants with low income and multiple problems is higher than in Aarschot. Based on the field reports we get the impression that these groups can be classified as police property groups (Reiner, 2000). These specific groups are well-known police clients. Because of the accumulation of problems and their lower education level they lack alternatives for solving their problems. As they are incapable to solve their own problems, they use the police monopoly of violence to calm down conflicts, obtaining as such a temporary solution to their problems (Eliaerts, Enhus, 1992).

The emergency cases consist predominantly of reactive police work, which means that the expectations the public has towards the police, play a major role in the sorts of problems they ask the police to intervene in. The problems they ask police interventions for have a relatively low degree of seriousness and show comparable patterns in the three observed cities. Due to this important role of the public, except for the local urbanisation, little influence can be seen from the other variables in the model.

In community beat patrol activities the observed differences between the three cities were more striking. This type of police activity seems to be influenced by local urbanisation, by national legislation (the historical role of the beat officers in treating the missions of the public prosecutor and his politics of dismissing cases), the culture (the central implementation of community policing in Belgium), the way community policing is translated throughout the local police force (management), the wanted outcome and the basic strategy (the overall police culture, the culture of the community beat patrol, the willingness to implement community policing).

These factors influence the sort of police work but strangely enough not so much the outcome of the incidents. We will discuss them in order of importance.

More than in the case of the emergency patrols, local urbanisation is influencing the work of community beat officers. The socio-demographic features of the population in a beat play a major role in their tasks.

In Brussels the high density and the accumulation of problems of people with lower income seem to create or stimulate a style of beat officer acting as a father, as an educator, as a liaison between the people of the beat and between the world outside. People rarely get summons: they get warnings, are coached, praised when reacting appropriately, helped when things are unclear or getting out of control, get a listening ear when problems outgrow them... The outcome is rarely repressive: nearly every intervention ends in doing administrative paperwork or giving a warning. This way of treating problems of the inhabitants matches the more traditional view on the tasks of the community beat patrol. In this force the community beat officers have a huge amount of administrative tasks which they combine with networking and small talks with the people.

In Dendermonde the community beat officers acted more as the mediators in their beat. A response was given to everything that was out of line. They tried to keep peace in their beat by listening to small resentments of the inhabitants and working on solutions in cooperation with them. Although Dendermonde is the safest city of the three, lots of conflicts between the citizens subsist. This situation seems to emanate a mediating style that is considered not to be compatible with a repressive attitude.

In Aarschot we found community beat officers that have a low work load and that spend little time on the streets. From the field notes we got the impression that they used a much more instrumentalist view on their tasks.

It must be clear that the impressions we gave on the styles of community beat working are much too global to do justice to great diversity in reactions and interventions that can be found in the work of community beat officers. It was not really the focus of this research, but when we look at the results on the way beat officers handle cases, it coincides with the styles found in recent research by Terpstra (2008). He found two important dimensions in the work

style of beat officers: the amount of attention for repression and order maintenance and the orientation towards the citizens. When combining both dimensions four work styles appear:

| | Communicative orientation | Instrumental orientation |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Relatively low level of attention for maintaining order and repression | (1) a nearby, communicative oriented beat officer with a relatively low level of attention for maintaining order and repression | (3) a beat officer oriented on prevention while focusing on the cooperation with external partners |
| Relatively high level of attention given to maintaining order and repression | (2) in many aspects close to the people of the beat but also correcting 'his people' | (4) the community beat officer as distant maintainer |

(Terpstra, 2008, 329)

Some elements in the research results could be interpreted as expressions of one of these 4 styles. The Brussels community beat officers seem to work as in style 1, Dendermonde in style 2 and Aarschot in style 3. If this interpretation is correct and compared with the context in which they work, this would lead to the conclusion that local urbanization influences highly the role the community beat officer choose to play in their beat. Although the community beat officers have more freedom in their activities than emergency patrol officers, the context of their daily work structures their choices.

In explaining the difference between the community beat patrol units, the transformation of the police structure and the national orientation towards community policing enabled the establishment of new working styles. However, although this model should be adopted by every zone, it needs to get a translation throughout the police force by the management (creating the conditions and the culture) and translated in daily practice. In Aarschot the management was not able to change the conditions (due to a lack of personnel) to create a new way of working as aimed in the ministerial circular. In Brussels efforts were made to enlarge the amount of beat officers, but the management didn't reallocate the more administrative tasks to other services in the force. The beat officers still work in the traditional way. Only Dendermonde seems to have succeeded in translating COP-principles into practice.

Although in this research evidence can be found that emergency patrol and community beat patrol function like communication vessels, a transfer of tasks from police work formerly done by the community beat patrol to the emergency patrol can only occur in the case of non-urgent activities. For the emergency patrol they are only performed in-between dealing with emergency calls. In forces with a high frequency of such calls, changes in tasks of the community beat patrol only have a limited effect on the emergency patrol. This means that managerial changes in the tasks of both patrol forms have little effect on the tasks of the emergency patrol.

Differences between the emergency patrol and the community beat patrol can be found in their activities and in their treatment of the cases. Due to the culture of the community beat patrol they rarely respond in a repressive way. The emergency patrol on the other hand acts much more repressive.

We found that on the European level, emergency patrol work handles 10.4% of all incidents by writing a summon. In Belgium this is a lot less: the proportions of summons in Brussels (3.1%) and Dendermonde (2.8%) are significantly less. The functioning of the Belgian penal system could be an important explanatory factor for the choices police officers make when handling cases. A former study in which cases treated by the police were traced on the level of the public prosecutor and the criminal courts, demonstrates that only 4% of all cases found their way to the courts (Van den Herreweghe, Vandevoorde, et.al, 2006) The amount of cases that were dismissed at the level of the public prosecutor elevates for some types of crime up to 75%. Especially problems of social order, criminal facts without known offenders and crime with seriousness are dismissed due to the heavy work-load of public prosecution. The research revealed that police officers anticipate to the expected treatment by the penal system. Although there is no standardised feedback mechanism between the public prosecutor and police, the individual police officers seem to have a clear view on the opinions and priorities of public prosecution (Vandevoorde, Vaerewijck, et.al, 2003). Because they anticipate the dismissal of a series of facts police officers are not motivated to do all the administrative work needed to get a case to the public prosecutor. This could possibly explain the low level of summons found in Belgium.

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CHAPTER 7

7. Policing the Streets in Norway

Helene Oppen Gundhus, Siv Runhovde, Karianne Rønning

7.1 The Norwegian Police

In this chapter we compare police patrolling in two Norwegian cities, one urban and one more rural, with each other and with the observations from other European cities. Before we start to explore similarities and differences in the fieldwork at the local police stations, we will shortly introduce the Norwegian police organization, the national police management and policy, and the national computer databases that are available to the Norwegian police.


The national police organization

The Norwegian police and prosecuting authority is organized in a two-track system. This means that the responsibility for providing the necessary police services is shared between the Ministry of Justice and the Director General of Public Prosecutions⁷⁹. The Law of police describes the duties and responsibilities of the Norwegian police. In short, the law states that the police are to maintain public order and secure the safety of person, property and common goods and defend against all that threatens the general safety in society. The police have the responsibility to prevent, uncover and fight crime and provide help and assistance to citizens in dangerous situations, legal incidents or whenever the circumstances demand it.

The National Police Directorate was established in 2001 and is organized under the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police acts, under the Minister of Justice's constitutional responsibility. The police reform 2000 was based on The Parliamentary White Paper no. 22 which called for the most comprehensive police reform in Norway in the last 100 years. In 2002, the number of police districts was reduced from 54 to 27 (St.meld. nr. 22 (2000-2001)). This figure shows the organization chart of the police structure on a national level:

Figure 1: Organization structure of the Norwegian

⁷⁹ The Director General of Public Prosecutions has been assigned responsibility for the professional handling of criminal prosecutions. All other areas are the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, although this responsibility has largely been delegated to the National Police Directorate. The principle is that the prosecuting authority shall make its own independent decisions. No other professional authority, not even the Minister of Justice, has the opportunity to instruct the prosecuting authority. Only The King in Council can instruct the prosecuting authority when it comes to making decisions in criminal prosecution cases.



Police.

Figure comment. In 2008, the national police service consists of the Police Directorate, managed by the National Police Commissioner, the Police Security Service, 27 Police districts, rural police districts and local police stations. In addition there are seven special services; National Criminal Investigation Service, National Police Immigration Service, National Police Computing and Material Service, Norwegian Police University College, National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime, Central Mobile Police Service and Border Commissioner – Norwegian/Russian border Governor of Svalbard.

At the national level there are no further planned reorganizations like ‘Reform 2000’. An important structural change worth mentioning is the Police Directorate’s “National strategy for intelligence and analysis” suggesting that intelligence- and analysis units should be established in all of the 27 police districts and in the special units mentioned above (Politidirektoratet 2007). This structural change is meant to impose a better basis for the national police policy called knowledge-led policing.

National police management

The main objective of The National Police Directorate is the professional leadership, management and development of the Norwegian police service, with a basis in the strategic and budgetary limitations laid down by the government (Politidirektoratet 2008). The National Police Directorate is responsible for managing and following up the police districts and the special police agencies, which employ a total of roughly 12,000 people, including both civilians and police educated personnel. On a national level there is approximately 1.8 police officers pr every 1000 inhabitant. The National Police Directorate has a staff of approximately 120 employees. Their main tasks in respect of the police districts and the special police agencies are strategic co-ordination, agency management, personnel and organizational development, support and supervisory duties, administrative duties, contingency planning and the handling of complaints.

The organization of the Norwegian Police is largely based on the principle of an integrated police, meaning that all the functions of the police are collected in one organization. This national police are divided into smaller police districts. The 27 local police districts, are each under the command of a Chief of Police. The Chief of Police has full responsibility for all kinds of policing in the district. Each police district has its own headquarter, as well as several police stations and so called offices for ‘lensmenn’ in rural districts. The districts are divided into rural police districts, under the command of a Police Chief Superintendent.

All police officers are trained as generalists at the Norwegian Police University College, and there is only one Police University College in Norway. The police students are educated to bachelor level in a three year program, and should be able to fulfill every aspect of ordinary police work, including criminal investigation as well as public order and community policing. Within each police district, special contingency units have been established. Their primary task is to provide reinforcements and assistance within the police district in connection with the solving of difficult assignments and in instances where firearms are involved.

National police policy

The National Police Directorate argues in the recent strategy plan that four factors are central in future public policing in Norway (Politidirektoratet 2007). The police have to be knowledge-led, increase the police availability and interaction with the citizens, expand the police focus on co-operation with private, public sector and non-governmental organizations, and increase international co-operation. This system of governance from a distance places police and a range of actors in a co-operative organization where the mutual responsibilities differ and depend on local variation. The objective is to act preemptively and proactively before crime occurs.

The idea that the police should have close ties to citizens and local communities as such has long traditions in the Norwegian police. In 1978-79, community policing was introduced by a number of experiments with local policing, decentralisation, foot patrol and establishing closer ties to local communities (Lorentzen 1980). In 1981 the Police role committee defined the police role in society by using ten principles describing good policing in Norway – for example that the police should be decentralized, in close interaction with citizens, reflect the society's ideals and have a civil trait. Overall, these principles have been understood as key principles describing community policing. According to White Paper 42 (St. meld. 42 (2004-2005)), these ten principles are still valid and guiding the contemporary police role as well.

Since the National Police Directorate was established in 2001, one important task has been to make national police policies. In 2008 there are three policy documents that are guiding the police patrol work.

The *first* policy document is the action plan for preventive policing (Politidirektoratet 2002), which is still valid. The plan's main focus is on problem-oriented policing (POP). POP employs a process model called SARA which is a practical guide for better allocation of resources by applying an analytical approach for dealing with crime. SARA is an acronym which refers to the four stages in POP⁸⁰; scanning, analysis, response and assessment. By introducing analytical responses to a crime problem, the objective is to ensure that problems are effectively identified and tackled in such a way that even future crime is prevented. Implementing the SARA-model has significance for aims concerning how patrolling is executed. For example, patrolling can be used as an instrument for collecting information to the scanning-process, or it can be used to perform responses. The philosophy behind patrolling changes; it becomes an instrument for doing POP. The analytical approach to police work is intended to change traditional police patrol by intervening on the basis of knowing what causes crime. POP is then a strategy to manage potential crime more effectively by

⁸⁰ The first step is to identify and scan hotspots; the second is to analyze spatial patterns of crime and criminal behavior and to make hypotheses about problems. Third, it is used to find new ways of intervening earlier and more fitting the problem to make it less likely to occur in the future. The fourth step is to assess the impact of the interventions (Clarke and Eck 2003).

governing the police officers tasks more in detail and target the police organization directly through the POP-process. For example, the patrols would to a lesser degree decide what to do themselves, but follow a plan described in the POP-manual.

The *second* guiding document focus on how to communicate the knowledge of crime to the community, and make crime the responsibility for more agencies through partnerships (Politidirektoratet 2005). This trend towards specifying relations with special authorities in the local community and not with the citizens in general, is due to the trend towards dispersal and plurality of safety and security providers, and strengthens ties to specific partners in policing. Plurality here refers to the emergence of local and municipal policy bodies, enlisted by the local community in the tasks of social control. This distribution of responsibility involves a way of thinking by which the government actively enlists participation by non-state actors and agencies and thus shares the burden of policing. The objective is to improve the communication and partnerships between local municipalities and the police, and to achieve central community policing objectives; for example establishing closer ties to the citizens and prevent crime through partnerships with communities (Balvig og Holmberg 2004, Holmberg 2004).

The partnership idea in the policy document is based on the recognition that the police are dependent on other agencies to prevent crime and achieve community safety. One important collaboration partner for the police is the Norwegian National Crime Prevention Council's (KRÅD), which is an agency under the Ministry of Justice. The councils' main task is to encourage local municipalities to follow a model for coordination of local crime preventive enterprises (or SLT which is the abbreviation in Norwegian).⁸¹ This model came to use in Norway in the early 1990's after a Danish model called SSP. At present, approximately 170 of 430⁸² Norwegian municipalities are working by this model. The police are intended to have an important role in this partnership. The key factor is to coordinate all co-operations in the municipality in the crime prevention field.⁸³

The *third* policy document is the National strategy for intelligence and analysis (2007). The strategy intend to improve the crime analysis functions in the police organisations, so that better crime reduction efforts will be implemented by the different police officers, including patrolling police officers. In this document the headline for all the new strategies and working philosophies is knowledge-led policing.⁸⁴ The common aim of these basic assumptions is to implement methods based on systematic use of information sources to interject in various patterns of crime and defined problems. The crime analysis involves the identification and analysis of problems, and the subsequent planning and implementation of targeted measures. Since knowledge-led policing indicates a police role that is subordinate to the knowledge processes, the aim of police patrol is changed. The patrolling is to become an instrument for this process. To collect information and register it in computers so it can be used in analysis,

⁸¹ KRÅD receives funding from the Ministry of Justice to distribute amongst municipalities who choose to adopt this way of work.

⁸² The amount of municipalities are from 01.01.2008

⁸³ This requires that the municipal authorities at top level and the local head of the police make a promise to be involved by participating in an administrative board. One person is engaged as a coordinator, a role similar to the British community safety manager (Hughes 2007).

⁸⁴ According to the Police Directorate knowledge-led-policing includes both strategies as problem-oriented policing directed towards 'problems', and intelligence-led policing directed towards serious crime using law enforcement instruments (Politidirektoratet 2007).

is one of the central differences it implies for patrolling. Another is to perform responses made to different targets, or collect information to evaluate the responses.

The National Police Directorate's principal intention is that all police districts are familiar with and work in accordance to the principles of partnerships and knowledge-led policing. The police patrol work is to be more goal-oriented and standardized on the basis of scanning and analyses of possible crime trends. Since these changes are dependent on changes in organizational structures, this is an on-going process that is implemented differently in the 27 police districts.

National police computer databases

One important aim of knowledge-led policing is the co-operation and exchange of information in different computer databases. Flow of information through the different levels in the police organizations is a premise for implementing knowledge-led policing (Gundhus 2006). In a recent study, Gundhus quantify that the police service has 90 computer databases available, and the challenge is to gather the information and ensure the quality of the information. But some police computer databases are more important than others, and in the following we will present the most central.

Indicia is the name of the latest developed national intelligence system in the Norwegian police. This database is to be implemented in the police districts in 2007-2008. This ICT-architecture is replacing the eleven National Police Databases (see Gundhus 2006: 471-473 for a description of them) that police officers and civilian analysts have access to. The aim of Indicia is to support visible police functions like police patrol, through the generation, storage and dissemination of information. Another important system is Central register for crime and police information (SSP), which contains information about people who are convicted and sanctioned, plus searches, arrests, physical descriptions, DNA, wanted or missing persons etc. The National Criminal Investigation Service is responsible for updating the register. Strasak is a national electronic system comprising all reports and criminal proceedings in the country including a system for the hearing of criminal cases. This system forms the basis for the national criminal statistics. Police operational system (PO) is the local police districts individual system for assisting police operations. It is supposed to be a supportive tool for decision making and assist and coordinate the proceedings of assignments by logging data and updating the status of the patrols. Last, Basic solutions (BL), is a local criminal case register for the control of criminal proceedings in the district. The system has an overview of all deadlines, the status of the case, name of the executive officers and written manuals for all steps in the case procedures.

7.2 Police in Lillestrøm and Oslo

Lillestrøm

Skedsmo local council, Lillestrøm and Romerike police district

Skedsmo local council

Lillestrøm police station is located within the Lillestrøm city area which is the largest city at Romerike comprising about 14 000 inhabitants. Lillestrøm lies within Skedsmo local council, one of a total of 430 Norwegian councils. The geographical area is 77 km² and the council has about 44 500 inhabitants. There has been a growth in population of about 3 percent the

last year. Skedsmo has a combination of rural and urban population. The city of Lillestrøm has a fairly high degree of urbanisation compared to its small size and few inhabitants. There is a university, industry, restaurants and shops. The train and bus terminal connects the district with the capital city and is busy with passengers. Other more or less urban places where people live within the council are Skedsmokorset, Strømmen and Skjetten. The rest is more rural and contains farmland. Strømmen has a big shopping centre that attracts people from the whole district. Lillestrøm police station's basic area of patrolling is Skedsmo local council, but as a part of a cooperation within the police district the patrol cars also get assignments in other parts of the district.

Romerike police district

As mentioned in 7.1, the Norwegian police service is divided into 27 police districts. Skedsmo council and Lillestrøm lies within Romerike police district which is organized into two police stations; Lillestrøm (where our fieldwork was carried out) and Gardermoen (main airport), and 9 local deputy offices.⁸⁵ In total the police district has about 560 employees and a budget of more than 300 million NOK a year. The police district covers 13 local councils comprising in total 234 000 inhabitants. Romerike is a rural area but also contains more urban places such as small cities and housing areas. The biggest highway in Norway runs through the area and brings a lot of challenges in handling traffic for the police.

Romerike police district is neighbouring Oslo police district; Oslo is the capital city in Norway and has different challenges than most of Romerike. However, the more urban parts of Romerike struggle with the same kind of problems as the capital city; public drunkenness in the weekends, drugs etc. Police officers patrolling Romerike has their biggest challenge in the enormous geographical area they are set to control. The distances are very large and there are usually not many police cars patrolling the area (ref. head of police force).

Lillestrøm police station

The police station is divided into four sections; Order Maintenance section (which has been the subject of observation), criminal investigators, the traffic unit and the incident room. The first two is set to cover Skedsmo local council. The traffic section and the incident room cover the whole police district. The incident room, Order Maintenance section and the criminal investigators are located in the same part of the building and also contain a 24 hour public service desk.

The administration has their offices in the same building. The Chief of Police at Romerike police district and his staff is located at Lillestrøm police station. There is a public service counter where people can be issued passports and other permissions. The building is located next to the courthouse and is close to city hall. Child welfare also has an office there. This creates a close connection between the police and other participants in the cooperation of crime coordination. According to the head of the police force, this also strengthens the cooperation between the sections at the police station.

Romerike police district has one person hired as a POP coordinator, mostly working at the police station and one person working with preventive police work towards young people in the community. Together with The Police Chief Superintendent and Police Superintendent for the Order maintenance Section, are both participating in the local crime preventive enterprise Samordning av Lokale kriminalitetsforebyggende Tiltak (SLT), which is a partnership between the police and the local authorities in Norway. The POP coordinator and the officer

⁸⁵ The Police Chief Superintendent at the local deputy offices is in Norwegian referred to as 'lensmenn'.

working with preventing youth crime, do not have their own patrol car. Since these police officers crime prevention work are separated from the rest of the sections at the police station, their work is absent from our observations in Lillestrøm.

The police force – Order Maintenance section

All of our observations in Lillestrøm took place at the Order Maintenance Section where there are 49 employees including the manager⁸⁶. The 48 employees are divided into 6 teams which all have their own team leader. The team leaders usually don't work in the patrol car but are located at the police station during the shift. At each shift they have one person working at the station who is responsible for the people brought into the county jail. This function is called the "picket", but can be described as a front desk, since the main duty is to give response to people visiting the police station asking for help. The receiver of the request can be a person with police background or a person with special training (but not police education). The rest of the officers working the shift are supposed to spend most of their time out in the police car responding to calls from the incident room. In addition they are supposed to carry out preventive efforts targeted towards identified challenges and problems in the community, generated from POP-projects. Vandalism around the local train station was such a prioritized problem area.

There are 8 women and 40 men included in the teams. It is a 'young' section; most of the patrolling officers are between 25 and 35 years old. Two men in the force have an Asian background, the rest is ethnic Norwegian. The team leaders are often older and experienced officers. A police officer at Lillestrøm can be police inspector (pb3), police sergeant (pb2) or police constable (pb1), all referred to as police officers in this chapter.

The force include 9 dog handlers in active duty who all have their own dogs trained for different assignments such as tracking drugs, people etc. They work a normal schedule but are often used for special assignments and also have more time to spend for training their dogs during work hours. In addition to the dog handlers there are 14 police officers with special operative training (UEH). These officers form a unit for special assignments such as transporting dangerous prisoners, dangerous situations where weapons are involved and other special operations. There are 6 employees without police background which have special training in handling prisoners.

The usual patrol car at Romerike fits the definition of the **emergency beat patrol** in this study. It is two uniformed police officers in a marked police car. The main focus for the EP is patrolling the streets in their area. Out on patrol the officers respond to calls from the incident room and act on their own initiative towards incidents in the community. Between assignments the EP are supposed to work proactive towards problems defined by the problem-oriented policing plans at the station.

While not responding to calls or acting on police initiative the officers, according to the head of the police section, are supposed to spend their time on other assignments such as:

- Getting assignments from their team leader such as transporting documents etc.
- Transporting prisoners back to jail
- Sitting guard in the courthouse during trial
- Transporting psychiatric patients to the hospital
- Writing cases at the police station

⁸⁶ This information is based on the situation during the study in February 2007.

- Personal and professional training

As a part of the cooperation in the police district the EP also have to respond to calls in other parts of the district.

Lillestrøm does not have officers exclusively assigned to **community beat policing**. Since CBP is integrated in the emergency beat patrol, it was necessary to classify CBP differently. While observing we separated the different shifts between EP as defined in the project and the rest as CBP. This means that the different patrols observed as CBP is:

- Dog handler: two uniformed officers in a marked car with a working dog in the car
- Unmarked car/ surveillance: one or two officers not wearing a uniform in an unmarked car
- Unmarked car with a uniformed officer and a student wearing uniform
- Local police officer from another local county: EP

Workload and management Lillestrøm

Problem oriented policing

Problem oriented policing was introduced to Romerike Police district in 2004. This was done according to a national plan of action. A superior plan for the whole district was made but it was up to each local unit to work out their own plan based on local analyzes. The POP plan at Romerike police district of 2006 is focused on narcotics in connection to young people and theft. Lillestrøm is supposed to have a special focus on theft at Strømmen shopping centre. As mentioned, there is one person dedicated to work with this strategic plan at the station.

The officers are supposed to work in line with the schedule for problem oriented policing while policing the streets. In practice, this means to be aware of the prioritized efforts which have been outlined according to the problem oriented policing model. During the period of observation, management changed the work schedule to make the officers work more active against specific problems. These assignments were in relation to the problems defined in the POP plans for the station, especially towards drugs and violence. In the weekends the officers are instructed to park the car outside the entrance to pubs and discotheques at closing time when people are pouring out into the street. The strategy is an example of the police wanting to be at the right place at the right time, believing that the presence of visible police has a preventive effect.

In 2006/2007 Romerike took part in cooperation with Oslo police district to combat gangs and gang related problems in Oslo and Akershus. For years there has been problems related to gangs mostly with Pakistani origin. There were also a project towards drugs and drug related problems.

The activity plan

The activity plan for Lillestrøm police station lists the focus and the amount of work the force has to fill. The officers have to check a certain amount of cars, give a certain number of tickets etc. According to the chief of the Order Maintenance Section, the activity plan gives

the criteria for success in crime fighting in the community. Striking hard against public drunkenness and violence is part of the strategy to reduce these incidents. In the issue of traffic, the officers have to stop and check a certain amount of cars each year.

Work schedule

The police force at Lillestrøm has their own work schedule but are also part of a cooperation with the lower part of the police district. The lower part contains Lillestrøm police station and 5 local police offices (Lørenskog, Nittedal, Sørum, Aurskog-Høland and Fet/Rælingen). During daytime they are each responsible for their own area but at night and during weekends they cooperate. Officers working at the local offices have the same police education but they often have more versatile assignments in their daily work. While out on patrol they have the same workload as the emergency beat patrol. They also get assignments from the emergency room. If there are not enough officers at work at the same police office they cooperate and patrol together in one car.

During the observations at Lillestrøm there were students in active duty. Students at the police academy spend their whole second year in practice at a police station, both as patrolling officers and as criminal investigators. They also spend time at child welfare. The students follow one specific officer while out on patrol. If there is only the student and an officer out patrolling they use the unmarked car. The students are not allowed to attend dangerous assignments where the officers are armed.

The officers do not have one steady partner but are set together as best seen fit for the workload that specific day. During observation, the schedule was changed to make the officers able to attend instruction days with professional training every sixth week. At the beginning of a shift, the team leader sometimes arranges a meeting with the officers on duty to discuss their workload. In addition, the chief of police force holds a parole meeting three times a week.

The incident room

The incident room is located at the police station in Lillestrøm and is set to cover the entire Romerike police district. Three or four people are usually there to respond to calls from the public 24 hours a day. They have access to all the police computer systems and other useful files. When a call is received, a decision is made whether to send a police patrol to the scene or not. If it's not important the assignment is set on hold and a patrol is sent when available. If there is an emergency, a police car is instantly called over the radio and given information about the incident. The officers are also instructed whether to act as in the case of an emergency and/or if they need to be armed. The police in Norway are not armed but have hand weapons locked in a room in the car. They need special permission to be armed. For use of heavier arms they need to go back to the station to get the right equipment. In dangerous situations, the officers with UEH training or the special emergency squad in Oslo is called.

When the incident room get a call they decide which patrol to send to the incident. The following criteria are used:

- Geographical position
- The aim of distributing assignments equally between patrols
- Type of car and type of assignment

The people in the incident room always know which patrols are available in the district and since all cars have a sender they can follow the location of the police cars at all times. All calls and incidents are written in the Police Operative (PO) log. The PO log is a very important information source for the police. Each district has a local log. Also prisoners and items taken by the police are written in the log. While patrolling, the incident room is one of the most important sources of information for the officers. The police officers working at the incident room have access to all national and local computer databases mentioned in chapter 7.1.

Oslo

Oslo police district

Oslo is the capital of Norway. Sentrum Police station is organized under the police district of Oslo. The total number of inhabitants in Oslo is just over 560 000. The city's population is rising, due to both increasing birth number and new people moving in. Oslo has the country's highest population of ethnic minorities; the percentage of people with non-western background is 25 percent. Oslo council and Oslo Police districts have established an important partnership based upon the SLT-model, which in Oslo is referred to as SaLTo.⁸⁷ The police station covers three different parts of the city with a total of 70 000 inhabitants⁸⁸.

Sentrum police station

There are a total of five police stations within the police district of Oslo. Sentrum police station is among the biggest, and the only one with a 24-hour contact service functioning as a front desk. Still, the area the station covers has the fewest number of inhabitants. Despite the rule of patrolling within the area of one's own station, the patrol cars often cross over to the other stations designated areas. Sentrum police station covers three different parts of Oslo. The area *Bygdøy-Frogner* has 45 000 inhabitants and varies from close settlement just west of the city centre, scattered houses and more rural, open areas, to the islands in Oslofjorden just south of the city centre. The area covering the *city centre* has around 600 inhabitants with a lot of business activity with service institutions like restaurants, hotels, banks, shops and bars which draw much traffic to parts of the area. The area *St.Hanshaugen-Ullevål* has 27 000 inhabitants. Here you find some business- and service activities and large institutions including a hospital. In recent years the area has received an increasing number of hospices and shelters and in turn, 12 00 social clients in the form of unemployed people, drugs- and alcohol addicts and mental patients.

Sentrum police station is localized in the middle of downtown Oslo. The station has 240 employees scattered over four different sections; order maintenance section (the subject of observation), criminal investigation unit, strategic planning unit and administration/management. All sections are localized in the same building. This is also the case for a child welfare office connected to the station.

Order Maintenance Section

The Order Maintenance Section is the largest section, comprising around 150 employees. The section is divided into four divisions or work teams, working shifts day, afternoon and night.

⁸⁷ It is possible to read more about the SaLTo-model on this URL: <http://www.salto.oslo.kommune.no/>

⁸⁸ All numbers are from 2007, obtained through the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics

This is the group of observation. In addition the section also holds the groups Operative planning, Community contact and Intelligence. These three groups work day- and afternoon shifts. The Community contact group is doing PR-work and children and youths are their main target group. They also work with the local authorities, the commercial community, restaurants and bars, and the taxi industry among others. Tasks often consist of traditional preventive work within the area, conflict solution, advice and guidance to individuals and groups. The Community contact group also cooperates with different problem-owners in drawing up and seeing through initiatives to reduce crime. These initiatives are later evaluated.

The four divisions are led by a division leader or chief inspector, two for each division. The divisions' main responsibility is to prevent and pursue criminal offenses, carry out other assignments determined by law or instruction to assure safety for the public, reduce crime and do guard duty at the 24 hour service desk at the station. Each division has a staff of between 30-35 officers. The number of officers on active duty varies as some has a leave of absence, some work at the service desk and so on. At Sentrum police station there is no sharp line between the emergency beat patrols and the community beat patrols. Who does what type of patrolling changes from day to day, meaning the same officers does both. As we will see, this organization structure has implications for the profile of patrolling the streets in Oslo.

Like in Lillestrøm, the patrol cars in Oslo fit the definition of the **emergency beat patrol** in this study. Two or often three uniformed police officers patrol the streets in a marked police car. A shift consists of many different types of tasks. They respond to calls from the incident room, get assignments from their division leader, transport prisoners to and from jail and sit guard in the courthouse during trial. During observation and through talking with the officers it became clear that, different from Lillestrøm, the EP in Oslo spend quite a lot of time searching for, and transporting mentally ill patients to the emergency room or hospital. Between assignments the EP are supposed to work proactive, such as checking cars they find suspicious, visiting places or addresses where there have been incidents before etc. and report their proactive activity to management afterwards. This is a crucial point for achieving good evaluations of the POP-projects. Without proper reporting, the strategic planning unit and management have a difficult time measuring the efficiency, making new plans and then communicating their efforts to other divisions. Without proper control from management, it is possible the officers do less problem oriented, proactive work. At the stations staff meetings, we did hear management comment on the lack of reported proactive activity from EP.

Sentrum police station does not have officers exclusively assigned to **community beat** or problem oriented policing, and EP are always prioritized if there are not enough officers on duty to fill both EP and CBP. Often, there were no CBP for us to follow; sometimes there were only a CBP for half the shift. CBP often get the same assignments as the traditional EP, but the incident room usually sends the EP first so the CBP can spend their time on proactive work. The CBP were labeled 620/621, indicating their category and ranking order for assignments. The basic assignments look like EP in their way of patrolling and they get their assignments through the incident room.

The following three groups are also part of the Order Maintenance Section; *the Group for operative planning* is responsible for organizing and preparing equipment, training and events for officers in operative service plus to plan and follow up state visits and other activities within the district. *The Community contact group* has children and youths as their target group. Their main task is to work crime preventive towards these groups by uncover problems and initiate contact with the municipalities youth and child welfare service. They also work

with the local authorities, the commercial community, restaurants and bars, and the taxi industry among others. Tasks often consist of traditional preventive work within the area, conflict solution, advice and guidance to individuals and groups. In addition the Community contact group cooperates with different problem-owners in drawing up and seeing through initiatives to reduce crime. They later evaluate these initiatives. *The Intelligence group* collects and organizes intelligence information according to the police station priority areas, with problem oriented police work as their work philosophy. The group is intended to coordinate and further communicate the flow of information in and out of the station.

Strategic planning unit

This unit holds five positions and is led by a chief inspector. The unit was established in connection with the introduction of problem oriented policing as a work philosophy at the station in 2000. The unit's objective is to monitor the development of crime within the district and work out analyses and evaluations of completed initiatives. This unit is the management's tool for acquiring knowledge concerning the current crime situation. The information is meant to give an overview of the type of criminal actions that dominates the district, at what point in time crime takes place, geographical localization, perpetrators and victims. This information is to be organized and processed to be the foundation for specific and goal-oriented efforts against crime in the district. This forms a base for the stations "Virksomhetsplan", an activity plan which outlines what the station should be working on, and what priorities that is to be made.

The plan is particular for the station and is based on the activity plan for the whole of Oslo police district, with larger and smaller aims according to the current crime rate in the area. According to the activity plan 2006, management had the following police priorities based on knowledge derived from the strategic planning unit's crime analysis at the time of observation: Most of the resources of Sentrum police station are to be distributed in the urban part of the district. The biggest problems recent years is said to be violence linked to the large number of bars and pubs in the centre and grand larceny from civilians in public places and daylight robbery for instance from shoppers. Recent years the emphasized trends and challenges in the activity plan have been violence, pick pocketing and robbery. The Strategic planning unit cooperates with all sections at the station. Since 2005, this unit has actively used a newly established intelligence group to gather information for crime analyses. In addition, effort is made to use research based material in the development of the analyses.

Child welfare

In the same building, there is also a 24 hour-child welfare office. The office is open every day with the responsibility to handle acute child care cases outside office hours. Assistance to children, youths and adults in crisis is the main task of the office. They assist in the form of conversation, dispute resolution, temporary follow-up of children and youths in collaboration with the parents and in the most serious cases, emergency placing in institution or foster care. In Norway the age of criminal responsibility is 15 years, but their target group is children and youths between 0-18 years and their parents/guardians. They are also responsible for juveniles the police officers take into custody in relation to criminal activity, serious drug- and behavioral problems, different types of domestic troubles or minors with psychological- or other problems and therefore in need of immediate help. The officers leave the child in the care of child welfare personnel, who makes contact with the parents.

Workload and management Oslo

Implementing problem oriented policing.

Problem oriented policing was introduced as a work philosophy in 2000. Through focusing on problem areas the station is supposed to develop detailed analyses with suggested goal-oriented initiatives plus cooperate with other problem-owners. The intention is to reduce the use of law enforcement as a crime reduction tool. POP also aims to make crime the responsibility of others than the police, and to prevent crime means to intervene early before crimes occur. The work model is called SARA as explained in 7.1; short for scanning, analysis, response and assessment. Sentrum police station was the first station in Norway to implement problem-oriented policing (POP) and they wanted to improve it with the use of electronic maps – geographical information systems (GIS). The aim was to implement GIS as an analytical tool in a problem-oriented policing context, not only to use GIS to improve efficiency in responding to crime, e.g. reduce the response time.

The GIS-story started in 1999 and the objective was to form an analytical basis for the leaders in their effort to make better decisions. GIS is used to enhance the police ability to identify and scan hot spots, the maps show where problems are located. Further it is used to analyze spatial patterns of crime and criminal behavior and to find new ways of intervening earlier to prevent the problems from occurring in the future (Clarke and Eck 2003). These systems are governed by the strategic planning department at the station. The intention with the use of these communication technologies is to keep close contact with what citizens are reporting to the station as problems, and also stay in tune with what they experience as difficult in their everyday life, to reduce so called ‘repeat victimisation’ and ‘prolific offenders’. This means that POP/GIS is implemented in a community safety context at the police station– the intention is to move away from the law enforcement paradigm towards crime prevention by using a partnership strategy.

Daily routines

Each shift starts with a “parole” or staff meeting at the station. The most important meeting, where all employees that are present attends, is every afternoon at 15.00. Management decides in the morning what is to be reviewed and discussed at the main meeting. According to the activity plan this meeting is a mandatory daily gathering for the whole station staff, and is to be a segment of- and support for the stations work-philosophy and expressed goals. Assignments for the following shift and feedback on already performed tasks is given here. There is also a briefing on incidents that occurred earlier on the dayshift. The staff meetings are also a place where the officers can address issues concerning the work environment and problems they wish the management to correct. The officers do not have steady partners, but patrol together with different people on their work team. The patrol cars often consist of 2-3 officers, and they take turns in driving, talking on the police radio and sitting in the back. The officer with the highest rank has the final word, and age also matters when it comes to making decisions. Most of the officers are between 25-35 years old.

When it comes to priority problem-areas, violence during weekends and patrolling on Friday and Saturday night often has precedence. In addition the police station also has the responsibility for guarding the American embassy. This is only during office hours Monday to Friday where a marked police car should be parked in immediate vicinity to the embassy building.

Operation central

As described for Lillestrøm, the patrol cars are controlled by an operation central. This is a common command central for all the stations within Oslo police district and is located at the police headquarters in Oslo. Each Norwegian police district has a common front desk which receives requests for assistance concerning accidents, emergencies, other dangerous situations and whenever there is the need for immediate help. The central has an outline on most of what goes on in the district and is able to quickly direct police patrols to where they are needed. The daily management and running of the operation central in Oslo is similar to the one in Lillestrøm and the cars are distributed according to comparable criteria. In Oslo, the rule is to save the patrol cars labeled 620/621 which are meant to work problem oriented, and primarily give the assignments to emergency patrol cars according to their ranking order. During the period of information, GPS senders were started to be installed in the patrol cars to make the incident room able to locate the cars at all times.

Table 7.1 below expresses the strength of the Norwegian police teams under observation, the police-inhabitant ratio and population density.

| | Strength (number of employees) * | Area covered by EP (km ²) | Inhabitants in this area # | Inhabitants per employee | Population density (inh./km ²) |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Oslo | 240 | 16.7 | 70,000 | 290 | 4190 |
| Lillestrøm | 202 | 77.0 | 44,600 | 220 | 580 |
| <i>TOTAL PSE</i> | <i>1,741</i> | <i>1,646.9</i> | <i>837,420</i> | <i>480</i> | <i>510</i> |

*: including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.

Comment to table 7.1: the area listed is the basic area for patrolling for Lillestrøm police station; Skedsmo local council. As part of cooperation in the district they are also obliged to respond to calls or patrol other parts of the district, especially at the lower part of Romerike (6 other local counties). Although the area covered by Lillestrøm is much wider than Oslo, the number of inhabitants per employee is much the same, 210 to 1 in Oslo and 220 to 1 in Lillestrøm. This is much lower than the European averages that are 1 employee per 480 inhabitants. As stated in 7.1, there are approximately 1.8 police officers per every 1000 inhabitant on a national level. The aim of the National Police Directorate is to increase this ratio to a minimum of 2 police officers per every 1000 inhabitant within 2020.

As described in chapter 2.5, the research data consist of observed incidents that can be separated into calls from citizens and police initiatives. Table 7.2 describe the workload of the two Norwegian stations.

Table 7.2: work load

| <i>Observed incidents</i> | <i>... of which are calls *</i> | <i>Inc./hour</i> | <i>Calls/hour</i> | <i>Police Initiatives hour</i> |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Oslo | 199 | 81 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.9 |
| Lillestrøm | 133 | 66 | 1.2 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>911</i> | <i>1.8</i> | <i>0.8</i> | <i>1.0</i> |
| <i>Community Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 155 | 34 | 1.8 | 0.4 | 1.4 |
| Lillestrøm | 82 | 30 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 1.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>323</i> | <i>2.6</i> | <i>0.4</i> | <i>2.2</i> |

*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding ‘answering a question from the public’ (var06=65) and ‘chatting with the public’ (var06=84).

The work load per hour in Oslo and Lillestrøm does not differ significantly from the European average, although the incidents per hour in the study data are lower in both the Norwegian cities.

7.3 Sort of Incidents Involved in Patrol Work

Traffic

Traffic is a sort of incident that can explain differences in incidents that are initiatives from the police and initiatives from the citizen.

Table 7.3: proportion of traffic (= 3.2: 61, 4.2: 93)

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 94 | 69.1 | 105 | 9.5 | 199 | 37.7 |
| Lillestrøm | 61 | ** 29.5 | 72 | 30.6 | 133 | * 30.1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.074</i> | <i>62.9</i> | <i>1.015</i> | <i>18.9</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>41.6</i> |
| <i>Community Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 91 | ** 58.2 | 64 | 9.4 | 155 | 38.1 |
| Lillestrøm | 45 | 51.1 | 37 | * 18.9 | 82 | 36.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>567</i> | <i>39.5</i> | <i>658</i> | <i>6.7</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>29.2</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Lillestrøm

The field work shows that Lillestrøm handles a relatively small proportion of traffic violations on their own initiative compared to the average of the places observed. Traffic is part of the activity plan and as a consequence the officers often spend time doing traffic controls to fulfil the demand in number of cars they are obliged to control each period.

Romerike police district have a special traffic unit located at Lillestrøm police station. They have one marked and one unmarked car in active duty. The workload contains routine traffic controls and patrolling the streets with traffic violations as their main priority. They have their own work schedule and are available for the whole police district. Four times a year the traffic unit arranges a huge traffic control in cooperation with boarder control, customs and the highway authorities. It also involves one emergency patrol and officers from the traffic unit. They stop all the cars on one specific road and ask all the drivers for license and registration.

If a car appears suspicious or it's a foreign car the officers gives a message over the radio and the car will be stopped and checked by one of the others. Several hundreds of cars and drivers may be stopped and checked in these controls. During the period of observation one traffic control like this where observed. It was organized by the traffic unit and also included one EP patrol car with two uniformed police officers.

A highly active traffic unit can be one explanation for why the EP officers in Lillestrøm come in to action on their own initiative more rarely than the average. On the other hand, the observation showed that the EP officers spend lots of time observing cars while patrolling the streets. Since the officers have such a large area to patrol they spend most of the time in the car driving around. They always keep an eye out for other cars since this has shown to be a good entrance to many incidents. In the study we did not report it as an incident if the officers did not get into contact with the public. To us it seemed like the officers did check a lot of cars by calling the incident room and getting them to check the license plate number in the computer files. However, we cannot be sure whether officers in Lillestrøm did this more often than officers in other places since we have not systematically recorded activities without the officers interacting with the public. Hence, we cannot compare these observations. Only if there was a specific reason, they would stop the car and check the driver. The active use of information sources as shown in the later introduced table 7.11, can be seen in connection to the active use of the incident room to get information. Even the officers themselves commented on the number of PO searches they asked for each day.

In Lillestrøm CBP includes a large proportion of traffic incidents in which the police are mobilized by citizens. This is so because the officers patrol in a car and the incident room assigns jobs to them. Also the patrol work observed does not have the character of "real" CBP as defined in this study. In chapter 1 the factors which determine what is involved in police work is outlined. In Lillestrøm we see that particularly basic assignment and police roles, way of patrolling as well as the profile and nature of incidents are different in Lillestrøm compared to the original definition of CBC. Also the time of the year is a factor of relevance. This is particularly related to weather conditions like heavy rain and flooding, snow and ice on the roads during winter time, plus more traffic during holidays etc. The patrol cars are often handling collisions, especially during winter when the weather conditions are difficult. The officers often spend a lot of time on these incidents. Another explanation why emergency beat patrols at Lillestrøm show a small proportion of traffic on police initiative may be that there are few police cars patrolling the area at all times and they have a large area to cover. Our empirical observations do not give foundation for making such assumptions, but it points to the argument that putting more police officers on the road can lead to more traffic checks on police initiative.

Oslo

In Oslo CBP includes a large proportion of traffic when the officers come into action on their own initiative. The officers told us that the CBP more often are given assignments from their own station. This is tasks of a more administrative type that are implemented as situational prevention techniques, like putting up temporary street signs, for instance "no entry signs" in streets crowded with people, public drunkenness and pirate taxis on weekend nights. After ten pm the officers drive around putting up street signs on designated places. The next shift has the responsibility for collecting the signs in the early morning hours when the pubs are closed and people have gone home.

To what level police officers are active in the area of traffic is determined by how busy they are with other work, for example citizen calls or POP-responses. Both in Oslo and Lillestrøm, traffic violations are the duty of other special departments which handle a large part of traffic related incidents. However, both EP and CBP in Oslo are encouraged to spend their time partly on traffic controls whenever they are free between assignments. The portion of traffic incidents is probably a result of a number of circumstances. Partly, it depends on the portion of other tasks, the extent management emphasizes traffic as a priority and the fact that some teams of officers are simply more devoted to traffic than others, and when given a choice, prefer traffic stops to other activities. Another explanation may be that because car theft and theft from cars is not clearly expressed as a priority area at the station, some attention to traffic is further lost. Also, like in Lillestrøm, weather conditions might influence the degree of traffic incidents the police work consists of. During a large part of the observation period the weather in Oslo were quite warm for the season, therefore snow in the streets did seldom cause problems.

Maintaining the law and other main themes in policing

The traditional categories in police patrol work are: maintaining the law, maintaining public order, giving assistance (and of course ‘other’). In this study we have enlarged this classification by adding ‘networking’ and ‘internal job’ because these play an important role in CBP. Maintaining the law, maintaining public order and giving assistance are traditional categories that came into being with regard to ‘classic policing’ – EP). Also in this study, maintaining the law always is the largest category in the European average. We will now point out local characteristics and explanations for differences between Oslo and Lillestrøm and the incidents in the European average in table 7.4.

Table 7.4: patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages) (= 3.1: 57, 4.1: 85)

| | <i>N</i> | <i>Maintain -ing the law</i> | <i>Maintain -ing public order</i> | <i>Giving assistan ce</i> | <i>Networki ng</i> | <i>Internal job</i> | <i>Else</i> |
|------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 199 | 55.3 | 12.6 | 21.1 | 6.5 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
| Lillestrøm | 133 | ** 33.8 | 10.5 | 30.8 | * 10.5 | 7.5 | 6.8 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>56.8</i> | <i>8.1</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>4.9</i> | <i>3.3</i> | <i>4.0</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 155 | 45.8 | 10.3 | 26.5 | * 11.0 | * 3.2 | 3.2 |
| Lillestrøm | 82 | 46.3 | 8.5 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 8.5 | 7.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>37.1</i> | <i>5.8</i> | <i>18.4</i> | <i>21.4</i> | <i>11.6</i> | <i>5.8</i> |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to ‘Total PSE’).

Lillestrøm

EP at Lillestrøm shows a small proportion of maintaining law and order. They also give a fine more rarely than the average of the study and often let people go with a warning (see table 7.10a). This can be in connection to the small proportion of traffic explained above but perhaps more likely it has to do with population density. It can also be connected to the large proportion of networking the study shows. Since the officers in many cases are well known with the person involved in an incident they might be more likely to let them go with a warning. Still, according to the activity plan and the head of the police section, the officers are

expected to give fines more often than they did during the observation. However, there is a balance between striking hard against public disorder and keeping a good connection with the public and doing networking in the community.

During weekends the police force always has patrol cars in the streets observing and maintaining order. This is especially true at night when all the restaurants and the discotheques close at the same time and drunken people are let out in the streets. This is the time when many fights, assaults or other problems related to public drunkenness occur. A fine is according to the activity plan the correct reaction to public disorder, but in many cases the officer chose to let people go with a warning.

The geographical area the officers in Lillestrøm are patrolling is large and most of the time is spent in the patrol car. Opportunities to do foot patrol are rare because of the large distances in the area. However, during Christmas and on special occasions the officers patrol on foot in shopping centres and in the streets. Most of the networking the officers do is thus during incidents they are involved in. In addition to reacting to incidents and maintaining law and order the officers work proactive according to the POP plan. They patrol specific areas, addresses etc already known to them as problem areas.

When it comes to implementation of POP, we were told that once a week, management tried to have enough people on shift to be able to work more proactive. Our observation is that the POP orientation at Lillestrøm is basically related to law enforcement maybe more than networking. They work specifically against potential criminal cases using surveillance and undercover police work. The officers got information from the intelligence service so they could work towards specific addresses or people known to the police, especially concerning drugs or gambling. These assignments required working in an unmarked car without wearing a uniform. These are examples of what we call CBP patrols in Lillestrøm. However, this was only done if there were also a marked car with uniformed officers on duty. This car was the one to respond to calls from the central, but the unmarked car got calls as well, when necessary. The new schedule was a positive experience for the officers since they got more information to work towards while patrolling and they also got to see more results of their own work in the police car. In addition, more time were left to spend on personal and professional development.

While not patrolling the streets the officers spent time at the station writing cases, training etc. Officers were also used as guards in the courtroom in specific cases. They are often used to transport prisoners and psychiatric patients and they often help the front desk if they bring in people to the arrest at the police station. These are all assignments that keep the officers away from policing the streets. The officers are also required to register all their own cases in the computers and this is done during work hours. Below is an outline of the course of events one Saturday night shift we observed at Lillestrøm;

- 01.25: overdose of heroin in a private home (call from the incident room)
- 02.25: youth drinking in public (own initiative)
- 02.35: public drunkenness (call from incident room)
- 03.24: public drunkenness (own initiative)
- 03.27: youth still drinking in public (own initiative)
- 03.39: a fight outside a bar (call from incident room)
- 05.30: checking out an address (own initiative)
- 05.56: stops and checks car and driver (own initiative)

- 06.10: stops and checks car and driver (own initiative)
- 06.30: stops and checks car and driver (own initiative)
- 06.45: stops and checks car and driver (own initiative)
- 07.00: helping a taxi driver with a drunken passenger (call from incident room)

The example below shows police cooperation between the units in the police district.

Lillestrøm – a Saturday night incident:

The police have gotten a tip from the public that two groups of young people in the upper part of the district are gathering to fight. There has been some trouble with these groups before and the police decide to send patrol cars from the whole district to set things straight. Arriving at the scene there are more than 50 young people in the street and the situation is tense. Seven police cars and over 15 officers, including a dog handler are present. The officers bring in ten young men, all known troublemakers. They also close the pub and tell the youngsters to go home. While at the scene, several cars arrives and the police fear more fighting. After a few hours the situation is calmed and the officers head on back to their own area.

Oslo

Both the emergency patrols and the patrols which in this project is labeled community beat patrol, spends most of the time patrolling the streets in uniformed police cars. With the exception of a meal break, a potential meeting or tasks concerning for instance maintenance of the cars, more or less the whole shift is spent driving on patrols. This is the case for all shifts, day, afternoon and night. Especially “driving at night” was by the informants emphasized as particular for Sentrum police station compared to other stations both in Oslo and in other parts of the country. When it comes to workload and types of assignments, there is a big variation for both EP and CBP between the different shifts, depending on the time of day and whether it is a working-day or weekend. The officers claim this is particularly the case for this station, which is responsible for the city centre.

There is a strong focus on law and order, concerning both EP and CBP in Oslo. The proportion of networking for CBP in Oslo is small compared to other large cities in the study. This may be because of a high degree of motorized patrol and presumably also because of police priorities / police policy in community beat patrol. The proportion of internal jobs in Oslo appears small. This might be because CBP in Belgium and Denmark consists of a large proportion of internal jobs.

Friday and Saturday night are busy shifts and the officers rush from handling one assignment after the other. The incidents at these times are often related to nightlife and to handling people under the influence of alcohol. Still, the officers seemed to be relatively free to prioritize and chose incidents themselves. During the day, both EP and CBP were given assignments concerning maintenance of the cars, picking up and dropping of other officers etc. Several officers uttered they much rather wanted to spend their time on what they called “real police work”.

Example: one shift with EP started with a stop at the engineering workshop to install a GPS sender and change lights on the car. They were told this would take the whole day, and therefore had to change car. The officers spent an hour on this assignment.

The incorporation and function of problem oriented policing at Sentrum police station is a time consuming process. In the activity plan it is pointed out that adjusting the organization to working problem oriented is a lot about building competence and developing more flexible ways of working together. This is a demanding process which will take many years. Some officers claim problem oriented police work doesn't exist at the station. They argue that the few projects that have been undertaken lacks evaluation and that the implementation therefore seems incomplete and halfhearted. This is in line with earlier observation studies of implementation of POP at the police stations in Oslo (Gundhus 2005, 2006; Sollund 2007). The nearest we observed as problem oriented policing at Sentrum police station was the patrol cars 620/621 which are less controlled by the operation central/dispatch central. These cars are intended to work more proactive, but the evaluation and control of these responses are pretty much absent. In essence, this means they stop and control a few more cars, do various preventive assignments like placing out temporary street signs and occasional guard duty. The emergency patrols are instructed to work proactive between assignments. During Christmas the officers took part in a project where they parked the car in the city centre and went on foot patrol in popular shopping malls and shopping streets. It was mainly the community beat patrols that took part in this, and the objective was to increase the public's sense of safety in the downtown areas by a more visible police. A similar project was conducted during the summer months of 2006.

As stated, the type of activity varies depending on the time of day. During daytime the CBP officers sometimes followed up on earlier incidents, like searching for wanted persons, surveillance/ observing suspicious situations or persons, standing guard at state visits etc. During late evenings and at night, the CBP work is often related to nightlife in downtown Oslo. Here is a few examples of typical assignments for the CBP patrols:

On more than one occasion the officers, on Friday and Saturday night, were told by their division leader to visit pubs and bars where there are often trouble on weekend nights to collect work lists from the staff. In case something would happen at the bar later that night, the police saw it as an advantage to know who was working behind the counter and at the door. The staff was told on forehand to have the work lists ready for the police. Still, they often didn't and the officers had to drive back and forwards several times while waiting for the manager to come to work.

Another example is that the officers often parked the car in central Oslo and went on foot patrol in shopping streets and shopping malls. This happened mostly around Christmas when a lot of people were out shopping, but also in the weeks before and after Christmas. It was mainly during day- and afternoon shifts, but also at night on one occasion. During these foot patrols, a lot of people came up to the officers asking questions, or just making conversations.

Each EP and CBP shift ends with writing incident reports at the police station. Both the EP and CBP in Oslo spends a large part of the shift patrolling the streets by car, being visible to the public and ready to act if something happens. Unlike the CBP, EP spent almost all their time in the car, without the occasional stops to do foot patrols.

Table 7.5: patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)

| | Traffic | | | | Law | | Order/ Assistance | | | | Other | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|-------|---------------|-------|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------|-------|------------|-----------|------|
| | Coll. | Viol. | Check | Other | Serious crime | Other | Social problem | Questions from public | Troublesome youth | Public order | Other | Networking | Int. job. | Else |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 07 Oslo | 2.5 | 26.5 | 5.5 | 3.0 | 18.6 | 1.0 | 3.0 | * 9.5 | 0.0 | * 10.6 | 7.0 | 6.5 | 2.0 | 4.0 |
| 07 Lilles | 9.8 | * 9.8 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 8.3 | 7.5 | 9.8 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 8.3 | 12.0 | 10.5 | 7.5 | 0.8 |
| Tot PSE | 6.1 | 21.9 | 10.1 | 3.4 | 15.5 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 3.8 | 1.2 | 5.3 | 7.6 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 2.8 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 07 Oslo | 1.3 | * 31.0 | 2.6 | 3.2 | 4.5 | 5.8 | 1.9 | 17.4 | 0.0 | ** 9.7 | 7.7 | * 9.7 | * 3.2 | 1.9 |
| 07 Lilles | * 3.7 | 11.0 | ** 17.1 | 4.9 | 6.1 | * 8.5 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 7.3 | 14.6 | 8.5 | 6.1 |
| Tot PSE | 0.7 | 21.5 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 7.4 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 11.4 | 1.3 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 21.3 | 11.6 | 3.8 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Profile of EP (different sorts of incidents):

The profile of emergency patrol in Lillestrøm differs significantly from the European average when it comes to traffic violations. The proportion is significantly low compared to the total PSE percent. One explanation can be the before mentioned fact that special agencies are handling traffic violations and the fact that the EP often use organized traffic controls to fulfill the demand of the amount of cars checked. A perhaps more plausible explanation is the size of the patrol area meaning traffic violations are less likely to be observed by the police.

In Oslo the proportions of (1) 'questions from the public' and (2) 'public order' are relatively large:(1) in large cities people often turn to a police officer with a question and the officers in Oslo often park their car for a while in the pedestrian area or Karl Johan's gate;(2) in the center of a large city there are always drug addicted or homeless people which by their simple presence is considered to be disturbing the public order. In these cases either a citizen call the police or the police come into action on their own initiative.

Profile of CBP (different sorts of incidents):

In Lillestrøm "CBP" includes (1) a large proportion of collisions and traffic checks and (2) a large proportion of law enforcement outside the sphere of traffic and other than serious crime (namely: searching for wanted persons; observing suspicious situations).

There is only a small difference between the types of incidents the EP and the CBP are involved in because it is the same officers working both types of patrol cars. There are only minor differences in the types of assignments the EP patrol car get from the incident room and the patrol cars here defined as CBP (surveillance, dog handler, students). This explains the differences in table 7.5 concerning CBP compared to the average PSE.

The difference in EP and CBP (as defined in the study) at Lillestrøm is caused by the fact that the patrol cars take different roles according to specific types of incidents/ assignments. While patrolling, the officers basically act in the same way but due to calls from the incident room there can be a difference. A dog handler is often “saved” for special assignment where a dog is needed. Still if they are not occupied they are most likely to be used on calls concerning car accidents etc. The unmarked car is often used if the officer is alone, if there is an officer driving only with a student or if there is a specific focus on surveillance that day. The patrol cars defined under CBP are used for the same kind of assignments as the EP but if there is an EP available, the incident room chooses this for assignments where a marked car and uniformed officers are preferred.

In Oslo CBP patrol includes (1) a large proportion of traffic violation (comparable with EP in Oslo: 26.5%) and (2) a large proportion of local order maintenance (comparable with EP in Oslo: 10.6%). Because of this there is a small proportion of networking (EP: 10.5%) plus a small proportion of internal jobs (partly because CBP in Belgium and Denmark consists of a large proportion of internal jobs).

As stated earlier, the findings indicate that CBP in Oslo is more directed towards ‘law and order’ than towards networking (establishing good relationships between the police and the public). As with the case for Lillestrøm, the lacking differences between working EP and CBP in Oslo is related to the same officers doing both types of patrolling. There is no strict separation between the two types of police work.

Serious crimes

Many police officers talk about serious crime and catching criminals as real policing. Especially police officers at Sentrum Police station in Oslo, who are young and hungry for real policing eager for this. However, when we look at table 7.6, only a small proportion of incidents are criminal offences. The European average is 16.1 per cent when it comes to emergency patrols.

Table 7.6: proportion of serious crimes

| | Incidents on the initiative of the police | | Incidents on the initiative of a citizen | | All incidents | |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 94 | 3.2 | 105 | 33.3 | 199 | 19.1 |
| Lillestrøm | 61 | 3.3 | 72 | 13.9 | 133 | 9.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.074</i> | <i>8.0</i> | <i>1.015</i> | <i>24.6</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>16.1</i> |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 91 | 1.1 | 64 | 10.9 | 155 | 5.2 |
| Lillestrøm | 45 | 4.4 | 37 | 10.8 | 82 | 7.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.436</i> | <i>7.4</i> | <i>658</i> | <i>7.8</i> | <i>2.094</i> | <i>7.5</i> |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

According to the study of Oslo and Lillestrøm, there are no numerical differences between these two cities concerning the part that criminal offences play in patrol work.

When it comes to both emergency patrol and community beat patrol, Oslo as well as Lillestrøm does not differ from the average values. It should be mentioned that during the study we were not allowed to observe incidents where the officers were armed. In these cases the observer left the car before the officers entered the scene.

Lillestrøm

Because of the fairly small number of police cars patrolling the streets of Romerike they often have to use all types of patrol cars on incidents concerning serious crimes. Sometimes the type of car is not of importance but factors related to the officer are; such as gender, experience etc. A CBP can in many cases act as an EP all in relation to the type of crime involved. A few examples may illustrate this:

A mother had called the incident room and told them her daughter had been assaulted and raped by a group of young boys earlier that day. The patrol car was a dog handler but since the officer driving was a woman and an experienced officer, the incident room chose her to do the assignment.

The incident room gets a call that a boy has been stabbed by a group of young men. The boy has been brought to the hospital but the boys who attacked him are still on the loose. All available cars are sent to the scene and on their way they get permission to be armed. The officers under observation are dog handlers (narcotics) but in this incident they are sent as an EP. In total there are five police cars at the scene, including another dog handler.

Oslo

The number of serious crimes during the observation period in Oslo was few. This may be partly a result of Oslo having a special emergency squad that handles the most serious cases. However, we did not witness any incidents where the special emergency squad took over for the order maintenance section during observation. On the other hand, what we did see several times was rather fierce competition between patrols from different stations for the most exciting assignments. Often, when an alarm went off, the operation central made all cars close to the area drive to the location. Whoever got there first, got the assignment. The example below shows the nature of one of the few incidents we witness in Oslo which fits the definition of a serious crime.

One morning shift started with a call about a robbery at a city gas station. The officers got the message over the radio after the staff had called in the incident. They drive to the station and one officer talks to the victim who had been working behind the counter and been threatened with a needle by the robber, while the other two drive around the area looking for the perpetrators. They stop two drug addicts who fit the description and does a PO search based on name and birth number. Both have prior convictions, including robbery. They find a needle in one man's backpack and drugs in the others pocket. Both men admit to have visited the gas station just before, but claim to have not seen anything of importance. After viewing the surveillance tape the police conclude none of the men committed the robbery, but suspect they may know something more about the robbery they are not saying, and take them to the station for further interrogation.

7.4 Police Mobilization

The proportion of initiatives of the police expresses the reactive or proactive profile of the police work. According to the European average, police officers take their own initiatives in the majority of incidents. Again we see a strong connection between traffic and police

initiatives; 77.9 per cent when it comes to the European average of the EP traffic, and 92.8 per cent when it comes to CBP and traffic.

Table 7.7: proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police (= 3.4: 66, 4.4: 97)

| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------------------|---------|-------------|---------|---------------|--------|
| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
| Oslo | 75 | 86.7 | 124 | 23.4 | 199 | 47.2 |
| Lillestrøm | 40 | ** 45.0 | 93 | 46.2 | 133 | 45.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 77.9 | 1.221 | 32.6 | 2.089 | 51.4 |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 59 | 89.8 | 96 | ** 39.6 | 155 | 58.7 |
| Lillestrøm | 30 | * 76.7 | 52 | 42.3 | 82 | * 54.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | 92.8 | 1.483 | 58.6 | 2.094 | 68.6 |

- $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

Lillestrøm

In Lillestrøm, police officers do not come into action on their own initiative as frequently as elsewhere (EP: 45.0 % and CBP: 76.7 %). Several factors might help explain why EP and CBP show such a small proportion of police initiative. One explanation is that the patrols observed were not community beat patrols as originally defined in this project, but a form of patrol that might be called ‘preventive patrol’. This was mentioned in 7.2. When it comes to emergency patrol, the frequencies in which police officers come into action on their own initiative are relatively low in Lillestrøm.

The question related to traffic is already discussed in addition to table 7.3. The lack of initiative in the field of traffic might be related to the types of patrol cars observed in Lillestrøm. We have earlier explained that there was a lack of “real” community beat patrol cars in Lillestrøm and that we observed different types of patrols here. These were labelled as CBP cars while the EP cars were similar to EP in other places. Sometimes our CBP patrols were in fact designated to work specifically with traffic which made that their priority. Thus the types of patrol cars observed might partly explain the low degree of police initiative for EP in the sphere of traffic. Different from in other European places the CBP in both Oslo and Lillestrøm are given assignments from the incident room. In addition to this, the police in Lillestrøm are more often than the average mobilized by citizens. This can be connected to the fact that there are few cars patrolling at each time in the district and this means that the patrol cars are occupied responding to calls from the public. They also have large distances to drive, leaving less time to check cars on their own initiative. However, we have not documented how many police cars that are on duty at the same time thus we cannot be sure about this factor.

Below is an example of an incident on police initiative which illustrate the use of information sources

Lillestrøm – a Sunday night incident

There is a quiet Sunday night shift and the officers are patrolling the streets of Strømmen. While driving by a construction site they see a man running on the inside of the fence. They stop the car and catch the man. He tells them his car broke down and he was looking for tools to fix his car. The officers tell him to show them the car but the car

is suddenly gone when we arrive. The officers find the whole situation suspicious and bring the man to the police car. They check his id and call the incident room to get information. The man has a criminal record as a car thief several years' back; he was then working for a well-known gang in Oslo. The officers search the man and find both tools and car keys on him. They also take his cell phone. The man tells them there was another man in his car and they call him. The car has stopped again nearby and the officers drive to the place. The man in the car shows to be a known drug addict in the records and they also find drugs on him. They call another patrol car to pick him up to bring him back to the station. The man in the police car has a hard time explaining the situation. A call to the incident room also shows that the car they were driving does not belong to either of the men and that there is a warrant to take the licence plates. They move the car and take the plates and the keys. Since they don't have anything specific on the man they have to let him go but they ask the incident room to report the incident in the PO log.

Oslo

For CBP in Oslo the proportion of incidents in which the officers come into action on their own initiative is small outside the sphere of traffic. This might be partly related to the small proportions of 'networking' and 'internal jobs' – something that might have to do with an orientation towards law and order. When it comes to the CBP, the low number of incidents on the initiative of the police may be partly related to the fact that the incident room has the opportunity to assign CBP officers to incidents, leaving them with less time to act on their own initiative. Compared to the profile of patrolling in the other cities, the profile of both EP and CBP in Oslo are to a high degree incidents-led. This is especially interesting because of the proactive and problem-oriented police strategy at the station. The finding is indicating a gap between police strategy, basic assignment and profile of the police patrol work, which we will elaborate in chapter 7.9.

7.5 Knowledge of the People in the Neighbourhood

In this study knowledge of the people in the neighbourhood means that the police officers deal with an incident "that involves a person known to (one of) them" (Stol et. al 2006: 67). The police officers then have ready background information they can use to interpret the situation. This type of information can be used to take into consideration specific circumstances in the context before they take action. If the police officers know personally who they are dealing with, or get information from the police computer databases, they know more about the persons background and social relationship, which can help in giving the right assistance in relation to for example social problems. It might be used to solve problems in a more preventive way by finding support for their action in the social surroundings of those involved. This does not necessarily turn out positive for the person involved. The background information can also be used to interpret the person in a more negative way, if the person for instance has been involved in a lot of criminal incidents. It can also help the police officer to be correctly prepared in regards of security.

Table 7.8: proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance: EP

| Traffic | | Social problems | | Other | | All incidents | |
|-------------------------|---|-----------------|---|-------|---|---------------|---|
| N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| Oslo | 75 | 1.3 | 31 | 25.8 | 93 | 2.2 | 199 | * 5.5 |
| Lillestrøm | 40 | 2.5 | 21 | 47.6 | 72 | 18.1 | 133 | 18.0 |
| Total PSE | 868 | 2.8 | 294 | 35.7 | 927 | 14.5 | 2.089 | 12.6 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 59 | 0.0 | 16 | ** 6.3 | 80 | ** 1.3 | 155 | ** 1.3 |
| Lillestrøm | 30 | 6.7 | 7 | 42.9 | 45 | 22.2 | 82 | 18.3 |
| Total PSE | 611 | 7.5 | 168 | 57.7 | 1.315 | 38.3 | 2.094 | 30.9 |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

The type of police work determines the possible extent of background information. As we see in table 7.8 background information is connected to the type of incident in which they take action. Police officers often meet acquaintances when they take action in cases of social problems. They more seldom have background information when they take action in traffic matters.

Lillestrøm

Even though Skedsmo and Romerike are large geographical areas to patrol, the people living there are often gathered in smaller places. Lillestrøm is a small city with 14 000 inhabitants. This makes it easier to control and help the officers to gain local knowledge. Many of the officers are also from or live in the area. So even though there is a young police force at Lillestrøm the officers in general have good knowledge of their own neighbourhood. The close contact with the intelligence service at the station also provides the officers with additional information about people in their community. The officers sometimes got important information directly from the intelligence section during meetings between shifts. This was information they used while patrolling.

The study shows that officers at Lillestrøm in many incidents already know the people involved. During the period of observation they had a specific problem with young people selling drugs at the local train station and many incidents involved these young boys even in incidents not including the train station. The officers knew the boys well by name and face, both from earlier incidents or information from the intelligence service. The young boys also knew the officers. The results of the study show the same percentage in where the officer meets an acquaintance for both CBP an EP. This is because Lillestrøm has no CBP and that the officers can be the same in CBP as EP, and that they have almost the same work load and assignments. Below are a couple examples from the fieldwork involving the officers in Lillestrøm meeting people they are acquainted with from earlier episodes.

On a Monday night the officers get a call from the incident room about a person making trouble at the train station. They drive to the station and find a woman they know from earlier episodes with public drunkenness. They start talking to her and she is very upset, claiming her heart to be broken. After a while she calms down promises to behave quietly and take the train home. The officers let her go with a warning.

On a Friday night an EP is patrolling the streets in the city centre during the time the restaurants and pubs are closing. They spot a boy who is standing in the street while yelling and screaming. They recognize the boy from previous incidents of public drunkenness. They drive up to him and give him a warning for making trouble. His friends seem to grasp the seriousness in the situation and promise to take him home with them.

Oslo

In Oslo the proportion of incidents in which police officers on EP meet a person they know is relatively small compared to the European average. This is true even though patrols often consist of three officers. Population density may be of relevance but is not the decisive factor since cities with a similar population density do not always have a smaller proportion than the average (Groningen: 12.1%, Brussels: 9.4%, Leeuwarden: 33.3%, Bochum: 5.4% ($p < 0,01$) and Amsterdam 2001: 14.4%). It is not possible to identify a specific type of incident that is responsible for this 5.5% in Oslo (it seems an overall phenomenon). When it comes to CBP in Oslo, the proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance is the smallest of all cities involved (next smallest is Aarschot in Belgium: 12.8%, followed by Lillestrøm 18.3%). This once again indicates that the CBP officers in Oslo are not strong in establishing / maintaining police-citizen relationships.

In Oslo, the officers' low degree of acquaintance with the citizens is striking. Partly, this can be attributed to the fact that many of the officers working at Sentrum police station are quite young. They have just finished the police academy, they often come from other parts of the country and they often don't stay at Sentrum very long. This means that they don't have enough work experience to get to know the people who roam the city streets, like drug addicts or homeless people. This despite the fact that a large proportion of the incidents in this study is related to "marginal people", meaning drug addicts, drug dealers, mentally ill people and homeless people. In addition it might be a result of an often changing marginal population. It is reasonable to assume that Oslo, being the biggest city in Norway and being a city surrounded by smaller places, attracts these kinds of people. Last, coincidence may also, to some extent play a part here. It might be, for some reason, that the officers in our sample had a slightly lower knowledge of marginal people in Oslo than the average officer at the station. While we did follow a large number of different officers, we did not follow all the officers at the station.

Since Oslo and Lillestrøm have problem oriented policing as their work philosophy, their knowledge about the people in the community can be interpreted as surprisingly low. But interrelated factors can also determine the low knowledge of people in Oslo. How well officers know their neighbourhood depends on the type of work they do together with the number of years that they work in the neighbourhood. Younger police officers seldom have the specific background which the older ones have (Stol et.al 2006), and in both Lillestrøm and Oslo the police officers patrolling the streets are quite young.

In Lillestrøm the officers know their neighbourhood and their area of policing. But there is a small amount of cars patrolling simultaneously and there is no CBP as defined. At the same time all the patrol cars are more or less EP since their main focus is responding to calls from the incident room. Still, while doing surveillance and working proactive against certain people or places they are close to the model for problem oriented policing. Nevertheless, because this is done in response to specific problems this work is closer to reactive policing.

7.6 Marginal persons

Table 7.9a: proportions of incidents with marginal persons

| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
|------------|-------------------------|--|-------------|--|---------------|---------|
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 75 | | 124 | | 199 | ** 13.6 |
| Lillestrøm | 40 | | 93 | | 133 | 6.0 |

| | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------------------|--|--------------|--|--------------|------------|
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | | 1.221 | | 2.089 | 5.8 |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 59 | | 96 | | 155 | 8.4 |
| Lillestrøm | 30 | | 52 | | 82 | 4.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | | <i>1.483</i> | | <i>2.094</i> | <i>4.3</i> |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

Lillestrøm

In spite of the relative urbanisation of Lillestrøm, the city has a small proportion of social problems. In Skedsmo there are places with a fairly high concentration of people with social problems. This is in certain housing areas owned by the municipality which offer cheap housing. The people living here are usually struggling with drug and alcohol problems and have been in the game for a long time. There have been a number of incidents in this area earlier. The police force works proactive towards these housing areas and patrols here on a daily basis. Because of previous incidents in the area the officers has good knowledge about the neighbourhoods and the people living there. The example below takes place in the vicinity of such a housing area:

The officers get a call from the incident room that a woman has reported a “crazy” person on a bicycle in the snow by the shopping centre. The patrolling officers take a walk through the shopping centre witch is close to the known housing area. In a book store they see a familiar face who is a known drug addict. He comes out to talk to them and recognises one of the officers. They chat for a few minutes but leave him after a while since he is calm. They assume he was the reported “crazy” person.

In addition to the housing areas, the community has a grooving problem concerning young people and drugs. Especially the train station has been a popular place for selling and using drugs. There has been done a lot of surveillance and proactive work against these persons. Many of the young people were also involved in incidents in local schools or in the city. The police officers therefore knew many of them by both name and face, as is illustrated in the example below:

The officers are called out to an incident in the upper part of the police district. A young boy has called and said his parents has thrown him out of the house and are acting violently towards him. At the house the officers recognise the boy right away. He has been involved in several incidents at his school because he has been beaten up and threatened by other boys. Many of these boys are involved in incidents at the train station in connection to drugs and public disturbance.

Oslo

In Oslo the proportion of incidents on EP where the officers have to deal with a ‘marginal person’ is relatively large. In this study, “marginal person” relates to alcoholics, drug addicts, drug dealers, mentally ill people and homeless people. The large proportion of these incidents could be attributed to Oslo being a large city surrounded by smaller places, thereby attracting these kinds of people. Several officers complained about how much time they spend on psychiatry-related assignments. In 2005, the year before our observations begun, the police in Oslo reportedly did about 2200 transports of psychiatric patients. This correspond to around 6 transports every day and the officers feel that way too much time is spent picking up, driving and waiting for these people at the emergency room or hospital. Below is an example of a psychiatry related incident involving three EP officers:

One morning the officers are called to an apartment where psychiatric health personnel are unable to get in contact with a female patient who has locked herself inside her own home. On their way to the address, the officers get information about the woman from a collage that has previous experience with the woman. After ringing the doorbell, shouting her name, calling her on the phone and trying to communicate with the woman through the entrance door to convince her to open the door; they call a locksmith who breaks down the door. Nobody has been in contact with the woman for a week. She's alive but very weak. The psychiatric team takes her with them. Three police officers spend almost three hours on this assignment.

As stated earlier, the police officers in Oslo seldom know these marginal persons. Table 7.9b and 7.9.c, which are combinations of table 7.8 and 7.9a, indicates clearly that the officers in Oslo are less acquainted with their marginal persons than their colleagues elsewhere. The first table 7.9b separates between emergency patrol and community patrol, and table 7.9c combine emergency patrol and community beat patrol.

In Lillestrøm the police officers quite often are familiar with marginal people, and this can be explained by both the basic police role in Lillestrøm plus the relatively small proportion of marginal persons in the area. As a result of surveillance, tips from the public and the officers own knowledge based on personal experience, the officers have relatively good knowledge about marginal persons and the addresses they live at. In addition, the intelligence unit at the station is a source of information through close cooperation and by participating at the parole meetings with the order maintenance section. Overall, the officers seem curious about people in their community and were eager to get information that could be in relation to problems already known to them. The following example might shed some light on the manner which patrolling officers in Lillestrøm become familiar with marginal people in the area:

While on patrol in the city the police officers spot two persons they think resemble drug addicts but who the officers do not remember to have seen in Lillestrøm before. They stop the car next to them and start a conversation through the window. The officers ask questions like where they live and why they are in Lillestrøm.

Table 7.9b Incidents with marginal persons (N) and % of these incidents in which the officers are acquainted with the marginal person in question

| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | |
|------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|
| Oslo | 27 | 29.6 |
| Lillestrøm | 8 | 50.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>121</i> | <i>48.8</i> |
| | <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | |
| Oslo | 13 | *7.7 |
| Lillestrøm | 4 | 75.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>91</i> | <i>70.3</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 7.9c Incidents with marginal persons (N) and % of these incidents in which the officers are acquainted with the marginal person in question

| | <i>Emergency Patrol and Community Beat Policing</i> | |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Oslo | 40 | ** 22.5 |
| Lillestrøm | 12 | 58.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 212 | 58.0 |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

The police officers in Oslo often gain information and knowledge about their neighbourhood on a more individual level from the strategic plan department and the scanning part of the POP-process. This combined with the low prioritising of networking, can explain why they have so little personal information about specific marginal persons. Information about crime situation, GIS analysis and communication at briefings often give them an overview of dangerous persons that are asked for by public notice etc., but this type of information seldom correspond with the marginal persons they meet when they are patrolling the streets of Oslo. This can be seen in contrast to the fact that there are a large number of marginal people in Oslo, and that the officers often are in contact with them. One explanation may be that the marginal people the officers mostly come in contact with on the street is worn out, inoffensive drug addicts and/or pitiful mental patients that are only a risk to themselves. These are rarely dangerous, hard core criminals on the police's most wanted list.

7.7 The Outcome of Incidents

Incidents can be managed and be reacted to in different ways by the police officers; by a warning, by a summons or by the most repressive action, an arrest. How the police officers are taking action in different types of incidents, may express the police officers working style in the cities. In table 7.10a we treat these three ways as mutually exclusive in a way that each category are more serious than the one before. Table 7.10a shows differences in proportion of officers taking repressive measures when it comes to emergency patrols and community beat patrol. In Oslo police officers take repressive action in more than one third of the incidents in both EP (33.7%) and CBP (31.6%). Usually it deals with warnings, which are in line with the European average.

Table 7.10a: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|-------|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 199 | 22.1 | 6.0 | 5.5 | 33.7 |
| Lillestrøm | 133 | 18.0 | * 2.3 | 6.8 | 27.1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 2.089 | 20.1 | 10.4 | 5.0 | 35.4 |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 155 | 23.9 | 6.5 | 1.3 | 31.6 |
| Lillestrøm | 82 | 12.2 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 18.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 2.089 | 20.0 | 3.1 | 1.3 | 24.4 |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

In table 7.10b and 7.10c the repressive action in emergency patrol and community beat patrol are categorized as either related to traffic or not.

Table 7.10b: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|--------------------------------|-----|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 75 | 46.7 | 14.7 | 0.0 | 61.3 |
| Lillestrøm | 40 | 27.5 | 5.0 | 2.5 | * 35.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 35.7 | 21.4 | 1.2 | 58.3 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 59 | 59.3 | 10.2 | 0.0 | 69.5 |
| Lillestrøm | 30 | ** 26.7 | 6.7 | 0.0 | ** 33.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | 59.9 | 8.2 | 0.0 | 68.1 |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 7.10c: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|--------------------------------|-------|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 124 | 7.3 | 0.8 | 8.9 | 16.9 |
| Lillestrøm | 93 | 14.0 | 1.1 | 8.6 | 23.7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 1.221 | 8.9 | 2.5 | 7.7 | 19.2 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 96 | 2.1 | * 4.2 | 2.1 | 8.3 |
| Lillestrøm | 52 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 9.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 1.483 | 3.5 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 6.3 |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 7.10b and 7.10c reveal the difference between Oslo and Lillestrøm when it comes to the proportion of traffic, and how it is related to repressive action. Outside traffic there is no striking local difference in the numbers. Inside the sphere of traffic, police patrol work in Lillestrøm is less repressive. This might/will have to do with Lillestrøm having a small proportion of observed traffic violations.

Lillestrøm

Inside the sphere of traffic the police officers in Lillestrøm often let people go with a warning and more rarely give a ticket or a summons compared to Oslo. This can be explained in connection to the small proportion of traffic or perhaps the fact that the officers in many incidents are familiar with the person involved. Below are a few examples.

One Thursday night, on their way to another incident, the officers spot a car they find suspicious. They stop the car to check the driver. There is a young couple with a baby in the car and the driver has forgotten his driver's licence at home and risks getting a fine. He explains that they have trouble getting the baby to fall asleep and that driving around helps. The officers believe him and let him go with a warning.

One a Saturday night the EP pulls over a car on a feeling that something is not right. The car is loaded with people and the officers give the driver a lesson about the danger of driving with too many people in the car, especially kids, and the importance of wearing seat belts. They let the driver go with a warning.

On a Friday night the officers is parked in a city street while observing the night life. They see a car driving against a stop sign. The officers pull over the driver and give him a fine for the traffic violation.

Oslo

In Oslo outside the area of traffic the proportion of incidents in which officers on CBP fine a citizen is relatively large (4.2% - 4 incidents). Below is two examples of the officers on CBP giving a ticket to a person for an offence outside the sphere of traffic plus one in which a man is arrested.

The officers spot a young man drinking from a beer bottle on the street pavement. They stop and tell him to empty out the bottle. The man says ok but takes another drink before he puts the bottle down on the street. This is not accepted by the officers who asks for his id and writes him a ticket.

The officers approach a man who is urinating on the street. They decide to give him a ticket and the man gives them his id and they write down his name, personal number and address. The man accepts the ticket but clearly expresses his opinion that police should spend their time on more important business. One of the officers asks for a PO search on the man which reveals a prior criminal history, concerning narcotics and violence towards the police.

The officers receive an assignment from the operation central about the staff in a grocery shop have reported a shoplifter who has threatened them with a hypodermic needle. They get a description of the man and drives towards the location. On the road there the officers spot a man fitting the description and pulls over. The man admits he is the one they are looking for right away. They put him in the back of the car and first drive to the store where they get a statement from the staff and watch the videotape. The staff explains that the man was stopped for shoplifting on his way out of the store and asked to show his id when he pulled out a needle and threatened the staff before he ran out. The officers transport the man to the arrest and write a report.

The CBP officers high degree of repressive measures might be caused by the officer's orientation towards law and order, and confirm a working style oriented towards repressive action. This means holding the public responsible for their illegal actions and thinking people might be prevented from breaking the law the next time by making them pay heavy fines. The officers' right to take repressive action is there for them to use and the proportion of incidents which the police take repressive measures in traffic is quite large. On one occasion the

officers indicated that they are obligated to write out tickets or bringing people in for arrest, even though it might feel harsh sometimes. Below is an example of an incident where the officers decided not to give a ticket.

On a Wednesday night the officers pull over a driver on the account of his abrupt driving, and the fact that one of his rear lights is missing and the cars windows is covered with dew. Two of the officers talk to the man and asks for his license and registration. The car is registered to the man and they ask him to correct the faults. Later in the car the officers describe the man as cooperative. He listens to what the officers tell him without arguing and promises to correct the faults. Because the officers believe the man will do as they tell him to, they let him drive on without a ticket.

7.8 Use of Information Sources

The police officers in Norway do not have computers in the car. The digital equipment available is mobile phone, the police radio, the police pilot and GPS. The police pilot is an instrument placed on the dash board in the police car to, among other things, measure the speed of other cars. Of manual sources they have a map. If the officer need more information than his or hers knowledge about the situation they have to call the incident room over the police radio or phone, or call their officer in charge at the police station. While working proactive in their community they use information from the incident room as a background to act against persons, stopping cars etc. They usually ask for a Police Operative search (PO). PO is the log for incidents which is administrated by the people working in the incident room, meaning they search the system whenever the officers ask for information. If the officers make an arrest, takes a person or an item into custody they register the case in a system called BL; which is an abbreviation for “basic solutions”.⁸⁹ Out on patrol they have no digital source for writing down information – they either have to use their personal note book or report to the incident room through the police radio and the information will be registered in the PO log.

Table 7.11a shows the proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources, and it is divided into source from citizen, source from the police, if it is manual or digital or if it is classified as under emergency patrol or community beat policing. When it comes to emergency patrol, Oslo as well as Lillestrøm does not differ from the average values.

Table 7.11a: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – all incidents

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| | <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| Oslo | 199 | 30.7 | 1.5 | 5.0 | 23.1 | 41.2 |
| Lillestrøm | 133 | 33.8 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 26.3 | 37.6 |

⁸⁹ In Norwegian BL is the abbreviation for “basis løsninger”

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------|---------|-------|-----|---------|---------|
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 2.089 | 28.8 | 0.7 | 2.7 | 22.6 | 39.9 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 155 | ** 30.3 | 0.6 | 3.9 | ** 20.0 | ** 34.8 |
| Lillestrøm | 82 | ** 28.0 | * 2.4 | 1.2 | ** 24.4 | ** 36.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 2.094 | 14.0 | 0.4 | 3.4 | 6.0 | 18.9 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 7.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--------------------------------|-----|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 75 | 45.3 | 0.0 | 5.3 | 28.0 | 52.0 |
| Lillestrøm | 40 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 47.5 | 60.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 46.9 | 0.2 | 3.6 | 32.1 | 57.1 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 59 | ** 50.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 32.2 | ** 50.8 |
| Lillestrøm | 30 | ** 70.0 | 0.0 | 3.3 | ** 56.7 | ** 80.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | 23.0 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 11.8 | 25.5 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 7.11c: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--------------------------------|-------|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 124 | 21.8 | 2.4 | 4.8 | 20.2 | 34.7 |
| Lillestrøm | 93 | 22.6 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 17.2 | 28.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 1.221 | 15.9 | 1.0 | 2.1 | 15.9 | 27.7 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| Oslo | 96 | 17.7 | 1.0 | 6.3 | ** 12.5 | 25.0 |
| Lillestrøm | 52 | 3.8 | * 3.8 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 11.5 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 1.483 | 10.3 | 0.5 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 16.2 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

In Oslo as well as Lillestrøm the proportion of incidents in which CBP officers use information sources is large (largest and second largest in the research). To some extent, this probably has to do with the fact that CBP in Oslo and Lillestrøm is more law and order oriented than compared to other places. When table 7.11b and c is compared, we see that the difference can be derived from community beat patrolling when an officer use specific source from a citizen inside the sphere of traffic. In Oslo it is 50.8 % and in Lillestrøm it is 70.0 %. The number also differs significantly when it comes to CBP and the source is digital from the police inside the sphere of traffic. In Oslo it is 32.2 % and in Lillestrøm it is 56.7 %.

Lillestrøm

The difference in the tables 7.11 when it comes to CBP can again be explained by that there is no significant difference between EP and CBP in Lillestrøm and that in general, officers in Lillestrøm are frequent users of information sources. Because of the lack of information sources in the police car they need to gain information from police sources (through the incident room) or get information from the citizen such as checking id documents, mobile phones etc. The officers have a large geographical area to control and spend most of their time in the police car. One way to patrol the streets while not responding to a call from the incident room is to look for suspicious situations. This can be specific types of cars, places where crime often is committed etc. The officers call the incident room using the police radio and ask for information about license plates, addresses etc. If they receive information that gives them a right to act towards the situation, they can stop the car, enter the address etc. At Lillestrøm this working method is very common and several incidents started this way. This makes the access to information very important in fighting crime and maintaining the law. Below is one example showing the use of information sources during a dayshift:

The officers are patrolling the area by car and spot another driver without the lights on. They follow the car and call the incident room to get information about the car before they ask the driver to pull over. It appears that there is an order to take the licence plates on the car and the owner of the car has a criminal record. The officers stop the car and checks id on the driver. To get more information about him they once again call the incident room. He is not the owner and there is no criminal record on him. The officers ask him to drive to a gas station where they can park the car and leave it. The officers take the licence plates and tell the man to get home by other transportation.

In the car the officers can also bring printed lists from the police systems such as cars stolen the last 24-hours, wanted or missing persons etc. This is an important source of information in their daily work. In Norway the drivers are obliged to bring a valid driver's license with them while driving. The officers also have a right to ask for id if they stop a person on the street or from people involved in incidents. This makes ID cards and drivers license an important source of information. The parole meetings in the beginning of the shift are also a good source of information. Once a week or more they got information from the operational intelligence service at the police station. This contained specific addresses, places or persons they wanted under surveillance or observation. This was especially in connection with selling drugs.

Oslo

In Oslo, manual information source from a citizen often concerned a tourist with a city map asking for directions. However, more often manual sources concerned documents like a driver's license, car registration documents and other identity papers. The CBP and EP have the same manual and digital information sources available. Like in Lillestrøm, the officers in Oslo also brought with them printed lists from the police system or other documents. In one case this was a pile of printed photographs of wanted persons. Below are a couple examples on the police officers use of information sources in Oslo.

Out on patrol, the officers spot a drug addict from the car that is standing on the pavement in a busy shopping area in the middle of down town Oslo. He is clearly under the influence of narcotics, barely able to stand up. They stop the car and two officers go

out to talk to the man. He gives them his identity papers and the officers ask the operation central to search his name and personal number to check if the police are looking for him in relation to a crime or anything else. The man is not wanted and the officers make him move away from the pavement. Later, one of the officers explains that they often do this kind of search because these people frequently lack a steady address. Random stop and search at the street is often the only way to get a hold of them in case they are wanted by the police.


Out on patrol the officers spot an old car with four youths, and decide to pull them over for control. One officer walks over to the car and gets the drivers licence and registration. Another officer asks the operation central to search the registration number and the driver's personal number. The central reports that the car lacks insurance, but there is no request for removal of the vehicles plates yet. The driver has no prior record. The owner insists that the car has just been insured. One officer says this can mean that the Norwegian Department of Motor Vehicles is not yet updated. The officer calls the insurance company on the phone and they can confirm that the car is insured. The youths are allowed to drive on.

7.9 What determines what is involved in police patrol work

In this chapter we will discuss the observations in light of the conceptual model, and find explanations for any difference between local policing and the 'European average'.

What in Oslo and Lillestrøm determine what is involved in local police patrol work? According to figure 1.2 in chapter 1 there are seven factors on the level of local police services that have influence on what patrol work consists of: basic assignment, basic police strategy, management control (particularly where it concerns priorities), national features, information facilities, and the degree of urbanization. For example Stol et al (2006) found that urbanization can cause a larger degree of anonymity, result in less severe action taken against traffic violations plus lead to less activity in networking. The last factor influencing the police patrol work is exceptional circumstances, which reasonably are rare.

Figure 1.2: conceptual model of police patrol work



The determining factors can be categorised into internal factors generated by the police organisation and external factors interplaying with the local policing. Before we refine the model by explaining the difference between local policing and the 'European average', we will resume what these differences consist of. What determines the sort of incidents involved in emergency- and community beat patrol work? What determines the outcome of the incidents?

Determinants in emergency patrol

In Lillestrøm, the EP has a small proportion of traffic violations. Because of the high level of traffic in the area, this is likely to be connected to external rather than internal factors. We believe it is mainly linked to the *organizational* structure of the police station, where traffic violations are handled by special agencies. It may also be a consequence of the *policy* concerning police strategy and priorities. Since 2001, the making of national police policies has been a priority in Norway, and the first strategic plan for preventive policing focused on introducing problem-oriented policing. Further, the police policy is to act preventively and proactively before crime occurs, and form close ties to citizens and local communities. In 7.2 we made clear that according to the districts POP plan, the officers in Lillestrøm are instructed to focus on drug- and violence related crime. This strategy is especially directed towards young people, and the importance of working proactive and the assumed preventive effect of visible police in the streets, are emphasized. The small proportion of incidents in which the officers fine members of the public might, to some extent, also be a result from this. The overall indication is that it is in the power of national police management to affect the character or basic assignment of local police patrol work, that is to say; to affect the proportion of traffic in emergency patrol in Lillestrøm.

In Oslo the EP incidents involve a relatively large proportion of 'questions from the public'.

Determinants which might explain this is the nature of the area they patrol, primarily related to the high degree of urbanization in the city centre. Parts of the inner city are busy with people, many of them are visitors and not familiar with the area. In addition, basic strategy or the way of patrolling might also account for the large proportion of questions from the public. The amount of incidents in which officers use specific information sources and where the source is from a citizen can illustrate how the urban area influence the way of patrolling. One determinant for the large proportions of these incidents is mainly because the citizens are tourists asking the police to show them the way on the map.

Observations in Oslo also revealed a large proportion of public order related incidents and a large proportion of “marginal persons”, which might be connected to urbanization as well. The proportion of incidents in which the officers deal with a person they know is small. We believe this might be explained in different ways. Our observations indicate that one explanation probably is that the officers have minor work experience with only a few years of duty. However, work force/experience is not a defined factor in the conceptual model above, and additional analysis is needed to make valid assumptions concerning the relationship between knowledge of people in the neighbourhood and determinants for what is involved in police work. We do not know whether police officers knowing or not knowing a lot of people in the community have any influence on the profile of police patrol work, whether this affects the outcome of incidents and/or the nature of incidents.

The urbanization of the area combined with a less developed or failing contact between the police and the public might also account for the officers’ very limited knowledge of marginal people in Oslo. Community policing have not been a part of the emergency patrols basic strategy. This police approach is ensured by building partnerships with other authorities and local actors in general, not the more elusive goal of building partnerships with local communities as such. This part of policing is reserved to police officers working in the Community contact group and dealing with public relations, as mentioned in 7.2. Both in Oslo and Lillestrøm these officers work separate from both the emergency and community beat patrols and do not go out on patrols. An interesting question is whether these groups undertake and fulfill some part of the desired proactive, community directed police work, thereby reducing the degree of community work done by the EP and CBP, as we are suggesting in relation to specialized traffic patrols.

Determinants in community beat patrol

As described in the chapter about Lillestrøm police station, the station does not have real community beat patrols. This is obviously influencing the sort of incidents involved in community beat patrol work and the outcome of the incidents categorized as such. In Lillestrøm, community beat patrolling consists of incidents very similar to the emergency patrols. There are large proportions of collisions, traffic checks, searching for wanted persons, observing suspicious situations, information use, and traffic incidents in which the police are mobilized by citizens. The proportion of police initiative is small. The main reason for these findings is most likely that the patrol work observed was not “real” community beat patrol. Since primarily basic assignment, but also way of patrolling and way of managerial control (assignments of jobs via the incident room) for community beat patrol is similar to emergency patrol, these two ways of patrolling look alike. Another factor was weather conditions which played an additional, minor role as it was snowing a lot in Lillestrøm during the observation period. This had implications both for the nature of incidents and the portion of incidents in which the police was mobilized by the public (for example in traffic collisions).

It should be stressed that neither in Oslo was community beat patrol congruent with the original definition of CBP. Rather, we could speak of POP-patrols, since that may be closer to what we actually observed. However, for the purpose of this study and to prevent confusion by using too many different terms, CBP has been our chosen definition. The observations of the community beat patrols in Oslo involve small proportions of networking and of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance. There are large proportions of traffic violation, order maintenance, and information use. This can be explained by the determinant basic strategy, principally way of patrolling, which for the most part is motorized patrol and seldom foot patrol.⁹⁰ Since the incident room assigns the cars for jobs according to a priority list, this influences the space for problem-oriented policing and the follow-up and evaluation of these efforts. The orientation is towards law and order, which also can be explained by a combination of basic strategy and way of patrolling on street level at the station, plus a focus on *crime* reduction. Because community beat patrol is organized as part of the priorities of the incident room's assigning of jobs, meaning basic assignment, it is shaping the incidents-led aspects of the community beat patrolling on the streets. Although this is not part of the police manager's policy at the station, the incident-led focus is in line with the police officers at the street levels understanding of real policing at the station. Since POP-patrols and emergency patrols are done by the same police officers, the observation study indicates that emergency patrols are influencing how the POP-responses are done by the POP-patrols in Oslo.

To sum up the observational study; emergency patrol in Lillestrøm includes a small proportion of traffic violations, and a small proportion of police initiatives. As stated earlier, neither Lillestrøm, nor Oslo has community beat patrols in the original sense of the word. Because of this, community beat patrol in Lillestrøm (and Oslo) is very similar to emergency patrol. Emergency policing in Oslo has typical features of emergency patrolling in a capital city: many questions from the public and a relatively high proportion of marginal persons. Furthermore it appears that police patrol work in Oslo, both emergency patrol and community beat patrol is particularly directed towards law and order maintenance and not so much towards the establishment and maintenance of close contact between the police and the public.

Towards an integration between emergency patrol work and community policing?

When we develop a conceptual model of police patrol, especially with regard to the concept of 'community beat policing', an important factor to take into consideration is police policy. Questions to discuss are what the national and the local police service views on 'CBP' are, and how the local police stations are practising these policies. According to Stol (2007) it is possible to distinguish between four models of community policing in Europe:

1. CBP officers are put at the service of other authorities, such as police chiefs and judicial bodies (support model).
2. CBP officers are put at the service of local society (reactive model, like EP).

⁹⁰ For example shifts at Friday and Saturday night in Oslo are busy and the officers rush from handling one assignment after the other. Still, they are relatively free to prioritize and chose incidents themselves. Both the emergency patrols and the patrol which in this project is labeled community beat patrol, spends most of the time patrolling the streets in uniformed police cars. With the exception of a meal break, a potential meeting or tasks concerning for instance maintenance of the cars, more or less the whole shift is spent driving on patrols. This is the case for all shifts, day, afternoon and night. Especially driving at night was emphasized as particular for Sentrum police station compared to other stations both in Oslo and in other parts of the country. This can be linked to the basic police role at the station, to go foot patrol is a rare and seldom exception.

3. CBP officers conduct an analysis of criminological/social problems in their area and act pro-active (POP model).
4. Same as 3 – in addition to which EP officers are put at the service of CBP officers (full POP model).

According to the above description, community beat patrol in Oslo looks most like model number 2. However the police station does not have a separate group of CBP officers which is the original premise for model number 2. In Lillestrøm there is no community beat patrol as such. When it comes to model 3, both in Oslo and Lillestrøm the analysis of criminological and social problems is done in separate intelligence groups as mentioned in 7.2. These groups does not have a regular patrol function and is more directed towards collecting and systematizing information as defined in the activity plan and function as contacts within their areas. The co-operation between the intelligence groups and the patrol departments seems to vary in both frequency and efficiency.

When we compare the above descriptions with the Norwegian national policy, model 4 appear as is in line with the main objective of the national policy documents about policing in Norway. According to the National Police Directorate, the Norwegian model of police patrol work does not separate groups responsible for interrelations and softer aspects of basic police work. The overall plan and ultimate desire is to make all police work preventive, from emergency patrols to interrogation departments. There are also trends towards closing down specialized crime prevention units, since the whole organization is supposed to work proactive and prevent crime. As the observation study indicates, this policy does not have significant consequences for the way of patrolling. At some local police stations, specialized units are established, working with youths under 18 years of age, with specialized youth police prosecutors. However, the existence and function of such units are varying across the country. The implementation is different between the local police districts, and one influential factor is that the local police districts only to a certain degree are measured through preventive performance indicators from the National Police Directorate.

More safety policy less community beat patrol?

We will now discuss what impact, if any, national policy strategies have on the local police organization (organizational structure); and what impact these national police strategies have on what is involved in patrol work? What are the similarities and differences between police policy and everyday practice?

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the National Police Policy in Norway can be described as knowledge-led community policing. As described in chapter 7.1, the police are imposed from the National Police Directorate to make multi-agency partnerships with specific agencies. This can be described as community policing that is aimed towards improving networking with other authorities and local actors in general. To some extent, our observations may illustrate whether this community policing strategy downsizes community beat patrolling and partnership-building with the local community as such. Since the police officers that work with partnership-building with other authorities and the local community in general are separated from the patrolling, the information flow and interaction between these different tasks are not part of the practicing community policing at the station.

The finding are also indicating that the process of implementing and putting into practice the principles of SLT in a way that manifests itself in everyday police patrol work is far from completed. The administrative level and the police patrol level is still very much two different

worlds. We were not able to point out any evidence of direct influence from the police participating in SLT during the observations in either place.

The findings are maybe indicating a tension between a community- and/or citizen-driven policing style and a policing regime driven by performance indicators and targets, although it is not documented in the empirical study. It points to that maybe the weight on knowledge-led policing as an instrument for crime reduction, overshadow the primary goal of community policing in patrolling; to make better relations with the general citizens.

On more than one occasion during observation, the officers expressed a wish for a more systematic evaluation on the problem oriented police work they carried out. It is our impression that there is a lack of realistic performance indicators that facilitate both the national and local management policy in the two cities. Nor seems the information facilities to make incentives for, or motivate the police officers to report on their POP police work, which are necessary for evaluating efforts in the POP-process. Without a proper evaluation there is a danger that important experiences and results from the work is overlooked and forgotten. This is revealing some of the weaknesses of POP. Too much weight on crime and accountability facilitate traditional- not innovative policing. One problem with implementing POP is features with the police organisation, namely it's hierarchic and less flexible and changeable organisation. Accountability does not have to be a threat for problem-oriented policing. However, because the way patrolling are managed in Oslo is in collision with the ground level's conceptions of real policing, it becomes a threat. This finding reveal POPs dilemma between greater accountability and more personal involvement, although it does not have to be an antagonism. This is in line with Sollunds (2007: 17) conclusions in her study of patrol work at three stations in Oslo. She argues that the implementation of POP reduced rank and file officers' autonomy and caused a subversive dissatisfaction and negative loyalty to the POP ideas.

Multiple basic assignments

Our observations in Lillestrøm and Oslo points to an existence of different point of views and ideas about policing within one station, connected to the officers belonging to different positions in the organization inside the police station. Since the implementation of knowledge-led policing are so far from the ideal, it can reveal how practices are shaped by different conceptions of "real policing". The dominant perceptions of this at the ground-level are different from how this is conceived by management. This indicates that different basic assignments may have a greater place as a factor in shaping the manner of patrolling than management control.

However, during our recent observations in Oslo it should be stressed that most officers did not express a strong aversion towards working problem oriented. In fact, many seemed quite positive and aware of the benefits of both POP and community policing. Their critique was more in the line of: "there is not much point of doing this unless it is done properly and management start to adequately evaluate the efforts and afterwards communicate the results from the evaluation back to the officers". Still, during shifts there was a clear preference for being part of an emergency patrol compared to a community beat patrol. This seemed to be linked with the probability of getting assignments from the operation central since CBP have lower priority. The clearest aversion among the officers was towards being in the patrol car standing guard outside the American embassy during most of the shift. These patrol cars were in a separate category, neither EP nor CBP, thus did we not observe any such patrols.

In Oslo, useful information was also described as ‘informative’ and connected to potential criminal offenders by the police officers. Our observations show a huge interest among the patrol officers to search in police databases for information about individuals and relations in the criminal milieu. As presented in table 7.11a-c the frequency of incidents in which officers in Lillestrøm and Oslo use specific information sources is largest and second largest in the research.

Summing up and refining the model

To sum up, our observation is that the POP orientation at Lillestrøm and Oslo is basically related to law enforcement maybe more than networking. They work specifically against potential criminal cases using surveillance and undercover police work. There is only a small difference between the types of incidents the EP and the CBP are involved in because it is the same officers working both types of patrol cars. The CBP officers high degree of repressive measures might be caused by the officer’s orientation towards law and order, and confirm a working style oriented towards repressive action. Compared to the profile of patrolling in the other cities, the profile of both EP and CBP in Oslo are to a high degree incidents-led.

However, there is a balance between striking hard against public disorder and keeping a good connection with the public and doing networking in the community. The finding is especially interesting because of the proactive and problem-oriented police strategy at the station. The finding is indicating a gap between police strategy, basic assignment and profile of the police patrol work.

The observation study of Oslo and Lillestrøm indicates that the implementation of POP has to a lesser degree influenced police patrols in the street of Lillestrøm and Oslo than expected. From this we assume that the internal factors; basic assignment, basic strategy and management control are important determinants for the practice of both emergency patrol and community beat patrol in the streets of Oslo and Lillestrøm. Meaning, we believe these are the factors that mainly affect what police officers do on a day to day basis.

Findings in Oslo indicate that the community policing model where the patrolling are integrated, are more focused on reducing crime through preventive work than networking and strengthening the relations to the citizens. Community policing is more directed towards strengthen the ties between the police and the partnerships. The profile of the strategy is to integrate emergency patrol with POP-patrols. One possible interpretation of effect of the integration is that the POP-patrols are doing less networking than the European average.

The observation study of Oslo reveals POPs dilemma between greater accountability and more personal involvement, although it does not have to be an antagonism. It also uncovers that the police strategy seldom has to be implemented in practice, it is translated into the organizational context, and it is depending on management’s internal control.

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CHAPTER 8

8. Policing the Streets in Europe

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8.1 Different models of Community Beat Policing

- the different approaches we have met in the different countries;
-

8.2 The role of information sources

- how important are information facilities such as computer data bases and digital equipment in the cop car?
- is there a connection between information use and the way police officers deal with incidents;
-

8.3 What determines what police officers do

- what determines what police officers do?
- towards an empirical grounded theory of policing?
- presentation of a revised conceptual model

8.4 Good practices – lessons learned

- what have we learned about policing (lessons worth while to share)?

8.5 Implications for police management

- what can/should police management learn from our findings?
- what can police management do with our findings?

Appendix

Table A.1: strength of the police teams under observation, police-inhabitant ratio and population density

| | Strength (number of employees) * | Area covered by EP (km2) | Inhabitants in this area # | Inhabitants per employee | Population density (inh./km2) |
|------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Groningen (NL) | 58 | 4.9 | 37,380 | 640 | 7,600 |
| Leeuwarden (NL) | 59 | 10.7 | 47,710 | 810 | 4,500 |
| Assen (NL) | 48 | 49.9 | 24,930 | 520 | 500 |
| Roskilde (DK) | 291 | 552.1 | 175,500 | 600 | 320 |
| Hillerød (DK) | 240 | 629.0 | 143,500 | 600 | 230 |
| Bochum (D) | 275 | 32.0 | 123,000 | 450 | 3,800 |
| Münster (D) | 68 | 155.5 | 100,000 | 1,470 | 640 |
| Brussel (B) | 86 | 0.9 | 20,000 | 230 | 22,200 |
| Dendermonde (B) | 117 | 55.7 | 43,400 | 370 | 780 |
| Aarschot (B) | 57 | 62.5 | 27,900 | 490 | 450 |
| Oslo (N) | 240 | 16.7 | 49,500 | 210 | 3,000 |
| Lillestrøm (N) | 202 | 77.0 | 44,600 | 220 | 580 |
| <i>TOTAL PSE</i> | <i>1,741</i> | <i>1,646.9</i> | <i>837,420</i> | <i>480</i> | <i>510</i> |

* : including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.

Work load Emeregency Police

| | <i>Inc./hour</i> | <i>Calls/hour</i> |
|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 3.1 | 1.3 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 1.6 | 0.8 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 2.3 | 1.0 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 1.8 | 0.6 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 2.4 | 0.6 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 1.8 | 0.9 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 1.3 | 0.8 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 1.6 | 0.7 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 1.4 | 0.8 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 1.9 | 1.0 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 1.4 | 0.6 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm | 1.2 | 0.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.8</i> | <i>0.8</i> |

*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding 'answering a question from the public' (var06=65) and 'chatting with the public' (var06=84).

***Proportion of traffic (emergency patrol) in %
of all patrol police activities***

| | |
|----------------------|-------------|
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 43.4 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | ** 21.1 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 33.1 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | * 55.1 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | ** 59.3 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | ** 57.5 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 51.2 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | * 30.4 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 30.3 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 41.4 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 37.7 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | * 30.1 |
| Total PSE | 41.6 |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

Patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages)

| | Maintaining the law | Maintaining public order | Giving assistance | Networking | Internal job | else |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
| 2005 Groningen(NL) | 59.8 | * 12.8 | 20.6 | 3.6 | 1.1 | 2.1 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden(NL) | ** 43.3 | 8.2 | 29.2 | 7.0 | * 7.6 | 4.7 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 57.7 | 4.6 | 22.9 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 3.4 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | ** 75.7 | 3.7 | * 11.0 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 2.2 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | ** 74.8 | 4.9 | ** 10.6 | 6.1 | 0.8 | 2.8 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 61.1 | 8.4 | 22.2 | 3.0 | 0.6 | 4.8 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 47.3 | 3.9 | ** 38.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 7.0 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 51.3 | 6.8 | 29.8 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 6.3 |
| 2006 Dendermonde(B) | 46.8 | 7.3 | 31.2 | 3.7 | 7.3 | 3.7 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 59.6 | 9.9 | 19.7 | 5.3 | 2.6 | 3.9 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 55.3 | 12.6 | 21.1 | 6.5 | 2.0 | 2.5 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | ** 33.8 | 10.5 | 30.8 | * 10.5 | 7.5 | 6.8 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>56.8</i> | <i>8.1</i> | <i>23.0</i> | <i>4.9</i> | <i>3.3</i> | <i>4.0</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to 'Total PSE').

Table A.5: patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)

| | Traffic | | | | Law | | Order/ Assistance | | | | | Other | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------------|-------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------|-------|-------------|-----------|--------|
| | Coll. | Viol. | Check | Other | Serious crime | Other | Social problem | Quest. from public | Trouble -some youth | Public order | Other | Net-working | Int. job. | Else |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05 Gron | 6.4 | 17.8 | *16.7 | 2.5 | 18.9 | 4.3 | 8.2 | 1.8 | 0.7 | * 10.3 | 6.4 | 3.6 | 1.1 | 1.4 |
| 05 Leeuw | 5.3 | *12.9 | ** 1.8 | 1.2 | 21.6 | 5.3 | 11.1 | 5.8 | 1.2 | 8.2 | 8.8 | 7.0 | * 7.6 | 2.3 |
| 05 Assen | 8.0 | 21.1 | * 2.3 | 1.7 | 22.3 | 6.9 | 8.6 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 8.6 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 3.4 |
| 06 Rosk | 2.9 | 30.9 | **19.9 | 1.5 | 16.9 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 2.9 |
| 06 Hille | 3.7 | 25.6 | **28.9 | 1.2 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 3.7 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 6.1 | 0.8 | 2.0 |
| 06 Boch | *12.0 | 28.1 | 13.2 | 4.2 | 14.4 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 1.2 | 0.6 | 4.2 | 7.8 | 3.0 | 0.6 | 3.0 |
| 06 Munst | **17.8 | 25.6 | 5.4 | 3.1 | 10.1 | 3.1 | 13.2 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 10.1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 5.4 |
| 06 Bruss | 1.6 | 23.6 | ** 0.0 | 5.2 | 18.3 | 4.7 | 13.6 | **11.0 | 3.1 | 2.1 | 7.9 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 3.1 |
| 06 Dend | 3.7 | *16.5 | ** 2.8 | ** 7.3 | 12.8 | 7.3 | ** 22.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 3.7 | 5.5 | 3.7 | 7.3 | 2.8 |
| 06 Aars | 4.6 | 23.0 | 5.9 | 7.9 | 11.2 | 8.6 | 9.9 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 12.5 | 5.3 | 2.6 | 3.9 |
| 07 Oslo | 2.5 | 26.5 | 5.5 | 3.0 | 18.6 | 1.0 | 3.0 | * 9.5 | 0.0 | * 10.6 | 7.0 | 6.5 | 2.0 | 4.0 |
| 07 Lilles | 9.8 | * 9.8 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 8.3 | 7.5 | 9.8 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 8.3 | 12.0 | 10.5 | 7.5 | 0.8 |
| Tot PSE | 6.1 | 21.9 | 10.1 | 3.4 | 15.5 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 3.8 | 1.2 | 5.3 | 7.6 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 2.8 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 05 Gron | 0.0 | 17.2 | 4.5 | 3.4 | 5.6 | 1.7 | * 8.4 | 10.1 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 7.3 | ** 34.6 | ** 1.7 | * 0.0 |
| 05 Leeuw | 1.6 | 14.1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | ** 23.8 | 5.4 | 3.8 | 7.0 | 4.3 | 6.5 | 4.9 | ** 10.8 | 13.5 | 1.1 |
| 05 Assen | 0.0 | * 31.9 | 1.2 | 2.5 | 4.9 | 3.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 3.7 | 2.5 | 3.7 | * 31.1 | ** 0.6 | 0.6 |
| 06 Rosk | 0.0 | ** 7.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 0.9 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 0.9 | 2.6 | 6.1 | * 32.5 | ** 23.7 | 0.9 |
| 06 Hille | 0.9 | ** 37.1 | * 8.6 | 2.6 | 6.0 | 2.6 | 6.0 | * 3.4 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 4.3 | ** 6.9 | 16.4 | 3.4 |
| 06 Boch | 1.5 | 15.8 | 3.6 | 3.6 | ** 1.0 | 0.5 | 2.0 | ** 27.6 | 0.0 | 4.6 | 4.1 | ** 31.6 | ** 1.5 | 2.6 |
| 06 Munst | 0.6 | 15.4 | ** 9.9 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 13.0 | 0.6 | 6.8 | 3.7 | 22.2 | 14.2 | 0.0 |
| 06 Bruss | 0.0 | ** 2.3 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 7.4 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 10.9 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 22.3 | ** 36.6 | ** 9.1 |
| 06 Dend | 0.0 | * 34.2 | ** 0.2 | * 7.2 | ** 2.7 | * 0.6 | 2.2 | 11.9 | 0.6 | * 1.0 | 2.9 | 19.2 | 8.8 | ** 8.6 |
| 06 Aars | 1.3 | * 6.4 | 0.0 | 2.6 | ** 28.2 | 2.6 | 5.1 | 10.3 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 3.8 | * 9.0 | ** 28.2 | 1.3 |
| 07 Oslo | 1.3 | * 31.0 | 2.6 | 3.2 | 4.5 | 5.8 | 1.9 | 17.4 | 0.0 | ** 9.7 | 7.7 | * 9.7 | * 3.2 | 1.9 |
| 07 Lilles | * 3.7 | 11.0 | ** 17.1 | 4.9 | 6.1 | * 8.5 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 7.3 | 14.6 | 8.5 | 6.1 |
| Tot PSE | 0.7 | 21.5 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 7.4 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 11.4 | 1.3 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 21.3 | 11.6 | 3.8 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Proportion of serious crimes

| | All incidents | |
|----------------------|---------------|-------------|
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 281 | 19.2 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 171 | 21.6 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 175 | 22.3 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 136 | 17.6 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 246 | ** 9.3 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 167 | 15.0 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 129 | 10.1 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 191 | 18.3 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 109 | 12.8 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 152 | 14.5 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 199 | 19.1 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 133 | 9.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>16.1</i> |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.7: proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police

| | Emergency Patrol | | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------|---------|-------------|--------|---------------|---------|
| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 122 | 80.3 | 159 | 37.1 | 281 | 55.9 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 36 | 72.7 | 135 | 37.8 | 171 | 45.0 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 58 | 70.7 | 117 | 43.6 | 175 | 52.6 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 75 | * 90.7 | 61 | 37.7 | 136 | ** 66.9 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 146 | ** 93.2 | 100 | 40.0 | 246 | ** 71.5 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 96 | 66.7 | 71 | 28.2 | 167 | 50.3 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 66 | 65.2 | 63 | * 14.3 | 129 | 40.3 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 58 | 89.7 | 133 | * 20.3 | 191 | * 41.4 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 33 | 60.6 | 76 | 27.6 | 109 | * 37.6 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 63 | 71.4 | 89 | 28.1 | 152 | 46.1 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 75 | 86.7 | 124 | 23.4 | 199 | 47.2 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 40 | ** 45.0 | 93 | 46.2 | 133 | 45.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 77.9 | 1.221 | 32.6 | 2.089 | 51.4 |
| | <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 122 | 80.3 | 159 | 37.1 | 281 | 55.9 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 36 | 72.7 | 135 | 37.8 | 171 | 45.0 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 58 | 70.7 | 117 | 43.6 | 175 | 52.6 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 75 | * 90.7 | 61 | 37.7 | 136 | ** 66.9 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 146 | ** 93.2 | 100 | 40.0 | 246 | ** 71.5 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 96 | 66.7 | 71 | 28.2 | 167 | 50.3 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 66 | 65.2 | 63 | * 14.3 | 129 | 40.3 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 58 | 89.7 | 133 | * 20.3 | 191 | * 41.4 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 33 | 60.6 | 76 | 27.6 | 109 | * 37.6 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 63 | 71.4 | 89 | 28.1 | 152 | 46.1 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 75 | 86.7 | 124 | 23.4 | 199 | 47.2 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 40 | ** 45.0 | 93 | 46.2 | 133 | 45.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | 92.8 | 1.483 | 58.6 | 2.094 | 68.6 |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

Proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance (in %)

| | |
|----------------------|---------|
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 12.1 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | ** 33.3 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 16.0 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 6.6 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 11.0 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | * 5.4 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 6.2 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 9.4 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | * 22.9 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 8.6 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | * 5.5 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 18.0 |
| Total PSE | 12.6 |

*Proportions of incidents with marginal persons:**0 % (Danmark) 13/14 % (Norway + Netherlands)*

| | Traffic | | Non-traffic | | All incidents | |
|----------------------|------------|--|--------------|--|---------------|------------|
| | <i>EP</i> | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 122 | | 159 | | 281 | * 10.7 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 36 | | 135 | | 171 | ** 12.9 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 58 | | 117 | | 175 | 4.6 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 75 | | 61 | | 136 | * 0.0 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 146 | | 100 | | 246 | ** 0.4 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 96 | | 71 | | 167 | 6.6 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 66 | | 63 | | 129 | 4.7 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 58 | | 133 | | 191 | 2.1 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 33 | | 76 | | 109 | 0.9 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 63 | | 89 | | 152 | 2.0 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 75 | | 124 | | 199 | ** 13.6 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 40 | | 93 | | 133 | 6.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>868</i> | | <i>1.221</i> | | <i>2.089</i> | <i>5.8</i> |
| | <i>CBP</i> | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 46 | | 133 | | 179 | 2.2 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 35 | | 150 | | 185 | * 8.6 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 58 | | 105 | | 163 | 6.7 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 11 | | 103 | | 114 | 1.8 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 57 | | 59 | | 116 | 2.6 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 48 | | 148 | | 196 | ** 11.7 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 50 | | 112 | | 162 | 4.3 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 6 | | 169 | | 175 | 1.1 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 203 | | 286 | | 489 | * 1.2 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 8 | | 70 | | 78 | 0.0 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 59 | | 96 | | 155 | 8.4 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 30 | | 52 | | 82 | 4.9 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>611</i> | | <i>1.483</i> | | <i>2.094</i> | <i>4.3</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.10a: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 281 | 16.4 | ** 18.9 | 6.0 | 41.3 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 171 | 14.6 | 8.2 | 9.4 | 32.2 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 175 | 13.7 | 9.1 | 7.4 | 30.3 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 136 | 26.5 | 10.3 | 3.7 | 40.4 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 246 | * 27.6 | 9.8 | 2.0 | 39.4 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 167 | 21.6 | ** 22.8 | 4.8 | ** 49.1 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 129 | 22.5 | ** 20.9 | 3.1 | 46.5 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 191 | 22.5 | * 3.1 | 3.1 | 28.8 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 109 | 15.6 | 2.8 | 4.6 | * 22.9 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 152 | 17.8 | 4.6 | 3.3 | 25.7 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 199 | 22.1 | 6.0 | 5.5 | 33.7 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 133 | 18.0 | * 2.3 | 6.8 | 27.1 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>20.1</i> | <i>10.4</i> | <i>5.0</i> | <i>35.4</i> |
| <i>Community Beat Patrol</i> | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 179 | 15.1 | * 7.8 | 1.1 | 24.0 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 185 | * 11.9 | * 7.6 | ** 5.4 | 24.9 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 163 | 23.3 | 6.1 | 0.6 | 30.1 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 114 | * 9.6 | 4.4 | 1.8 | 15.8 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 116 | ** 35.3 | 3.4 | 1.7 | ** 40.5 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 196 | 18.4 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 20.9 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 162 | ** 6.2 | 1.9 | 0.6 | ** 8.6 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 175 | ** 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | ** 4.6 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 489 | ** 35.4 | ** 0.0 | 0.2 | ** 35.6 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 78 | * 7.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 7.7 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 155 | 23.9 | 6.5 | 1.3 | 31.6 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 82 | 12.2 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 18.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>2.089</i> | <i>20.0</i> | <i>3.1</i> | <i>1.3</i> | <i>24.4</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.10b: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|----------------------|-----|---------|---------|--------|--------------|
| <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 122 | 28.7 | ** 38.5 | 1.6 | 68.9 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 36 | 33.3 | 19.4 | 0.0 | 52.8 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 58 | 29.3 | 27.6 | 1.7 | 58.6 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 75 | 36.0 | 18.7 | 0.0 | 54.7 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 146 | 38.4 | 15.1 | 0.7 | 54.1 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 96 | 30.2 | 32.3 | 0.0 | 62.5 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 66 | 30.3 | ** 39.4 | 1.5 | 71.2 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 58 | ** 63.8 | * 5.2 | 0.0 | 69.0 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 33 | 42.4 | 6.1 | 3.0 | 51.5 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 63 | 27.0 | 7.9 | 4.8 | * 39.7 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 75 | 46.7 | 14.7 | 0.0 | 61.3 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 40 | 27.5 | 5.0 | 2.5 | * 35.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 35.7 | 21.4 | 1.2 | 58.3 |
| <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 46 | 47.8 | ** 30.4 | 0.0 | 78.3 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 35 | 40.0 | * 28.6 | 0.0 | 68.6 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 58 | 60.3 | 17.2 | 0.0 | 77.6 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 11 | 45.5 | 27.3 | 0.0 | 72.7 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 57 | 68.4 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 71.9 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 48 | 54.2 | 4.2 | 0.0 | 58.3 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 50 | ** 20.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | ** 22.0 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 6 | 33.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 33.3 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 203 | ** 82.3 | ** 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 82.3 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 8 | 37.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 37.5 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 59 | 59.3 | 10.2 | 0.0 | 69.5 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 30 | ** 26.7 | 6.7 | 0.0 | ** 33.3 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | 59.9 | 8.2 | 0.0 | 68.1 |

* $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.001$ (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.10c: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Warning | Summons | Arrest | One of these |
|----------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|
| <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 159 | 6.9 | 3.8 | 9.4 | 20.1 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 135 | 9.6 | 5.2 | 11.9 | 26.7 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 117 | 6.0 | 0.0 | 10.3 | 16.2 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 61 | 14.8 | 0.0 | 8.2 | 23.0 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 100 | 12.0 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 18.0 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 71 | 9.9 | ** 9.9 | 11.3 | 31.0 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 63 | 14.3 | 1.6 | 4.8 | 20.6 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 133 | 4.5 | 2.3 | 4.5 | 11.3 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 76 | 3.9 | 1.3 | 5.3 | 10.5 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 89 | 11.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 15.7 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 124 | 7.3 | 0.8 | 8.9 | 16.9 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 93 | 14.0 | 1.1 | 8.6 | 23.7 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>8.9</i> | <i>2.5</i> | <i>7.7</i> | <i>19.2</i> |
| <i>PSE</i> | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 133 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 5.3 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 150 | 5.3 | 2.7 | ** 6.7 | ** 14.7 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 105 | 2.9 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.8 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 103 | 5.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 9.7 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 59 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 10.2 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 148 | 6.8 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 8.8 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 112 | 0.0 | 1.8 | 0.9 | 2.7 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 169 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 3.6 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 286 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 2.4 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 70 | 4.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.3 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 96 | 2.1 | * 4.2 | 2.1 | 8.3 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 52 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 9.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>3.5</i> | <i>1.0</i> | <i>1.8</i> | <i>6.3</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (wit respect to Total PSE).

Table A.11a: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific informaton sources – all incidents

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|--------------------------------|-------|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>Emergency Patrol</i> | | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 281 | ** 19.2 | 0.4 | 5.0 | 21.7 | 37.4 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 171 | * 19.3 | 1.8 | ** 9.9 | 14.6 | 35.7 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 175 | ** 13.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.9 | ** 21.7 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 163 | ** 43.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | ** 41.2 | * 52.9 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 246 | ** 40.7 | 0.0 | 2.0 | ** 33.3 | ** 58.1 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 167 | ** 50.9 | 0.6 | 0.6 | ** 41.3 | ** 60.5 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 129 | 30.2 | 0.8 | 3.1 | 29.5 | 41.9 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 109 | 25.7 | 0.0 | 0.5 | ** 3.1 | * 27.2 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 109 | ** 7.3 | 1.8 | 0.0 | * 10.1 | ** 16.5 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 152 | 29.6 | 0.0 | 0.7 | * 11.8 | 38.2 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 199 | 30.7 | 1.5 | 5.0 | 23.1 | 41.2 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 133 | 33.8 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 26.3 | 37.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 2.089 | 28.8 | 0.7 | 2.7 | 22.6 | 39.9 |
| <i>Community Beat Policing</i> | | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 179 | 8.9 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 2.8 | * 10.6 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 185 | 13.5 | 1.1 | ** 21.1 | 10.8 | ** 36.2 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 163 | * 6.1 | 0.6 | 0.0 | * 0.6 | ** 7.4 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 114 | 7.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.8 | 10.5 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 110 | 19.8 | 0.0 | 0.9 | ** 14.7 | 27.6 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 196 | 13.3 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 5.1 | 14.3 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 162 | 13.6 | 1.2 | ** 11.1 | 6.2 | * 27.8 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 175 | 14.9 | 0.0 | 1.7 | * 0.6 | 17.1 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 489 | * 9.4 | 0.0 | ** 0.0 | ** 0.2 | ** 9.4 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 78 | * 26.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 26.9 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 155 | ** 30.3 | 0.6 | 3.9 | ** 20.0 | ** 34.8 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 82 | ** 28.0 | * 2.4 | 1.2 | ** 24.4 | ** 36.6 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 2.094 | 14.0 | 0.4 | 3.4 | 6.0 | 18.9 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Tabel A.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific informaton sources – in the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|----------------------|-----|-----------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>PSE</i> | | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 122 | 38.5 | 0.0 | 7.4 | 25.4 | 57.4 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 36 | 44.4 | 2.8 | * 13.9 | 22.2 | 58.3 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 58 | * 27.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 36.2 | 51.7 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 75 | ** 70.7 | 1.3 | 1.3 | ** 60.0 | * 74.7 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 146 | * 61.0 | 0.0 | 3.4 | 33.6 | ** 71.9 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 96 | ** 65.6 | 0.0 | 1.0 | * 47.9 | ** 75.0 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 66 | 48.5 | 0.0 | 6.1 | 43.9 | 60.6 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 58 | ** 6.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 0.0 | ** 6.9 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 33 | ** 15.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | * 6.1 | ** 18.2 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 63 | 38.1 | 0.0 | 1.6 | * 12.7 | 46.0 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 75 | 45.3 | 0.0 | 5.3 | 28.0 | 52.0 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 40 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 47.5 | 60.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 868 | 46.9 | 0.2 | 3.6 | 32.1 | 57.1 |
| <i>PSE</i> | | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 46 | 26.1 | 0.0 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 28.3 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 35 | 28.6 | 0.0 | ** 25.7 | * 28.6 | * 45.7 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 58 | 15.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | * 0.0 | 15.5 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 11 | * 63.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 54.5 | * 63.6 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 57 | 26.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 35.1 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 48 | 31.3 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 6.3 | 31.3 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 50 | 38.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.0 | 38.0 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 6 | 16.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 16.7 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 203 | * 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 0.0 | ** 1.0 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 59 | ** 50.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 32.2 | ** 50.8 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 30 | ** 70.0 | 0.0 | 30.3 | ** 56.7 | ** 80.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | 611 | 23.0 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 11.8 | 25.5 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.11c: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside the sphere of traffic

| | N | Source from a citizen | | Source from the police | | One or more of these |
|----------------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|------------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| | | Manual | Digital | Manual | Digital | |
| <i>PSE – EP</i> | | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 159 | ** 4.4 | 0.6 | 3.1 | 18.9 | 22.0 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 135 | 12.7 | 1.5 | ** 8.9 | 12.6 | 29.6 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 117 | * 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 4.3 | ** 6.8 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 61 | 9.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 18.0 | 26.2 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 100 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 33.0 | 38.0 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 71 | ** 31.0 | 1.4 | 0.0 | ** 32.4 | 40.8 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 63 | 11.1 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 14.3 | 22.2 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 133 | ** 33.8 | 0.0 | 0.8 | ** 4.5 | 36.1 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 76 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 11.8 | 15.8 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 89 | 23.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 11.2 | 32.6 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 124 | 21.8 | 2.4 | 4.8 | 20.2 | 34.7 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 93 | 22.6 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 17.2 | 28.0 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.221</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>1.0</i> | <i>2.1</i> | <i>15.9</i> | <i>27.7</i> |
| <i>PSE – CBP</i> | | | | | | |
| 2005 Groningen (NL) | 133 | * 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.3 | ** 4.5 |
| 2005 Leeuwarden (NL) | 150 | 10.0 | 1.3 | ** 20.0 | 6.7 | ** 34.0 |
| 2005 Assen (NL) | 105 | * 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | ** 2.9 |
| 2006 Roskilde (DK) | 103 | * 1.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.9 | * 4.9 |
| 2006 Hillerød (DK) | 59 | 13.6 | 0.0 | 1.7 | * 10.2 | 20.3 |
| 2006 Bochum (D) | 148 | 7.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.7 | 8.8 |
| 2006 Münster (D) | 112 | * 2.7 | 1.8 | ** 16.1 | 5.4 | 23.2 |
| 2006 Brussel (B) | 169 | 14.8 | 0.0 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 17.2 |
| 2006 Dendermonde (B) | 286 | 15.4 | 0.0 | ** 0.0 | * 0.3 | 15.4 |
| 2006 Aarschot (B) | 70 | ** 30.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | * 30.0 |
| 2007 Oslo (N) | 96 | 17.7 | 1.0 | 6.3 | ** 12.5 | 25.0 |
| 2007 Lillestrøm (N) | 52 | 3.8 | * 3.8 | 0.0 | 5.8 | 11.5 |
| <i>Total PSE</i> | <i>1.483</i> | <i>10.3</i> | <i>0.5</i> | <i>3.9</i> | <i>3.6</i> | <i>16.2</i> |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.12: emergency patrol subdivided into incidents (percentages)

| | Gron | Leeuw | Assen | Rosk | Hille | Boch | Münst | Bruss | Dend | Aars | Oslo | Lilles | Total |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| (N) | 281 | 171 | 175 | 136 | 246 | 167 | 129 | 191 | 109 | 152 | 199 | 133 | 2,089 |
| Traffic | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 accident with casualties | 2.8 | 1.2 | 3.4 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 1.6 |
| 11 acc. without casualties | 3.6 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 2.2 | 1.6 | * 10.2 | **14.7 | 1.6 | 3.7 | 4.6 | 1.5 | 6.8 | 4.5 |
| 12 drunk driving | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 3.3 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.6 |
| 13 directing traffic | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.6 |
| 14 street furniture | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.5 | ** 3.7 | ** 3.3 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| 15 traffic stop | 3.2 | 1.8 | 2.3 | **19.9 | 8.5 | **13.2 | 5.4 | ** 0.0 | 2.8 | 1.3 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.6 |
| 16 traffic violation | 17.8 | * 12.9 | 21.1 | 30.9 | 25.6 | 28.1 | 25.6 | 23.6 | 16.5 | 23.0 | 26.6 | ** 9.8 | 21.9 |
| 17 roadside stop | **13.5 | * 0.0 | * 0.0 | 0.0 | **20.3 | * 0.0 | * 0.0 | * 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.6 | * 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.5 |
| 15+16+17 | 34.5 | 14.7 | 23.4 | 50.8 | 54.4 | 41.3 | 31.0 | 23.6 | 19.3 | 28.9 | 32.1 | 15.1 | 32.0 |
| 19 other traffic | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 3.8 | 1.6 |
| Criminal law / specific laws | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 30 burglary | 3.9 | 4.7 | 5.7 | * 9.6 | 3.7 | 1.8 | 4.7 | 6.3 | 4.6 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 0.8 | 4.2 |
| 31 car break-in | 1.8 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.7 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| 32 theft motor vehicle | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| 33 theft moped/bicycle | 0.0 | * 1.8 | * 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| 34 shop lifting | 1.8 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 0.7 | * 4.5 | 0.8 | 1.5 |
| 35 robbery/pick pocketing | 0.4 | 1.8 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| 36 hold-up bank, shop etc | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.2 |
| 37 narcotics | 1.1 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 0.6 |
| 38 weapons | 1.4 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| 39 assault | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.2 | 1.6 | ** 5.4 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.3 |
| 40 vandalism | 0.4 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.2 | 0.4 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 4.6 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 1.8 |
| 41 fraud | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 |
| 42 sex offences | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| 43 café check | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| 44 suspicious sit. | 3.9 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 2.3 | 3.7 | 3.7 | * 7.9 | 0.5 | 2.3 | 3.6 |
| 45 wanted pers/stolen good | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.7 | ** 3.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ** 4.5 | 0.9 |
| 46 false name | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| 47 false report | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 48 immigration law | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| 49 other crim. law | 0.0 | 0.6 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.5 | * 2.8 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.6 |
| Public order / assistance | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 50 twist (no relationship) | 5.0 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 3.9 | **11.5 | 5.5 | 4.6 | 3.0 | 6.8 | 4.8 |
| 51 relationship problems | 1.8 | 3.5 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 1.0 | **11.9 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 |
| 52 noise nuisance house | 0.7 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.6 | ** 7.8 | 0.0 | 3.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 1.3 |
| 53 - from café/business | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 |
| 55 environment | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.5 | * 2.8 | ** 4.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 |
| 58 dangerous situations | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.8 | * 2.6 | 0.0 | ** 3.9 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.7 |
| 59 missing persons | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.4 |
| 60 publ. drunkenness | * 4.6 | 2.9 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.8 | 1.3 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 1.8 |
| 61 assistance / unwell pers. | 3.9 | 5.8 | 4.6 | 1.5 | * 0.0 | 4.8 | 3.9 | 2.1 | 0.9 | 3.3 | 5.0 | 6.8 | 3.5 |
| 62 public order | 5.7 | 5.3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 0.9 | 0.7 | * 8.0 | 6.0 | 3.4 |
| 63 fire | 0.7 | 0.0 | 2.3 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.9 |
| 64 lost and found | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 |
| 65 question from the public | 1.8 | 5.8 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 1.2 | 3.1 | **11.0 | 1.8 | 2.0 | ** 9.5 | 3.0 | 3.8 |
| 66 nuisance from yought | 0.7 | 1.2 | 2.3 | 0.7 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 3.1 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 2.3 | 1.2 |
| 69 other | 1.1 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 2.3 | 1.0 |
| Miscellaneous | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 80 false alarm | 1.1 | 0.6 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 2.3 | 1.0 | 2.8 | 1.3 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 1.4 |
| 81 iternal job | 1.1 | * 7.6 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 7.3 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 7.5 | 3.3 |
| 82 questioning a person | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
| 83 helping a colleague | 0.0 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
| 84 chatting with the public | 3.6 | 7.0 | 5.7 | 2.2 | 5.7 | 3.0 | 1.6 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 9.8 | 4.8 |
| 85 chatting with an official | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.1 |
| 86 interviewing residents ⁹¹ | ** 6.4 | 4.7 | ** 9.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.1 |
| 87 crime prevention | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 89 other | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

* p<0.01; ** p<0.001 (with respect to row Total).

⁹¹ Interviewing local residents after a crime has occurred, such as a burglary.

Community beat patrol subdivided into incidents (percentages)

| (N) | Gron | Leeuw | Assen | Rosk | Hille | Boch | Münst | Bruss | Dend | Aars | Oslo | Lilles | Total |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| | 179 | 185 | 163 | 114 | 116 | 196 | 162 | 175 | 489 | 78 | 155 | 82 | 2.094 |
| Public order / assistance | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 65 question from the public | 10.1 | 7.0 | 6.1 | 4.4 | * 3.4 | **27.6 | 13.0 | 10.9 | 11.9 | 10.3 | 17.4 | 2.4 | 11.4 |
| 81 internal job | * 1.7 | 13.5 | * 0.6 | **23.7 | 16.4 | * 1.5 | 14.2 | **36.6 | 8.8 | **28.2 | * 3.2 | 8.5 | 11.6 |
| 82 questioning a person | 0.0 | 0.5 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 4.6 | 2.2 | **26.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.3 |
| 84 chatting with the public | * 26.3 | ** 7.0 | 23.9 | 24.6 | ** 3.4 | 21.4 | 17.9 | 22.3 | 18.0 | 7.7 | * 7.7 | 14.6 | 17.1 |